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History of the Problem of Universals 
in the Middle Ages 
Office Hours:  
E-mail:  
Title of the course: History of the Problem of Universals in the Middle Ages. 
This course is a combined undergraduate/graduate course, being 
offered under two simultaneous numbers: P401 for the 
undergraduate graduate version and P515 for the graduate version. 
The fact that we have two “instances” of what is in effect exactly 
the same course is perhaps an illustration of the very problem of 
universals that is the topic of this course. (I’ll say more about what 
that problem is in a moment.) 
But it’s not really exactly the same course. I will be expecting an 
appropriately more ambitious term-papers and examination 
answers from those of you taking this course under the graduate 
number. 
Handouts: 
(1) Syllabus 
Lectures: 2:30–3:45 PM Mondays & Wednesdays. 
Format: Lecture with some questions. 
Required Texts: 
Paul Vincent Spade, Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals: 
Porphyry, Boethius, Abelard, Duns Scotus, Ockham, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1994). 
Paul Vincent Spade, History of the Problem of Universals in the Middle Ages: 
Notes and Texts. A packet of materials containing additional notes on the 
translations in Five Texts, together with some further translations. It comes to 191 
pages, and is available from Mr. Copy, 501 E. 10th St. (= 10th & Dunn) (334-
2679). ($29.90 plus tax.) 
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Bring these first two items to class with you regularly; I will be frequently 
referring to particular passages in them. 
Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence, Armand Maurer, tr. 
I’d like to call your attention to some things on the Syllabus. You can read the 
details there. 
(a) Oncourse site for this class: https://oncourse.iu.edu/. When you log 
in, you will see two tabs across the top of your screen: one for 
either FA09 BL PHIL P401 11962 or FA09 BL PHIL P515  
29794, depending on whether you’re enrolled in this class under 
the undergraduate or the graduate number; and the other a tab for 
FA09 BL PHIL P401 C11662. The latter is the combined site I am 
using for this course, rather than having to duplicate everything. 
Everything will take place on this combined site. If you go to 
either of the other course sites, you will be redirected to this 
combined one. 
On the Oncourse site, you will find:  
 A copy of the Syllabus. 
 Various announcements, posted as we go along. 
 An email archive, where you can view messages from me or your 
classmates relevant to this course. You can send email to 
porphyry@oncourse.iu.edu and it will be automatically forwarded 
to all members of this class and deposited in the email archive for 
later viewing. (Porphyry is one of the first main figures we will be 
talking about in this class.) Note that this feature is to be used only 
for matters relevant to this class. If you abuse it and start sending 
random emails to everybody, I'll have to reconfigure the utility so 
that only I can send mail through it. 
 An "Assignments" utility, where you will submit your 
examinations and papers for this course in digital format. 
 A quiz-taking utility, for weekly quizzes as described below. 
(Click on the "Original Test and Survey" link in the menubar on 
the left of your screen.) 
 A "Post'Em" grade-reporting utility, where you can see your 
running grades for this course: quiz grades, examination grades, 
paper grades, comments, etc. (Note: I have to upload these grades 
manually from my Excel spreadsheet gradebook. So there will be 
some lag-time between, say, taking a quiz and seeing the results 
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posted here.) I am not using the Oncourse "Gradebook" utility, 
which I find too restrictive for my purposes. 
 A "Resources" folder. Lots of important things will be deposited 
here. These will include information about books on reserve for us 
at the Wells Library, several articles and papers in PDF format, 
copies of all class handouts (including the Syllabus), and whatever 
other amazing and unpredictable things I come up with. Get 
familiar with the “Resources” folder. 
(b) Course requirements: Mid-term and final examinations and a term 
paper. Also: Series of eleven weekly 20-point quizzes, beginning 
next week. (We won’t have done enough this week to be able to 
quiz you over anything.) These quizzes will be done through 
Oncourse. They will be available from 3:45 Wednesday afternoons 
(right after this class) until the following Sunday midnight 
(technically 0:00 a.m. the following morning). (See the Syllabus 
for details.) The idea here is (a) to prod people to keep up, (b) 
make sure you have all the facts and names and things in place 
before we start drawing connections, raising objections and getting 
too theoretical, and (c) to give both you and me some constant 
feedback. 
Finally, I want to make one last preliminary remark about the nuts and 
bolts of this class. All written work for this class will be submitted online. 
The quizzes I’ve already told you about; they are handled through the 
Oncourse quiz utility. The mid-term, the term paper, and the final 
examination, will all be submitted through the “Assignments” utility on 
Oncourse. 
(2) Reserves. This is not a reading-list of stuff you are expected to master for 
this course, although it would be terrific if you did. Rather the idea is that 
these are mostly things that may be relevant to writing your term papers. 
A few of them are things we will be actively discussing in class. 
First Reading Assignment (For Next week): 
This is not as much as it sounds like.  
From the Five Texts: 
Porphyry the Phoenician, Isagoge, together with the corresponding 
further notes in the Notes and Texts. 
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Boethius, together with the corresponding further notes in the 
Notes and Texts (there’s only one further note in this case). 
Then, in “Part Two” of Notes and Texts, where you get further 
translations, please read the additional material from Porphyry and 
Boethius. That is: 
Porphyry the Phoenician, From his Exposition of Aristotle’s 
Categories by Question and Answer. 
Boethius, From his Second Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge, 
III.11. (This is the same work as, but a different passage from, the 
Boethius text in Five Texts.) 
Boethius, From his Second Commentary on Aristotle’s De 
interpretatione, II.7. 
Boethius, Two Texts from his Theological Tractates. 
This is not a lot of reading, some 44 or 45 pages in all. We will be spending 
considerable time on these texts, but we will begin talking about them fairly soon. 
The main ones are: Porphyry’s Isagoge, the passage from Boethius in Five Texts, 
and the passages from the Theological Tractates. I will be using the other texts 
simply to illustrate particular points I want to make along the way. Pay particular 
attention to the Boethius passage in Five Texts. 
Don’t be worried if you don’t understand these texts the first time through. You 
soon will. 
Optional (But Entertaining and Highly Recommended) Readings: 
From “The Course in the Box,” Version 3.0 beta (explain): 
Ch. 2: “Methodological Considerations.” (That is, “Why Study the History of 
Philosophy Anyway?”) 
Perhaps Ch. 3: “The Greek Background to Mediaeval Philosophy, or Everything 
You Need to Know About the Greeks.” If you need to brush up on your Plotinus, 
for instance. 
Ch. 22: “Boethius: Life and Works.” If you want to know who this Boethius 
fellow was that we’ll be talking about. (I will say a little about that later on.) 
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What Is The Problem of Universals? 
The first thing we need to do is to ask: What is the problem of universals anyway? 
In other words, what is this course going to be about? 
We can ask this question in at least two forms: 
(1) If all we are asking for is some kind of motivation for the problem of 
universals, something to get the discussion going, then that is fairly easy, and I 
will try to do that in a moment. 
(2) But if we are asking for a precise statement of the problem of universals 
— or of the problems of universals, since after all there is a whole cluster of 
relevant philosophical problems here — then that is a much harder task, and 
something you have to work into slowly. This is something we will get into 
gradually throughout the semester. 
But let’s start with what I said was the easy part, the motivation for the problem 
of universals — a kind of quick and easy statement of it. 
Consider these two pieces of chalk. They come from the same manufacturer and 
— apart from their different lengths — are in most respects pretty much alike. In 
particular, they are of the same color: they are both white. 
Now I want you to look at these two pieces of chalk, and for the moment to 
ignore everything else about them, and to focus only on their color. 
How many colors do you see here? How many whitenesses? One or two? 
If you reflect a bit, I think you will see that, at an initial, pre-philosophical level, 
either answer is plausible. (And I will want to maintain in this course that, even at 
a fairly sophisticated, philosophical level, the correct choice is not clear.) 
Now don’t interrupt with objections — not yet. I’m about to give 
you some arguments you may think are fallacious and silly — on 
either side of the question. That doesn’t matter for now. I’m 
simply trying to set up the situation for future discussion. It is my 
contention that although it is of course possible to state these 
arguments in silly and fallacious ways, in fact they’re much more 
serious arguments than they may appear at first. 
First side: For example, you might say that there is only one color, one whiteness 
here. After all, didn’t I just say that the two pieces of chalk were of the same 
color? You only have to look at these two pieces of chalk to see that this is the 
case. Here it is, this particular shade of whiteness, once over here, and there it is 
again — the same whiteness — over there. 
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There is only one color here, one whiteness, even though it is in two distinct 
things and in two distinct places at once. 
If this is the answer you are inclined to give, then you believe in universals — or 
at least you believe in one universal, the one whiteness common to or shared by 
these two pieces of chalk. And, of course, if you are inclined to give similar 
answers to other, similar questions, then you believe in universals all the more. To 
that extent, you are said to be a realist with respect to the problem of universals. 
The other side. On the other hand, let’s do it again. Look once more at these same 
two pieces of chalk. 
You might want to say instead that you do not see just one color in these two 
pieces of chalk. You see two colors, two whitenesses — one here, in this piece of 
chalk, and the other there, in that piece of chalk. 
They look exactly alike, to be sure, but they are nevertheless two for all that. All 
you have to do is to look at them to see that this is so. Just count them! Here is the 
one whiteness, the whiteness of this piece of chalk, and there is another (exactly 
similar) whiteness, the whiteness of that piece of chalk. 
If this is what you are inclined to say, and if you are inclined to say similar things 
in other such cases, then you do not believe in universals — or at least you don’t 
believe the color of these two pieces of chalk is one. There is no one color shared 
by or common to these two pieces of chalk. The colors of the two pieces of chalk 
are just as distinct, although of course just as much alike, as the two pieces of 
chalk themselves are. 
Insofar as you do not believe in universals in this way, you are said to be a 
nominalist. (The significance of this term — that is, what is “nominal” about 
“nominalism” — is a matter of considerable historical murkiness. Oddly enough, 
originally the term seems to have had nothing to do with the problem of 
universals at all.) 
So — how many colors do you see: one or two? That, reduced to the bare 
essentials, is an example of the problem of universals. And the two main answers 
to it are realism and nominalism. 
A “universal” then is a kind of common or shared entity, like the one color, the 
one whiteness, postulated by the “realist” response I just described. (Note that, 
despite the term, there is no suggestion that “universals” have to be shared by 
absolutely everything. Universals need not be “universal” in that sense. 
Nevertheless, they are supposed to be common to, or shared by, several things — 
more than one, anyway.) 
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In its most general form, therefore, the problem of universals can be put as 
follows: 
Are there universals or are there not? 
Realists say yes; nominalists say no. 
As we shall see, there are all sorts of nuances I have left out here. But this will 
serve to get us started. 
 
Now, with that as a preliminary statement of the problem of universals, let’s turn 
to  another problem: 
Who cares? So what? 
In other words, does the problem of universals have any real philosophical 
importance, or is it just a kind of cute question like “Is the glass half-full or half-
empty?” — a question the answer to which may tell us something about your own 
personal psychology, the way you personally are inclined to view the world, but 
which really does not go beyond that? 
In other words, what real philosophical importance is there to the problem of 
universals? What rests on it? 
Well, I want to maintain that a great deal rests on it. Let me approach the matter 
gradually. 
The case for Realism: 
I suspect many of you are, initially at any rate, realists of one kind or another, or 
at least think you are. 
I may be wrong about this, but if I am it doesn’t matter. I am just easing into my 
topic here. Nevertheless, I don’t think I am wrong. I suspect that many of you — 
particularly if you’ve had some philosophical training in what used to be called 
the “analytic” tradition — thought there was something implausible, not to say 
misguided, about the nominalist line I presented a moment ago when I was doing 
the little chalk-trick. 
If so, then what I’m saying now is on your behalf. (The rest of you can listen in; 
I’ll be addressing you in a moment.) 
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OK, you realists. Let me put words in your mouths. You might say, for example, 
that what the nominalist was calling the two colors — the two exactly similar 
whitenesses — of the two pieces of chalk, is really just two instances or 
instantiations of one color, one whiteness. In other words, the nominalist is 
counting the wrong things! He’s counting the instances instead of the one 
universal thing they are all instances of. 
(a) You might in fact suspect that I gave the game away a while ago, when I was 
presenting the nominalist point of view, by admitting that what I was then calling 
the two colors of these two pieces of chalk looked exactly alike. 
How could I recognize that, you might ask — and now we get an actual argument 
for the first time (we’ve not had any arguments so far, but only the bald 
presentation of views) — how could I recognize that the two colors, or color-
instances, or whatever you want to call them, looked exactly alike, unless they 
had something in common? 
What basis could there be for their looking alike, for their looking the same, 
unless they really are the same? Otherwise, wouldn’t their looking the same, or 
looking alike, be a distortion and falsification of the facts — an illusion? 
(b) Let me make another pass over the same point, this time with a slightly 
different emphasis. If there is nothing really shared by or common to the two 
whitenesses of these two pieces of chalk, then it would seem that the fact that we 
spontaneously tend to group them together and recognize them as being both 
“white” would be utterly gratuitous, utterly unfounded, utterly groundless. It 
would be a matter of arbitrary convention — cultural conditioning perhaps, or 
something like that — but in no sense would it be a matter of hard, rock-bottom 
ontological fact. 
(c) Let’s make a third pass over the point, this time putting it more generally. 
When we know things, when we think of things intellectually (whether it counts 
as knowledge or not), we categorize them, we group them together with other 
things and call them by the same name. We call both these pieces of chalk 
“white.” For that matter, we call them both “chalk.” What right do we have to do 
that, unless there is some real basis for that grouping? 
In short, if nominalism is correct, it seems that all of our so called knowledge that 
proceeds in terms of general concepts or general terms — and indeed all of our 
thoughts that proceed in such terms, whether we want to call them “knowledge” 
or not — are utterly arbitrary, in the sense that they proceed by grouping and 
categorizing things in ways that have no objective basis at all, but rather depend 
entirely on our own pragmatic purposes, our cultural or social conditioning, or 
other extraneous factors — but in no case on any objective facts. 
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In other words, nominalism appears to destroy any possibility of genuine human 
knowledge. That is, NOMINALISM ENTAILS SKEPTICISM. And skepticism of a very 
strong variety: not the skepticism that says merely that, while there probably are 
certain facts out there that we may or may not be thinking about correctly, we can 
never be sure we are thinking about them correctly. Rather, the much more 
radical skepticism that says that, for a huge majority of our thoughts, those that 
proceed in universal or general terms, there simply is no universal or general 
reality out there to correspond to them. (All that’s left is such utterly particular 
bits of “knowledge” as: “This, here, now!”) 
It’s not, then, that our thoughts may or may not be true, but we can never be sure 
which. Rather, we can be dead sure all such thoughts are false. False, that is, if 
truth is supposed to be a kind of correspondence with reality. 
No doubt, this is why many more or less recent nominalists have abandoned a 
correspondence theory of truth and adopted a kind of pragmatic or coherence 
theory of truth instead. For example, Quine, or Nietzsche. Our general terms and 
concepts do not “cleave nature at the joints,” as Plato put it. They rather reflect 
our own subjective, cultural or scientific purposes. 
(d) In fact, we can perhaps argue the case against nominalism even more strongly 
— and this I suppose is a fourth pass over the realist case. Nominalism holds that 
our general concepts fail to correspond to general or universal realities. ALL our 
general concepts fail in this way, since there are no universals. ALL OF THEM DO. 
You see, nominalism itself is a theory that is framed in general terms, and so is 
condemned by its own verdict. 
Nominalism not only wrecks human knowledge — or divine knowledge, for that 
matter. It is also self-refuting. What stronger case could possibly be made against 
it? 
I suspect, as I said, that this is the sort of reasoning many of you would find 
appealing, and perhaps even persuasive. In fact, I don’t think the case is nearly so 
strong as I have made it sound — but that is something we will get into later in 
the course. For the present, let’s just take the argument as it stands. 
Notice one crucial thing about it: 
IT PROCEEDS ENTIRELY IN EPISTEMOLOGICAL TERMS. 
That is, the case against nominalism is entirely an epistemological case. Even the 
point about nominalism’s being self-refuting is, if you think about it, an 
epistemological argument. The realist’s argument here is not that there is anything 
incoherent about things’ being the way nominalism says they are. The 
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incoherence is only in saying or thinking that things are the way nominalism says 
they are. (A little like the early Wittgenstein, and the business about trying to say 
“what cannot be said.”) 
Here we have Spade’s First Great Law of the History of Philosophy: 
NOMINALISM HAS PROBLEMS OVER KNOWLEDGE. 
Not that the problems cannot be solved. Perhaps they can be. The point is rather 
that it is going to be in the area of epistemology that the problems arise. And if 
you are going to attack nominalism, you will almost inevitably attack it here.  
This is a situation we will see verified time and time again throughout this 
semester. Keep your eyes open for it. 
 
The Case for Nominalism: 
But the story isn’t over yet. The nominalist has yet to have his say. Let’s look at 
his side for a while. 
The nominalist might try to launch a counterattack, by pointing out that realism, 
after all, is not without problems of its own. 
(a) You realists (let us speak in the nominalist’s voice for a moment), you realists 
are committed to postulating these spooky things you call “universals.” And they 
turn out to have the most marvelous and paradoxical properties. For instance, they 
can be in two places at once — as the one universal color “whiteness” was 
present simultaneously in the two distinct pieces of chalk. 
(b) But worse than that. Your realist theory is committed to saying positively 
impossible things about universals. Universals, according to you realists, can be 
combined with contrary properties at the same time. 
For instance, the universal nature animal (or animality) is combined with 
rationality in human beings, but with irrationality in cows (conspicuously in 
cows, in my judgment). But how can that be? How can the incompatible 
properties rationality and irrationality “come together” in the same animal nature 
at the same time? What does it mean to call them “incompatible” if not that they 
can’t “come together” like that? 
(c) It is important to realize that it really is the same, one animal nature that is 
involved here. We are not talking about two animal natures, a human animal 
nature that is rational, and a bovine animal nature that is irrational. That would be 
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to give up the notion of one shared animal nature, and so to abandon realism here 
entirely. 
No, it is the one universal nature that is both a rational animal nature and an 
irrational or non-rational animal nature — which is a violation of the Law of 
Non-Contradiction if I ever saw one. How much stronger a refutation of realism 
could be asked for? 
(d) Neither will it do any good to say that the one animal nature is a rational 
animal nature only in human beings, and that it is an irrational or non-rational 
animal nature only in brute animals such as cows and other non-humans — as 
though the clauses ‘only in this’ and ‘only in that’ somehow saved the theory 
from contradiction. They don’t; they only distract you from the contradiction. 
They cannot save you from it so long as it is the one, same animal nature in both 
cases. 
(e) It also won’t do any good to say that the objection is misguided, that it is not 
the animal nature that is rational or not. It is animals — humans and cows — that 
are rational or non-rational, respectively. In other words, it won’t do you any 
good to say that rationality and non-rationality are not things we say of the nature, 
but rather of the individuals that have that nature along with other properties as 
well, so that the contradictory properties do not belong to one and the same 
animal nature, but rather to several and distinct individual animals, and there is 
therefore no violation of the Law of Non-Contradiction after all. 
That won’t work, I say. Such a dodge may indeed save you from violating the 
Law of Non-Contradiction. But, insofar as you have just committed yourself to 
saying that the one, universal animal nature is neither rational nor non-rational 
(it’s only individual animals that are rational or irrational), you have just violated 
the Law of Excluded Middle. 
Let’s pause here. I don’t really care for now whether you agree completely with 
these arguments, or even whether you fully understand them at this point. That 
can come later. 
For the present, just notice something about them. There is not one word about 
knowledge. These arguments, unlike those we saw a while ago against 
nominalism, are entirely metaphysical or ontological in nature. If nominalism 
traditionally runs into difficulties on epistemological matters, realism traditionally 
runs into problems over metaphysical or ontological matters. 
Just as before, in the case of nominalism, I do not here mean to suggest that the 
problems are insuperable. Perhaps they can be resolved. But the fact is, it is here 
that the problems arise for realism. This, like the dual case for nominalism, is one 
of the great laws of the history of philosophy. It is Spade’s Second Great Law: 
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REALISM HAS PROBLEMS OVER METAPHYSICS. 
Combining our results so far, here is the situation: Nominalism has difficulties 
traditionally over matters of epistemology, whereas realism has difficulties 
traditionally over matters of metaphysics. The choice between nominalism and 
realism is to some extent a question of preference: Where do you want your 
problems? 
Nominalism has no special problem over metaphysics. Its metaphysics is clean 
and neat. The problem of nominalism is not how the world can be the way 
nominalism says it is. The problem is rather how we can know the world is the 
way nominalism says it is — how we can even think it or say it. The problems for 
nominalism are epistemological. 
Realism, on the other hand, has no special problems with epistemology. (Or at 
least it has no problems over and above the problems any epistemological theory 
has; it has no special problems arising from realism.) If universals are really out 
there in reality, then they are there to be read off by the mind without any special 
ado. Realism has no special trouble saying how we know the way the world is. Its 
problem is rather in explaining how the world can be the way realism knows it is! 
Let me emphasize once again: The difficulties are perhaps not so absolute as I 
have made them sound here. 
But what I want you to get out of this for now is the line-ups. 
In the great battle between realism and nominalism, the armies have historically 
always lined up this way — and still do so today, if you read the literature: 
Metaphysics is on the side of nominalism; nominalism has the less 
problematic metaphysical view. 
Epistemology is on the side of realism; realism has the less problematic 
epistemological time of it. 
Now, of course, you shouldn’t think this means that nominalists are going to be 
constantly talking about metaphysics (which is where their advantage lies) and 
realists about epistemology. 
Sometimes it is just the other way around. 
John Duns Scotus, for instance, a kind of realist at the turn of the 13th and 14th 
centuries, has a great deal to say about the metaphysical implications of his own 
realism. 
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And William of Ockham, who was a nominalist from the generation right after 
Scotus, discusses epistemological matters at great length. 
What is going on here is that these people are being honest enough to face up 
squarely to the difficulties in their own theories, and try to answer them. They are 
not just dwelling on their advantages, but trying to overcome their disadvantages 
too. 
In other words, this is not just a matter of scoring points against the opposition, of 
dwelling on your own advantages and your opponent’s disadvantages. Philosophy 
is not a contest like that, at least not if you’re serious about it. It’s a matter of 
honestly trying to get things right, so you have to deal with the real problems 
your views present, and not just try to distract attention from them. 
Scotus the realist has epistemology on his side. But he talks a lot about 
metaphysics because that’s where the work has still to be done for him. 
So too, Ockham the nominalist has metaphysics on his side. But he talks a lot 
about epistemological problems precisely because those are the problems for his 
theory. 
This is enough for the present about the overall lay of the land. I want you to keep 
your eyes open and be sensitive to this line-up as we proceed through the 
semester. 
 
Terminology 
With that out of the way, let me turn now to our first substantive item of business 
— and that is terminology. I’m going to spend a little time on this now, at the 
beginning of the course, while you’re reading Porphyry and Boethius. What I’ll 
be saying here is somewhat miscellaneous. I just want to get you familiar with 
certain terms, notions and doctrines before we get down into the thick of it with 
Boethius. 
One of the hardest things about reading medieval philosophy is the technical 
vocabulary that is unlike anything you may be familiar with. 
Part of this is just a matter of knowing what the words mean, and part of it is a 
matter of seeing where these people are coming from. And of course all this is 
complicated by the fact that the words frequently change their meaning from 
author to author, and so do the presuppositions and starting points. So, it’s a 
sticky business. 
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Nevertheless, we have to begin somewhere, and I am going to begin with 
Porphyry the Phoenician, and his Isagoge. 
You may not have read clear through the Isagoge yet, and I am not going to do a 
close and detailed analysis of the text — either now or later. But I do want to give 
you a kind of orientation. 
First of all, who was Porphyry, and what is this book called the Isagoge? 
Porphyry was a neo-Platonist, who was born at Tyre, in what is now southern 
Lebanon, about 232 AD. (Pass out handout “Where on Earth is Tyre?”) He moved 
to Rome in the 260s, where he spent the main part of his career. He died 
sometime early in the following century — i.e., in the early 4th century. 
Porphyry was a pupil of Plotinus, the great third-century neo-Platonist. Porphyry 
is the one responsible for arranging Plotinus’s works into six groups of nine 
essays each — the so called Enneads (= the “nines”) — which is the form in 
which we have Plotinus’ work today. 
He also wrote a famous Life of Plotinus, which is included in most editions and 
translations of Plotinus’s writings. It begins with the striking sentence: 
Plotinus, our contemporary philosopher, seemed ashamed of being 
in the body. 
Porphyry was a pagan philosopher, and wrote in Greek (even thou he worked in 
Rome). He was a severe critic of Christianity, and in fact wrote some vitriolic 
attacks that ridiculed Christianity. 
He also wrote a number of purely philosophical works, including the one I am 
asking you to read in Five Texts — the so called Isagoge. 
‘Isagoge’ is Greek for “introduction.” The Greek is åkóáãùãÞ. 
It ought properly to be transliterated ‘Eisagoge’, but almost never is when we are 
referring to the title of this book. 
The Isagoge then is an “introduction.” In fact, it’s an introduction to Aristotle’s 
Categories. 
In the Categories, as you may know, Aristotle distinguished ten ultimate 
categories, the ten basic kinds of things. They are (Cat. 4, 1b25–27) (Pass out 
handout “Two Passages from Aristotle.”): 
substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position (i.e., 
orientation), state, action, and affection (i.e., passion, being 
passive — the opposite of action). 
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There was a long-standing dispute in the commentary tradition over whether these 
ten categories were meant to be a classification of things, or a classification of the 
terms we use to describe things. 
Porphyry certainly thought it was the latter, but that doesn’t matter for now. 
The Greek êáôçãïñßá just means ‘predicate’, although obviously it has a special 
sense in Aristotle. In the Latin (although not in the Greek), there are two words to 
distinguish in this context. There is ‘praedicatum’, which just means predicate — 
any old predicate. And there is also ‘praedicamentum’, which means one of the 
ten Aristotelian categories in particular. Sometimes the latter term is translated 
“predicament” (pronounced “PREdicament,” not “preDIcament,” which means 
something altogether different). If you see that word, it just means an Aristotelian 
category. 
There is some other terminology too, which we’ll talk about later. 
Well, Porphyry’s Isagoge is meant to be an introduction to Aristotle’s Categories. 
He proceeds not by talking about the ten Aristotelian categories directly, but 
instead by discussing five words or notions that he says are important for a clear 
understanding of the Categories. These five notions are: genus, difference, 
species, property and accident. 
They came to be known as the five “predicables” — praedicabilia, not to be 
confused with the predicaments, which are the ten Aristotelian categories. 
Although there is considerable doubt about it, people sometimes say that 
Porphyry’s list of five predicables is based on a similar list of four items that 
Aristotle presents in his Topics I.4 101b23–25, and again in more detail in Topics 
I.5 101b37–102b26. There Aristotle discusses: definition, property, genus and 
accident. 
Porphyry’s list differs from Aristotle’s by adding difference, which Aristotle 
doesn’t have on his list, and by substituting species for definition. We’ll see a 
little later why I say this would most likely be the way it went — if they’re 
talking about the same things at all. But let’s just ignore all that for the moment 
and move on. 
The Isagoge then proceeds by discussing each of the five predicables in turn. It 
describes what each of them is, how each of them is to be defined, and then goes 
on to explain how each of the five is like, and how it is unlike, each of the other 
four. 
And that is the book. 
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Now what is the importance of this work for us? Why am I asking you to read it 
in a course on the medieval problem of universals? 
Well, the work turns out to be extremely important for the medieval history of this 
problem. 
Like all of the other major philosophical works of this early period, it was written 
in Greek. Philosophy, as you recall, was after all a Greek invention. In the 
Roman, the Latin world, it was decidedly an import. 
Now, in the early centuries of the Christian era, as the old pagan culture of the 
ancient world gradually declined, Greek died out in the Latin West. The general 
level of education declined, and you could no longer assume, as you can today (!), 
that any educated person would of course know Greek. Greek became a very 
specialized kind of knowledge, confined to a few scholars. 
This of course meant that the Latin world was effectively cut off from the primary 
sources and works of its philosophical heritage in Greek. Plotinus was almost 
wholly lost — that is to say, it was unavailable in Latin — until the Renaissance. 
(Actually, that’s not quite true. Some passages of Plotinus did circulate in Latin 
translation, only they weren’t attributed to Plotinus but to Aristotle!) And the 
same was true for Plato. The Meno and the Phaedo, and perhaps some other 
scraps, were translated into Latin in the 12th century, but they were not very 
widely read or circulated. The first half of the Timaeus was translated at a fairly 
early date, and did enjoy a relatively wide readership — but that is all, until 
Lorenzo Valla in the Renaissance made all the rest of Plato available to the West 
in Latin translation. (That first half of the Timaeus will be immensely significant 
for our story, as we’ll see in due course.) 
The situation with Aristotle was more complicated. The bulk of Aristotle’s 
writings were translated only in the late 12th and early-13th centuries, and this was 
an event of immense importance in the whole history of western philosophy. 
But, even before that time, the Latin West had a few things of Aristotle. The 
translations were done in the early-sixth century by Boethius (c. 480–524/6). 
Boethius was a Roman noble, who had a very important official position in the 
Ostrogothic (that is to say, barbarian) government of Theodoric. Boethius did 
know Greek, and he also knew a great deal about the Greek philosophical 
heritage. He took it upon himself to translate all of Plato and all of Aristotle into 
Latin, and then to write a work showing how they really said the same thing in the 
end. (This was a kind of commonplace of the period: Truth is one, and so Plato 
and Aristotle were not ultimately irreconcilable; each supplemented the other.) 
Well, Boethius did not live to complete this ambitious project. He was arrested for 
treason and executed somewhere between 524 and 526. But before he died, he did 
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succeed in translating at least three works: Aristotle’s Categories and De 
interpretatione, and Porphyry’s Isagoge. (He also seems to have translated most 
of the rest of Aristotle’s logical works, but the other ones went out of circulation 
pretty quickly.) Boethius also wrote a number of other philosophical works of his 
own, based on these three Greek sources and on some of the Greek commentators. 
And he himself wrote several commentaries on these works, including two 
commentaries on the Isagoge, one based on an earlier translation by one Marius 
Victorinus (whom you may have met if you’ve read Augustine’s Confessions), 
and the other — a much longer commentary — based on his own translation of 
Porphyry. I have asked you to read two passages from that second commentary on 
Porphyry, one in Five Texts and another in the Notes and Texts. The first of them, 
the one in Five Texts, is a crucial passage, and was an important step in the 
development of the medieval history of the problem of universals. In fact, it was 
the very first step. 
You see, at the very beginning of his Isagoge, Porphyry mentioned three 
questions that he said he wasn’t going to discuss in this work, since they would 
involve too detailed a study to be included in an introductory work such as the 
Isagoge. The three questions — which are found in the Isagoge, p. 1, § (2) in Five 
Texts — are all about the “ontological status” of the things Porphyry is talking 
about in this work, that is, of genus, difference, species, property and accident — 
the five so called predicables. 
We’ll look at these questions in more detail later on. For the present, we can say 
that these questions in effect raised the problem of universals in a fully explicit 
form. And they did so in one of the three and only three original works of Greek 
philosophy generally available to the Latin West before the mid-12th century 
(with the exception of the first part of Plato’s Timaeus). But, of course, while 
Porphyry does raise these questions, he says he is not going to discuss them in his 
Isagoge. 
Well, that is a perfect set-up. The stage couldn’t have been better set for someone 
like Boethius to come along and to try to answer the questions Porphyry had 
declined to discuss. And that is exactly what happened. 
And not only Boethius discussed the problem. As time went on, lots of other 
people did too. And they often did it in commentaries on this very text of 
Porphyry. Commentaries on Porphyry become a main place to look for 
discussions of the problem of universals throughout the Middle Ages. There were 
other discussions as well, of course. But if an author has a commentary on 
Porphyry, you should always look there for his view on the problem of universals. 
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Now, with that background, let’s talk about some of the terminology and doctrine 
involved in Porphyry’s Isagoge. 
Perhaps the best way to get into it is via the notion of definition. 
In present-day usage, the term ‘definition’ is used much more loosely and broadly 
than in the medieval usage. For us, a definition of something is pretty much any 
phrase or expression that allows us to identify or pick out that thing uniquely. 
And if what we are defining is some sort of general or common notion, then a 
definition is any phrase or expression that allows us to pick out exactly the things 
(plural) to which that general or common notion applies, no more and no fewer. 
Not so in the Middle Ages. For the Middle Ages, not all uniquely identifying 
expressions like this are called “definitions.” Some are and some are not. Those 
that are not are called descriptions. Those that are definitions, on the other hand, 
are of two kinds: some are so called real definitions, and some are nominal 
definitions. Thus, we have: 
I. Uniquely identifying expressions 
 A. Descriptions 
 B. Definitions 
  1. real 
  2. nominal. 
This schema goes back a long way. And in fact, the basis for it may be found in 
Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics II.10. But the Middle Ages was quite familiar with 
the distinction even well before the Posterior Analytics became available in Latin 
in the 12th century. It was part of the general lore associated with Greek 
philosophy, transmitted by Boethius and others. 
A nominal definition is what we might today call a stipulative definition. That is, 
it is a kind of agreement or decree, stating how we are going to use a certain term. 
In effect, a nominal definition says that we agree to use a certain word, the 
definiendum, as a kind of abbreviation of, or shorthand version of, a longer 
expression that is then called its nominal definition. 
Nominal definitions, then, proceed entirely at the level of language. (That’s 
what’s nominal about them; the term here has nothing here to do with 
“nominalism.”) They correlate words with their defining expressions, and that’s 
that. Nominal definitions do not tell us anything about what does or does not exist 
in the external world, or any other informative fact about the world beyond 
language. They are purely a matter of our agreed upon stipulations. We can 
change a nominal definition, for instance, if we want to. 
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A real definition, on the other hand, is not like this. A real definition is not a 
matter of our conventional stipulations. It is not up to us. A real definition is 
supposed to express somehow the inner metaphysical structure of the thing 
defined. A real definition does not stay at the level of language; it reveals 
something about the structure of the world. How it does that, or how anything can 
do that is, of course, a matter to be negotiated, but that’s at least the starting point. 
The difference between a real definition and a mere description is this: a real 
definition uniquely picks out what is defined by expressing its inner metaphysical 
structure — in other words, its essence, if we want to use “essence”-talk. On the 
other hand, a description  picks out what is described by expressing some 
accidental (non-essential) feature or features that, for one reason or another, 
together uniquely characterize what is described. 
‘Featherless biped’, therefore, is not a real definition of man. It is a description. It 
is true that human beings and only human beings (let us say) are featherless 
bipeds. But that is not what it is essentially to be a man. Essentially, man is a 
rational animal — and the expression ‘rational animal’ gives us the real definition 
of man. 
Of course, the question what is essential and what is accidental to a thing is a very 
delicate question — and in fact is one of the deepest questions I know of in this 
area — but I do not want to stop over it right now. I do want to say, however, that 
the division between essence and accident is not drawn in the Middle Ages the 
way it is often done today: in terms of logical modalities. That is, for the Middle 
Ages, the essential features of a thing are not just those it necessarily has, given 
that it exists at all. And the accidental features of a thing are not the same as those 
it may or may not have, given that it exists. 
A quick way to prove this claim is to point out that the Middle Ages had the 
notion of an inseparable accident. This was pretty much a generally accepted 
notion. It appears in Porphyry’s Isagoge, for instance (p. 11.57), although 
Porphyry’s discussion seems to fudge on just how inseparable these accidents 
really are. Here is what he says: 
Accident is what comes and goes without the destruction of the 
substrate. [That much sounds as though all accidents are separable
—as with the modern notion of a “contingent property.”] It is 
divided into two kinds. One kind of accident is separable [no 
problem there] and the other is inseparable. [Now it sounds as if, 
despite what he has just said, not all accidents are separable after 
all.] Thus, sleeping is a separable accident [since I may or may not 
be sleeping], whereas being black is an inseparable accident of the 
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crow and the Ethiopian [The example is a standard one from 
Aristotle]. Nevertheless, a white crow and an Ethiopian who has 
lost his color can be conceived without the destruction of the 
substrate. [Now it sounds again as if we really could “separate” 
these “inseparable” accidents, after all — at least conceptually, 
whatever difference that makes.] 
So what is going on in that passage is not altogether clear, although it certainly 
does bring out the notion of an inseparable accident, which is the point I want to 
make now. But perhaps the best source for this notion is in Aristotle himself, 
Metaphysics, V.30, which states the point quite clearly (see the 2nd passage on the 
handout “Two Passages from Aristotle”): 
‘Accident’ has also another meaning, i.e., all that attaches to each 
thing in virtue of itself [that is, in virtue of the thing, not in virtue 
of the accident] but is not in its essence, as having its angles equal 
to two right angles attaches to the triangle. 
The fact that the angles of a triangle add up to two right angles — i.e., 180o — is 
certainly not something that just may or may not happen to hold of any given 
triangle. It is a necessary feature of any triangle. And yet Aristotle here explicitly 
calls it an accident. In short, we have inseparable accidents. 
The details of how all this is worked out need not detain us now, but be warned 
that the notion of essence and accident is perhaps not what you expect. 
One other quick point. Things that don’t exist cannot have real definitions. There 
can be no real definition of a unicorn, a definition that expresses its essential 
structure. Unicorns don’t have an essential structure; they don’t exist, and so 
don’t have any structure at all — or anything else, for that matter. 
So too, things that don’t exist cannot be described either. Just as unicorns have no 
essential structure, so too they have no accidental structure either, which could be 
expressed in a description. They don’t have any structure at all; they don’t exist. 
But things that don’t exist can nevertheless be nominally defined. I can stipulate 
what a unicorn is (or perhaps better, what the term ‘unicorn’ means), but I cannot 
discover what one is, either essentially or accidentally. 
Now let’s focus on real definitions, definitions that express the essence of what is 
defined. How do they do this? Well, they all do it in the same way: in terms of 
genus plus difference. 
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For example, man is defined as a rational animal. In this case, ‘animal’ is the 
genus term and ‘rational’ is the so called difference (differentia) term. 
Real definition always proceeds in these terms: genus + difference. And if you 
ask why that should be so, the answer is just that this is what they meant by a 
“real definition.” If you will, we can say that for the Middle Ages, the stipulative 
or nominal definition of the phrase ‘real definition’ requires that it always proceed 
by genus + difference. 
One good way to think of how this goes, perhaps, is to put it in terms of 
questions. How would you go about asking for the real definition of something? 
Of course, you could just say “Give me its real definition!,” but that isn’t what we 
want now. We want to know what that amounts to. 
Well, here’s how you ask for the real definition of a thing: 
(1) First, you ask: What is it? Here, ‘What is it?’ is not a 
request for the full definition (that would of course be no help), but 
rather means: What broad classification does the thing fit into? 
(2) Then, when you have the answer to that, you ask a second 
question: Where, how does it fit into that broader group? And this 
narrows the broad classification down to what you are looking for. 
For instance, 
What is man? Man is an animal. (That’s the broader group.)  
Then 
What kind of animal? A rational animal. 
Real definition always proceeds in this two-step way: genus, then difference. (In 
English, we sometimes express the difference first, as when we say ‘rational 
animal’, because the difference is typically expressed by an adjective, and in 
English adjectives usually come before their nouns. But no significance should be 
seen in that fact; in the “natural” order of questions, the difference comes second.) 
The genus is the part of the real definition that answers the broad question What 
is it? What is man? Man is an animal. Now in Latin, the interrogative pronoun 
‘What?’ is ‘quid’. And so the genus of a thing is said to be predicated “in quid” of 
that thing. The phrase ‘in quid’ is a kind of horribly abbreviated way of saying 
“with respect to what the thing is,” or “in a way that answers the question ‘What 
is it’” — or in effect, “in a way that gives you the genus.” In Greek, the 
expression is: 
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dí ô² ôß dóôé . 
It is an Aristotelian expression, and occurs in Porphyry’s Isagoge. (See p. 2.8.3–4, 
and the corresponding note in the Notes and Texts.) 
On the other hand, the difference is the part of the real definition that answers the 
question What kind of a _____ is it?, where the pause is filled in with the genus. 
What is man? Man is an animal. What kind of animal? A rational one. 
In Latin, the interrogative pronoun ‘What kind of?’ or ‘What manner of?’ is 
‘quale’. And so the difference of a thing is said to be predicated of it not in quid, 
but rather in quale. In Greek the expression is 
dí ô² ðïéüí ôß dóôéí . 
It too has a genuine Aristotelian pedigree, and it too appears in Porphyry. (See p. 
3.12.6 and the corresponding note in the Notes and Texts.) 
The terms ‘in quid predication’ and ‘in quale predication’ are sometimes (e.g., in 
the Edward Warren translation of the Isagoge that I mention in my Notes and 
Texts) translated as “essential” predication and “qualitative” predication. I think 
those are not good translations, and the former especially is misleading, since the 
difference, which is predicated in quale, belongs just as much to the essence of a 
thing as the genus does. But I guess there is nothing wrong with this translation, 
provided you know what is going on. 
The expression ‘qualitative predication’ is also perhaps misleading if you are not 
careful, because the word ‘qualitative’ — although it does come from Latin 
‘quale’, which is the word involved here — nevertheless suggests the Aristotelian 
category of quality, which is an accident. (All the categories other than substance 
were said to be accidental categories.) But we are not talking about accidents 
here; we are giving the real definition, after all. 
The same sort of opportunity for terminological confusion is present in the Latin 
‘quale’, and for that matter in the Greek. So you have to keep your wits about you 
in reading this stuff. 
Now, we have seen that the real definition is given by genus + difference. But the 
real definition of what? The answer: the real definition of the species. That is, 
here is the formula (and get this down): 
genus + difference = species. 
Note that this formula covers three of the five “predicables” Porphyry discusses. 
And, incidentally, you can perhaps now see how natural a move it was for 
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Porphyry, starting from Aristotle’s list of four predicables in the Topics: 
definition, property, genus and accident, (if that is in fact where Porphyry started), 
to replace definition by species. A real definition is just what tells you the species. 
(Porphyry also added difference to the list, just for the sake of making it explicit, I 
suppose.) 
Now, given this set-up, let’s push a little further. 
What is man? An animal (genus). What kind of animal? A rational 
animal (difference). 
But now we can ask the same kind of questions one step higher: 
What is animal? or What is an animal? It goes more smoothly in 
English if we use the articles, but we should do so sparingly for 
reasons I hope will become clearer later. 
What is animal? Animal is an organism (genus). 
What kind of organism? An organism with sensation (difference). 
Sensation was regarded as being the difference that distinguished animals from 
plants within the broader genus organism, just as rationality was the difference 
that distinguished human beings from brute animals within the genus animal. 
(Sometimes the difference for animal was said to be the ability animals have to 
move about under their own power, in contrast to plants that are “rooted” to one 
place. But don’t worry about that.) 
So the definition of animal can be given as: sensitive organism, which doesn’t 
mean it’s “sensitive” in the — well — “sense” that it’s very delicate and moody, 
but rather that it’s something that has sensations. There’s really no good English 
adjective here, but alternative formulations include: sensible organism, which 
doesn’t mean there’s no nonsense about it (“it’s a very sensible organism”), and 
doesn’t mean that we can sense it, but rather that it is capable of sensation. 
‘Sensate organism’ suffers from a similar problem in English. ‘Sensate’ comes 
from the Latin passive participle ‘sensatus’, and would mean something that is (or 
at least can be) sensed, not something that can do the sensing, which is what we 
want. So there’s no really good English translation, but any one of these will do if 
you’re careful. 
So we have a real definition of animal just as we had a real definition of man. 
But now wait a minute. A moment ago I said that animal was a genus. It was the 
genus of man. Now we are saying that animal has a real definition of its own, so 
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that animal must be a species, according to the formula for real definition: genus 
+ difference = species. So which is it? Is animal a genus or a species? 
The answer, of course, is that it’s both, and there is nothing wrong with that. 
Animal is the genus of man, but it is a species of organism. 
And of course we can go yet higher. What is an organism? An organism is a 
body. (Genus — ‘body’ here doesn’t mean “corpse.” It means “body” in the sense 
in which physics uses the term: a material object.) 
So an organism is a body. What kind of body? A living body (difference). 
And again: What is body? Body is a substance (genus). What kind of substance? 
A corporeal substance, or material substance, to distinguish it from God or angels, 
or perhaps human souls, depending on your theory. 
Now look. What we have here is a kind of “tree-structure”: 
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A structure like this is called a Porphyrian tree. In this particular case, it is a 
Porphyrian tree for man, which is at the bottom. 
(Pass out handout of diagram of Porphyrian Tree, and also handout 
of MS sketch of Porphyrian Tree.) 
In principle, we should be able to construct such a tree-structure for any species: 
for cow, dog, rock, or whatever. And we should be able to do this in any category. 
We may not in fact know all the steps and branches for a given tree, but in 
principle there should be such a hierarchical tree-structure. 
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But that’s in principle. In practice, the Porphyrian tree you always see discussed, 
and the only one that was ever worked out with any kind of detail, is the 
Porphyrian tree for man, in the category of substance. Sometimes, therefore, when 
you see the term the term ‘the Porphyrian tree’, it just means the one I’ve just 
given you. 
On the handout, I’ve given you a version of this little figure. And on the other 
handout, I have duplicated for you a page from an actual medieval manuscript, 
containing a diagram of the Porphyrian tree. Don’t be surprised if you can’t read 
it, since it’s in Latin to begin with, and abbreviated Latin at that (plus two words 
near the bottom in some language I can’t identify). 
Nevertheless, notice a couple of things about the handouts. First, in the 
manuscript version there is an extra step between animal and man: 
 
This reflects the fact that Porphyry himself was a pagan, and seems to have 
thought of the pagan gods as immortal rational animals. (Note: This would seem 
to imply that they are corporeal — that is, material.) Needless to say, this step 
quickly dropped out in Christian discussions of the Porphyrian tree (although 
there it is in this manuscript). 
Second, notice that the manuscript adds individuals at the bottom of the tree, 
below man: Socrates and Plato. Let’s just hold off for a moment on individuals; 
we’ll talk about what to do with them later. 
Now in the Porphyrian tree (in any Porphyrian tree, not including individuals for 
now), all the intermediate stages (body, organism, animal, in the example) are 
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both genera and species. Each is a genus with respect to the stage below it, and 
each is a species with respect to the stage above it. 
These intermediate levels are called subalternate genera. 
At the top end of our tree, we have substance. Substance was one of the ten 
Aristotelian categories, recall. Now you may well ask: Why stop there? Why 
can’t we go further? Just as we asked: What is Man? What is animal? What is an 
organism? What is body? — so too, why can’t we ask: What is substance? 
The answer is: You can’t do that, because there can be no real definition of 
substance (or of any category). Why not? Because, if there were, it would have to 
proceed in terms of genus + difference (since all real definitions do that). But 
there is no higher genus than substance. 
That’s just what a category is, after all: a highest genus, a broadest possible 
classification of things. When Aristotle divides the world up into ten categories, 
he is saying that there are ten irreducibly distinct broadest classifications into one 
or another of which everything can be put. The key word here is ‘irreducible’. 
They are irreducible to one another, and they are also irreducible to anything 
higher — to any higher or broader classification. 
The categories, then, are the most general genera, the “genera generalissima,” as 
on the handout of the MS. Whenever you see this phrase, you should recognize 
that it is just a code word and means a category. Sometimes, in fact, the 
expression is abbreviated, and you see references to a “generalissimum” — 
period. That’s just a category. 
You may well be wondering why this should be so. Why can’t we reduce the ten 
so called categories to a higher classification? What about being, for instance? 
What is wrong with saying that the ten categories are species of one super-
category being? 
Well, it turns out, everyone agreed that being is not a genus. Porphyry, for 
instance, says this (p. 5.29.8–9), and Aristotle says it quite plainly at Metaphysics 
III.3 998b22. 
The reasoning behind this is rather tricky, and it is surprisingly difficult to find it 
stated explicitly and in detail in the medieval texts. 
Here is a handout (distribute “Why Being Is Not A Genus”) in which I give you 
the argument as clearly as I have seen it — which is not after all very clear. I do 
not want to delay over the point here. 
So much for the top end of the Porphyrian tree: the most general genera. What 
about the lower end, the species man? 
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Well, just as the category, substance, is a most general genus, so too the species 
man is said to be a most specific species, or species specialissima, as on the 
handout. It is sometimes also called an infima species (= “lowest species”). Just 
as the most general genus is a genus that is not also a species of something higher, 
so too a most specific species is a species that is not in turn a genus of some yet 
lower species. Man is as far down as you go in the line of species. There are no 
sub-species of men; below man there are only individuals: Socrates, Plato, and so 
on. 
Once again, there are a lot of questions you might ask here. Why is man a lowest 
species? Why can’t you find yet lower species? You can certainly find narrower 
sub-groups under man. We can talk, for instance, about Greeks vs. barbarians, 
males vs. females, and so on. By calling man a lowest species, we are committed 
to saying that these narrower sub-groupings are not genuine species. Why not? 
Well, that’s not an easy question. The answer to it differs considerably from 
author to author, and sometimes it’s not clear just what an author’s answer to it is. 
But it will obviously have something to do with what counts as an essential 
feature of a thing and what is merely an accidental feature of it. We’ll have more 
to say about that later on, but we’re not ready for it now. 
Nevertheless, the claim is clear, even if the reasons for it are not. Man is a most 
specific species. Below man there are only individual men, not yet lower species. 
What this means, of course, is that the differences among individual men are not 
essential differences but accidental ones. If they were essential differences, then 
we would have lower species after all. Species, recall, is what is defined by a real 
definition, and a real definition is one that expresses the essence of a thing. If, 
once we had got down to the level of man, there were still further essential 
features of things that had not been taken into account yet, then those essential 
features could be brought out in yet further real definitions that would define 
lower species. 
Thus, within the species man, all the differences among individuals are accidental 
ones, not essential ones. This suggests, although it does not strictly require, a 
doctrine we shall see explicitly later on in Boethius: the doctrine of individuation 
by accidents. (That is, the doctrine that these accidental differences we find 
among the individuals in some lowest species are not just a symptom of the fact 
that they are distinct individuals; they are what make them distinct individuals.) 
Note it now and file it away for future reference. 
The notion that man is the lowest species has yet another consequence: The 
individual cannot be defined by a real definition. Real definitions stop at the level 
of the species. In order to narrow this down yet further to get an expression or 
phrase that uniquely picks out one individual and no other, you would have to 
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appeal to accidental features, which of course are out of place in a real definition 
(although they’re OK in a description). 
 
All right, now we’ve talked about genus and difference and species, and I’ve said 
a little bit about accident. That’s four of Porphyry’s five predicables. The 
remaining one is property, and I should now say a little about that. 
The medieval term ‘property’ (proprium) is a real trap for modern students. It 
does not mean what the term means in present-day philosophical jargon. 
In present philosophical usage, the term ‘property’ is used in a very broad sense, 
to mean pretty much any characteristic or feature of a thing. A property, in this 
sense, is whatever it is that is picked out by a predicate that can be truly said of a 
thing. (There may be funny exceptions to this, but that’s the basic idea. The 
exceptions would be predicates like ‘non-existing’, etc.) 
That is not the sense we have in Porphyry, or anywhere else throughout the 
Middle Ages. In Porphyry — and for that matter in Aristotle — the notion of 
property is more like the notion of private property in modern social and political 
philosophy. That is, it carries overtones of exclusive ownership. 
In fact, ‘proprius’ as an adjective in Latin can frequently be translated as ‘own’: 
Save your own soul — your anima propria. 
So, for example, when in medieval texts you see one thing being described as 
proper to another, that doesn’t just mean that the former belongs to the latter. And 
it certainly doesn’t mean it is “proper” in the sense of conforming to correct 
etiquette. It means that the former belongs to the latter, and to nothing else. So 
too, you’ll see it said that A is “properly” said of B, and other such locutions. This 
doesn’t mean there’s anything wrong with calling B something else, but only that 
A “fits” B exactly. 
In Aristotle and in Porphyry, and in medieval metaphysical discussions generally, 
the word ‘property’ means, first of all, something that is not essential to a thing 
(genus, difference and species are the essential predicables), but that nevertheless 
belongs to it and to it alone. (So exclusive ownership is only part of the story.) 
Now we’re not talking primarily about individuals here. In fact, Porphyry has 
very little to say about individuals at all in the Isagoge. We’re talking at the level 
of genera and species. And when we say something is a property of a certain 
species, we mean that it belongs to exactly the things in that species, and to 
nothing else. So we say, for instance, that it is a property of the species man to be 
risible — that is, to have the ability to laugh. 
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The ability to laugh is not an essential feature of human beings; the essential 
features are rationality and animality — which, combined, give you humanity —
and that’s all. Nevertheless, the ability to laugh is somehow supposed to follow 
from the essential features of human beings in such a way that all human beings, 
and only human beings, have the ability to laugh. The idea seems to be that you 
have to be an animal to have the vocal apparatus for laughing, and you have to be 
rational in order to see the point of the joke. The reasoning may be a little 
tenuous, but this was always the standard example of a property. 
Properties, then, are “convertible” with their species — that is, they are 
coextensive — even necessarily coextensive — with their species. But they do 
not belong to the essences of things. 
Now, if you’ve been playing close attention, you might notice that property, in the 
sense I’ve just described, sounds an awful lot like those inseparable accidents I 
mentioned a while back. In fact, when I brought up inseparable accidents, I gave 
you a reference to Aristotle (Metaphysics V.30 — see the handout  “Two Passages 
from Aristotle”): 
‘Accident’ has also another meaning, i.e., all that attaches to each 
thing in virtue of itself [that is, in virtue of the thing] but is not in 
its essence. 
Then he gives an example: 
as having its angles equal to two right angles attaches to the 
triangle. 
It isn’t essential to the triangle to have its angles add up to 180o. It’s essential to it 
to be a rectilinear figure with three angles. The 180o is something that follows 
from that essence, and Aristotle here calls it an accident — indeed, an inseparable 
accident — although it also appears to fit the definition of property we’ve just 
given. 
So what’s the difference between property and inseparable accident? That’s a 
very good question, and one that is not very well settled in the medieval literature. 
Porphyry (p. 19.121.1–6, not the same as the earlier passage I just gave you, 
which is from p. 11) suggests that the notion of inseparable accident is the 
broader notion—i.e., that properties are a kind of inseparable accident. He gives 
the example of blackness, which is an inseparable accident of Ethiopians, crows, 
coal, and ebony. In that example, the inseparable accident cuts across several 
species, and so doesn’t have the exclusiveness required for a property. All that’s 
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fine, but of course it doesn’t fit the example Aristotle has just given of an 
inseparable accident of the triangle, which is one species. 
Probably the easiest way to think of this is to regard property as a subdivision of 
inseparable accident: in fact, property = inseparable accident that is CONVERTIBLE 
with a species (and so property would give you a kind of description). But in fact 
these relations are not very clearly worked out in the Middle Ages. Perhaps that’s 
because the question in the end isn’t very important. 
These then are some of the basic terms and notions in Porphyry’s Isagoge. You 
should familiarize yourself with them, because they will be coming up all 
throughout this course. 
 
Now there is a big question that I’ve been delaying here, and it may have been 
bothering you: What on earth is all this about? 
We’ve talked about genus, species, difference, and so on. What are they? Are 
these things supposed to be real, or what? In short, what is the “ontological 
status” of these things? 
Well, remember that I said that at the beginning of the Isagoge Porphyry 
mentioned three questions that he said he wasn’t going to discuss because they 
were inappropriate for an introductory work like the Isagoge. The three questions 
are exactly the questions about the “ontological status” of these things. Here is 
what he says (p. 1.1.6–2.4): 
…I shall abstain from the deeper questions and aim, as is 
appropriate, at the simpler ones. 
For example, I shall beg off saying anything about (a) whether 
genera and species are real or are situated in bare thoughts alone, 
(b) whether as real they are bodies or incorporeals, and (c) whether 
they are separated or in sensibles and have their reality in 
connection with them. Such business is profound, and requires 
another, greater investigation. 
This is the passage that raised the problem of universals in the form in which it 
was first, and perhaps most commonly, discussed in the Middle Ages. They are 
some of the most consequential lines in the whole history of philosophy. 
Porphyry, of course, had left a perfect set-up for subsequent authors. If you want 
to guarantee that your followers — if any — will devote tremendous efforts to a 
certain problem, just be sure to mention it without saying very much about it. 
Porphyry might just as well have said “I dare you to talk about this.” 
 32
Well, people took up the challenge, and Boethius was the first to take it up in the 
Latin world. (Note that Porphyry does not suggest these three questions are 
original with him; in fact, he seems to be suggesting they had been discussed for a 
long time. And that’s certainly right; the Greek commentary tradition had talked 
about these issues for a long time. But of course the Greek commentaries were 
effectively lost to the Latin West — until Boethius.) 
So now let’s get down to business and turn to Boethius. 
Boethius 
First, let us look at where we are chronologically. Porphyry wrote the Isagoge in 
the late third century AD. Boethius lived from 480 to 524/526. So he was writing 
in the early sixth century. There is a period of over 200 years between them. What 
happened to the problem of universals in the meantime? 
The answer, surprisingly, is very little. In the Greek world, the main philosophical 
current was neo-Platonism, in its most flamboyant form. There simply wasn’t 
much serious and careful discussion of the problem of universals. (Earlier, there 
was some discussion in commentaries on Aristotle, etc. But not like what we are 
about to see in the Latin world.) In fact, there isn’t really any serious and careful 
discussion of the problem in Porphyry either. He raises the questions, but doesn’t 
answer them. And what he does say, in the Isagoge and in his other writings, does 
not present a very carefully worked out view. 
Taken by himself, then, Porphyry would not be a very important figure in the 
history of the problem of universals. His importance is based entirely on the fact 
that Boethius translated him and used his text as the occasion for discussing the 
problem on his own, and by so doing, set things up for the rest of the Middle Ages 
and beyond. 
In the Latin world, there simply wasn’t much high-quality, precise philosophy 
before Boethius. There was some, but most of it tended to be of the ethical kind, 
and was more “wisdom literature” than what we would think of today as hard-
headed philosophy. The most important Latin author before Boethius was St. 
Augustine, who was probably the most important and influential philosopher who 
ever wrote! Augustine is a thinker for whom I have infinite respect. But he had 
little to say about the problem of universals. (He does have some very important 
things to say about related topics, however — notably about the notion of “divine 
ideas,” which was his answer to the Platonic Forms. But he had virtually nothing 
to say about the problem of universals directly.) 
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So that leaves us with Boethius. For some material on his life and writings, see 
Ch. 22 of the “Course in the Box” Version 3.0 beta. (I’ve given you a handout on 
this.) 
Boethius discussed the problem of universals in several places. He wrote two 
commentaries on Porphyry’s Isagoge, for instance, and a commentary on the 
Categories. He also wrote two commentaries on Aristotle’s De interpretatione, 
which contains the important passage at the beginning of Ch. 7 (De 
interpretatione 7 17a38–b1): 
Among things, some are universal while others are singular. By 
“universal” I mean that which is apt to be predicated of many, by 
“singular” that which is not. For example, man is a universal, 
Callias a singular. 
As you can imagine, commentaries on that passage (by Boethius and others) will 
prove to be very interesting. I’ve given you a passage from Boethius’s second 
commentary on it in the Notes and Texts. 
Boethius is also the author of the famous Consolation of Philosophy, which 
contains a few remarks pertaining to universals, although not much. He also wrote 
a group of relatively short works, collectively called the Theological Tractates, 
and some of them contain a great deal of important and influential material on this 
topic. I’ve translated some of it in “Boethius, Two Texts from His Theological 
Tractates” in the Notes and Texts, and there are complete translations (of varying 
quality) in the Loeb edition of Boethius, on reserve in the Wells Library. 
If you want some further reading on Boethius’s views on universals, see Jorge 
Gracia, Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages, 
Chap. 2, and Peter King’s dissertation, Peter Abailard and the Problem of 
Universals, Chaps. 1 and 2, particularly Chap. 2. (Both on reserve.) King also 
gives you a translation of the relevant passage from Boethius’s first commentary 
on Porphyry, in vol. 2 of his dissertation. I am going to concentrate on the second 
and longer commentary on Porphyry, and on the Theological Tractates. I will 
bring in other Boethian writings only occasionally. 
There are different theories of universals found in Boethius, depending on where 
you look. In fact, I have a thesis I am sometimes tempted to believe, that every 
theory of universals ever held in the Middle Ages can — in a non-trivial way — 
be found at least in germ in Boethius. There are probably exceptions to this claim, 
but they will take some looking. 
There is one theory of universals to be found in the second commentary on 
Porphyry. The same view, more or less, is found with some refinements and 
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additions, in certain passages of the Theological Tractates. But there is also a 
quite different theory found — or at least suggested — in other passages of the 
Tractates, and in certain other texts. 
Let’s begin with the second commentary on Porphyry (in Five Texts). In the first 
commentary, Boethius had based his work on the translation by Marius 
Victorinus (a Latin rhetor contemporary with St. Augustine), whereas in the 
second commentary he translated the text of Porphyry himself. 
The passage we are concerned with is the passage where Porphyry raises and then 
dismisses three questions about the ontological status of genera and species. It’s 
the commentary on that passage that I have translated in Five Texts, and that I 
want to discuss now. 
First, let’s be sure the text as Boethius translated (p. 20.1.1–5) it really says the 
same thing as the text of Porphyry’s Greek (p. 1.2.1–5). If you look at my English 
translation of the two of them, you will see that they pretty much say the same 
thing, with one exception that may or may not be important. 
Here is how Boethius translates it (Five Texts, p. 20.1.1–5): 
“As for genera and species,” he [= Porphyry] says, “I shall decline 
for the present to say (a) whether they subsist or are posited in bare 
understandings only, (b) whether, if they subsist, they are 
corporeal or incorporeal, and (c) whether they are separated from 
sensibles or posited in sensibles and agree with them. For that is a 
most exalted matter, and requires a longer investigation.” 
The word I want to focus on here is the word ‘subsist’. (Porphyry himself has a 
rather more neutral word here, one I have translated as ‘real’.) As it turns out, this 
word ‘subsist’ is something of a technical term in the Boethian vocabulary. 
He defines it in one his Theological Tractates, called “On Person and the Two 
Natures” (De persona et duabus naturis). It’s a Christological treatise, and is 
concerned with the theological doctrine that in Christ there is only one person — 
the second person of the Trinity, in fact — but two natures: the divine nature and 
a human nature. An alternative title of the work is “Against Eutyches and 
Nestorius” (Contra Eutychen et Nestorium), who were the authors (or said to be 
the authors) of two heretical views on this Christological question. The work is 
generally referred to by its shortened title “Contra Eutychen,” and that is how I 
shall refer to it here. I have translated the relevant lines in the Notes and Texts, as 
the first passage in “Boethius, Two Texts from His Theological Tractates” (pp. 
49–51). 
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In this passage, he explains the difference between subsisting, on the one hand, 
and substanding or being a substance, on the other. See especially lines 44-47: 
For that “subsists” which does not need accidents in order to be 
able to be. But that “substands” which furnishes a certain subject 
to other accidents, so that they may be. For it “stands under” them 
[= sub+stands], as long as it is a subject for accidents. 
Basically, what he is saying in these and the surrounding lines is that a subsistent 
is what does not need any accidents in order to be. A subsistent, therefore, is an 
independent entity in a fairly strong sense of the word. 
Now substances are a sub-class of the things that subsist. See lines 47–52: 
Hence genera and species only subsist. [Note: This would seem to 
answer Boethius’s version of Porphyry’s first question, as 
Boethius translates it.] For accidents do not befall genera and 
species. But individuals not only subsist, they also substand. For 
neither do they need accidents in order to be. For they are already 
informed by their properties and specific differences, and provide 
to accidents the opportunity to be — that is to say, as long as they 
[= the individuals] are subjects. 
A substance is a subsistent, therefore, and so doesn’t need any accidents in order 
to exist, but nevertheless has them anyway — “stands under them,” supports 
them, gives them being. 
It follows from this that, since substances do not need accidents, they could lose 
their accidents without losing their own identity or being otherwise destroyed in 
the process. And indeed, that is pretty much the way an accident is defined. 
Remember Porphyry (p. 11.57.1–2): 
Accident is what comes and goes without the destruction of the 
substrate. 
(If you say “What about inseparable accidents then?,” the answer is: “I told you 
that was a tough one.”) 
Get this picture clearly in your mind: Accidents depend on their substances, not 
the other way around. 
In the passage I just read you from the Contra Eutychen, Boethius says that 
genera and species subsist but are not substances. They don’t need, and in fact 
don’t have, accidents. (So much then for Porphyry’s first question.) 
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Individuals, on the other hand, not only subsist, they are also substances. They do 
have accidents, even though they don’t need them. 
Now, back to Boethius’s commentary on Porphyry: If we understand Boethius’s 
translation of Porphyry’s first question as asking whether genera and species 
subsist in the sense just defined in the Contra Eutychen, then we have a fairly 
clear grasp of that first question: Boethius is asking whether genera and species 
are independent entities in their own right, insofar as they do not need accidents 
in order to exist. 
Unfortunately, the situation is not as clear as that. For, in the same passage from 
the Contra Eutychen, Boethius tells us (p. 50.42–44) that he is using the nominal 
and verbal forms of ‘subsist’ to translate forms of the Greek ïšóé§óéò (the noun), 
or ïšóé§óèáé  (the verb), whereas ‘substance’ and ‘substand’ he uses to 
translate forms of Greek ›ðüóôáóéò or ›ößóôáóèáé, respectively. 
Now, I’m not sure what the best way is to translate these Greek terms into 
English. But the point to note is that Boethius does not stick to these translating 
conventions in his commentary on Porphyry. 
That is, when in the first question, Boethius translates Porphyry as asking whether 
genera and species subsist, the Greek word he is translating there is not 
ïšóé§óèáé, as it ought to be according to the conventions announced in the 
Contra Eutychen, but rather ›ößóôáóèáé, which according to the Contra 
Eutychen ought to be translated ‘substands’. 
What are we to make of this? Is this just a kind of terminological looseness and 
imprecision on Boethius’s part, or is he deliberately changing the sense of 
Porphyry’s first question? It’s not clear, but I suspect it’s just the former, and that 
Boethius interprets Porphyry’s first question in the way we’ve just discussed. 
But it is clear that, however that turns out, this problem is one that is only going 
to bother someone who reads Boethius and compares it to the Greek. For the 
medieval Latins, who did not for the most part read Greek, the interpretation 
suggested by the Contra Eutychen would be the only plausible way to read this 
passage. 
Let’s turn back now to the text of the commentary on Porphyry. 
Boethius’s discussion takes the following form. First, he gives arguments on both 
sides of the issue — pro and con. Then he resolves the argument, giving his own 
theory. 
This format is a common one in later medieval philosophy — and we will see it in 
Scotus and Ockham in a highly developed form. It is called the quaestio form. If 
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you look at Thomas Aquinas’s Summa theologiae, for instance, you will see that 
it is written entirely as a series of such quaestiones. 
You have to be very careful in reading something written in this quaestio format. 
The author may be presenting an argument that does not reflect his own view. He 
may simply be setting it up as one of the preliminary pro and con arguments, only 
to be rejected later. Always look to the context before you assume that a medieval 
author is speaking his own mind when he gives an argument. 
So, first we get the pro and con arguments, and then we get Boethius’s own view 
— or at least the view he is defending in this work. (You’ll see later why I add the 
qualification.) To begin with, we get the negative arguments — that is, the 
arguments that genera and species do not subsist. (Actually, Boethius’s arguments 
are stronger than that: He argues that they do not exist at all — whether as a 
subsistent, i.e., an independent entity, or even presumably as an accident. This 
just aggravates the doubt over exactly how we are to understand ‘subsist’ here.) 
So, what we are getting here is the argument against realism, and so the argument 
for nominalism. Here’s how it goes (Five Texts, pp. 21.11.1–22.12.3 — I am 
paraphrasing): 
(1) To be is to be one. That is, anything that is is one thing, and conversely, if a 
thing is one thing, then it is. Being and unity, therefore, are coextensive notions, 
or to use the medieval lingo, they are “convertible.” (See p. 22.12.2: “Everything 
that exists exists for the reason that it is one.” Note that the statement of this 
premise comes at the end of the argument, not at the beginning. This “backwards” 
way of presenting arguments is not at all uncommon in medieval texts. You’ll just 
have to get used to it.) 
Even if you think of a “collective” entity, like an army, which is after all not one 
soldier but many soldiers, nevertheless it is one army. If you think an individual 
soldier is a unity, a unified organism, in a stronger, more metaphysically “robust” 
sense than the kind of low-grade, derivative, loose and second-order collective 
unity the army has, that is fine. But in exactly the same sense, and to exactly the 
same degree, this premise claims, the individual soldier is a being in a much 
stronger and more robust sense than the kind of derivative, shadowy, loose and 
second-order collective being the army has. 
The convertibility of being and unity, therefore, is a basic premise of this first 
argument we’re looking at in paras. (11)–(12). 
Indeed, you might suspect — and reasonably suspect — that the convertibility of 
being and unity is a presupposition of the whole problem of universals in the first 
place. You might think that without that principle, there simply is no problem of 
universals. If universals could somehow be real without having to be in any way 
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one, then what’s the problem about having a universal humanity in Socrates and 
Plato at the same time? If you’re willing to count Socrates’s humanity and Plato’s 
humanity as a universal humanity even if they’re not the same one thing, then 
what further objection can there be to admitting the reality of universals? (You 
might respond that the “further problem” is that you can’t do that, but that’s just 
to reaffirm that every being is one being.) In short, if you’re willing to weaken 
your realism to the point that it’s indistinguishable from nominalism, then of 
course the nominalist will have no further quarrel  with you, and the “problem” of 
universals has disappeared. 
Now I say you might think this. I thought so too for a long time. And, I must 
confess, I’m still inclined to think so. But, as it turns out, there may be later on in 
this passage — para. (13) — an argument against universals that doesn’t depend 
on the convertibility of being and unity. This is a possible interpretation I only 
came to recognize late in life, and I find it a very suggestive and intriguing 
possibility. But I’m not going to talk about it in lecture. I do have a paper, 
“Boethius against Universals,” that talks about it in § VIII (web-published on my 
Mediaeval Logic and Philosophy website). I will distribute this paper in a handout 
later on, since there are other things in it I do want to talk about, and you can read 
§ VIII then if you wish. The argument in para. (13) depends on an obscure infinite-
regress argument we will discuss soon. But I want to refer you to it at least even 
now. 
In any case, the argument we’re looking at now, at this point in our discussion, 
does explicitly take the principle of the convertibility of being and unity as a 
premise. 
Now, whether or not you can get a problem of universals without appealing to this 
principle, it nevertheless seems to be a highly plausible thing to say. In fact, it is a 
fundamental principle that many people would find impossible — even senseless 
— to deny. 
It can be found, for example, in Aristotle, Metaphysics X.2, especially the end of 
the chapter, where he says: 
And that in a sense unity means the same thing as being is clear 
from the fact that it follows the categories in as many ways, and is 
not comprised within any category [recall how being is not a 
genus], e.g., neither in substance nor in quality, but is related to 
them just as being is; and from the fact that in ‘one man’ nothing 
more is predicated than in ‘man’, just as being is nothing apart 
from substance or quality or quantity; and to be one is just to be a 
particular thing. 
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Now for a bit of a digression. Plausible though it is, and despite Aristotle’s 
personal authorization, we cannot take this principle for granted. Boethius is 
getting the principle of the “convertibility” of being and unity from St. Augustine, 
who made a big deal about it because some people had denied it. Indeed, there is 
a long and quite reputable philosophical tradition, one that still exists today, that 
denies the convertibility of being and unity. 
For example, at Republic VI.509b9, Plato describes the Form of the Good as 
“above being,” and Plotinus says the same thing, explicitly quoting Plato’s Greek, 
at Enneads, I.7.1. Many Neo-Platonists, in fact  — like Plotinus — have as one of 
their central notions something they call “The One,” which they explicitly 
identify with Plato’s Form of the Good, and describe as above being. 
So, for many Neo-Platonists (see the handout “The Greek Background to 
Mediaeval Philosophy”), the One is something that is a unity — in fact, it is the 
most unified thing of all — and yet is not a being. (Note that, by itself, this would 
not be enough to disarm the problem of universals, because although it’s true that 
for these Neo-Platonists there are unities that are not beings, it’s still true for them 
that there is no being that isn’t a unity.) 
The reason for denying the equation of being and unity here comes from another 
equation that goes back at least to Parmenides, and that almost everyone held. It is 
still held in effect today (although people don’t usually formulate it this way any 
more). This is the equation of being with intelligibility. What is can be 
understood, and vice versa. Perhaps we mere humans are not in a position to 
understand certain things that are, but in principle they are intelligible in 
themselves. An unlimited intellect could grasp them. 
This is the reason, for instance, why Plato’s Forms (apart from the Form of the 
Good, which is special) are not only the only things that truly are, they are also 
the only things that are truly intelligible. (For Plato, this world is the realm of 
opinion, remember.) 
Now if (for whatever reason) you believe that some things — some one things —
cannot be understood, and that this unintelligibility is not just a matter of our 
poor, finite intellects, but that they cannot in principle be understood (in other 
words, that this is something about them, not about us), and if you accept the 
equation of being with intelligibility (as virtually everyone did), then you must 
reject the equation of being with unity. 
And that is exactly what many Neo-Platonists did. The Neo-Platonists’ One, by 
being “beyond being,” is also “beyond intelligibility.” That is, the One is utterly 
mysterious and ineffable. You can’t say anything that would describe it. You can 
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only talk about it negatively, or by the most strained and inadequate kinds of 
metaphor. 
This strand of Western thinking is still with us today, and — I want to emphasize 
— is a reputable tradition; it’s not just mystery-mongering. It is present, for 
example, when Paul Tillich (who is unfortunately not still with us today) says that 
God is not a being, but “the ground of being.” Tillich stands squarely in this Neo-
Platonic tradition. By saying that God is not a being, he is not professing atheism, 
he is not saying that God fails to exist. He is saying that God more than exists, he 
is above being. 
This same tradition is also behind what is sometimes called “darkness mysticism” 
in the Western tradition, where the mystical experience of God is not described in 
terms of a “blinding flash of light” (light is always an intellectual metaphor in 
Western thought), but rather as “A Cloud of Unknowing,” a “Dark Night of the 
Soul.” 
There is also a tradition of “light mysticism” in the West — for instance in 
Augustine. And for that matter, in Plato — whose “Allegory of the Cave” in the 
Republic is, after all, probably the most famous statement of light-mysticism there 
is. (This despite the fact that the Form of the Good, which is the Sun in the “Cave 
Allegory,” is also said in the very same work to be “above being.” Plato himself 
seems a little unclear on exactly where to locate the Form of the Good.) 
Now Augustine, I said, denied this part of the Neo-Platonic tradition, and equated 
being with unity. And he did this for a pretty good reason. The Neo-Platonic One 
looks an awful lot like God. But, on the other hand, there is the famous and 
important Scriptural passage in Exodus 3:14, where God tells Moses “I am who 
am,” and “Go tell the Israelites that He Who Is sent you to them.” Augustine took 
this very seriously, and so did the entire subsequent Augustinian tradition. The 
text implies — in fact, it emphasizes — that God is a being, and indeed is a being 
par excellence. (At least that’s the way Augustine interpreted it; heaven only 
knows what it really means.) 
Augustine, then, accommodated this text to the Neo-Platonic notion that the One 
is the highest and most exalted thing of all, the very ideal of Goodness, and so to 
be identified with God — and simply drew the inevitable conclusion: Unity is not 
above being, as Plotinus and other Neo-Platonists say. Unity and Being are 
convertible. 
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As Étienne Gilson put it in his brilliant and exasperating book, Being and Some 
Philosophers:1 
What makes the greatness of St. Augustine in the history of 
Christian philosophy is that, deeply imbued with Neoplatonism as 
he was, he yet never made the mistake of devaluating being, not 
even in order to extol the One. 
All this should be kept in mind, then, when we find Boethius using the premise 
“To be is to be one.” It’s not a trivial point for him, trivial either in the sense that 
he could take for granted or in the sense that it would be without important 
consequences. 
END OF DISGRESSION 
Let us return now to Boethius’s argument against the reality of universals. (We 
are still paraphrasing Five Texts, pp. 21.11.1–22.12.3.) 
First step: To be is to be one, as we have seen. 
Second step: But genera and species are supposed to be common to many (recall 
the motivation in my chalk example back at the beginning of this course), and 
THEREFORE (note the ‘therefore’) not one. Hence, from step (1), genera and 
species (and for that matter, any universal, although Boethius doesn’t generalize 
the point) cannot subsist — and, for that matter, they cannot be at all. 
This is a radically compressed paraphrase of pp. 21.11.1–22.12.3. But if you’ll 
look carefully at those lines, I think you’ll see that this is basically what the 
argument is. 
The crucial step, of course, is the second one. Note the implicit assumption (at the 
‘therefore’), that what is common to many in the way in which, say, humanity is 
supposed to be common to Socrates and Plato, is itself many. In other words, the 
plurality of individuals to which humanity is common somehow is contagious; it 
somehow infects the species humanity itself, and so destroys its unity. 
Why should anyone think this is so? Well, presumably it is going to have 
something to do with the way in which universals are supposed to be common to 
their individuals. We’ll return to that point in a moment. 
First, let’s go on in the text. We’ve looked at §§ (11)–(12). Let’s look now at § 
(13). 
                     
1Étienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 2nd ed., (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Mediaeval Studies, 1952), p. 31. 
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Here Boethius gives a very curious infinite regress argument, the point of which 
is not very clear at first. The difficulties with the passage are two: (1) first, to 
figure out just what the argument is in the paragraph, and (2) second, to determine 
just what role the argument plays in the discussion as a whole. With respect to 
(1), what I am about to say conforms to what I said in “The Course in the Box” 
Version 2.0 (NB), Chap. 23, pp. 5–7. With respect to (2), however, I’ve thought 
some more about the matter, and what I am going to say now is quite different 
from what I said in “The Course in the Box.” If you’re interested, here is a 
HANDOUT entitled “Boethius against Universals: The Arguments in the Second 
Commentary on Porphyry.”  
Let’s look at the paragraph, then. (Read para. (13.) 
OK, here we go: 
Suppose you agree with Boethius so far (i.e., in paras. (11)–(12)). In that case, the 
humanity of Socrates and the humanity of Plato cannot possibly be one humanity, 
but must be two. (We still do not have the full reasoning behind this, but let’s just 
grant it for now.) The plurality of individual humans, therefore, introduces a 
plurality into the species “humanity” itself. Or, to put it another way, the term 
‘humanity’ is no longer a proper name, so to speak, of one universal entity, but 
rather a common name or common noun applicable to the humanity of this 
individual and also to the (distinct) humanity of that individual. In effect, this is 
what the argument in paragraphs (11)–(12) amounted to. 
Thus, while humanity, just like that, is not one thing, any given humanity is. The 
humanity of Socrates is one, and the humanity of Plato is one, and so on. Each of 
these two humanities is peculiar and private to the individual whose humanity it 
is. Neither is shared or common, although of course they are quite similar. (We 
have a nominalist picture here.) 
Boethius puts this by saying that the species is “multiple and not one in number” 
(p. 22.13.1–2). 
Now, for our first puzzle with this passage, there’s a question about exactly what 
that phrase means. I discuss it in my paper “Boethius against Universals” that I 
just mentioned, and I won’t say much more about it here. The question arises over 
whether by something that is “multiple and not one in number” Boethius means 
some kind of collection — as he says in a passage from the Contra Eutychen, a 
“heap or chorus.” There’s some textual basis for this conjecture, but in the end I 
don’t find altogether persuasive. See my paper for details. 
However that turns out, suppose you agree with the claim — “species is multiple 
and not one in number.” Nevertheless, you might still want to preserve some kind 
of realism. Suppose then that genus and species do exist (the realist move), but 
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are “multiple and not one in number” — whatever that means. What is supposed 
to follow from that? Well, Boethius gives an example in terms of the genus 
animal, and argues somehow that there would be an infinite regress, and so “no 
last genus.” Presumably this is supposed to be an unacceptable result, so that the 
argument in (13) as a whole amounts to a reductio. 
OK, now notice something already. What is the unacceptable conclusion this 
argument in (13) is trying to derive? That “there will be no last genus,” he says. 
Now even though no one I know of has ever interpreted the passage this way, the 
phrase ‘last genus’ certainly suggests the interpretation “highest genus,” a “most 
general genus” or category, so that the argument would then be that the existence 
of universals that “are multiple and not one in number” would violate the 
Aristotelian theory of the categories. Surely the argument in the rest of the 
paragraph doesn’t suggest that this is what is going on at all, but the claim ‘there 
will be no last genus’, taken by itself, certainly sounds like it. 
Everyone who has ever written about or discussed this argument has, as far as I 
know, in effect taken it for granted that this is not what is going on in it. In fact, I, 
in “The Course in the Box,” and Peter King in his dissertation, when we 
paraphrase this argument, cast it not in terms of the genus ‘animal’, as Boethius 
himself had done, but in terms of the species ‘man’ or ‘humanity’. It’s as if we’ve 
been tacitly assuming that the fact that Boethius puts his example in terms of the 
genus ‘animal’ is purely accidental, and that the argument is meant to apply to 
any universal, whether a genus, a species or whatever. 
And I think this is the right interpretation in fact. Evidence for it can perhaps be 
found in the fact that all the other arguments in this part of Boethius’s discussion 
are put in terms of genus too, and nevertheless at the end of paragraph (12), 
Boethius says “[t]he same can be said about species.” Again, at the end of the 
paragraph (19), he says “[a]nd the same is to be understood for the other 
predicables.” 
But if this is so, if there is nothing unusual about genus in this argument, then 
what are we to make of the very first sentence of paragraph (13): “But even if 
genus and species do exist, but are multiple and not one in number, there will be 
no last genus”? Notice what the sentence does not say. It does not say that if 
genus exists and is multiple, there will be no last genus, and if species exists and 
is multiple, there will be no last species. Rather, on the most natural reading, what 
it says is that in either case, there will be no last genus. In other words, we will 
get the same result — no last genus — whether we start the argument by talking 
about genus or by talking about species. And if it is species we are talking about 
instead of genus, that result — that “there will be no last genus” — would mean 
that somewhere in the argument we move from species to genus, and so to 
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something broader than what we began with. If that step is repeated as the regress 
goes on, then the regress is not just a regress of further and further stages, but a 
regress that involves increasing generality. And if that’s what’s going on, then — 
however the argument works in detail — we do have a regress that does away 
with the Aristotelian theory of the categories as “most general genera.” 
Nevertheless, it remains true, as we shall see, that the actual argument in the rest 
of paragraph (13) doesn’t seem to involve any kind of regress to ever-increasing 
levels of generality, and no one has ever interpreted the argument as if it did. 
We’re left then with an initial puzzle about paragraph (13): Its first sentence 
would lead one to expect something quite different from the actual argument 
given in the paragraph. That may be significant or not, but there it is. 
Now let’s look at the actual argument in paragraph (13). What exactly is the 
objectionable infinite regress Boethius thinks he has found? 
Well, consider several animals, say, Socrates, Plato and the delightfully named 
Browny the Ass. (= Brunellus. We will meet Browny the Ass later on. He is Peter 
Abelard’s favorite example of an irrational animal. He will have a distinguished 
future. I use him here because I wanted to include another animal that’s not in the 
species man.) 
Now Socrates, Plato and Browny the Ass are “not the same” (see line 4 of the 
paragraph), since there are three of them, and yet they have “a certain similar 
something” (same line). In other words, they are alike in being animals. And “for 
that reason,” he says (next line, line 5), we look for their genus. 
That is to say, likeness — being alike — is a matter of coming under the same 
universal. In this case it’s a genus — animality. (Recall the similar argument I 
gave when I was setting out the realist response to the problem of universals at 
the very beginning of this course. The fact that we recognize certain things as 
being “alike” in various ways means there must be something they have in 
common; otherwise our “recognition” would be a distortion — and all the 
epistemological disasters consequent on nominalism would follow at once.) 
But the genus itself, by the hypothesis of the whole argument in paragraph (13), is 
not “one in number” but just as “multiple” as our three animals were to begin 
with. That is, Socrates’s animality, Plato’s animality and Browny’s animality are 
three animalities that are “not the same,” just as Socrates, Plato and Browny 
themselves were three animals that are not the same. But these three animalities 
are alike in being animalities, and therefore they too “have a certain similar 
something,” so that we must look for their genus in turn. And off we go on our 
regress. 
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That’s the argument. 
Comment: It’s a little hard to get a good grip on what’s going on here. Notice first 
of all that, as I suggested earlier, on this reading the argument does not proceed in 
terms of a regress of increasing generality of the kind that would result in there 
being no highest genus and therefore in a rejection of the Aristotelian theory of 
the categories. If there are three animals, then there are three animalities and three 
of that “similar something” those animalities have — call it animality-hood or 
whatever. And so it goes: three all the way up, never anything more general than 
that. 
Now if this really is the form of the argument in paragraph (13) — and I think it is 
— then, although it’s certainly obscurely put, it really isn’t anything we haven’t 
in effect seen before — at least “in germ.” 
Remember back to the very beginning of this course, when I was arguing both 
sides of the problem of universals by means of my two pieces of chalk. 
In that discussion, I started off by asking “How many colors do you see here? One 
or two?” Then I said that to the nominalist’s response that he sees two colors, 
although they are exactly alike, the realist would respond: “Oh, what you’re 
calling the two colors of the two pieces of chalk are really just two instances of 
the one color whiteness. Otherwise, how could you tell they were exactly alike?” 
Notice what’s happening here. We started off asking what it was that made the 
two pieces of chalk alike. Was it one universal color whiteness, as the realist 
maintained, or was it two exactly similar individual whitenesses, as the nominalist 
maintained? To the nominalist answer that it was two whitenesses that are alike, 
the realist then asks what it is that makes the two whitenesses alike. Notice how 
we’ve moved up one level — from talking about similar pieces of chalk to talking 
about similar individual whitenesses. And of course the same dialectic can be 
played out at this higher level, although I didn’t do it when I was talking about the 
chalk. In fact, it can be played out as many times as you want — and there doesn’t 
seem to be any progress made. 
Now that is exactly the kind of infinite regress Boethius seems to be talking about 
in paragraph (13). If Socrates, Plato and Browny the Ass are all similar animals 
not because they share in some one universal animality, but instead each has its 
own individual animality that is similar to the other two’s, then how do we 
account for the similarity of those animalities? (Not similar animals now, but 
similar animalities.) 
And if you say that each of those animalities is like the others not because they all 
share in some one universal “animality-hood” (or whatever you call it), but 
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because each animality has its own animality-hood that is exactly like that of all 
the other animalities, then (you see) we’re off on an infinite regress. 
So in effect the argument in paragraph (13) is directed against what might be 
called a “last-stand realist” — someone who might be willing to grant the 
nominalist line at a certain basic level, and even at higher levels, but who at some 
point is going to insist that we’re going to have to ground this “cascade” of 
similarities in some one universal. 
But of course it should be obvious that the realist has not made his case, and 
therefore that Boethius’s argument in paragraph (13) has to be taken seriously — 
obscure though it is. Whatever reason led the nominalist to say that animality is 
not one thing but many similar things, the same reason would seem to apply to 
animality-hood, or whatever we call it, one step up — that is, to whatever it is that 
all animalities have in common. And so the nominalist can say that animality-
hood itself will not be one either, despite the realist’s argument; it too turns out to 
be split up, to be “multiple and not one in number,” as Boethius puts it, so that, 
just as Socrates has his own animality, and so does Plato, so too the animality of 
Socrates has its own animality-hood, and so does the animality of Plato. These 
several animality-hoods are distinct, but of course they are similar, so that the 
realist might be tempted to try yet again one step higher. But, of course, what we 
have here is an infinite regress. 
The point is: Each time the realist makes his realist argument, the nominalist can 
counter with his nominalist line. And we can play that game as long as we like. 
The realist who refuses to give up is therefore committed to an infinite regress. 
Now you might well ask: Why should it be the realist who has to give up? Why 
not the nominalist? 
And of course the answer to that trade-off is that the whole thing depends on the 
force of that original nominalist move, whatever it was that led the nominalist to 
say that Socrates, Plato and Browny have three animalities and not one. If that 
move, whatever it is, is legitimate, then it will presumably work at each step of 
the infinite regress, so that there would have to be something wrong with what the 
realist is doing. 
So let’s turn back to that initial nominalist move. We’ve already seen one 
argument for it, in paragraphs (11)–(12), in terms of the convertibility of being 
and unity. But of course there was a crucial gap in that argument that I said we 
would come back to. 
The gap was in the move from saying that a universal was supposed to be 
common to many to saying that therefore the universal itself had to be many, that 
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the plurality of things that share in a universal somehow infects the universal 
itself and makes it a plurality too. 
Boethius says some further things along these lines in paragraphs (14)–(18). And 
of course, the whole thing depends crucially on the notion of exactly how a 
universal is supposed to be “common to many.” 
Well, Boethius says, just how can one thing be said to be common to many? 
(a) First of all — para. (15) — one thing can be common to many 
part by part, as happens for instance when we all share a pizza . 
You get one slice and I get another. None of us gets the whole 
thing. In fact, if I do take the whole pizza and hog it all myself, 
then we no longer are said to “share” it. 
But genus and species are not supposed to be common or shared in the way a 
pizza is. Socrates and Plato don’t have only slices or pieces of human nature. 
Each of them is supposed to possess human nature as a whole. Indeed, the whole 
point of saying that we all have a common human nature is just to be able to say 
that I have exactly what you have, not just a different slice or part of a larger 
whole. So universals are supposed to be common as a whole to several things. 
(b) Well, then — para. (16) — a single thing can be common to 
several things as a whole, but at different times. For instance, 
Boethius says, a slave or a horse. The idea is that I buy a slave or a 
horse, and he belongs to me totally, not just in part. I don’t have to 
share him with anyone else. But then I sell him to you, and he is 
totally yours, not just in part. So the slave or horse belongs as a 
whole to both of us, but at different times. 
But that’s not the way genus and species are supposed to be held in common. 
Human nature is not something we all take turns possessing — like the three 
Norns of Norse mythology. No, universals are supposed to be common to or 
shared by several things as a whole and at the same time. 
(c) Well, then — para. (17) — a single thing can be common to 
several things as a whole and at the same time, in the way a show 
or spectacle is. That is, for instance, we all stand around and watch 
the same performance. We all see the whole thing, not just part of 
it, and we all see the whole thing at the same time. (Ignore the fact 
that the show itself may be spread out over time — as, for instance, 
with a three-act play. That’s irrelevant. The point is that we don’t 
have to take turns seeing it.) 
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But this is still not the way genus and species are supposed to be common or 
shared. Genus and species are supposed to be common as a whole at the same 
time to several things, Boethius says, in such a way that they constitute their 
substance. Boethius is of course talking about genus here, and in particular about 
the genus animal, which is in the category of substance. So he would have to put 
this point rather differently if he were talking about universal properties or 
accidents — for example, risibility, or if he were talking about other categories 
than substance. But, however you put the point, it is clear that a universal is 
supposed to enter into the metaphysical make-up of the things to which it is 
common in a much more intimate way than a show or spectacle does. Exactly 
what that “metaphysical intimacy” is will of course be something we’ll have to 
examine more carefully in due course. 
If you combine all this, we are now in a position to see that a universal is 
supposed to be something — para. (18) — that is common to many things (a) as a 
whole, (b) simultaneously, and (c) in such a way as to enter into their 
metaphysical make-up in a particularly intimate way. 
In effect, what we have just seen is an attempt to define the notion of a universal. 
And, although there are still some questions (particularly about the exact kind of 
relation involved in (c)), it is really a pretty good, and even an admirable attempt. 
Very often people argue about universals without ever stopping to specify exactly 
what it is they are talking about, as though the notion of a universal were 
something plain and obvious and agreed upon by everyone. In fact, of course, it is 
nothing of the kind. Boethius’s definition here is a pretty good attempt to specify 
what we are talking about. It will be a very influential definition, as we shall see, 
although it will not be the only one in the Middle Ages. 
Now Boethius thinks that no one thing can be common to many things in all the 
ways required by this account of a universal. And obviously, the claim here will 
depend especially on what the peculiar sort of metaphysical “intimacy” is that 
universals are supposed to have with the things that possess them (see clause (c)). 
Unfortunately, Boethius doesn’t say anything more about it in this passage, and 
we are left with not quite everything we need for a complete assessment of the 
argument against universals in paragraphs (11)–(19). 
In any case, this whole passage — paragraphs (11)–(19) — is Boethius’s 
argument against universals, and it is supposed to show that genera and species do 
not subsist — or, for that matter, are not real at all. Later on, when we come to 
Peter Abelard in the twelfth century, we’ll see further arguments, of different 
kinds, for this nominalist position. 
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Before we turn to the other side, to the realist argument for universals, there are a 
number of things I want to point out about the argument we have just seen and 
about the attempt to define a universal that we’ve just gone through. 
(1) First of all, observe that the argument is a purely 
metaphysical one, just as we have by now come to expect. 
The difficulties with a realist view of universals, recall, are 
metaphysical or ontological ones. How can there be the 
kinds of entities that universals are supposed to be? 
(2) Second, I used to think that the attempt to define a 
universal that we have just seen in paragraphs (14)–(18) 
was Boethius’s own original account. I still think that 
Boethius was the first to use such considerations to try to 
define universals (or at least I know of no one earlier who 
did so), but I have now come to realize that Boethius was 
not being altogether original here. 
Take a look, for instance, at the passage from Porphyry in the Notes and Texts, 
not his Isagoge but from another work of his, called Exposition of Aristotle’s 
Categories by Question and Answer (pp. 41–42). This is a work that survives only 
in a single badly mangled manuscript, so that there are a number of textual 
difficulties with it. But it is an exceedingly interesting work anyway. 
The passage I have given you in the Notes and Texts comes from part of the 
commentary on the very first words of the Categories. At the beginning of the 
Categories, you may recall, Aristotle discusses homonyms (that is, equivocal or 
ambiguous terms), synonyms and “paronyms” (that is, pairs of words like 
‘just’/’justice’, ‘fire’/’fiery’). In the very first sentence of the work, Aristotle says 
that equivocals, or homonyms, are things that have a name in common — IN 
COMMON — but the definition of that name they do not have in common. For 
instance, ‘bank’ when it means the side of a river, and ‘bank’ when it means a 
financial institution. The word or name is the same, but the definition is not. 
(That’s of course not Aristotle’s own example.) 
Aristotle says that they have a common name. Now in the passage from 
Porphyry’s Exposition, the “questioner” asks what the word ‘common’ means 
there in Aristotle’s statement. But first, he says, “tell me in how many ways 
‘common’ is said” (line 10). 
So what we are going to get then is a kind of catalogue of various senses of the 
word ‘common’, and then we are going to see which one of those senses is the 
one Aristotle is using here. 
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Now notice: This is a quite different kind of context from the problem of 
universals. Porphyry is talking about having a single name in common, even 
though it’s a single name with a variety of different senses. He’s not talking about 
having some sort of metaphysical entity in common the way universals are 
supposed to be. Remember, I said that Boethius, as far as I know, was the first to 
apply what we’re about to see to the notion of a universal. 
Nevertheless, even though they’re talking about different things, it seems pretty 
clear to me that Boethius knew this passage from Porphyry, or some similar 
passage in another author, and had it very much in mind when he wrote the text 
we’ve just analyzed from his Commentary on Porphyry. 
Porphyry in this passage gives four senses in which things can be “common.” 
First, he says, “that is called ‘common’ which is divided into parts, like a loaf [of 
bread], and wine if it is one of [the things that] are divided” (lines 11–13).  
Now what do you suppose Porphyry means by that odd proviso, “if it is one of 
[the things that] are divided”? First of all, there’s a textual problem here. The 
Greek has the active participle ‘are dividing’ here, rather than the passive 
participle ‘are divided’. But I can make no sense of the active participle, and I 
suspect we just have to regard this as one more of the many corruptions of the text 
in this work. 
But why add such a condition at all? I suspect the point here is to contrast wine, 
and perhaps bread earlier in the sentence (although it’s not clear whether the 
condition is supposed to apply to both the bread and the wine or only to the wine) 
with the examples he’s going to give of the second sense of being “common,” in 
the next few lines. The examples there are “a horse” and “a slave.” The examples 
listed under the first sense can be divided up without destroying them, whereas 
the examples listed under the second sense cannot. Cutting up a loaf of bread or 
sharing a loaf of bread is just good cheer all around. But cutting up a horse or a 
slave is another matter altogether; it completely ruins their usefulness. 
I say I suspect Porphyry is making some such contrast here, I’m not entirely sure. 
In any event, it doesn’t matter a whole lot for our present purposes. However it 
turns out notice that this first sense is exactly what Boethius is talking about in his 
own paragraph (15), being “common” by part by part, as a pizza is “shared” by all 
those who take a slice. Universals, if there are any, are not common in that way. 
Second, Porphyry says, “That is called ‘common’ which is not divided into parts 
but is received by many for [their] use, like a horse or a slave [that is] common to 
many brothers” (lines 14–16). The examples, a horse and a slave, are exactly the 
ones Boethius uses for his own second way of being “common,” in paragraph 
(16). 
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Now at first you might think that Porphyry’s second sense doesn’t have anything 
to do with possessing something at different times, which is what Boethius is 
talking about. It looks as though all Porphyry is talking about here is something 
like the legal notion of “joint ownership” (“common to many brothers,” he says). 
On the other hand, perhaps the words “for their use” are important. Only one 
person at a time can actually use the slave or the horse. Well, maybe, but that’s 
not particularly plausible. Nevertheless, the word I have translated here as 
‘received’ is the Greek ðáñáëáìâáíüìåíïí (see n. 5 of the Porphyry text), a 
word often used in the context of inheritance, so that whatever Porphyry himself 
may have meant, this text could easily have suggested the notion of temporal 
succession to Boethius. 
Oddly, Boethius omits Porphyry’s third sense of being “common.” In this third 
sense, Porphyry says, “that is called ‘common’ which is in someone’s possession 
beforehand and, after being used, is returned to common [ownership]” (lines 16–
18). This is perhaps not altogether clear. In Porphyry’s second sense, as we have 
seen, what is “common” is passed from one individual to another, like for 
instance an inheritance or a  horse or slave, whereas in his third sense the 
predominant notion does seem to be one of “joint or common ownership,” which 
is to be distinguished from actual possession and use. He gives the examples of 
the public baths and the theater or assembly (lines 18–19). The idea here seems to 
be that even if no one is actually in the public baths at a given time, they are still 
“common” — they are still public. And the public theater belongs to everyone, 
even if no one is actually there at the moment and no performance is actually 
going on. On the other hand, if no one person actually has possession of a slave at 
a given time (one of the examples both Porphyry and Boethius give of the second 
sense), then he or she is simply not a slave then, and certainly not a slave “in 
common.” A slave that’s not owned just isn’t a slave at all! And a wild horse, not 
owned by anyone, doesn’t thereby become a public horse. 
The distinction between (2) and (3) is perhaps a little hard to make out 
convincingly. It is easy, for example, to suppose a slave owned by a whole 
family, rather than by any one individual in the family, so that we can contrive the 
kind of “joint ownership” Porphyry seems to have in mind for his third sense in 
the case of slaves and horses too. In any event, the distinction Porphyry seems to 
intend between his second and third senses of being “common” is that in the 
second sense what is received is received from another individual rather than 
from the “common store,” whereas the third sense allows the latter possibility as 
well. 
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That distinction is nuanced and subtle, and perhaps not altogether certain. And I 
suspect that’s why Boethius ignores it and reduces Porphyry’s four senses to 
three. 
In any case, Porphyry’s fourth and last sense once again uses the example of the 
theater or assembly. This is confusing, to be sure, since he had just used the very 
same example for his third sense. But here’s what he says: In the fourth sense 
“that is called ‘common’ which, as a whole, comes undividedly into the use (see 
my remark above on sense (2)) of many simultaneously” (lines 19–20). And, with 
the same example of the theater — or as Boethius puts it, a “stage-play, or some 
spectacle” — this is exactly Boethius’s third way of being “common” without 
being a universal (paragraph (17)). 
The upshot, then, is that this well-known passage from Boethius’s second 
commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge is not altogether original with him, although 
he does seem to have been the first to apply these distinctions to the problem of 
universals, and to make the point that a universal is not supposed to be common 
in any of these ways. 
The first thing I said wanted you to notice about this passage up through 
paragraph (19) in Boethius was that the argument is entirely metaphysical; the 
second thing is the parallel in Porphyry’s Exposition of the Categories. 
(3) The third thing I want you to notice about this passage from 
Boethius — and the corresponding passage from 
Porphyry’s Exposition of the Categories — is that, 
although the details are not at all alike, the passage is 
obviously reminiscent of, and probably inspired by, that 
part of Plato’s Parmenides where he is struggling to 
explain how things participate in the Forms. As you may 
recall, in Plato’s Parmenides Socrates is represented as a 
young man who has just come up with this neat theory of 
Forms, and is trying to defend it and explain it to 
Parmenides, who’s not entirely convinced. 
Now, recall, the Middle Ages did not have the text of the Parmenides. 
Nevertheless, here’s part of the discussion (Parmenides 131a–b — Parmenides 
speaks first): 
Then each thing that partakes receives as its share either the form 
as a whole or a part of it? Or can there be any other way of 
partaking besides this? 
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No, how could there be? 
Do you hold, then, that the form as a whole, a single thing, is in 
each of the many, or how? 
Why should it not be in each, Parmenides? 
If so, a form which is one and the same will be at the same time, as 
a whole, in a number of things which are separate, and 
CONSEQUENTLY WILL BE SEPARATE FROM ITSELF. 
Now think about that passage. In it we see the first two of Boethius’s three 
requirements for a universal: that it be present as a whole and simultaneously to 
many things. (In fact, it you’ll look at the last sentence of Boethius’s paragraph 
(11), you’ll find that these same two clauses are mentioned there — but not the 
third clause brought out later in paragraph (17). So there’s a very close parallel 
there.) 
We also see something else in this passage, and now I want to digress a bit on 
this. 
What is still missing from Boethius’s argument against universals? Well, what we 
still need is some reason that will persuade us that the three ways of being 
“common” that Boethius distinguishes—(i) part by part, (ii) as a whole but in 
succession, and (iii) as a whole and simultaneously, but in an external way that is 
not metaphysically constitutive—are the only ones there are, and that 
consequently there is nothing “common” to many things as a whole and 
simultaneously, in the metaphysically intimate way Boethius requires of a 
universal. 
Or to put it another way, we still need to know more about this “metaphysical 
intimacy,” by which, Boethius says, a universal is supposed to “be able to 
constitute and form the substance of the things to which it is common” (paragraph 
(18)). 
Or, to push it back one step further, we still need to know why the plurality of 
things to which a universal is supposed to be common would infect the universal 
itself, so that it too would be a plurality, and not one thing — with the result that, 
since it is not one, it is not a being either. 
The passage I have just read from Plato’s Parmenides addresses this point in a 
way that I think will perhaps advance our understanding of the matter, although it 
won’t settle it. 
One of the objections nominalists frequently raise against universals is that they 
are metaphysically too strange, because they are supposed to be in two or more 
 54
places at once. I raised this objection myself when I was presenting the nominalist 
point of view at the beginning of this course, with my two pieces of chalk. 
Realists frequently respond to this objection by saying that there simply isn’t 
anything wrong with being in two places at once. Individuals cannot be in two 
places at once, or at least material individuals cannot, but universals are just the 
kind of thing that can be in two places at once. That’s part of what it means to be 
a universal, and can hardly be used as an objection. To do so would amount to 
little more than saying that universals can’t exist, because if they did, they would 
be universal. 
The passage I just read you pushes the point a little further, I think, by telling us 
more about what is supposed to be wrong with being in two places at once. 
Well, Plato says (speaking through the voice of Parmenides): 
a form which is one and the same will be at the same time, as a 
whole, in a number of things which are separate, and consequently 
will be separate from itself. 
The real problem, then, is that if the whiteness of this piece of chalk and the 
whiteness of that piece of chalk are one and the same universal whiteness, then 
that one entity is separated from itself. In fact, it is separated from itself quite 
literally, by a measurable distance. 
To say that a thing is “separated from itself” sounds much stronger than merely 
saying that it is “in two places at once.” To say that something is “separated from 
itself” begins to sound like some kind of violation of the Law of Identity, saying 
something is distinct from itself. But the Law of Identity presumably applies to 
everything, individuals and universals alike. 
And this, of course, is exactly Boethius’s claim. By being wholly in two separate 
things at once, a universal violates its own identity. It would be no longer one 
thing, but two. 
Whether there really is some kind of logical principle involved here is a question 
that would require a further consideration. But it certainly looks like a stronger 
argument than just saying that the same thing would be in “two places at once” 
without explaining why that should be a problem. 
If you are interested in pursuing the matter further, you may want to look at the 
“Course in the Box,” Ver. 2.0, Vol. 1, Ch. 31 (“Anselm’s Monologion Discussion 
of How God Can and Cannot Be Said to Be in Space and Time”). 
Anselm is a late-eleventh century writer, whom we won’t have occasion to 
discuss in this course, since he doesn’t say much directly on the problem of 
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universals. In the passage I discuss in Ch. 31, Anselm wonders how, on the one 
hand, we can say God is everywhere (he is “omnipresent”), and he exists at all 
times changelessly, and yet, on the other hand, we also say that he is “outside 
space and time” entirely. How can we say both? 
Although Anselm is not talking about universals, what he says there has obvious 
applications to the same problem in connection with universals. And it’s pretty 
interesting stuff. 
Now, one thing you cannot say in reply to this argument in the Parmenides is 
that: 
The one universal whiteness is not separated from itself in these 
two pieces of chalk. What is separated is this whiteness, the 
whiteness of this piece of chalk, this instantiation of the one 
universal whiteness — and what it is separated from is that 
whiteness, the whiteness of that piece of chalk, that instantiation of 
the one universal whiteness. The two instantiations are separated, 
yes, but the one universal whiteness is unaffected by this. 
Why can’t you say this? Well, you can — but only by abandoning universals in 
the sense Boethius has just defined. 
 
Back when I introduced the problem of universals, I said that the realist view held 
that when I look at the color of this piece of chalk and then look at the color of 
that piece of chalk, I see only one color, one whiteness. In other words, the one 
universal color is present in each of these two pieces of chalk in the 
metaphysically intimate way Boethius requires. It is an ingredient of the two 
pieces of chalk, it enters into their metaphysical make-up. And in that case, of 
course, it is separated from itself. 
But, according to the response I just said you couldn’t give and still be a realist, 
this is no longer so. What enters into the metaphysical make-up of these two 
pieces of chalk is no longer the one universal whiteness, but rather two 
instantiations of one whiteness, individual whitenesses that are derived somehow 
from a common origin in that one whiteness. 
Now, there may not be anything wrong with this theory — and in fact we’ll see 
versions of throughout the semester — but it’s no longer a realism, it’s a form of 
nominalism. The so called universal whiteness is no longer an ingredient in the 
metaphysical make-up of the two pieces of chalk. Rather, it is its instantiation that 
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plays that role. And its instantiations are just as particular, just as individual, as 
the two distinct pieces of chalk they help make up. 
In other words, the so called one universal whiteness, by being removed from the 
two pieces of chalk, so that it no longer plays the role of a universal common 
structural ingredient but rather the quite different role of a common cause or 
ultimate origin, ceases to be a universal in the Boethian sense. On this theory, 
everything is particular. The one external, separated color whiteness is, to be sure, 
a kind of common cause of the particular colors of these two pieces of chalk, but a 
universal has to do more than that. The sun, after all is a kind of cause of all the 
life here on earth, but that doesn’t make it a universal in the sense we’ve been 
discussing. 
When we talked about the passage from Boethius, we said that the exact nature of 
the “metaphysical intimacy” Boethius required of a universal was something he 
left pretty much unspecified. Nevertheless, however it goes, it appears that on the 
theory we’ve just been discussing, the particular instantiations of the one, 
separated whiteness are much more “intimate” with their individuals than that 
separated whiteness is. They are what “enter into its metaphysical make-up,” they 
are “ingredients” of the finished product. It is not — although of course it has a 
role to play. 
In short, insofar as on this view everything is particular, it is a nominalism, not a 
realism. 
This brings me to the fourth point I want you to notice about the Boethian 
definition of a universal: 
(4) Plato was a nominalist, not a realist. Or at least the main 
strand of the Platonic theory, the “generally received” 
theory, is a nominalism, not a realism. Probably not the 
Theory of Forms in the Parmenides, in the passage we’ve 
just looked at, but certainly the Theory of Forms in the 
Republic and other dialogues — including an important 
passage we’ll discuss in a moment. 
Plato’s usual view is exactly like the one I’ve just described: one whiteness, the 
Platonic Form, off in another realm of pure Being quite separate from this realm 
of Becoming down here, a separated Form that serves as a kind of cause of the 
individual whitenesses that enter into the metaphysical make-up of particulars. 
(See the handout “The Greek Background to Mediaeval Philosophy.”) On Plato’s 
theory, then, everything is completely particular. 
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So the phrase ‘Platonic realism’ is a misnomer as applied to this theory, even 
though it is in common usage, and even though in a sense it is perfectly all right 
to use it. But if nominalism is the doctrine that says that everything that exists is 
completely particular or individual, that nothing real is shared or common in the 
way Boethius describes, then “Platonic realism” in its usual form is a nominalism, 
and that’s the end of that. 
The first time I announced (in an earlier version of this class) that Plato was a 
nominalist, the class gasped in disbelief. It was amazing to watch how otherwise 
reasonable people, who had followed and were willing to accept everything we 
had done up to that point, everything that, taken together, entailed by the most 
rigorous logical inexorability, that Plato was a nominalist and not a realist, 
nevertheless simply refused to accept that conclusion. It was as if logic and 
rationality, and everything else, were but small prices to pay in order to be able to 
maintain at all costs the conviction that Plato was a realist. It was an astonishing 
display, but it actually happened. 
Let’s practice saying it: Plato was a nominalist. 
(See? It doesn’t hurt so bad.) 
Digression 
Now I’ve thought about this for a long time: Why is it that people are so stubborn 
about this? 
Several years ago, I read a paper in the Medieval Studies Institute lecture series 
here on campus on the problem of universals. In the question and discussion 
period afterwards, a colleague of mine from another department — an 
accomplished scholar and a person for whom I have the utmost respect — just 
insisted that Thomas Aquinas believed in universals because he talks about Ideas 
in the mind of God, which serve as the patterns after which the things in this 
created world are fashioned. 
Now’s there is perhaps a sense in which Aquinas does believe in universals (we’ll 
talk about that later in this course). But he doesn’t mean the Divine Ideas. After 
that discussion session, I thought: “Aquinas does believe in those things. He calls 
them Divine Ideas. Sometimes he calls them the genera and species of things. But 
he never calls them universals. So why do you?” 
Now I said I’ve thought about this a lot recently, and I think I now understand 
better what is going on. 
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I think my colleague, like a lot of people, implicitly take a universal to be 
whatever it is that answers the so called “problem of universals.” And that’s not 
right. Universals are one answer to that problem, but not the only one. (If they 
were, then nominalists would turn out to believe in universals too, since they too 
think they have an answer to the problem, and all our distinctions would become 
hopelessly muddled.) 
Now let’s be clear about exactly what the “problem of universals” is. At the 
beginning of this course, I described the problem as simply “Do universals exist 
or not?” But while that’s perfectly correct as far as it goes, I think we’re now in a 
position to go deeper. 
The real motivation behind the question is this: How do we explain the 
undeniable fact that things seem to alike in certain respects? How do we account 
for what seem to be the “natural” groupings of things. 
What I am saying, in other words, is that what gets our whole problem going is 
the epistemological factors that at the beginning of this course I said provided the 
pressure in favor of realism. 
Think about it. The nominalist denies, on metaphysical grounds, the existence of 
the entities the realist believes in — these strange things that are somehow 
“shared” by or common to several things at once in the way we’ve seen Boethius 
try to make precise. But that’s not where the historical discussion begins. There 
would be nothing for the nominalist to deny unless someone else had affirmed the 
reality of universals to begin with. 
So the structure of the whole discussion is like this: The problem begins by asking 
how we can account for the undeniable fact that some things seem to be like other 
things in various natural groupings. That fact provides the epistemological 
pressure behind realism, and the belief in universals as the answer to the question. 
Only then, as a second step, do nominalists appeal to certain metaphysical factors 
that lead them to deny the existence of the things the realists believe in, and — 
they hope — come up with an alternative and better explanation of the undeniable 
fact that got the whole things started. 
In a word: You could in principle have realists 
without nominalists, but it is highly unlikely that 
you would ever have nominalists without realists. 
End of Digression 
Now let’s bring this back home. People’s generally stubborn insistence that Plato 
was a realist — and so was Aquinas and anyone else who ever talked about these 
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topics — is based, I think, on a combination of two things, one of which is 
legitimate and the other mistaken. The legitimate one, and something we can 
learn from, is the realization that the whole problem of universals from the very 
beginning is about how we are going to account for apparent natural groupings of 
things. The mistaken point is the implicit assumption that any answer to that 
question is going to count as a universal. 
In short, while Plato’s Forms, and medieval “Divine Ideas,” are most certainly 
relevant to the problem of universals in the sense we’ve just been talking about, 
while they are most certainly answers to the problem of universals in that sense, 
they are not universals. They are not what we mean by “universals” in this class, 
and they are not what most other people mean by “universals” throughout the 
entire subsequent history of the problem. 
Once again, when I say that Platonic Forms are not universals, and that Plato was 
a nominalist, it depends on where you look. There is the passage from the 
Parmenides, the one I read you a little while ago, where Plato describes the Forms 
as being “at the same time, as a whole, in a number of things which are separate.” 
And that certainly sounds pretty close to the Boethian definition of a universal 
(except that Boethius emphasizes the “metaphysical intimacy” more). In that 
passage, Plato no doubt really is a realist. 
Nevertheless, the “generally received” Platonic doctrine , the main strand of his 
thinking, doesn’t go like that at all. 
For example, look at Timaeus 48e–53c. (READ IT. Here is a handout for the 
passage. The English translation there is the old Benjamin Jowett translation, 
which has been much criticized but is not bad, and has the virtue of being freely 
available. Nevertheless, I will using another translation in what follows.) 
Recall, I said earlier that the Middle Ages possessed only part of the Timaeus in 
Latin translation. The part they did have ended with 53c, the very end of the 
passage I want to talk about now. The main use of the Timaeus in the Middle 
Ages came about only in the twelfth century, but it was available much earlier. 
More or less the same doctrine we find in the Timaeus is also contained in Plato’s 
Seventh Letter 342a–343c (if that is authentic). But it is not so clear or explicit 
there. 
The Timaeus is Plato’s account of the origin of the cosmos. At Timaeus 48e–53c, 
he discusses what he calls the Receptacle (= ›ðïäï÷Þ), or “the receptive.” 
Now we all know that in Plato, things in the sensible world are but pale imitations 
of the Forms. (See the earlier handout on “The Greek Background.”) So we have 
two poles here: (1) the Forms, and (2) imitations of Forms. 
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We also know that, as early as the Parmenides, the exact nature of the relation 
between Forms and their imitations bothered Plato. I read you a short passage 
earlier from that discussion. 
The theory of the Receptacle or the Receptive in the Timaeus is an attempt to 
work this out. 
The Receptacle is, according to the analogy Plato develops in the Timaeus, like 
sealing wax, the sort of thing people used to use to seal envelopes. The Forms, on 
the other hand, are like the seal ring, a signet ring. The metaphor then is that, just 
as a seal ring leaves a number of distinct impressions in the wax, so too a Form 
leaves a number of distinct impressions in the Receptacle. The impressions are 
quite particular and individual. No one impression is shared or common. The 
Form is an individual too. It is “shared,” in a sense, but it is no more a universal 
than the seal ring is. It is “common” or “shared” only in the sense of being a 
“common cause,” a cause that has several distinct effects. It does not enter into 
the inner metaphysical structure of its products in the way the particular 
impressions of it do. To use the example I gave you a while ago, the Form is no 
more a Boethian “universal” than the sun is, which is likewise, after all, a cause of 
several effects at once. 
At Timaeus 50c (near the beginning of the relevant passage), Plato says: 
Its [= the Receptacle’s] nature is to be available for anything to 
make its impression upon. 
The word translated ‘impression’ here is dêìáãåsïí, and is exactly the word used 
in Greek for impressions of a seal or signet ring. 
Here then we see for the first time the seal ring metaphor. It is going to be very 
important for us. We will meet it time and again through this course, and it is used 
throughout the Middle Ages for all sorts of things — not all of them having 
directly to do with the problem of universals. (For example, is it also a central 
metaphor in Aristotelian epistemology.) Keep the metaphor in mind. 
Note something here: Despite the Jowett translation, which uses the term ‘matter’ 
— for instance, at 50d and 50e — Plato himself nowhere uses the term ‘matter’ 
(in Greek, œëç).He calls it the Receptacle (›ðïäï÷Þ). And when it comes to a 
question what this really is, Plato identifies the Receptacle with: space. 
(See 52b. This is the “empty container” theory of space.) 
Unfortunately, of course, the seal-ring metaphor doesn’t fit very well with the 
notion of space. It’s hard to stamp an impression on empty space. 
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Nevertheless, in the subsequent history of this passage, although the connections 
with space will always remain, it is the seal-ring analogy that is picked up and 
becomes the dominant feature of the passage. The talk about space comes to be 
viewed as just as metaphorical as the seal-ring metaphor itself. 
When Chalcidius translated the first part of the Timaeus (through 53c) into Latin 
in the late third or early fourth century, and then wrote a commentary on it, 
Plato’s Receptacle came to be interpreted not as space but rather as matter. (This 
had already happened in Plotinus, Enneads, II.4.) And this is the form in which 
this picture is transmitted down through the Middle Ages: The Forms leave their 
individual impressions stamped on matter. 
Let me say one last thing about this seal-ring metaphor for now: It is a metaphor, 
not an argument. If it were an argument, the realist would no doubt object that, 
while the Forms may be individual in this picture, and the impressions may be 
individual, nevertheless the picture doesn’t do without universals entirely, insofar 
as the relation of “causing” or “impressing” or “stamping” that holds between the 
Forms and the impressions seems to be a universal relation, shared by or common 
to the many instances of Forms’ being impressed on matter. 
But of course, the metaphor is not an argument, and was never meant to me. The 
nominalist might well reply: If you are realist enough to raise an objection like 
that, then you shouldn’t be using my seal-ring metaphor to begin with; it simply 
doesn’t apply to your theory. And if you are nominalist enough to use the 
metaphor, then you should be willing to use it again to account for the relations of 
impressing. In short, the situation here is exactly like the situation we saw earlier 
with Boethius’s infinite regress argument about there being “no last genus” 
(paragraph (13)) — that is, “who gives up first?” 
And, at this point, I want to give you another piece of assigned reading. 
It’s a paper of mine called The Warp and Woof of Metaphysics: How to 
Get Started on Some Big Themes. (Distribute.) It’s a kind of “grab-bag,” 
of material I put together years ago in connection with a course on 
Thomas Aquinas. You probably won’t be in a position yet to see why I’m 
raising certain points in it. But never mind. Read it and keep it handy as 
we go along. The considerations in that paper will become relevant at 
various points as we go along. For the present, there’s an important 
discussion of the distinction between “Platonic”-style and “Aristotelian”-
style metaphysics, of how the modern use of the term ‘properties’ is not 
the medieval one, of the seal-ring metaphor, and of this passage from the 
Timaeus. 
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Now let’s return to Boethius. Everything we’ve said so far about the passage from 
his Second Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge has been a kind of explication of 
and meditation on paragraphs (11)–(19): the preliminary arguments against 
universals. Let us now turn to the other side, and look at the argument for 
universals, p. 23 paragraphs (20)–(22) in Five Texts. We can treat this rather 
quickly, since we’ve now got a lot of the terminology and machinery in place. 
If, as the previous arguments concluded, genera and species are not real, then it 
appears, Boethius says, that they must be pure fabrications of the mind. Or, as he 
puts it, generic and specific concepts are concepts taken from things, but (p. 
23.20.3) “as the thing is not disposed.” 
We form generic and specific concepts for the sake of dealing with external 
realities, but if there are no generic or specific entities those concepts have 
nothing answering to them on the side of reality. The objection to nominalism 
then is that it makes our concepts “false” and “empty.” They are not just arbitrary; 
they are outright distortions of reality. 
Hence, we could have no real knowledge of the world, since our knowledge — or 
at least any that’s going to be very important — proceeds in terms of general or 
common concepts. Thus, the argument against nominalism — and so for realism 
— is that without universals, we are left with insuperable epistemological 
difficulties. 
Note that this is exactly what we should expect, given what I said at the outset: 
metaphysics is on the side of nominalists; epistemology is on the side of realists. 
 
Now those are the preliminary arguments. Remember, I said that Boethius’s 
discussion in this whole passage was constructed in a kind of rudimentary 
quaestio-form. That is, first we get arguments on the one side and then arguments 
on the other, and then we get the author’s own view, which must of course 
address the preliminary arguments. 
Boethius’s own view begins on p. 23, in paragraph (23). 
He says he is taking his solution from a certain “Alexander.” This is Alexander of 
Aphrodisias, the famous third-century AD commentator on Aristotle, and indeed 
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one of the three truly all-time great commentators on Aristotle.2 (Note: This 
remark implies that there was at least some discussion of universals before 
Boethius.) How does the solution go? 
At first, it may seem to you that there is a kind of studied ambiguity in the 
doctrine. In fact, I don’t think there is. But that will come later. Let’s approach 
this “solution” now in several passes. 
On our first pass, we can say that the solution proceeds by adopting the 
nominalist alternative (so Boethius in the Second Commentary on Porphyry is a 
nominalist), the claim that genera and species do not subsist — and in fact are not 
real in any sense — but rather exist purely in the mind. The solution then goes on 
to reject the counterargument to this view, that it leads to skepticism. That is, 
Boethius denies that concepts formed from things “as the things are not 
disposed,” as he puts it, need to be false and empty (distortions of reality). That 
depends on how they depart from the way things are disposed. 
First, let’s look at what Boethius means when he talks about a concept’s being 
formed “as the thing is not disposed.” Well, what would it mean for a concept to 
be formed “as the thing is disposed”? Let’s try to explain it like this: 
A concept can be regarded as a kind of mental picture or representation, and 
Boethius does so regard it. 
Now, this “picture”-theory of concepts has been subjected to a lot of criticism and 
ridicule over the years. But it need not be held in any kind of naive and simple-
minded way. Provided one is sophisticated enough about it, there need be nothing 
wrong with this theory. In particular, we can say that concepts are mental pictures 
without committing ourselves to a view that would confuse concepts with 
imagination images or fantasy images.  
If a concept is a “picture” of an object in this way, then we will say that a concept 
is formed “as the thing is disposed” if and only if the concept is an exact picture 
or representation of the object. That is, it includes all and only what is included in 
the object itself. A concept is formed “as the thing is not disposed” if it fails to be 
like this. 
Now, without worrying too much at this point about the details of this picturing 
relation, we can see that if a concept fails to be an exact picture of an object — 
that is, if it is formed “as the thing is not disposed” — this may come about in one 
(or both) of two ways: 
                     
2 A wide old professor of mine in graduate school (Anton Pegis) once observed that, 
although there have been lots of very good commentators on Aristotle, there have been three and 
only three really great commentators: Alexander of Aphrodisias, Averroes, and Thomas Aquinas. 
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(a) First, because of “composition,” as Boethius puts it (p. 
23.24.4). For instance (his example), when we put together 
the concept of a horse and the concept of a man, to get the 
concept of a centaur. The resulting concept may include — 
and in this example does include — more than is included 
in any one real object (if centaurs are impossible), and for 
that matter than in any one possible object, and so the 
concept says too much. In that sense, it is formed as the 
thing (any thing) is not really disposed. 
Actually, Boethius’s example of a centaur may not be well put, if you think about 
it. It seems to depend on taking a centaur to be a complete horse plus a complete 
man, rather than — as it is usually portrayed — something that is part man and 
part horse. But never mind, the basic idea is clear enough. Boethius is talking 
about the kind of concept that “departs” from reality by “saying too much.” If you 
don’t like the example of a centaur, take the example of a square-circle. 
Concepts formed by “composition,” then, are a little like what Bertrand Russell 
called “knowledge by description” — the so called “knowledge” I have of 
something not by experiencing it directly but rather by contriving a kind of 
description of it, composed of several other concepts that I do get by directly 
experiencing what they are concepts of. 
A concept that departs from reality in this way, Boethius says, is false and empty. 
Note: When Boethius calls a concept “false,” he is not talking about false 
judgment. He just means an “empty” or “non-denoting” or “vacuous” concept. 
Concepts formed like this then are “false” by saying too much, so that they end up 
saying something that isn’t so. 
Note that not all concepts formed by “composition” like this are “false and 
empty”; not all such concepts end up “saying too much” and so departing from 
reality. In Russell’s terminology, I can have “knowledge by description” of things 
that really do exist. (That’s the way I know Portland, Maine, for instance, since 
I’ve never been there.) But the point is that when I put concepts together like this, 
there is no guarantee that they won’t end up “saying too much” and so being 
“formed,” as Boethius says, “as the thing is not disposed” (any thing). 
(b) On the other hand, Boethius says, concepts may also be 
formed “as the thing is not disposed,” and so depart from 
reality, by what Boethius calls “division” or “abstraction” 
(p. 23.25.1). What we have here then is our first encounter 
with a theory of abstraction. 
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Concepts formed in this way, by “division” or “abstraction,” Boethius says, are 
never false or empty, even though they too in a sense depart from reality by 
leaving out certain things that are included in the real object. 
For instance, I can form the concept of color without considering surface. I can 
treat them separately. And the concept I end up with by so doing, the concept of 
color, is a perfectly legitimate concept. There is nothing false or empty about it. 
There really are colors, after all, and the concept of color is really of them. So 
those concepts are not false and empty. 
Let’s be clear about what Boethius is not doing here. He is not saying that the 
concept color-without-surface is not empty, because that concept is empty. There 
are no colors without surfaces. Boethius is not talking about a concept that 
includes only certain features of the object like this, and then positively excludes 
the rest. Instead, he is talking only about a concept that includes certain features 
of the reality and completely ignores the rest, has nothing to say about the rest. 
In the terminology of the later Middle Ages, this is the difference between plain 
old abstraction, and what is called precision, or abstraction with precision (from 
Latin ‘praescindere’ = to cut off). 
TAKE THIS SLOWLY. Here’s an example of the difference between these two 
kinds of abstraction. (It comes from Thomas Aquinas’s On Being and Essence.) 
Consider the term ‘body’. To say that something is a body is to say that it is a 
physical object. (Think back to the Porphyrian tree. The real definition of body 
was material substance.) In this sense, we can say that Socrates is a body. He is a 
very special kind of body, of course. He is alive (or was then), he reasons, and so 
on. But none of that is to deny that he is a body. When used in this sense, the term 
‘body’ is said to be taken in abstraction, but not with precision. The other features 
of Socrates are not ruled out; they’re just not mentioned. This is the kind of thing 
Boethius is talking about, what he means by “division.” 
Contrast this with what happens when we say that Socrates is a composite of a 
body plus soul plus various accidents. Here ‘body’ is taken with precision. ‘Body’ 
in this sense doesn’t just fail to mention the rest. It positively excludes the rest, so 
that if we want to bring them into the picture too, we must mention the other 
factors explicitly as distinct things to be added on from outside. This is not the 
kind of thing Boethius means by forming a concept by “division.” 
‘Body’ is one of the few terms in English where the same word can be used both 
with and without precision like this. Usually we do it with concrete vs. abstract 
forms of the noun. Thus ‘man’ [concrete] vs. ‘humanity’ [abstract].) We can do it 
that way with ‘body’ in English too: ‘body’ vs. ‘bodyhood’ or something like 
that. But we don’t have to; we can use ‘body’ both ways. Furthermore, ‘body’ is 
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one of the even fewer English words like this where the corresponding Latin word 
— ‘corpus’, in this case — behaves exactly the same way! Aquinas uses the 
example in On Being and Essence. Nothing much rests on these oddities of the 
words ‘body’ and ‘corpus’, but it is important to keep in mind the distinction 
between abstraction with precision and abstraction without precision. Boethius is 
here talking only about what will later be called abstraction without precision. 
Boethius’s own example of this (paragraph (26), and again in paragraph (29)) is 
of a geometrical line, which he says is present in and inseparable from a physical 
body. Yet the mind can “separate” it from the body and consider it apart from any 
consideration of the body, even though it cannot exist apart from the body. For 
example, we can do geometry! 
For us — or for me, at any rate — that is rather an awkward example, since it 
seems to say that mathematical notions can be derived from sensation by 
abstraction. This will be a problem if you don’t think there are any absolutely 
straight lines (which is what Boethius is talking about) in physical nature, or any 
perfect circles or absolutely smooth surfaces. If they’re not really out there in 
physical nature, then they are not there to be abstracted from experience of 
physical nature. Nevertheless, Boethius’s view here is basically an Aristotelian 
theory of mathematical objects. I happen to find it a not very plausible view, 
which is why I gave you the example of ‘body’ — and of color vs. surface — 
rather than Boethius’s own example of a geometrical line. 
Boethius thinks our generic and specific concepts — and in fact all our basic 
general concepts — are formed by “division” or “abstraction” in the sense we’ve 
just described. (We also have concepts formed by composition, of course, but 
they are not “basic”; they are derived, and we’re not talking about them for now.) 
Our basic general concepts all depart from reality, and in that sense are formed 
“as the thing is not disposed.” But they are not false or empty. They say nothing 
false; they just don’t say the whole truth. 
So far, so good. What we have here is a kind of rudimentary theory of abstraction. 
There are no universal entities out there in reality. There is no humanity in 
general; there is only the humanity of Socrates and the humanity of Plato. But the 
mind can observe these humanities and disregard — or “divide out,” to continue 
Boethius’s “division” talk — their differences, so that what it ends up with is a 
general or universal concept of humanity that is based on and grounded in reality, 
and does not falsify reality. 
I will say more about the virtues or vices of such views later on. But for the 
present, let’s listen to Boethius some more, because he’s not done. And things 
now begin to get terminologically rather confusing in Boethius’s text. Or at least 
they’re confusing if you’re not careful. 
 67
For example, at the end of the whole passage, when he is finally answering 
Porphyry’s three questions, he says in response to the first question (p. 25.34) that 
genera and species do subsist after all. In reply to the second question (paragraph 
(35)) he says they subsist in themselves (whatever that adds) and are incorporeal. 
He doesn’t quite go on to say they are in the individuals they are genera and 
species of, which is what Porphyry’s third question asked. He only says they are 
“joined” to individuals. We’ll see in a moment why he’s being non-committal. 
But it doesn’t make any difference whether he says it here, because he does say it 
explicitly at the top of p. 25, at the beginning of paragraph (31): “And so these 
things exist IN singulars, but are thought of as universals.” (This sentence 
becomes a kind of slogan later on in the Middle Ages.) 
But how can all this be? I thought we just said Boethius accepted the nominalist 
view, that such universals do not subsist. And if you look through the passage as a 
whole, it is clear that he does accept this. So what is going on? 
In order to understand this, you must first realize that Boethius is using the term 
‘genus’ here for two quite distinct kinds of things, and so too the term ‘species’. 
I’ll explain in a moment why this is not just irresponsible equivocation. But for 
the present, let’s just look at what those two quite distinct kinds of things are. 
When Boethius says genera and species do subsist or exist, he is not saying that 
something common or universal subsists or exists. The antirealist arguments at 
the beginning of the passage are correct here, Boethius thinks. There is no 
humanity in general, no animality in general. On the other hand, we do have a 
humanity of Socrates, and a humanity of Plato, and likewise an animality of 
Socrates and an animality of Plato. And there is a perfectly good sense in saying 
that Socrates’s humanity is his species or specific nature, whereas his animality is 
his genus or generic nature. In that sense, then, genus and species do subsist or 
exist, but they are not universal or common; there is nothing shared here. 
Boethius goes on, immediately after the sentence about how genera and species 
exist in individuals but are thought of as universals, to say (lines 2–4 of paragraph 
(31), at the top of p. 25): 
Species is to be regarded as nothing else than the thought gathered 
from the substantial likeness of individuals that are unlike in 
number. Genus, on the other hand, is the thought gathered from the 
likeness of species. 
(The last occurrence of the word ‘species’ there is in the plural.) 
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In other words, the common concept of the species has no common thing 
corresponding to it in reality; what corresponds to the concept “humanity” is 
several things, all the individual, private humanities of Socrates and Plato and 
others, which are alike and yet have nothing in common. So the concept is not 
empty and false. It is just that the correspondence with reality is not one-to-one; it 
is one-to-many. 
Notice the terminological shift in this passage at the beginning of paragraph (31): 
First he says genera and species exist in singulars or individuals (line 1). Here he 
is talking about the individual humanities and animalities of Socrates and Plato, 
and calling those things the species and genera. Then, in the very next words 
(lines 2–4), he turns around and says species must be considered to be a kind of 
thought. Here he is talking about the general concept. 
Now, this may look like a hopeless terminological muddle. But in fact, it isn’t. 
What seems to be going on here is that Boethius is implicitly using a basically 
Aristotelian theory of knowledge — which is not inappropriate, since after all he 
is commenting on the Isagoge, which is an introduction to Aristotle’s Categories. 
Now one of the most basic and fundamental features of Aristotelian epistemology 
is that the knower is supposed to take on the form of the known. (See the handout 
“The Greek Background to Mediaeval Philosophy.”) This doctrine may sound 
absolutely wild to you, but Aristotle means what he says. When I have sense-
knowledge of an object, for instance, it is based on a sense-impression caused in 
me by the action of an object on my sense-organ. Aristotle even explicitly uses 
the “seal-ring” metaphor, which we have already seen in a different context in 
Plato. When the ring is stamped into the wax, it leaves there an impression of 
itself, which formally speaking (that is, from the point of view of the form), is 
exactly identical with the ring itself — or at least with that portion of the ring that 
does the impressing. The form is the same, although of course the matter is not. 
The ring is gold or brass or whatever, but the impression is just wax. So too, the 
sense-power of the soul takes on the form of its object, although not the matter. 
The form that inhered in the matter in the external object now inheres in the 
sensitive faculty of the soul, which therefore acts like matter. As a result, we are 
“informed,” and gain “information.” (That’s where this terminology comes from.) 
So too at the level of concept-formation. General concepts are formed, according 
to Aristotle, when the mind takes one of these sense-impressions, and does 
something to it to remove the features that make it an impression of this particular 
object and no other. In short, it “removes the individuating conditions,” as later 
authors will put it. What it ends up with then is a universal concept. This is 
Aristotle’s theory of “abstraction,” which is very much like the theory we’ve just 
seen in Boethius. 
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Just as the sense-impression was formally identical with the original object, so too 
for the universal concept. It’s just not formally identical with the whole of the 
original object, but only with that part or aspect of it that is preserved or left after 
the mind gets done removing the individuating conditions. 
If you are not familiar with this doctrine — and you may well not be — I suggest 
you consult the handout on “The Greek Background to Mediaeval Philosophy,” 
but especially (Distribute) “Aristotelian Epistemology and Its Arabic 
Developments” (from Ver. 2.0 of “The Course in the Box,” with mysterious 
coding in the text), and the correlative texts of Aristotle (distribute) “Passages 
from Aristotle’s De anima” (from “The Course in the Box,” Ver. 3.0). Do get 
familiar with the doctrine one way or another, because it is going to be very 
important. We will have more to say about it later on. 
Now it’s crucial to realize that when Aristotle says the universal concept is 
formally identical with the object, or at least with the conceived part of the object, 
he means identical. It is not just that one is like the other, that the one is a kind of 
duplicate of the other. No, they are identical. That is, they are one thing, not two 
things. 
There may well be a question about just what kind of “identity” Aristotle has in 
mind here. It’s not silly, although it’s not exactly what we normally mean by 
“identity” either. (But it’s also not that far from it, either. If you want to find out 
more about this, look at my paper “Degrees of Being, Degrees of Unity: Aquinas 
on Levels of Reality,” in the “Articles (Bibliography)” subfolder on the 
“Resources” page of our Oncourse site. That paper is really about Aquinas, but it 
also has something to say about this matter.) In any case, it’s clear that Aristotle 
means “identity” in a strong enough sense that no inference is needed from the 
concept to the object. In other words, by insisting on the identity of concept and 
object Aristotle can guarantee the objectivity of knowledge. With Aristotle, you 
do not have the kind of problem Descartes had, starting with a concept or idea in 
his mind, and then wondering whether it was legitimate to infer from that idea to 
the existence of an object represented by it. For Aristotle, you don’t have to infer. 
The concept puts the mind into direct contact with the object, insofar as the 
concept just is the object — or at least that aspect of the object that is known by 
the concept. So the objectivity of knowledge is guaranteed for Aristotle. (He, of 
course, has the opposite problem: How can we ever make mistakes? That one was 
easy for Descartes, whose whole philosophy started from the fact that we make 
mistakes sometimes.) 
All this can of course be said without supposing that Aristotle’s purpose in 
holding this view was to avoid Cartesian problems. That would be hopelessly 
anachronistic. But whatever his motivation was, his theory has this consequence. 
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That’s enough for the present about Aristotle’s epistemology. (For the rest, see 
the references I gave you a moment ago.) You are now in a position to see that, if 
this is what Boethius had in mind — and I think it is, since after all Boethius was 
pretty familiar with Aristotle — then he can, quite legitimately and with impunity 
— i.e., without equivocation — use the terms ‘genus’ and ‘species’ both for the 
universal concept in the mind, and also for the individual correlates in reality. 
There is no ambiguity at all, even though there is some danger of confusion if you 
don’t realize what is going on. 
This then is Boethius’s answer to the problem of universals in his Second 
Commentary on Porphyry. It adopts a basically nominalist metaphysics, but then 
argues that this does not compromise human knowledge. The mechanism that 
makes this possible is a theory of abstraction, conceived of as a kind of “filtering” 
or separating out — what Boethius calls “division.” The “individuating 
conditions” are filtered out, leaving the pure universal concept. 
 
This is a common theory in the Middle Ages — and for that matter even today. It 
is sometimes called “moderate realism”; it’s just “realist” enough to safeguard 
human knowledge, but not realist enough to get you into metaphysical difficulties. 
It’s nominalist enough to avoid the metaphysical difficulties of more robust forms 
of realism, and yet not so nominalist that it wrecks any possibility of general 
knowledge of reality. Theories like this are also called “conceptualism” by some 
people. 
Frequently the most astonishing claims are made for this kind of theory. As we 
shall see, Thomas Aquinas had a theory very much like it, at least on the usual 
interpretation of Aquinas, and so the theory has come to have all the authority that 
Thomas Aquinas had — at least until the 1960’s — in Catholic intellectual 
circles, and so among the majority of historians of medieval philosophy for the 
last forty years or so. 
People who accept this view as a successful solution to the problem of universals 
describe the alternative views in terms verging on libel. On the one hand, we have 
the extreme realists, ultra-realists, or naive-realists. On the other hand, we have 
the nominalists who are so beyond the pale that we don’t even have a special term 
of abuse reserved for them, even though they were probably responsible for the 
destruction of the entire medieval synthesis, and are suspected, at least, of secretly 
bringing about the Reformation. By contrast, the kind of theory we have just 
looked at is a “moderate realism,” and therefore has all the middle-of-the-road 
virtues of the Golden Mean. 
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As you read around in the literature, you really will find this kind of talk a lot. 
You should learn to expect it, and also learn not to take it too seriously. For the 
fact is, this kind of “moderate realist” theory has severe — and, I frankly think, 
crippling — philosophical difficulties of its own. 
The main problem is that the theory can’t seem to decide whether it’s a 
nominalism or a realism, whether universals really exist or not. When the theory 
is speaking in the metaphysical tone of voice, it sounds as nominalist as they 
come. There is nothing shared or common out there in reality. 
But when it comes to epistemology, the same theory sounds pretty strongly 
realist. Our general concepts do have a basis in reality. 
The crucial device that gives this theory its apparent plausibility is of course the 
doctrine of abstraction. It’s what is really doing all the work in the theory. But as 
long as “abstraction” is thought of — as it is in Boethius — as a matter of 
filtering out or stripping away the individuating conditions, the theory is hopeless. 
The whole point of the “filtering out” metaphor — the “dividing,” as Boethius 
puts it — is that what you end up with is something that was really there to begin 
with. It was just all covered over with these “individuating conditions.” So, if 
what you end up with as the result of this process of filtering is a universal, that 
universal must have been present at the outset in the original object. And that’s 
not nominalism; that’s realism. 
As long as abstraction is thought of as a matter of uncovering the universal by 
disregarding its individuating conditions, we are committed to the view that the 
universal is after all there to be uncovered. Otherwise, abstraction would fail! 
So “moderate realism” — at least until it gives us an altogether different account 
of “abstraction” — is an unsuccessful theory. It solves the problems of realism by 
simply speaking like a nominalist whenever they arise, and it solves the problems 
of nominalism by speaking like a realist whenever they arise. This kind of 
prestidigitation might create the illusion of success for some people. But we can 
surely see though that. 
No, if this kind of theory is going to have a hope of really working, and not just of 
fooling the people who are already committed to believing it, we’re going to have 
to come up with some notion of concept formation — call it “abstraction” if you 
want — that is not based on a “filtering” or “subtracting” or “separating” 
metaphor. 
There is a philosophical task for you, quite apart from any history lessons you 
may learn in this course. 
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Now let’s finish up with our text. 
At the very end of the entire passage (paragraph (37)), Boethius makes a truly 
astonishing remark. 
He has just observed (paragraph (36)) that Plato and Aristotle disagree over the 
answer to Porphyry’s third question. Aristotle says that genera and species 
(although not universal genera and species, according to Boethius) are in 
individuals, whereas Plato says they are separated — that is, they are the Platonic 
Ideas or Forms. (And remember, Platonic Forms are no more universal in 
Boethius’s sense than what Aristotle is talking about.) 
After noticing this difference, Boethius says that he has followed Aristotle here 
(through his commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias) not because he thinks this 
theory is true, but because he is commenting on a text, the Isagoge, that is 
supposed to introduce the reader to Aristotle’s Categories, so that it is his job to 
be Aristotelian about it. 
All right, now what are we to make of this? Does Boethius mean that he doesn’t 
believe a word of all the stuff he has just been feeding us, and that he’s really a 
crypto-Platonist — or even a realist (GASP)? 
 
Well, if you look at some of Boethius’s other works, where is he speaking in his 
own right, and is not operating under the constraints of a faithful commentator, 
you can piece together another view that is somewhat more Platonic than the one 
we have just been looking at. In fact, you can piece together at least two views 
from these other passages. 
Let’s look at some of these passages, then. In particular, I want you to look at the 
passages contained in the section Boethius: Two Texts from His Theological 
Tractates in the Notes and Texts (pp. 49–53). And let me warn you: We’re going 
to be going over these texts quite closely, and extracting from them theories you 
might suspect the texts can’t really bear. But don’t be deceived: The theories I 
may seem to be straining to get out of these texts are all theories we will see again 
in the twelfth century, and in fact see again in discussions of and commentaries on 
these very passages. 
All right, now we’ve already talked about the first passage to some extent, from 
the Contra Eutychen. This is the passage where Boethius makes the distinction 
between ‘subsisting’ and ‘substanding’, and tells us they are used to translate two 
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distinct Greek terms in a way that in fact he doesn’t stick to in his commentary on 
Porphyry. 
In this first passage, from the Contra Eutychen, we get a picture of an individual 
substance, to which accidents can be added and from which they can be removed. 
Substances don’t need accidents, remember, even though in fact they have them. 
(That was the difference between “substanding” and “subsisting.”) 
This is a basically Aristotelian picture. The idea is that accidents are ontologically 
parasitic kinds of things; they depend on their substances. The substances are the 
basic things, and don’t depend on accidents. 
Given this, let’s approach things by looking at the structure of an individual, and 
asking ourselves what it takes to be an individual for Boethius. 
In effect, what we are asking now is how to make that last step on the Porphyrian 
tree (if we include individuals), the jump from the infima species, the last species 
“man,” to the individuals Socrates and Plato. At every previous step on the tree, 
we made the transition to the next lower step by adding a difference — or a 
specific difference, as it is sometimes called — to the genus. What do we have to 
add now to the lowest species “man” to get to the level of the individual? 
In effect, what we are looking for now is the so called “principle of 
individuation.” We might also call it an “individual difference,” after an analogy 
with the notion of a specific difference. (And in fact, later on it is called this.) 
What is it then that narrows down or contracts (as they say — get used to this 
terminology) the species to yield the individual? This is the first time we’ve dealt 
with this issue head on. 
On this question, there are at least two views implicit in the Theological 
Tractates. 
These two views may or may not in the end amount to the same thing in Boethius 
himself. But, because of what he says here and doesn’t say there, and vice versa, 
they lend themselves to being interpreted and developed in radically different 
ways into quite different theories, and were in fact so interpreted and developed 
by subsequent authors, as we shall see in the twelfth century. 
The first theory is one that can be derived by juxtaposing what Boethius says here 
in the Contra Eutychen (Text 1 of Two Texts) with what he says at the end of the 
passage I’ve quoted there from the De trinitate (the end of Text 2, lines 123–135). 
The other theory comes from a slightly earlier passage in the same work (Text 2, 
lines 74–88). 
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Let’s look at these two theories in turn. As a preliminary, I want to make a 
relevant digression on the phrase ‘principle of individuation’: 
A number of quite distinct questions are often treated under the heading ‘the 
principle of individuation’, or ‘the problem of individuation’. And it will be 
important to keep the distinctions clear in our discussion of the passages from the 
Theological Tractates. (And for that matter throughout this course.) 
There are at least three questions that might be called the “problem of 
individuation.” To begin with: 
(a) What is it that makes something an individual? What is it 
that makes Socrates an individual, and what is it that makes 
Plato an individual, rather than, say, a universal, or rather 
than, say, a genus or species? Note that these are not the 
same question. So, in effect, we can subdivide this first 
question. Even nominalists, who say everything is singular 
and nothing is universal, will distinguish individuals from 
genera and species. But, quite apart from that, there’s 
another question: 
(b) What is it that makes an individual the individual it is? 
That is, what makes Socrates Socrates, and what makes 
Plato Plato? 
It’s easy to see that these two questions are not the same, since they might well 
have different answers. For example, you might think that what makes something 
an individual — that is, what answers question (a) — is being in space and time. 
(If I understand him, Reinhardt Grossmann, who used to teach in this department, 
held and no doubt continues to hold this view.) Now being in space and time is 
something that is equally true of all individuals (if you believe this theory); it is a 
universal feature, you might want to say, of all individuals. And therefore being in 
space and time cannot be what makes Socrates Socrates — that is, it cannot be the 
answer to (b) — IF what makes Socrates Socrates is some feature or characteristic 
such that, when it is present in something, it makes that something Socrates. For 
we just said that being in space and time was a feature common to all individuals, 
so that all individuals would end up being Socrates. 
So (a) and (b) are different questions, because they might very well have different 
answers. Whether they do have different answers or not is a different story. But 
even if they have the same answer, they remain distinct questions, and we should 
be aware of the distinction. 
There is a third question too: 
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(c) What is it that distinguishes one individual from another? 
That is, what makes Socrates distinct from Plato? 
(Note: This is not the epistemological question what allows us to draw the 
distinction, but rather the metaphysical question what makes them distinct.) 
It is easy to see that this question is different from the other two. For example, 
suppose only one individual existed. (If you believe in the traditional doctrine of 
creation, according to which God created absolutely everything besides himself, 
and furthermore didn’t have to create what he did, or indeed create anything at all, 
then you are committed to saying that this hypothetical case is a possible one. If 
God had created nothing at all, he would have been the only individual — and in 
fact the only entity — around.) 
Now you can sensibly ask about that situation what it is that makes that sole 
individual an individual, and you can also sensibly ask what it is that makes it the 
individual it is. But you probably can’t sensibly ask in that case what it is that 
distinguishes that individual from others, since by hypothesis there aren’t any 
others for it to be distinguished from. So since questions (a) and (b) have answers 
in that situation, whereas question (c) does not, plainly question (c) is a different 
question from questions (a) and (b). 
You might not think it’s so clear that question (c) doesn’t have an answer in that 
hypothetical situation. But in any case, it is clear that questions (a) and (b) do. So, 
since (a) and (b) clearly do have answers, whereas (c) does not so clearly have an 
answer, once again (c) has got to be different from (a) and (b). And of course 
questions that are distinct in one set of circumstances remain distinct questions 
even in circumstances where they might have the same answer. 
So questions (a)–(c) are three distinct questions. Depending on our metaphysical 
theory, they might or might not have the same answer. But in any case we need to 
keep clear not only about how we answer those questions but also about just 
exactly which question it is we’re asking. 
All these questions are often treated together indiscriminately under the heading 
‘the problem of individuation’. In order to keep them distinct in our minds, let’s 
agree to call them by different names. (a) The first question, what it is that makes 
something an individual rather than, say, a universal, or rather than a genus or 
species, we will call “the problem of individuality.” (b) The second question, 
what it is that makes an individual the individual it is, we will call “the problem 
of identification.” (Or perhaps “the problem of individual identification” would 
be better, since presumably we could ask a similar question about universals too: 
What is it that makes a universal the universal it is? What is it that makes a genus 
 the genus it is? But let’s not worry about that for now.) (c) The third question, 
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what it is that distinguishes one individual from another, we will call “the 
problem of differentiation” or “the problem of distinction.” 
I don’t mean to make too much out of this terminology, or to suggest that this is 
the only — or even the best — way to set up the issues. What I want to stress here 
is only that we should be as clear as we can about exactly what we are asking and 
what we are not. 
 
Armed with these distinctions, then, let’s now turn back to the texts from the 
Theological Tractates and once again ask how get from the level of the infima 
species down to individuals. In Text 1 (see Notes and Texts), the passage from the 
Contra Eutychen, we get the view that individuals are subsistents — that is, they 
don’t need accidents in order to exist. Nevertheless, they have accidents anyway, 
and so we also call them not just subsistents but also substances. On the other 
hand, genera and species, according to Text 1, cannot do this. (Look again at lines 
47–52.) We’ve seen this much before. 
And that’s basically all Boethius says about it in this passage. But it’s enough to 
tell us something. The last step on the Porphyrian tree, the step from the lowest 
species to individuals, is the step that introduces the ability to have accidents, 
even though of course they’re not needed. 
On the other hand, what it is that accounts for this new ability we don’t yet know. 
That is, is it the accidents themselves that do this, so that we have the doctrine of 
“individuation by accidents” that I mentioned briefly some time ago? Or is it 
something else that allows individuals to have accidents? Text 1 is totally silent 
on that point. 
For this, let’s turn to Text 2, from the De trinitate, and in particular to lines 123–
35 at the end of the passage. 
The main point of these lines is to distinguish forms from what Boethius there 
calls “images.” A form, for Boethius, is in effect a Platonic Form. But with a 
qualification. 
Boethius did not believe in the Forms in the original Platonic sense (either the 
realist sense of the Parmenides or the nominalist sense of the Timaeus and other 
dialogues). He doesn’t believe in them because they would conflict with the 
doctrine of creation, according to which God created absolutely everything other 
than himself. In the original Platonic version of the theory of Forms, of course, 
the Forms were uncreated, eternal things. So, as it stands, that theory is 
unacceptable to Boethius, who believed in the doctrine of creation, just as it was 
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unacceptable to lots of other philosophically-minded believers before Boethius — 
people such as St. Augustine, and the important Jewish writer from around the 
turn of the Christian Era, Philo of Alexandria (= Philo the Jew). 
Philo was apparently one of the first people to make an important move in the 
history of Platonism: He moved the Platonic Forms into the mind of God, where 
they became Divine Ideas. As a result of this move, everything in this world is 
still made after the patterns found in the Forms (now “divine ideas”), just as they 
were for Plato. The Forms are still uncreated and eternal — just as uncreated and 
eternal as God himself. They are his uncreated and eternal thoughts. All this is 
compatible, however, with saying that God created everything besides himself. 
This move was picked up by people like St. Augustine, and through him Boethius 
and pretty much the entire Middle Ages. Plotinus has a somewhat similar 
doctrine, although it isn’t quite the same (and, anyway, he isn’t worried about the 
doctrine of creation in the way Augustine and Boethius are). He’s also later than 
Philo by a couple of centuries. 
You should get used to the terminology here: Whenever you see the term ‘idea’ in 
the Middle Ages, it can mean one of two things and nothing else. It can mean 
either Platonic Ideas in the original sense. And when that is what an author 
means, he almost always says so explicitly. Or else it can mean a “divine idea” — 
and that is the usual sense. The term ‘idea’ never in the Middle Ages just means 
“concept,” in the sense in which, for instance, Descartes talks about ideas in our 
minds. 
It helps to keep this in mind. Otherwise, you’ll find a lot of strange discussions 
that you won’t understand. In the Summa theologiae, for instance, Thomas 
Aquinas asks “Whether there are ideas?” And at first you might think: “What a 
strange question to ask.” It is even stranger when you read what he actually says 
in that question, and it doesn’t appear to be addressing at all the question you 
thought he was asking. The truth is, of course, that he is talking about divine ideas 
in the sense I’ve just described. 
This theory of divine ideas was held virtually unanimously in the Middle Ages — 
although William of Ockham in the fourteenth century rejected the theory. 
(Actually, he didn’t reject it; he just interpreted it in a way that amounted to 
making it say the direct opposite of what it originally meant.) 
There is of course a problem for this theory: How can the plurality of Forms or 
Ideas be made compatible with the unity and simplicity of God? That was a 
problem much discussed, and some pretty sophisticated things came to be said 
about it. For more on the doctrine of divine ideas, you may want to look at “The 
Course in the Box,” Ver. 2.0, Vol. 1, Ch. 19. 
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Now this is what Boethius has in mind when he talks about a “form” in lines 123–
35 of the second passage from the Theological Tractates. God himself is a form, 
and his ideas are forms. (In fact, they are the same form — which is what gives 
rise to the problem I just mentioned.) 
Now according to these lines, forms  are to be contrasted with what Boethius 
there calls “images,” even though he suggests that sometimes we speak loosely of 
the latter as forms too. (In fact, Boethius himself does this sometimes.) 
What are these “images”? Well, an image is an imitation of a form. Furthermore, 
it is found in matter. 
What we have then in Text 2 is in effect Plato’s seal-ring picture all over again — 
although Boethius doesn’t explicitly use the metaphor here. The forms are the 
Platonic Forms, now divine Ideas, and the images are the impressions of those 
forms in matter, which, recall, is what Plato’s Receptacle became. Listen to what 
Boethius says (lines 130–33): 
From the forms [= divine ideas] that are outside matter come the 
forms [loosely speaking] that are in matter and make a body. We 
misuse the others [that is, the ones in matter], which are in bodies, 
when we call them “forms” while they are images. For they are 
made like [the Latin is ‘adsimilantur’ = are assimilated to) those 
that are not constituted in matter [= the divine ideas]. 
So far, so good. But now, to get back to our point, what does all this have to do 
with our question, which was how we get from an infima species to the 
individuals under that infima species. 
Well, remember where we left off after Text 1: We had learned that the difference 
between genera and species, on the one hand, and individuals, on the other, was 
that the latter had accidents (although they don’t need them) whereas the former 
don’t have them. But we did not yet know what it was that accounted for this 
difference. 
If we look around at the end of Text 2, we get what appears to be an answer to 
that question: it’s matter that accounts for the difference. Look at lines 124–27 
(he’s talking about God): 
Neither can it [= God] be a subject. For it is a form, and forms 
cannot be subjects. When another form, like humanity [NOTE: a 
species], is a subject for accidents [that is, when it appears to be 
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so, as we’ll see in a moment], it does not take on accidents insofar 
as it is, but insofar as matter is subjected to it. 
But this still isn’t put quite right, and Boethius goes on in the very next lines to 
correct himself. So far, it sounds as if the form or divine Idea itself takes on 
accidents insofar as matter is subjected to it — that is, insofar as it is stamped on 
matter. But that’s not quite right, as he now explains (lines 127–28): 
For, as long as matter, subject to humanity, takes on any accident, 
humanity itself appears to take it on. 
Aha! So it’s really the matter that the accidents inhere in. He goes on (lines 128–
30): 
But a form that is without matter cannot be a subject, and cannot 
be in matter. For it would not be a form but an “image.” 
And then we get the rest of the passage, which I’ve already gone through, where 
he explains the difference between forms and images. 
OK, now let’s put all this together. So far from this second text, we’ve learned 
that accidents inhere in matter, not in separated forms. From Text 1 we know that 
it’s the ability to have accidents that distinguishes individuals from species and 
genera. So it’s matter that allows us to have accidents in the first place, and it’s 
the ability to have accidents that gives us individuals rather than species or 
genera. So it would appear then that matter plays an important role in giving us 
individuals, and so is in some sense a principle of individuation. 
But if matter is a principle of individuation, in which of the senses we 
distinguished earlier is it such a principle? 
Well, at first glance, matter would appear to be a principle of individuation in the 
first of those senses: It is what we called a principle of individuality, what makes 
something an individual as distinct from a universal, or as distinct from a species 
or genus. On the Porphyrian tree, you make the last step, from the lowest species 
to individuals, by adding matter, which gives you the ability to have accidents. 
(As we’ll see in a few moments — p. 83 below — one can argue different ways 
about this.) 
But you might also argue that matter is a principle of individuation in the second 
of the senses we distinguished earlier: It is a principle of individual identification, 
what makes the individual the individual it is. After all, what makes Socrates this 
individual and Plato that other individual is just the fact that all the “images” that 
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make up Socrates have been stamped on this particular glob of matter, while the 
images that make up Plato are stamped on that glob of matter. After all, as far as 
their essential features are concerned, Socrates and Plato are exactly alike. And as 
far as their accidental features are concerned — well, you need matter in order to 
have accidents at all. And if Socrates and Plato have different combinations of 
accidents, they are going to need different globs of matter for the accidents to 
inhere in. So it appears that matter is really doing all the work here. 
Similar considerations might also lead one to argue that matter is the principle of 
individuation in the third sense we distinguished, a principle of differentiation: 
what makes one individual distinct from another. 
Does this mean that matter is the principle of individuation in all three of the 
senses we have distinguished? It looks like it, but we’d have to think about this a 
lot more before we were in a position to say we’ve got this sorted out correctly. 
For example, you might well ask: How can matter be a principle of 
differentiation, when in order for Socrates to be distinct from 
Plato, the specific human nature has to be combined with 
Socrates’s accidents in one blob of matter, and with Plato’s 
accidents in a distinct blob of matter. Matter can’t be the whole 
story, since having matter isn’t by itself going to distinguish one 
blob of matter from another. 
In any case, there’s nothing surprising about calling matter a principle of 
individuation. After all, Aristotle himself says this. See, just to cite a few places: 
Metaphysics V.6 1016b32; VII.8 1034a5–8; VII.10 1035b30; X.3 1054a33; X.9 
1058b5–25; XII.8 1074a33. 
To summarize this then, how do we get an individual — say, Socrates? Well, we 
start with some matter, and then impress on that matter the images of certain 
divine ideas or “forms,” like stamping a seal-ring into wax. 
First we have the image of substantiality, then the image of corporeality, of life, 
of sensitivity, or rationality, and finally various accidental images — all stamped 
on top of one another in the same glob of matter. (Notice I’ve just descended the 
Porphyrian tree from top to bottom.) 
Now, in a sense, the forms might be called the true genera and species on this 
theory. (Recall from Text 1, from the Contra Eutychen, genera and species only 
subsist, they don’t substand accidents.) These forms are “common” by way of 
being common exemplars or paradigms, just as the one seal-ring is the common 
source of all the several impressions it makes. But the forms (the divine Ideas) are 
not universals in the sense defined in the Commentary on Porphyry, since they’re 
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outside the metaphysical structure of  individuals; what’s in the structure of 
individuals on this theory is not the forms but the images. Everything on this 
theory is particular, just as it was in Plato’s Timaeus. 
Recall, how, at the end of the discussion in the Commentary on Porphyry (p. 
25.36), Boethius said that Plato and Aristotle disagreed over Porphyry’s third 
question, and that while Aristotle held that genera and species are in individuals, 
Plato held that they are separated. In the terminology of the De trinitate that 
we’ve just seen, this in effect means that Plato calls the forms (=  Divine Ideas) 
genera and species, while Aristotle calls the images genera and species, and 
completely ignores — or worse, rejects — the theory of Forms. 
The kind of theory we’ve just seen will be a very common one in the Middle 
Ages. It all goes back to Plato’s discussion of the Receptacle in the Timaeus, and 
his use of the seal-ring metaphor. For that reason, I will call this theory and its 
variations the “seal ring theory.” 
Now for a little more terminology. The impressions of the seal-ring Boethius calls 
images. Chalcidius, the translator of and commentator on the Timaeus, calls them 
native forms (formae nativae = inborn forms). He also calls them impressed 
forms. This last term, ‘impressed forms’, will be picked up again in the twelfth 
century and used by one Gilbert of Poitiers, whom we will meet later on. 
The terminology will vary. But the theory itself, the basic picture, is a quite 
common one. So get it firmly fixed in your mind. It’s the “seal-ring” theory. It has 
its roots in Plato’s Timaeus, but in the Latin tradition we find it first in Boethius’s 
Contra Eutychen and the end of the passage I’ve given you from the De trinitate. 
 
Now there are lots of questions one might ask about this theory, and let’s face 
some of them now. 
(1) First, I just said that on this theory, matter is a principle of 
individuation in at least some sense. On the other hand, I 
also said that on this theory, everything is individual; there 
are no universals. This theory is a form of nominalism. 
Now you might well ask: What sense does it make to talk about individuation at 
all in a nominalist framework? We don’t mean that there is something you add to 
a universal to narrow it down, to “contract” it, as they will later say, to an 
individual. There are no universals to be narrowed down on this theory! 
 82
That’s true, no doubt, and so matter is not a principle of individuation that works 
in that way. But there are still genera and species, on this theory, as well as the 
things that come under genera and species. So if we ask “What is it that allows 
you to have these other things, and not just genera and species?,” the answer is 
matter on this theory. Again, if you ask “What is it that allows you to make that 
last step on the Porphyrian tree, from the lowest species to the individuals that 
come under them?,” the answer is matter. So, in that sense, matter is a principle of 
individuation (in particular, a principle of individuality in the sense distinguished 
earlier). 
We have to watch out for a terminological trap in reading these authors. The term 
‘individual’ isn’t always to be taken (a) as contrasted with ‘universal’; sometimes 
it should be taken (b) as contrasted with ‘genus’ and ‘species’. Even nominalists, 
even those who hold a variant of the “seal-ring” picture, for which everything is 
“individual” in the former sense, can nevertheless continue to distinguish 
individuals from genera and species, so that for them not everything is 
“individual” in the latter sense. Moral of the story: When you see the term 
‘individual’ used in these authors, you have to be constantly asking yourself, 
“Individual as opposed to what?” 
(2) A second problem: I just said that matter is a principle of 
individuation, in the sense that it is what you add at the last 
step on the Porphyrian tree, to make the transition from the 
lowest species to the individuals that come under them. It is 
what provides the ability to have accidents. 
But if you go back and look at the Porphyrian tree, and think about how you 
would build up Socrates, for instance, in the way I did a moment ago, you might 
say: Wait a minute! Corporeality if the very first difference on the tree. And it is 
corporeality, isn’t it, that distinguishes material substances from immaterial ones? 
So it looks as if matter is introduced way up at the level of corporeality, not at the 
last step on the tree. 
For that matter, let’s push this objection one step further. Substance is a category; 
it is at the very top of the Porphyrian tree. But we know from what Boethius says 
about subsisting and substanding, in Text 1 from the Theological Tractates, that 
substances have accidents. And now we’ve just seen from Text 2 that matter is 
what makes this possible. So it looks as if matter is introduced at the level of 
substance, at the very first step of the Porphyrian tree, the very top — not at the 
very last step. What sense does it make then to talk about matter as a principle of 
individuation? And for that “matter” (ha ha), what sense does it make to talk 
about immaterial substances any more? 
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Well, those are all good questions, but let’s not pursue them here. Notice, 
however, that they in no way indicate that there is anything incoherent or 
philosophically objectionable about the seal-ring theory we’ve just seen. At worst, 
they mean that such a theory will be hard to reconcile with the kind of picture 
presented by the Porphyrian tree. But perhaps that’s not so bad. Perhaps we can 
abandon that picture. (The Porphyrian tree turns out to have all sorts of 
awkwardnesses if you think about it carefully.) But let’s not prejudge all that. 
Perhaps everything can be reconciled. 
(3) There is another thing you might say here. You may think 
it isn’t really matter that individuates on this theory — 
although it certainly has a role to play. Rather it’s accidents 
that individuate. 
Matter makes it possible to have accidents, to be sure. (See the De trinitate.) But 
Text 1 from the Theological Tractates explicitly says that individuals substand, 
whereas genera and species subsist (lines 47–52), and that things that substand are 
said to do so because they underlie and support (“provide a subject for”) accidents 
(lines 45–47 and 51–52). 
So why, you might ask, do I say it’s matter that individuates in this doctrine, 
rather than accidents? (This is what I meant a few moments ago when I said there 
are different ways one can argue about this.) 
Well, good point. What this shows is that both matter and accidents have roles to 
play in individuating. And that suggests that they might have different roles to 
play, and be answers to different versions of the “problem of individuation.” 
But which is serving which function exactly? Which is individuating in which 
sense? The texts — and our analysis — are not yet clear on this point. 
In any case, the role of accidents provides me with a nice lead-in to another 
passage I want to focus on in Text 2, from the De trinitate. 
But before I turn to that, there is one last small terminological point I want you to 
notice about Text 2. And that is at lines 70–71 (I’ve flagged it by a note, n. 7.) 
Boethius is talking about the basis for the unity of the three persons of the Trinity, 
and he says it is based on a “lack of difference.” The Latin here is ‘indifferentia’ 
= literally, indifference. I just want to call your attention to this now, because the 
term will come up again explicitly, later in our story. Remember, you saw it here 
first. 
 
 84
With that, let’s turn to the second paragraph of Text 2, still from the De trinitate 
(p. 51, lines 74–88). Basically, this paragraph identifies accidents, not matter, as 
the principle of individuation. How are we going to fit this together with what 
we’ve seen so far? Well, let’s look at it. 
In this paragraph, Boethius begins by listing three ways in which things may be 
said to be “diverse from” or “other than” one another: by genus, by species, or by 
number. Socrates and a line differ in genus. (In fact, they differ in their most 
general genus; they differ by category. Lines were taken as paradigm examples of 
continuous quantity, and so fall under the category of quantity, not of substance. 
There was also discrete quantity, “how many” rather than “how much.”) Again, 
Socrates and a rose bush differ in genus (although not in the most general genus). 
Socrates and Fido the dog differ in species. They’re both animals, but belong to 
different species of animals. But Socrates and Plato differ only numerically. That 
is, there is no essential difference between them at all; they are just two. 
This is a standard way of talking, and Boethius is not saying anything new so far. 
It comes from Aristotle — for instance, Metaphysics V.9. (Metaphysics V is the so 
called “Lexicon” book of the Metaphysics.) 
Explanation. Note that, in general, the term ‘numerical difference’ or ‘numerical 
diversity’ or ‘numerical distinction’ means merely numerical difference or 
diversity or distinction. In other words, people don’t generally say that Socrates 
and a line are numerically distinct, even though, if you count them, they are two 
just as much as Socrates and Plato are. ‘Numerically distinct’, therefore, is 
usually said only of things in the same most specific species. So too, ‘specifically 
distinct’ is usually said only of things in the same proximate genus. That 
convention is perhaps not always observed, but you can pretty much count on it. 
The crucial part of this paragraph comes from line 82 to the end: 
Now it is the variety of accidents that makes for difference in 
number. For three men are distinguished not by genus or species 
[since they are all rational animals], but by their accidents. If by 
the mind we separate all their accidents from them [UNDERSTAND: 
all their other accidents, we’ll see “other than what” in a moment 
— and NOTE: the notion of abstraction or division coming up again 
here, as it did in the Commentary on Porphyry], nevertheless place 
[there it is] is diverse for each of them, and we can in no way 
suppose that it is one. For two bodies will not occupy one place, 
which is an accident [i.e., one of the “accidental” categories]. And 
therefore they are several in number because they are made several 
by their accidents. 
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That’s pretty explicit — much more explicit than the theory of matter as the 
principle of individuation, which we had to extract by juxtaposing passages from 
the Contra Eutychen and the De trinitate. In the present passage, unlike what we 
got out of the earlier discussion, it’s pretty clear that accidents individuate in the 
third sense we distinguished earlier: they are a principle of differentiation; they 
are what make Socrates and Plato distinct individuals within the same species. 
Nevertheless, there are some questions to ask here. 
First, is it accidents in general or place in particular that’s said to 
be the principle of individuation or differentiation? 
Certainly, for physical objects — “bodies” — he explicitly says here that no two 
bodies can be in the same place. Presumably this means “in the same place at the 
same time,” so that it’s not just place but (as we would put it) spatio-temporal 
location that’s at stake here. Otherwise, once a physical body occupied a certain 
place, nothing else could ever occupy that same place, which I certainly don’t 
think is what Boethius intends to say at all. 
So, a diversity of spatio-temporal coordinates is regarded here as a necessary 
condition of having two physical objects. And it is also just as plainly regarded as 
a sufficient condition. The whole point of the end of the passage is that place at 
least (or place and time) will differentiate the three men. 
But it’s also fairly clear in the passage that this is a minimal condition. Even if we 
ignore all their other accidents, he says, we can’t disregard the fact they are in 
different places (at the same time). So presumably those other accidents too, if 
they are diverse in our three men, would also individuate or differentiate them one 
from another. 
The point then seems to be that it is all the accidents taken together that 
differentiate one substance from another. If any accident is different, then we 
have a different individual. In the case of bodies, of course, we know that at least 
place (or place at a given time) will be different. 
This becomes important if we ask: What about things that are not bodies, or that 
are not in space and time? Boethius doesn’t say anything about them here, but 
presumably they too can be differentiated by their accidents — although place 
and time will not be involved. In fact, later in the De trinitate (Loeb ed., p. 26.40–
42 — not translated in the Notes and Texts), Boethius explicitly says: 
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For, absolutely, there is a great truth in the rule that the “distances” 
[here a metaphor for “distinctions”] among incorporeal things are 
brought about by differences, not by places.3 
In the context, Boethius is talking about God and the Trinity, but presumably the 
same thing would hold for angels (if Boethius thinks they’re immaterial), or for 
any other immaterial thing. Place is irrelevant to immaterial things, according to 
this quotation. 
In fact, if you think about the seal-ring theory and the doctrine of individuation by 
matter (that is, back to the earlier theory, not the one we find in the present 
paragraph of the text), you can see that there is no way on that picture to talk 
about the individuation or differentiation of immaterial substances. In fact, on that 
theory you can’t even have immaterial individual substances as distinct from 
genera and species. Once you get below the level of genera and species, you get 
matter; that’s what that theory is all about. (This poses an obvious problem: Does 
it mean that God is not an individual on the seal-ring picture, but a genus or 
species? I don’t know that Boethius has any satisfactory answer to this that fits 
the theory we’ve seen so far.) 
In any case the picture we get in the present paragraph is one we’ve not yet seen 
so far. Here the picture is one of individuation or differentiation by the sum total 
of all the accidents of a thing. 
 
There’s a problem with this theory, as I see it: It eliminates accidental change. 
The theory freezes the individual, so that no individual thing can change in any 
way by acquiring or losing an accident without becoming a different individual 
than it was beforehand. All change therefore is substantial change. (See the Warp 
and Woof handout.) 
When I wiggle my finger, I acquire some new, accidental (and really quite trivial) 
feature concerning the spatial configuration of my body and its relations to other 
bodies around me. But, since the accidental features have changed, and since it is 
just “the variety of accidents that makes for difference in number,” it follows that 
when I wiggle my finger, I become a new individual, numerically distinct from 
the one I was before. And that, I suggest, is too high a price to pay. (It also 
suggests that, on this theory, the variety of accidents is not only the “principle of 
individuation” in our third sense, a “principle of differentiation,” but also in our 
                     
3Omnino enim magna regulae est veritas in rebus incorporalibus distantias effici 
differentiis non locis. 
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second sense, a principle of individual identification; it is what is responsible for 
making an individual the individual it is. We’ll talk more about that in a moment.) 
Note that Leibniz later on (in the 17th century) will have to deal with exactly this 
same problem. He solves it by adding explicit time-indexing to accidents, so that 
Caesar, for example, did not have the property of crossing-the-Rubicon, just like 
that. He had — and always, tenselessly, “has” — the property of crossing-the-
Rubicon-on-such-and-such-a-day-at-such-and-such-a-time. 
This trick preserves the theory of individuation by “variety of accidents,” as 
Boethius puts it, but also allows things to undergo what is usually called 
accidental change. It’s just that accidental change is not analyzed now as the 
gaining or losing of any accident, but simply as the “coming due” of the time-
indexes on the various accidents the thing has all along. 
This trick is surely reminiscent of a move Boethius himself makes in his 
Consolation of Philosophy when it comes to the problem of reconciling God’s 
omniscience and foreknowledge with human free will. Boethius tries to solve this 
traditional problem by putting God outside time, and in effect “time-indexing” all 
God’s knowledge. (On this, see “The Course in the Box,” Ver. 2.0,Vol. 1, Ch. 
22.) But, for some reason, he doesn’t adopt it here in the De trinitate, and seems 
even to be unaware that there is a problem that might warrant adopting it. 
A digression. Leibniz’s view, I should mention, is already present in St. 
Augustine (from whom Leibniz more or less consciously took it), in the doctrine 
of seminal reasons. And for that matter, Augustine took it over from the Stoics. 
The idea is that the reasons (rationes, ëüãïé) or structures of things are already 
built into creation from the very beginning, and just unfold or develop over time 
like seeds — or, as Leibniz would say, like clockwork, or as we might put it, like 
a computer program. Everything that ever happens to the thing is built in in 
advance. 
For Augustine, at any rate, the point of such a theory is in part to accommodate 
the view that creation was over once and for all at the end of the sixth day of 
Genesis; any novelties that have emerged since then are really just the unfoldings 
of “seed reasons” that were there all along. As we might put it, it’s all just “pre-
programmed.” 
Boethius, although he certainly knew his Augustine and had this device available 
to him, and although he in effect would use it himself in the Consolation, for 
some reason doesn’t use it here, and ends up with a theory that rules out any 
accidental change at all. 
Now I should mention at this point that Peter King, who wrote an excellent 
dissertation on Peter Abelard’s theory of universals (on reserve in the Library), 
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takes me to task for the reasoning I’ve just gone through, and thinks it fails — or 
at least he did in his dissertation. Here is what he says (vol. 1, p. 58): 
Spade suggests [King here gives a reference to an earlier version of 
“The Course in the Box” — Ver. 1.0] that this view makes all 
change into substantial change, for when one gains or loses any 
accidents one thereby becomes a new individual. [And that is in 
fact exactly what I have just claimed.] But this is to confuse the 
question of identity at a time with the question of identity over 
time; to confuse what makes a thing the very thing it is with what 
is to count as the same thing (over time). Boethius here could be 
proposing the former, not the latter, view. 
Well, with all due respect to Peter, I’m not sure of this. My first response is to say 
that I am not confusing those two questions. What I’m doing is observing that 
Boethius’s answer to the first question commits him to an unacceptable answer to 
the second. And that can surely be said without confusing the two questions. 
But maybe there’s more to it than this. Consider two metaphysical structures that 
differ from one another only with respect to a single accident; in all other 
respects, the two are the same. 
Then perhaps what King is saying is this: If we think of those two metaphysical 
structures as existing at the same time, then clearly Boethius’s theory implies that 
they are two distinct individuals. “It is the variety of accidents that makes for 
difference in number.” But if we think of them as existing at two different times, 
then perhaps they are two distinct individual, but perhaps not. That depends not 
on the question of identity at a time but on the question of identity over time. 
But the only way I can think of to make it turn out that these two metaphysical 
structures are really the same individual at two different times, and still to do 
justice to Boethius’s doctrine in the paragraph we’re looking at now, is to go back 
to the Stoic-Augustinian-Leibnizian theory of seminal reasons and time-indexed 
accidents — the very theory we just said Boethius does not appeal to here. 
In fact, Boethius conspicuously does not appeal to it precisely where one would 
most expect him to do so, at lines 86–87: “For two bodies will not occupy one 
place.” The text almost begs out loud to be filled out with the words ‘at the same 
time’. But Boethius doesn’t do it. 
In short, I think Boethius really does have a problem here, and that King’s 
objection doesn’t disarm it. 
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Notice, incidentally, that time itself is one of the nine Aristotelian accidental 
categories, so that if my objection is correct, then not only can’t a thing change 
accidentally over time. It cannot even endure over time. At the later time, it will 
have a different temporal accident, and so be a distinct individual. 
In short, if we push this theory, there is really no such thing as “enduring.” What 
we have instead is a continuous succession of things that exist only for an instant, 
and then vanish and are succeeded by an entirely distinct but more or less similar 
thing. There are such theories in the history of philosophy, but Boethius’s isn’t 
one of them. 
In any case, you can sort all this out for yourselves and make up your own minds. 
 
The theory of individuation or differentiation by accidents can also be found, at 
least implicitly, in certain other passages from Boethius as well. 
For instance, Boethius wrote two commentaries on Aristotle’s De interpretatione, 
just as he did on Porphyry’s Isagoge. Now, De interpretatione 7 begins with these 
words (I’ve quoted them before): 
Among things, some are universal while others are singular. By 
“universal” I mean that which is apt to be predicated of many, by 
“singular” that which is not. For example, man is a universal, 
Callias a singular. 
(That’s a translation of the Greek. Boethius’s own Latin translation substitutes 
‘Plato’ for ‘Callias’.) 
This passage, of course, provides the commentator with an opportunity to explain 
the differences between universals and singulars. 
I’ve given you a passage from Boethius’s second commentary on this text, in the 
Notes and Texts, right before the passages from the Theological Tractates. In that 
passage (pp. 46–48), beginning in line 31 (p. 46 of the Notes and Texts), Boethius 
talks about “qualities” (as he says) that are unique to a single individual. As I 
point out in n. 7 of the translation (p. 46), he is using the term ‘quality’ here very 
broadly, so that it includes more than things in the Aristotelian category of 
“quality” in the strict sense, and is as broad as our general term ‘feature’. (This is 
not at all an uncommon usage.) Unlike the “quality” of humanity, he says, which 
is shared as a whole by several things (lines 34–37 — NOTE: There’s no “seal-
ring” theory in these lines; he is being pretty explicitly realist here), the “quality” 
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that’s peculiar and unique to Plato, say, is proper and private to him alone; it is 
not common — not “communicated,” as they say later on. 
This peculiar feature of individuals he calls a “characteristic.” The Latin here is 
‘proprietas’. It’s related to, but not the same word as, ‘proprium’, which is one of 
the Porphyrian predicables. A proprium or “property” is found only at the level of 
the species, whereas these “proprietates” or “characteristics” Boethius is here 
talking about are found not only at the level of  species, but also at the level of 
individuals. 
In line 43, Boethius even goes so far as to give the characteristic of Plato a name. 
With some apologies for the neologism, he calls it “Platonity” — that is, the 
peculiar feature of being Plato. 
So “Platonity,” whatever that is, will according to this passage be the answer to 
the second form of the so called “problem of individuation” we distinguished 
earlier: the problem of individual identification — what makes an individual the 
individual it is. 
Now, the disappointing thing about this passage is that Boethius doesn’t say very 
much about what this “Platonity” is. He calls it a “quality,” to be sure, but then in 
the same passage he also calls humanity a quality, so that we don’t have any 
special reason to think Platonity is a kind of accident. In other words, we don’t 
really have enough in this passage to say that we have the theory of individuation 
by accidents here. 
On the other hand, there is yet another passage, this time from Boethius’s Second 
Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge (the same work from which we took our 
main Boethius text earlier). I’ve given you this passage also in the Notes and 
Texts (pp. 43–44). It comes from much later in Boethius’s commentary than the 
main passage we looked at earlier. It’s part of his commentary on the text where 
Porphyry is telling us what an individual is (see Isagoge, paragraph (36)). 
Porphyry tells us there that: 
Such things are called individuals because each of them consists of 
characteristics the collection of which can never be the same for 
anything else. 
The word ‘characteristics’ here is ‘proprietates’ again (in Boethius’s Latin 
translation), the same word we saw in the commentary on the De interpretatione 
just a moment ago. And there is a corresponding terminological distinction in 
Porphyry’s Greek text between this term and the term for the Porphyrian 
predicable “property.” 
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Now the important thing about this is that in Boethius’s commentary on this 
passage, he explicitly says these “characteristics” of individuals “come from 
accidents,” thereby filling in what was missing in the passage from the 
commentary on the De interpretatione. He says it twice, at lines 25–26 (“these 
characteristics, which came upon him [= Socrates] from accidents”) and again at 
lines 36–37 (“[But] their characteristics, coming from accidents”). He doesn’t 
exactly say they are accidents, mind you; he says only that they “come from 
accidents.” Porphyry, I should add, says nothing like this in his text. 
Notice, in Porphyry’s own text (the one I quoted a moment ago, para. (36), pp. 6–
7), the talk about collections of characteristics. What seems to be going on here, 
then, is that the characteristics Porphyry is talking about are universal features — 
like the “characteristic” of man that he mentions later on in the passage (p. 7 (36) 
line 1). It is only the collection or combination — so to speak, the intersection of 
a whole bunch of these universal characteristics that is narrowed down to be 
necessarily unique to a certain individual and to no other. 
And this seems to be the idea in Boethius’s commentary too. Especially in lines 
23–27, we get the picture that the characteristic of Socrates — and here we are 
talking about an individual characteristic — is a kind of intersection of his being 
“bald, snubnosed, pot-bellied” and having “other bodily features or well 
established practices or mannerisms of speech.” NOTE: Those are all universal 
features, each of which applies to lots of people, not just to Socrates. 
So, you put these two passages together — the one from the commentary on the 
De interpretatione and this other from the commentary on Porphyry — and you 
get the picture that Plato’s peculiar characteristic, his Platonity, is his unique 
collection of universal accidents — or at least of universal features that “come 
from accidents,” if that makes a difference. 
In short, we get something very much like the doctrine of individuation or 
differentiation by accidents that we have already seen in the one passage from the 
De trinitate. BUT THERE IS ONE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE:: 
In the De trinitate, the operative statement is that “the variety of accidents makes 
for difference in number,” which would seem to imply a fairly strong version of 
the Indiscernibility of Identicals, that any accidental difference would result in a 
distinct individual — which I suggested led to the unacceptable consequence that 
accidental change is made impossible. 
Here, however, in the two commentaries we’ve just looked at, there is nothing to 
imply this. Individuation or differentiation appears to be brought about by a 
combination of accidents — a combination that can only be found in one 
individual — but there is nothing in these texts to suggest that all the accidents 
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are included in that combination. In short, if some subset of Plato’s accidents is 
enough to differentiate him from all other real, or perhaps even from all other 
possible individuals, then there is still room for accidental change with respect to 
the remaining accidents. Still, how do we tell which ones are the differentiating 
ones? 
 
Let’s now put it all together on individuation. Let’s go back and look once again 
at our three senses of the term ‘principle of individuation’, and see if we can sort 
out what plays which role in Boethius — that is, what he really thought — and 
whether there is any one overall, consistent view here. 
Pretty clearly, it is accidents that individuate in sense (3) — that is, they 
differentiate or distinguish one individual from another in the same species. The 
second paragraph from Text 2 (from the De trinitate) — about “the variety of 
accidents” — says that explicitly, and it seems to be confirmed in the other 
passages from the commentaries we’ve just looked at. 
But what about the other two senses? And as far as that goes, what about matter? 
Well, the texts are simply not unambiguous here. But I have an interpretation I’m 
reasonably confident of. It goes like this: 
1. Matter is the principle of individuation in sense (1) only — 
that is, the principle of individuality, what makes 
something an individual, as opposed to a universal or a 
genus or species. (See the Contra Eutychen and the end of 
De trinitate.) 
2. On the other hand, accidents — and in particular, the 
unique combination of accidents an individual has (either 
all of them or some of them, depending on which passages 
you read — the second paragraph of Text 2 [from the De 
trinitate] or the passages from the two commentaries) — 
individuate in sense (2). They are the “principle of 
identrification.” That is, it is the unique combination of 
accidents that Socrates has that makes him Socrates — the 
individual he is. And it is the unique combination of 
accidents Plato has (his “Platonity,” as Boethius calls it) 
that makes Plato be Plato. 
On this interpretation, then, the unique combination of accidents serves two roles 
and answers two versions at once of the problem of individuation. It answers both 
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version (2) and version (3). The unique combination of accidents is what makes 
an individual the individual it is, and also what differentiates that individual from 
other individuals in the same species. In the vocabulary of the commentary on the 
De interpretatione, Plato’s “Platonity” both is what makes Plato Plato, and also is 
what distinguishes Plato from Socrates. 
I say I am reasonably confident of this interpretation, although it is not forced by 
the texts. For the fact is, Boethius simply never tells us explicitly that accidents 
serve function (2) — that Plato’s Platonity is an accident or collection of 
accidents that makes him Plato — although he does say that it distinguishes him 
from Socrates. 
Nevertheless, if you look at what Porphyry says in the passage on which Boethius 
is commenting (Porphyry, § (36)), he says that each individual consists of 
characteristics the collection of which will never be the same for anything else. 
This certainly looks as if he is saying that accidents not only differentiate one 
individual from another, but also are what makes an individual the individual it is. 
That’s Porphyry, of course, not Boethius — although since Boethius is 
commenting on this text, we might suppose that he accepts the doctrine unless he 
says something to the contrary. On the other hand, perhaps this is to put too much 
weight on the one word ‘consists’. 
Now my reason for saying that matter only answers question (1) — that it is what 
makes something an individual — and not question (2) or (3), is that matter is just 
matter. (I raised this point briefly a while back.) If we say that matter is what 
individuates me and matter is what individuates you, then it looks as though it is 
the same thing that’s individuating both of us. This shows that matter cannot 
“individuate” me in sense (2) — that is, it cannot be such that, when it is present 
in something, it makes that thing to be me, since then when it is present in you it 
would make you to be me. So matter cannot serve to answer question (2). And it 
certainly doesn’t answer question (3), since the texts are pretty explicit that the 
combination of accidents is what answers (3). 
On the other hand, we saw some time ago that matter certainly does have some 
role to play in getting from genera and species to individuals. Thus, there appears 
to be no other role for it to play than answering question (1). (This of course holds 
only if our list of three questions for the principles of individuation is an 
exhaustive list. But I certainly can’t think of any other role matter could play.) 
Besides, matter fits that role well. The presence of matter is what allows a thing to 
have accidents, as we saw from the “forms and images” passages in De trinitate 
(lines 123–35), and so what allow it to be an individual. According to these new 
passages, the particular combination of accidents it turns out actually to have will 
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determine which individual it turns out to be, and will also distinguish it from 
other individuals. 
Now, if this tentative interpretation is correct — and in particular, if accidents 
individuate in sense (2), are what makes an individual the individual it is — then 
we have a serious objection: 
It violates what the Contra Eutychen said about subsistence vs. substance. 
According to that text, remember, individual substances are a subclass of the 
subsistents, and so don’t need accidents (see p. 50, lines 48–52 of Two Texts): 
But individuals not only subsist, they also substand. For neither do 
they need accidents in order to be. For they are already informed 
by their properties and specific differences, and provide to 
accidents the opportunity to be — that is to say, as long as they are 
subjects. 
In other words, according to the Contra Eutychen, accidents are derivative from 
and dependent on substances, which “provide them the opportunity to be.” Not 
the other way around. But according to the view that accidents make an individual 
the individual it is, it is the other way around: individual substances do depend on 
accidents for their very identity. This seems to conflict with the whole notion of 
an accident — which is, after all, supposed to be — well — merely accidental to a 
thing. 
This rather “unsettled” role for accidents in the theory of individuation is never 
clarified very satisfactorily in Boethius, and becomes a recurring feature of early 
medieval thought on this topic — up to the time of Peter Abelard in the twelfth 
century. He points out the problem explicitly: if accidents give an individual its 
very identity, they don’t seem to be accidental any more. That’s not a refutation, 
of course, but it does mean that if we are going to adhere to a picture like this, we 
should probably give up the framework of essence and accident altogether, and 
start using some other vocabulary, some other framework, instead. 
 
Now let’s step back, come up for air, take a kind of overview of all this material, 
and begin to wrap up our discussion of Boethius. 
We have: 
(1) The second commentary on Porphyry, where at the 
beginning (the passage translated in Five Texts) Boethius 
takes a kind of “moderate realist” view. There’s nothing 
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really common out there in reality in the way a universal is 
supposed to be common. Nevertheless, the mind somehow 
abstracts a common or universal concept from individuals. 
Those concepts are therefore grounded in reality, so that 
the skeptical consequences of nominalism are blocked. 
(2) The passage from the Contra Eutychen, and the end of  the 
passage from the De trinitate that I’ve given you. Here we 
get the distinction between form and image, and the notions 
of substance and subsistence. These passages are in effect a 
development of the “seal-ring” metaphor that goes back to 
Plato. Matter has an important role to play here in 
individuation, but so do accidents. How exactly those roles 
are to be sorted out is not made very explicit. 
(3) The second paragraph of the passage from the De trinitate, 
about how “the variety of accidents makes for difference in 
number.” Here the role of accidents in differentiation is 
emphasized very strongly. This role of accidents is also 
found in the two short passages I’ve given you from the 
commentaries on the De interpretatione and on Porphyry, 
and has roots that go back at least to Porphyry himself. 
Given all that, we’re now in a position to speculate about what Boethius found 
objectionable in the theory of universals he set out in the passage from Five Texts, 
and attributes there to Alexander of Aphrodisias and Aristotle, and why he added 
that odd business at the end about how he has said all he said not because he 
believes it but because he is dutifully fulfilling his job as a faithful commentator. 
If you think about it, the “seal ring” view we’ve just sketched from the 
Theological Tractates — the Contra Eutychen and part of the De trinitate — is 
very much like the theory he attributes to Alexander and Aristotle. The individual 
humanities of Socrates and Plato, which the commentary on Porphyry appeals to, 
are just the seal-impressions, the “images” of the Theological Tractates. There are 
no universals; there are only these quite individual “images,” and the equally 
individual “forms” or divine Ideas of which they are the impressions or copies. 
The difference between the “seal ring” view Boethius attributes to Alexander and 
Aristotle, on the one hand, and the “seal ring” view in the Tractates, on the other, 
is that in the former, at least as Boethius tells it, there’s no mention of Divine 
Ideas at all, and no real discussion of matter either. 
So, I suggest — and it’s not just random speculation, it’s informed speculation, 
although no more than that — Boethius’s hesitation about the Alexandrian-
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Aristotelian theory centers on the fact that it ignores the role of the Divine Ideas. 
(As for matter, even though it isn’t mentioned in Boethius’s discussion, Boethius 
certainly knew Aristotle well enough to realize that he definitely did not ignore 
matter.) In short, the problem with that theory is not that it’s wrong — as though 
Boethius accepted a screaming realist view, or as though he were a nominalist but 
just accepted the skeptical consequences — but rather that it doesn’t go far 
enough. It’s incomplete by leaving out the role of the divine Ideas. 
The view we’ve just discussed then — a basically “moderate realist” theory filled 
out with an account of the role of matter and of the Divine Ideas — is probably 
Boethius’s own theory. Boethius is not 100% consistent about this, of course; 
there is, after all, the pretty explicitly realist statement in the Commentary on the 
De interpretatione (p. 46, lines 34–35 in the passage in Notes and Texts). But by 
and large, most of what Boethius says seems to converge on this kind of “seal-
ring,” “moderate realist” theory. 
 
Nevertheless, if you don’t look at the whole picture, but concentrate instead on 
that one passage about how “the variety of accidents makes for difference in 
number,” and then recall also the passages about “collections of characteristics” 
in the commentaries on the De interpretatione and on Porphyry, you might be led 
to an altogether different view. 
Now, fair warning: What I’m about to give you may strike you at first as pretty 
far-fetched as an interpretation of Boethius, given all we’ve looked at so far. But 
you have to remember that it wasn’t true in the Middle Ages any more than it is 
today that people who interpret their predecessors’ philosophical views always 
take the trouble to look at the whole context; sometimes they focus on tiny little 
phrases taken out of context, and build whole theories around them. 
And in fact that actually happened in the Middle Ages with this passage about 
how “it is the variety of accidents that makes for difference in number.” As we’ll 
see when we get to the twelfth century and people like William of Champeaux 
and Clarenbald of Arras, the theory I’m about to give you was actually held, and 
was attributed to Boethius on the basis of that “slogan” from the De trinitate. 
So here we go. Look at that passage all by itself — the second paragraph of Text 
2 (pp. 51–52). Notice that by itself, there is absolutely no mention of matter in it. 
On the basis of this text alone, there’s no reason to bring in matter at all, and 
therefore no reason to use the seal-ring metaphor or to distinguish “forms” from 
“images.” 
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Of course, there likewise wasn’t any talk about forms and images, or even about 
matter, in the discussion of the Alexandrian-Aristotelian theory earlier in the 
commentary on Porphyry. But there we did have the nominalist picture of the 
individualized humanities of Socrates and Plato — with no universal humanity 
common to them. None of that is explicitly mentioned in this one crucial 
paragraph of the De trinitate about the “variety of accidents.” 
Furthermore, as we’ve seen, the passage from the commentary on the De 
interpretatione, and the passage from the commentary on Porphyry about the 
“collections of characteristics,” at least strongly suggest that that accidents or 
characteristics involved here are universal accidents or characteristics, and that it 
is only their intersection that narrows things down to one individual alone. 
So this isolated paragraph from the De trinitate, taken in light of those other 
passages from the commentaries, is open to a strongly realist development. It 
doesn’t require such reading, but it allows it. On such a realist interpretation, the 
humanity of Socrates would be the same as — that is, identical with — the 
humanity of Plato. In Socrates and Plato we have a total of one humanity, not 
two. To this humanity, you add certain universal accidents that together, by their 
combination, narrow this universal humanity down to Socrates. And you add 
other, different accidents that together narrow it down to Plato. 
Similarly, Socrates and Browny the Ass (an example we’ve met before) really do 
have a common animality. You add certain other things to that animality to 
narrow it down to humanity, and then further narrow it down to Socrates. And 
you add other things to animality to narrow it down to asininity, and then further 
narrow it down to Browny. 
The individual, then, on this alternative view, is built up like a kind of layer-cake, 
out of a series of universals. The individual is just the intersection of all these 
universals. 
So the picture looks like this: 
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Such a highly realist doctrine is allowed by that paragraph from the De trinitate, 
if you take it in isolation, although it is not explicit there. Notice that on this 
picture, there is no appeal to matter or to the distinction between “forms” and 
“images.” They simply don’t come up here. 
(Note: You wouldn’t expect matter to appear in this context of Boethius’s 
discussion. He is talking about the inner workings of the Trinity, and there’s no 
matter in God.) 
So, we find in Boethius a kind of “seal-ring,” “moderate realist” theory, and also 
might think we find in him the basis for a strongly realist theory of universals as 
well. As I said earlier, I have a thesis I’m sometimes tempted to believe, that all 
theories of universals ever held in the Middle Ages can be found, at least in germ 
but in a non-trivial way, in Boethius. 
 
One last thing about Boethius: We’ve already talked about the kind of definition 
of a universal Boethius gives in his Commentary on Porphyry — as something 
that is common to several things as a whole, simultaneously, and in an appropriate 
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metaphysically intimate way. For future reference, let us call this the 
metaphysical definition of a universal. 
But if you look back the passage from Boethius’s second commentary on the De 
interpretatione in the Notes and Texts, and look at the text Boethius is 
commenting on there, you will see another definition. Aristotle says (p. 45, lines 
8–9): 
I call “universal” what is apt to be predicated of several [things], 
but [I call] “singular” what [is] not. 
I mentioned this text in passing earlier, more than once. As it stands, the last part 
of it is of course ambiguous. The “singular” is not predicated of many, Aristotle 
says. That could be either because it is predicated of one thing only, or because 
it’s not the kind of thing that can be predicated at all. 
Porphyry, however, resolves this ambiguity. For him, the individual is something 
that is predicated, but predicated of one thing only (Isagoge, the end of paragraph 
35, p. 6): 
But the individual is said of only one of the particulars. 
Now predication is often thought of nowadays as exclusively a matter of 
language. That is, terms are what are predicated. They are predicated of other 
terms, or perhaps terms are predicated of things, depending on how you want to 
put it. But, in any case, we don’t often say that non-linguistic things are 
predicated of other things. 
Nevertheless, there is a long and quite reputable philosophical tradition according 
to which “predication” is not exclusively a logico-linguistic relation, but also a 
relation among things, and according to which, in fact, the predication relations at 
the level of language (or at least the true ones) are based on and derived from this 
more basic metaphysical relation of predication. How all this works out is 
something that takes some work, and we will be discussing it in much more detail 
later. For the present, however, just observe that Boethius too talks this way a lot. 
(For passages and references, see Jorge Gracia, Introduction to the Problem of 
Individuation in the Early Middle Ages, Ch. 2. There are lots of such passages.) I 
talk about all this to some extent in my Warp and Woof paper. 
Now, it’s not at once clear that these two notions of a universal amount to the 
same thing. That all depends on your theory about these things. Nevertheless, we 
do have two notions of a universal: the metaphysical notion (what is present “as a 
whole, simultaneously, and in the right metaphysically intimate way” in several 
things), and this other one, which I shall call the “logical” or “predicational” 
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notion, in terms of predication. Both are found in Boethius — as indeed is 
virtually everything else we have to say about universals in the Middle Ages. 
In Boethius himself, the two are not clearly distinguished. And, as far as I can see, 
all the action in Boethius is with the metaphysical notion of a universal. But keep 
the other one in mind for future reference. 
 
Historical Overview 
The next reading assignment from the Notes and Texts: 
Fridugisus of Tours, On the Being of Nothing and Shadows. (This is the 
complete work.) 
Odo of Tournai, selections from his On Original Sin. 
We are now done with Boethius. 
At this point, let’s pause a while and step back for a larger view of things. (I will 
do this several times throughout the course: After wrangling with the details of a 
text, we’ll pause to catch our breath and look at where we have been and where 
we are going, both historically and theoretically.) 
There are really three main periods in the medieval discussion of universals: 
(1) Boethius, in the late fifth and early sixth centuries. (We’ve 
just been through that.) 
(2) The 12th century. Here there are several people to keep in 
mind, but the main figure is Peter Abelard (1079–1142). 
(3) The period from the middle thirteenth century on. Here 
there are lots of important names: 
Aquinas, Scotus, Burley, Ockham, Wyclif, and 
many less familiar — but by no means unimportant 
— figures. 
The difference between the second and the third period is the presence of the texts 
of Aristotle. 
Recall, I said long ago that, because Greek was largely a forgotten language in the 
Latin West, the original works of Greek philosophy were for the most part 
unknown — except for Porphyry’s Isagoge, Aristotle’s Categories and De 
interpretatione, and part of Plato’s Timaeus. 
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All this changed beginning around the middle of the twelfth century, when a great 
deal of translating activity took place. On this, see “The Course in the Box,” Ver. 
2.0, Vol. 1, Chs. 34 and 44. 
Works of many different kinds were translated, including things on mathematics, 
medicine, etc., as well as philosophy. 
In philosophy, the main thing was in effect the rest of the works of Aristotle 
(almost all of what we have today), along with certain Greek commentaries and 
the works of certain towering Islamic philosophers like Avicenna and Averroes. 
(Remember, the bulk of Plato was not translated until the Renaissance.) 
By the middle of the thirteenth century, the Latin world had basically all the 
works of Aristotle — and enough commentary to let them get at least started on 
assimilating and understanding all this material. 
With respect to the problem of universals, of course, the main texts — besides 
Porphyry and the Categories (which the Latins had had ever since Boethius) — 
were Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, and a few other texts, but mainly the 
Metaphysics. 
It’s the presence of this Aristotelian material that changes the whole flavor of the 
discussion of universals from the thirteenth century on. 
But that’s the thirteenth century. First, we have to go through the twelfth century, 
with Peter Abelard and his contemporaries. 
The interesting thing about these people is that they did not have the metaphysical 
works of Aristotle. They basically had nothing more than Boethius did — in fact, 
they had much less than Boethius did, since Boethius knew Greek. They had only 
what Boethius left. They also drew heavily on mediaeval grammatical theory, in a 
way I have never really been able to follow completely, although its definitely 
there. 
Nevertheless, the level of sophistication and the fineness of the analysis are very 
good. These people represent the culmination of early medieval philosophy — 
before the revolutionary events that came with the rediscovery of Aristotle. 
Further Reading Assignment: 
For your readings for this part of the course (after Fridugisus and Odo, pp. 55–63, 
in Notes and Texts, who are “transitional” figures), please read: 
The passage from Abelard in Five Texts and the material from 
Abelard and from the School of Chartres in the Notes and Texts, 
pp. 65–71. Concentrate on the long passage from Abelard, the one 
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in Five Texts. This is a taken from his Glosses on Porphyry in a 
work of his called the Logica ‘ingredientibus’. 
The short passage from John of Salisbury’s Metalogicon (comment 
on title) contained in Hymen and Walsh, Philosophy in the Middle 
Ages, 2nd ed., pp. 167–69.  
The material on John of Salisbury in Part One of the Notes and 
Texts (this is just a couple of brief notes on the passage I’ve just 
mentioned), and the outline of and notes on the long passage from 
Abelard, also in Part One of the Notes and Texts (i.e., Notes and 
Texts, pp. 17–25 [from Part I], and pp. 65–71 [from Part II]). (You 
are going to need some kind of guide-book to help you through 
that complicated passage.) 
Also (optional): 
Peter Abelard, Story of My Misfortunes, selection (handout). These 
pages are public domain, but I have also put on reserve Abelard’s 
The Story of My Adversities in the Muckle translation, and I will be 
quoting from that. (These few pages contain some remarks about 
Abelard’s views on universals. If you have the time, you might like 
to read the whole of Abelard’s Adversities (on reserve). It’s 
basically his autobiography, and it’s an absolutely amazing 
document; there’s nothing else like it in the Middle Ages. He’s 
brilliant, he’s caustic, he’s offensive, he’s paranoid — and he had 
an (ahem!) “interesting” life in many respects.) 
“The Course in the Box,” Ver. 2.0, Vol. 1, Chap. 42 (on the so 
called “School of Chartres”). 
Note: In “The Course in the Box,” I did not use the translation of 
Abelard I have included in the Notes and Texts (since I had not yet 
done that translation then), but rather a translation by Richard 
McKeon, included in many anthologies, among them Hyman and 
Walsh, Philosophy in the Middle Ages. (On reserve.) Everything in 
this part of “The Course in the Box” is keyed to that translation. 
The translation is execrable, which is why I did my own. There is 
also a translation in Peter King’s dissertation. But I don’t like it 
either (although it’s much better than McKeon’s). 
Ch. 39 of “The Course in the Box” contains an outline of the main 
Abelard passage, keyed to the pages in Hyman and Walsh. It is 
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replaced by the outline in the Notes and Texts, which is keyed to 
my own translation in Five Texts. 
Also, you should be aware of the following items listed in the handout of 
“Reserves”: 
Peter King’s superb dissertation on Abelard’s theory of universals. 
(The second volume of this contains translations of lots of texts we 
will not be discussing much. But they may be of use to you in your 
papers.) 
Jorge Gracia’s book, Introduction to the Problem of Individuation 
in the Early Middle Ages. 
Martin Tweedale’s book, Abailard on Universals. 
But before we get to Abelard and the people around him, I want to look at some 
other points first. In particular, I want to look at Fridugisus of Tours and Odo of 
Tournai in the Notes and Texts. 
(You should regard both of these as more or less “recreational” reading, since 
neither of them is an especially sophisticated or influential figure. Nevertheless, I 
will use them to illustrate some general theoretical points. Note that I am 
paraphrasing “The Course in the Box,” Ver. 2.0, Vol. I, Chap. 37, here, if you 
want to look at a printed approximation of what I’m about to say.) 
 
Remember our setup: Realists have epistemology on their side, but have 
difficulties over metaphysical problems. Nominalists have metaphysics on their 
side, but have difficulties over epistemology. 
These are the philosophical pressures of the problem. But the philosophical 
pressures are not the only ones involved. Some people thought there were, for 
instance, certain theological considerations that led necessarily to realism. One of 
these was the doctrine of original sin, the doctrine that the entire human race has 
somehow inherited the sin committed by Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden, 
and that this “original sin” so wrecked things for human beings that it took a 
redemptive act by God himself to set things right again. 
This is not a peripheral or throw-away doctrine in Christianity. On the contrary, it 
is one of the two central points of Christianity. (The other one is that things are 
OK now; we’ve been redeemed. In my more “waggish” moments, I’m tempted to 
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claim that every other feature of Christian doctrine can be more or less “deduced” 
from the combination of these two theses.) 
In any case, in connection with the doctrine of original sin, look at the passage 
from Odo of Tournai’s work On Original Sin in the Notes and Texts. 
First, a word about the man. His name was “Odo,” which is a variant of “Otto.” 
He was born in Orleans, we don’t know when. In 1105, he was elected abbot of 
the newly restored Benedictine abbey of St. Martin in Tournai, in Belgium, and 
was indeed the first abbot of that monastery after its restoration. He died in 1113. 
Now, an important piece of knowledge about Odo: He is Odo of Tournai, not Odo 
of Tours. I have checked the biographical information on him, and as far as 
anyone can tell, he never set foot in Tours. Tours is in France, whereas Tournai is 
in Belgium. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be a plot afoot to move poor old Odo to Tours. The 
first evidence of this plot comes in Peter King’s dissertation (1982), who in Chap. 
5, § 2, discusses “Odo of Tours on Original Sin.” The misnomer then seems to 
have been picked up by Jorge Gracia in 1984, who devotes Chap. 3, §2, of his 
book (at least in the first edition) to “Odo of Tours.” In both cases, the man in 
question is our own Odo of Tournai, who had nothing to do with Tours. 
I suspect the error arose over a confusion between Latin ‘Tornacensis’ = Tournai, 
and ‘Turonensis’ = Tours, together with the fact that the abbey of St. Martin in 
Tournai is a relatively obscure little abbey, whereas the abbey of St. Martin of 
Tours is a famous and important one. 
In any case, I am happy to report that I gleefully called King’s and Gracia’s 
attention to this, and that in the second edition of Gracia’s book, and in the long 
promised but probably no longer forthcoming publication of King’s dissertation, 
poor old Odo has been returned to his rightful place. 
Odo is supposed to have written a number of works on dialectic and logic, some 
of which have interesting titles, but none of which has come down to us today. 
The work we are concerned with is instead a theological work, his On Original 
Sin. 
The problem that concerns Odo is this: According to the standard Biblical account 
of the origin of species, we are all descended from Adam. That is, we get our 
bodies from Adam through the normal reproductive and genetic processes. It is 
purely a matter of biology. So there is a physical continuity between Adam and us 
— a genetic continuity, if you will, although of course Odo himself wasn’t 
thinking in terms of chromosomes. 
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But — and here is the crucial point — our souls do not come from Adam. That is, 
we do not inherit the soul. It is not transmitted in the way the body is. On the 
contrary, by this time, the generally accepted doctrine was that the individual soul 
is the product of a kind of special on-the-spot creation by God at some point in 
the development of the fetus (not necessarily at conception). 
The production of our bodies, then, is a matter of rearranging and restructuring 
matter that has presumably existed in some form or other all the way back to the 
original six days of creation. It is a case of getting the right carbon atoms, 
proteins, nutrients, etc., all put together in the right way (although medieval 
authors wouldn’t have put it in those terms). 
But our souls are not like this. They are not manufactured by a kind of 
development or restructuring of pre-existing soul-stuff. They are made up ex 
nihilo on a case by case basis. 
Fine, but now what about the doctrine of original sin? Well, Odo points out, sin is 
something that inheres in the soul, not in the body. (The consequences of sin, 
such as our being susceptible to diseases and to death, may be said to inhere in the 
body, but that’s a different story.) 
So, if sin infects the soul and not the body, and if only our bodies and not our 
souls come from Adam, then how can we in any sense be said to have inherited 
original sin from Adam? How is it that we share in Adam’s sin? 
Note, incidentally, that this is a very good theological question. If you are going 
to interpret the doctrine of original sin as anything more than a kind of pious, 
edifying, but basically symbolic story, it is not at all clear how you are going to 
answer this question. As a result of this kind of problem, some people have toyed 
with the idea that we do inherit the soul from Adam, just as we do the body. 
Now, what does Odo do in this situation? Well, he starts like this: 
He points out, first of all (lines 30–31), that it’s perfectly possible to have a 
species that as a matter of fact turns out to have only one individual in it. There 
might have been, for instance, only one man — say, a certain Peter. Or, he goes 
on (lines 35–36), consider the species phoenix. 
The phoenix, you will recall from your study of Egyptian mythology, is a 
beautiful, unique bird that lives in the Arabian desert for 500 or 600 years 
(accounts vary), and then consumes itself in a fire, only to rise again from its own 
ashes to begin another long life, over and over again. It is used as a symbol of 
immortality and bodily resurrection. 
Well, you can think what you like about the phoenix. It’s not clear it is really a 
very good illustration of Odo’s point anyway. Perhaps an easier example is the 
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sun. (Many people used this example later on.) In order to make the example 
work, you have to regard the term ‘sun’ not as a proper name of the particular 
fireball we all know in our sky, but rather as a kind of job-description. 
Now, we have only one sun in our sky, although it is perfectly possible (and 
indeed true in various science-fiction stories) that there would be two or more. In 
other words, sun is a species; this sun — the one we’ve got — is an individual in 
that species, and as it happens, the only individual within that species. There 
might have been several suns, and if there were, they would all have the same 
substance or species, and would differ only by their accidents (lines 29–30). 
Now where do you suppose Odo got that last bit? Recall the doctrine of 
individuation by accidents we saw earlier in Boethius’s De trinitate. Here it is 
coming up again. And in fact Odo goes on in line 31 to say that a man, for 
example a certain Peter, “is an individual because of the collection of his 
accidents.” Recall the talk about “collections of characteristics” in Porphyry and 
in Boethius’s commentary on Porphyry (the shorter text, the one I gave you in the 
Notes and Text) linking those “characteristics” with accidents. 
 
Now, a short digression. Odo claims in lines 31–32 that you cannot in the same 
way have a genus with only one species in it. The whole point of a species is that 
it is supposed to subdivide a genus into a subsection, so that there must be a 
remainder: another species. A genus must have at least two species (And, I might 
add, depending on how you work out the Porphyrian tree, perhaps a genus must 
have exactly two species in it.) 
Well, that’s Odo’s view, at any rate: a genus must have at least two species. But 
it’s not at all clear to me that he’s made his case. 
It’s true that, conceptually speaking, if you add “rational” to “animal” to get 
“man,” then you are implicitly allowing that there is a species of irrational 
animals too. Otherwise, the addition is not really an addition. (Go back and look 
at the reasoning in the handout “Why Being Is Not A Genus.”) But that’s all a 
matter of conceptual division. It still seems perfectly possible to have it be the 
case in fact that the only animals that exist are human beings (say) — just as Odo 
himself admits that it was once the case (in the Garden of Eden) that the only 
human being who existed was Adam. 
In short, genera and species appear to be quite alike in this respect. If we are 
talking conceptually, then just as you cannot have a genus that is not divisible into 
several species, so too you cannot have a species that is not divisible into — that 
is, potentially common — to several individuals. On the other hand, just as you 
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can have in fact a species with only a single individual in it (so that the species is 
not actually common to several things — like the sun or the phoenix, or the 
species man), so too it seems you could have a genus with only a single species in 
it, even though it could have had more. 
So, it seems to me that Odo has not made his point. But, the point doesn’t really 
matter for us. So let us end our digression. 
 
Odo goes on (lines 46–49) to say: 
And when the species is said of a solitary individual [i.e., when we 
do have a case of a species with only one individual in it], only 
then is it valid to attribute an accident both to the individual and to 
the species, although principally and in the first place accidents are 
in individuals. 
There are several things implicit in this passage: First of all, accidents, he says, do 
not strictly speaking (“principally and in the first place”) inhere in species. And 
where do you suppose Odo got that? Recall Boethius’s De trinitate again (near 
the end of Text 2 I gave you, lines 125–28), or his Contra Eutychen. To be sure, 
Boethius there goes on to say accidents inhere in matter, whereas Odo says they 
inhere principally in individuals. But that’s not the important point. The important 
point is that they both say accidents do not inhere in species. 
Nevertheless, Odo goes on in the passage just quoted, even though strictly 
speaking accidents do not inhere in species but only in individuals, still if, as it 
happens, there is only one individual in the species, and if it has an accident A, 
then we can in a sense (but not “strictly”) say that the species itself has accident 
A. 
Now, although that’s what he says, Odo in fact means something a little stronger. 
He means that, whether there is one member of a species or several, as long as 
every member of the species has the accident A, then we can in a sense say the 
species itself has A. We’ll see in a moment why he need the more general 
formulation. 
In short, if Adam had blue eyes, then as long as he was alone in the Garden of 
Eden (that is, until Eve came along — and if she had blue eyes too, then the point 
would still continue to hold), it was in a sense true to say that humanity itself had 
blue eyes — since every human being (namely, the only one) did. 
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Now here is how all this gets applied to the case at hand. (See the paragraph 
beginning at line 50.) 
While Adam and Eve were still the only people in the Garden, they both sinned. 
That is, every human sinned, and therefore, humanity itself in a sense sinned. 
(This is why I said that Odo wanted to generalize his claim: not just if there is 
only one member of a species, but as long as every member of a species had 
accident A, the species as a whole can be said to have A. After all, when the sin 
occurred in the Garden, there was more than one human being.) 
Since every human being then in existence in the Garden of Eden then sinned, so 
that humanity itself in a sense sinned, the sin of Adam therefore somehow infects 
the whole species. Hence we, who are of the same species as Adam and get souls 
of the same nature as his (although of course we do not get them biologically 
from him), end up with souls infected with sin too. By the time a third human 
being came on the scene, it was too late. The entire nature had been corrupted. 
It is important of course that both Adam and Eve sinned. If Eve had eaten the 
apple and then given it to Adam who threw it away in pious indignation, then 
there would have been no original sin in the whole species. Presumably, Eve 
would have been in big trouble, but she alone would have been guilty. In order to 
affect the entire human species, Adam’s contribution was crucial too. 
There is some traditional basis for this device of applying the accidents of 
individuals to the species. In Categories 5 3a4–6, for example, Aristotle says: 
If we call an individual man “skilled in grammar,” the predicate is 
applicable also to the species and to the genus to which he belongs. 
This law holds good in all cases. 
Note that Aristotle does not say that every member of the species or genus has to 
be “skilled in grammar.” In fact, he seems to suggest that even a single case 
suffices, no matter how many individuals the species or genus has. 
Later on, in the late fourteenth century, this kind of thing will become an 
important worry to people like John Wyclif. If a single man runs, then in what 
sense can we say that man runs? The text I just quoted from Aristotle would seem 
to allow at least some sense in which this is legitimate. How do we sort all this 
out? (The question is a rather more natural one in Latin than in English, because 
Latin has no indefinite articles.) 
Well, however it all works out, it ought to be clear that as an account of original 
sin, Odo’s theory is a crazy doctrine. If you poke at it even a little bit, it falls 
apart. If Adam and Eve were both right-handed, then so is the entire human 
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species. If Adam and Eve both danced a jig in the Garden of Eden, then so do I, 
since what they did affects the whole human species, in which I partake. 
But my reason for discussing Odo’s theory here is not that it is a good theory, but 
rather that it is a strongly realist theory. And notice why Odo thinks he has to be a 
realist here. It is to accommodate a theological doctrine, not a philosophical one: 
the doctrine of original sin. 
There is another traditional theological reason too why some people have felt they 
had to be realists. And that is the doctrine of the Trinity. 
I must confess, I have never understood the pressure here. But if you look at “The 
Course in the Box,” Ver. 3.0, Vol. II, Text 12 (handout “Selections  from 
Anselm’s Correspondence conerning Roscelin”), you will find there several 
passages from St. Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109), who was arguing against a 
certain Roscelin. (We don’t know much about Roscelin’s life or his philosophy, 
although you might want to look at the papers by Eike-Henneer W. Kluge and 
Constant J. Mews on Anselm, in the “Articles (Bibliography)” subfolder of our 
“Resources” page on Oncourse. We will have more to say about Roscelin later on, 
in connection with Abelard.) 
In any case, Anselm suggests that Roscelin was an extreme nominalist, a 
nominalist of the strict observance. He held a strong form of the view that there is 
nothing really shared by or common to many things in reality — not even in God. 
As a result, Anselm seems to argue, if there are three divine persons in the 
Trinity, then on Roscelin’s theory there must be three gods, since there is nothing 
at all that unites them metaphysically into a unity. 
Roscelin is the only medieval figure I know of who was ever accused of out and 
out tritheism (by Anselm) as a result of his nominalism. It is unclear whether 
Roscelin himself ever went so far as that. And in fact, it is unclear to me whether 
such a doctrine has anything to do with nominalism. On the contrary, it seems to 
me that realism would be the doctrine that leads more directly to tritheism here. 
That is, if you think you need to be a realist because of the doctrine of the Trinity 
(as Anselm apparently did), then this is presumably because you think that the 
divine nature is a universal common to the three divine persons. Otherwise, it 
seems to me, realism and nominalism are simply irrelevant to Trinitarian doctrine. 
But in fact, if you do think the divine nature is a universal common to the three 
persons of the Trinity, then it is you who are committed to tritheism, not the 
nominalist. For consider: If you have a universal human nature common to three 
individuals, what do you say about the three individuals? You say they are three 
men. So too — and I see no relevant difference here — if the divine nature is a 
universal common to the three divine persons, then you have three gods. In short, 
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you had better not interpret Trinitarian doctrine in terms of the theory of 
universals. 
In the late fourteenth century, this was explicitly recognized by John Wyclif, who 
says in his On Universals (Chap. 8, lines 621–23 of Anthony Kenny’s 
translation): 
But there is a great dissimilarity between the relation between the 
common divine nature and its persons, and the relation between 
specific nature and its persons. 
Nevertheless, Wyclif goes on to say (lines 625–27), even though the divine nature 
is not a universal, the theory of universals is very instructive in interpreting the 
doctrine of the Trinity. He says: 
And this, I believe, is the reason why God has not permitted the 
doctrine of universals to die out altogether. 
In short, realists enjoy a kind of special divine protection! 
Well, you can believe that or not, as you wish. For my own part, although I am 
willing to grant with Wyclif that the notion of a universal is a useful thing to keep 
in mind when thinking about the theology of the Trinity, I simply see no 
necessary connection at all between nominalism and tritheism, no matter what 
Anselm said. 
But, however that works out, many people apparently thought — and still think 
today — that there is some connection here, so that orthodoxy requires some 
version of realism. 
We have then at least two kinds of theological pressures that people have 
sometimes felt compelled them to a version of realism: the doctrine of original 
sin, and the doctrine of the Trinity. 
 
In addition to these theological reasons, of course, there were also purely 
philosophical ones. We have already talked several times about the 
epistemological reasons for realism. 
I want to say some more about those now. 
Recall: reasons for realism are reasons against nominalism, and the main 
traditional reason against nominalism is that it seems to make any knowledge of 
the world impossible. 
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First: Think back to the beginning of this course, when I was first setting up the 
arguments on both sides. At that time, I said that one way in which nominalism 
seemed to compromise the possibility of knowledge of the world is that it made 
our knowledge claims arbitrary. That is, if there are no real universal entities out 
there to correspond to our general concepts and terms, then the fact that we 
automatically and spontaneously tend to group things together and think of them 
as under a common concept, and refer to them with a common term — that fact 
would be without any objective justification. Our classifications of things would 
not, then, “cleave nature at the joints” — to use Plato’s phrase. They would 
reflect perhaps our conceptual framework, our beliefs, our cultural conditioning, 
our pragmatic and perhaps scientific purposes — but they would not reliably 
reflect the way things really “are” in any objective sense. 
In short, if nominalism is correct, then our so called “knowledge” cannot be a 
matter of our discovering the way things are, but must be instead a matter of how 
we interpret the way things are. Knowledge, then, would not be a discovery but a 
constructing. 
This then is the first strand I want to separate out of the cluster of epistemological 
arguments against nominalism. To put it in a kind of slogan, it is the strand that 
would push nominalism toward a kind of pragmatic theory of knowledge — and 
in fact has pushed some modern nominalists in that direction. (Note that this is 
not exactly “skepticism,” but a much more sweeping claim.) 
Now if you think about this line of reasoning carefully, I think you will see that 
there is an implicit but important assumption behind it. The assumption is that if 
our groupings and classifications of things are to have any objective justification, 
we must somehow derive those groupings and classifications from observing the 
things so grouped and classified. 
In other words, the argument seems to run implicitly like this: 
(1) On a nominalist theory, if we observe the objects of knowledge, 
we will not find there any objective basis for grouping them 
together in this way rather than that. For example, grouping 
Socrates and Plato together and calling them both “men.” In short: 
Nominalism  No objective basis 
for our general groupings of things 
can be found in the objects 
themselves. 
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(2) But — an ASSUMPTION — since, if we are going to have any 
objective basis for such groupings, we could only get it by looking 
at the objects themselves, it appears that nominalism leaves us with 
no objective basis at all.  
Now, that second step incorporates a kind of empiricist premise. By ‘empiricism’ 
here I do not necessarily mean the doctrine that all our knowledge comes from 
sensation, but rather the doctrine that all our knowledge (or at least all our 
knowledge that proceeds in general terms) comes from experience of the objects 
known, whether that experience comes from the senses or however. That is, step 
(2) amounts to saying: 
If there is any objective basis at all 
for our general groupings of things, 
that basis must be found in the 
objects so grouped: 
Basis → in objects. 
What would happen if we rejected that assumption? Let me sharpen the point by 
asking: What happens to the argument I’ve just given you (the “first strand” of the 
epistemological case against nominalism) if we apply it not to our knowledge 
(that is, to human knowledge) but to God’s knowledge? 
Well, of course, God is supposed to have “universal” or general concepts just as 
much as we do. They are called divine Ideas (according to a medieval doctrine 
we’ve met before, that goes back through Augustine to Philo of Alexandria, and 
became pretty much the standard view). 
But God’s knowledge — and so God’s universal concepts — are not derived by 
observing the objects known. (At least this is so for God’s knowledge of 
creatures.) God’s knowledge does not depend on creatures; indeed, nothing about 
God depends on creatures. It is the other way around. Creatures depend on God 
— he created them, after all. And he created them knowing what he was doing. 
(That is called divine “providence.”) In other words, he created them in 
accordance with the divine Ideas. 
The point is: God’s knowledge is not the knowledge of an investigator; it is the 
knowledge of an artisan who has a picture in his mind in advance that serves as a 
kind of model or pattern for what he then produces. God’s knowledge, therefore, 
is not a discovering but a constructing. 
Now, of course, there are problems with this traditional view. One main problem 
is how to reconcile it with the doctrine of human free will. If God knows my 
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future actions in the same way he knows the laws of the solar system —  namely, 
because he determined them to turn out that way — then it appears that there is no 
truly free will for us humans. 
This is a real problem, but I want to set it aside because it seems to me to be 
equally a problem whether you are a nominalist or a realist about universals. So 
too, if the problem can be solved, its solution (as far as I can see) will have 
nothing to do with the problem of universals. In short, the problem of reconciling 
divine omniscience with human free will seems to be an entirely separate issue. 
So let’s focus instead on other cases of divine knowledge of the world: other 
things he knows because he set them up that way in accordance with his own 
divine Ideas. 
What does all this have to do with the argument against nominalism we were 
considering a moment ago? Well, I think you can see that it undercuts that 
argument completely. The argument got its plausibility from the assumption that 
our universal concepts must somehow be derived from their objects. But that is 
simply not so for God’s concepts. 
So — as far as this argument at least is concerned — the nominalist may have a 
hard time accounting for human knowledge, but he will not have any special 
difficulty with God’s knowledge. 
How then does God’s knowledge work? Well, one theory goes like this: God 
knows the way things are out here in the created world because he knows his own 
acts of will, his own decisions to create this and to create that. (Aquinas maintains 
a doctrine like this.) 
For our purposes, the point is: Each of these acts of will, and each of the resulting 
creative productions, is quite consistent with a nominalist metaphysics. That is, 
there doesn’t have to be any kind of metaphysical universal here — or at least not 
for any epistemological reasons. 
There are universal or general concepts involved in God’s creative activity, the 
divine Ideas — just as we have universal or general concepts too. But the 
universal or general divine concepts are not metaphysical universals any more 
than Platonic Forms are. They are “universal” merely in the sense of having many 
effects at once. Recall the “seal ring” theory. 
God, then, can say: “I’m going to create Socrates, in accordance with my Idea that 
I call the Idea of man,” and then again he can say “I’m going to create Plato, in 
accordance with that same Idea that I call the Idea of man.” And so on. There’s 
nothing metaphysically universal here; each act is entirely a singular affair. 
Although it may appeal to a universal concept, and to the same universal concept 
each time, metaphysically there is nothing but individuals on this account. 
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Objection: Now you might say that this just isn’t so. Creation itself will turn out 
to be a universal relation on this theory. All creatures will be related to God’s will 
through this one universal relation: creation. So the theory hasn’t really made its 
case. We don’t have a nominalism that does away with universals altogether; we 
have only reduced their number. 
Reply: Well, you can say that if you want. But the point is: You don’t have to say 
it if you don’t want. 
In other words, this objection shows a preference toward realism more than it 
shows us any real argument against nominalism. 
What we have here is a situation very much like a situation we’ve already seen — 
back when we were talking about the seal-ring metaphor in Boethius. Then I said 
that a realist might claim that the relation of the seal-ring to each of its 
impressions in the wax — the relation of causing or impressing — is a universal 
relation. I also said that the nominalist could quite rightly reply: No. If you are 
nominalist enough to use the seal-ring metaphor to begin with, then you ought to 
be nominalist enough to use it again to account for the relations of impressing. 
(Remember, the seal-ring metaphor is a metaphor; it is a model for a theory. It us 
not by itself an argument for that theory. The theory captured in that model would 
have to be argued for on some other grounds.) 
The realist might very well feel uneasy about the claim that God’s knowledge, 
interpreted as I have just done, does not require any universals. But uneasiness 
does not count as an argument where I come from. And, as far as I can see, the 
realist has no argument here — or at least no epistemological argument along the 
lines we have just been considering. The nominalist can maintain his case. 
Another objection: Now, the realist might still have an answer. He might say: It’s 
all very good to save God’s knowledge in this way. But a nominalist should 
derive little comfort from this achievement, since whatever is the case for God’s 
knowledge, it appears that humans still don’t have any knowledge. We don’t 
establish the metaphysical structures of the world by our concepts. Hence the 
argument we have been considering may not work for God, but it still appears to 
work for humans, so that the nominalist is in almost as bad a situation as before. 
Reply: But not so. It would only be so if the only way we could get our universal 
concepts, and justify them, were by observing the objects. That is, only if we 
accepted the hidden “empiricist” assumption behind the second step of the 
argument I sketched just above. 
But, historically, there have been lots of theories according to which that 
assumption is just not so. 
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Consider Descartes’ theory of innate ideas, for instance. (Not that Descartes 
himself was a nominalist. My point is only that he doesn’t think he has to ground 
general human concepts in metaphysical universals.) Those innate ideas were 
implanted in us at birth. Unlike the Platonic theory of Recollection, which holds 
that pretty much the same ideas Descartes wanted to call “innate” were in fact 
acquired by a direct experience with the corresponding objects in a prior state, 
Descartes’ theory of innate ideas holds that these ideas are not derived from any 
experience with external objects. And yet, according to Descartes, they give us 
real knowledge of the physical world. In fact, for Descartes, they give us the only 
real knowledge of the physical world we can possibly have. What we have here is 
in effect another version of the familiar “seal ring” theory. 
So too, there was a theory of human knowledge that was very common in the 
early Middle Ages — indeed, it was pretty much the standard theory. It is called 
the “Theory of Illumination,” and it goes back to Augustine. And, although later 
on some people (like Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus) rejected the theory, it 
remained a live, viable epistemological option right up to the end of the Middle 
Ages and beyond. (For that matter, Descartes’s doctrine of innate ideas is a kind 
of “degenerate” form — degenerate, that is, in my opinion — of Augustine’s 
Theory of Illumination.) 
According to the Theory of Illumination, knowledge is not something that is 
derived from the objects known; it is something that is put into our minds by God. 
Of course there are lots of qualification, limitations and adjustments that have to 
be made both to make this theory a plausible one and also to make it historically 
accurate to the Augustinian texts. But I don’t want to go into all that now. (The 
theory of illumination is discussed at some length in several chapters of “The 
Course in the Box,” Ver. 2.0.) My point is that you are now in a position to 
discern a way out of our problem — that is, a way to avoid at least this strand of 
the epistemological argument against nominalism. 
If our universal concepts are not somehow derived from the objects known, but 
are put into our minds directly by God, then just as God’s knowledge does not 
require the existence of metaphysically real universals, so too neither does our 
human knowledge. Just as God’s knowledge can proceed in terms of the general 
ideas in the divine mind (which are not copied from reality, but the other way 
around: reality is copied from them), so too our human knowledge can proceed in 
terms of our own general concepts —  and with just as much authority — because 
those concepts are implanted in us by God, not derived from the objects. 
Let me summarize this: It seems to me that the strand of epistemological 
argument that would tend to push nominalism toward a pragmatic theory of 
knowledge as the only alternative to out and out skepticism can be countered by 
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adopting something like a theory of illumination, or some other theory that severs 
the empiricist connection in step (2) of the argument I sketched above. 
You may not be comfortable with the theological assumptions of a theory of 
illumination, but that is not the point. If you don’t want to believe in God, for 
instance, then perhaps you can find something else to play the same role for you 
(the Platonic Theory of Recollection, for example). The point is just that there 
may very well be an alternative to accounting for our universal concepts in terms 
of our deriving them from the objects known by them. And if there is, then one 
kind of epistemological argument against nominalism will fail. 
So, we’ve learned something. And in fact we’ve learned something pretty 
important. We’ve learned that nominalism does not run into problems with 
epistemology in general, but only with a kind of empiricist epistemology. At least 
this is so with respect to this first line of reasoning I’ve just been considering, the 
question about the objective basis for our general groupings of things. 
Note, incidentally, that if these considerations carry any weight at all, then 
Boethius was quite right to express hesitations over the “moderate realist” theory 
he had presented in his Second Commentary on Porphyry, with it’s theory of 
“abstraction” or “division,” regarded as a process of filtering out or subtracting. 
Earlier, I speculated that perhaps the main reason for Boethius’s hesitations about 
this theory is that it left out any role for the Divine Ideas. If that’s right, then it 
was a very good reason indeed. 
 
But there is also a second strand of argumentation I want to separate out of the 
cluster of epistemological reasons against nominalism. If the first strand focused 
on the notion of knowledge, this second one focuses on the notion of truth. As a 
result, you may not want to regard it as properly an epistemological argument at 
all — although, since knowledge implies truth, it will certainly have 
epistemological consequences. 
This second strand of argumentation can perhaps best be approached by stating it 
in its most extreme form first. Not that the most extreme form is very plausible, 
but the most extreme form is the one in which it’s easiest to see the point. This 
new line of argument is based on what might be called a picture theory of truth, 
somewhat in the sense in which the early Wittgenstein was said to have 
maintained a “picture theory of truth.” 
The reasoning here goes like this —  and once again I’m putting it in its most 
extreme (and therefore probably least plausible) form in order to make it as clear 
as possible: 
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If our knowledge is to be knowledge, it must first of all be true. (That’s fair 
enough.) But, in order for our judgments to be true (the theory goes), they must 
somehow capture the way the world really is. In short, there must be a kind of 
correspondence between the elements of our true judgments and the things in the 
world. What grounds the truth of our judgments in the world must have the same 
structure as the judgments themselves have. (One form of this is what I called the 
“Platonic”-style approach to metaphysics in the Warp and Woof paper. I’m not 
now thinking of the “seal ring” picture, but rather the discussion of predication in 
that paper.) 
Let me illustrate the theory. If I say “The cat is on the mat” —  and if that’s true 
— then there must be something out there corresponding to the term ‘cat’, and 
something out there corresponding to the term ‘mat’, and something out there 
corresponding to the relation expressed by ‘is on’, and so on. 
People who don’t like theories like this make fun of them by saying that, on such 
a theory, the world turns out to look very much like an English sentence. And in a 
sense this summation is not too far off the mark — although it doesn’t look quite 
so immediately ridiculous once you realize that it is not so much the structure of 
spoken languages that is at stake, but rather the structure of judgments, which you 
may very well want to interpret in terms of thoughts that are expressed by spoken 
sentences. 
The basic idea then is that the form of our true judgments is the logical form of 
the world. 
Now what does this have to do with realism, you might well ask. The connection 
is this: If you do not hold some form of the picture-theory of truth, if you grant 
that the relation between our true judgments and the world does not have to 
proceed in this fashion, then why on earth would anyone think we need to have a 
universal or common entity to correspond to our universal or general concepts? 
In other words, the “picture theory” appears to provide one of the most basic 
motivations behind the argument that we need to have universal entities in the 
world to correspond to our general concepts — and therefore in order for our 
judgments in terms of general concepts to have any chance at all of being true. 
So, even if you grant that the first strand of argument I gave you a while ago can 
be met by some version of a theory of illumination (say), there is still this second 
strand that appears to lead just as inevitably to realism — at least if we’re going to 
preserve the truth of any of our general judgments. 
Of course, it’s certainly true that a subtle theoretician might very well reject the 
extreme form of this “picture” theory I’ve just given you, and yet still find 
philosophical reasons for thinking he has to be a realist. Nevertheless, the picture 
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theory as I have stated it does encapsulate a prominent underlying historical 
tendency in its most extreme — and therefore its clearest —  form. 
The extreme form of this theory is not just a historical abstraction; I am not just 
setting up a straw man here. 
Some people in the Middle Ages did in fact explicitly hold a relatively extreme 
form of the view that our true thoughts map part by part onto reality (although 
they did not, as far as I know, explicitly apply this view to the problem of 
universals). 
For example, a certain Fridugisus, in his very odd Letter on Nothing and 
Shadows, contained in the Notes and Texts. 
Fridugisus (there are lots of different spellings of his name, at least seventeen of 
which have some manuscript authority) was associated with the court of 
Charlemagne in the ninth century. Note that this puts him before Odo of Tournai. 
I’m treating him out of sequence here, because I wanted to discuss the issues 
raised by Odo before I got to this new point. I should hasten to warn you that 
Fridugisus was not an especially good or especially important philosopher, and in 
fact might be called a “hack.” But he does illustrate the point I want to make. 
Fridugisus’ Letter on Nothing and Shadows was a letter written to Charlemagne, 
who must have been very surprised to get it. 
Look at line 38 of the translation: “Let us proceed by reason,” he says. “Every 
finite name signifies something.” 
Now first, some points of terminology. The word ‘name’ here is ‘nomen’ in Latin, 
and it’s a medieval grammatical term that means both nouns and pronouns and 
also adjectives. A “finite” name is to be contrasted with an “infinite” name, which 
is what they called expressions like ‘non-man’ or ‘non-tree’. (This terminology 
comes from Aristotle, De interpretatione 2 16a30–32.) Fridugisus doesn’t say 
anything about whether infinite names signify anything or not; his claim is 
confined to the finite ones. 
Now (he goes in lines 42–43) the word ‘nothing’ is a finite name, as the 
grammarians tell us. It is not an infinite name, since it does not have the prefix 
‘non-’ or an equivalent. 
(In Latin, ‘nihil’ = ‘nothing’ is not obviously made up of ‘no’ + ’thing’, as in 
English. Etymologically, to be sure, the word comes from ‘ne’ + ‘hilum’ = ‘not in 
the least’, so there is a kind of negative built into it, but let’s just pretend we don’t 
know that. Fridugisus certainly didn’t know it.) 
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So, ‘nothing’ is not an infinite name. And yet it certainly is a name. After all, it 
functions grammatically like a name — like a noun, in fact. It can serve in subject 
position in a sentence, for example. So, by a process of elimination, it’s a finite 
name. (Here, incidentally, is an instance of the role of medieval grammatical 
theory that I said runs all through the medieval problem of universals.) 
Therefore, since “every finite name signifies something,” as Fridugisus has said, 
it follows that ‘nothing’ signifies something. 
But now that’s a peculiar thing to say. For consider: 
Just as to say that the term ‘tree’ (quotation marks) signifies a certain kind of 
plant amounts to saying that a tree (no quotation marks) is a certain kind of plant, 
and to say that the term ‘dog’ (quotation marks) signifies a certain kind of animal 
amounts to saying that a dog (no quotation marks) is a certain kind of animal — 
so too, it would seem, to say the term ‘nothing’ (quotation marks) signifies 
something amounts to saying that nothing (no quotation marks) is something. And 
that certainly seems odd. 
But Fridugisus just accepts the consequence, peculiar or not, on the basis of his 
principle about finite names. In fact, he goes on to say that this nothing is not only 
something, it’s a very important something, since it is that out of which God 
created everything. God created ex nihilo (= out of nothing), recall. 
Fridugisus then goes on to suggest that this very special nothing is pretty spooky 
stuff, a little like “shadows.” But, fortunately, we don’t have to follow his 
argument any further. 
You can see what is happening here. The naive and extreme application of the 
“picture theory” I set out earlier gets you involved in hopeless confusions and 
paradox. After all, if we are going to treat ‘nothing’ just like any other noun, then 
we might as well argue: 
Nothing is better than eternal happiness. 
But a Big Mac is better than nothing. 
  Therefore, a Big Mac is better than eternal happiness, 
by the transitivity of ‘better than’. 
Of course, you might well say: Look, we sophisticates in the twentieth century, 
who are blessed with all knowledge and most wisdom, surely know that ‘nothing’ 
may look like a noun, and grammatically is one (actually, it’s a pronoun, but the 
point is the same: it’s still a “name” in Fridugisus’s sense) — it can be the subject 
of a sentence, for instance. But of course really it can be paraphrased away. To 
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say that God created ex nihilo is only to say that he created and did not create 
from something. 
That’s true, of course. But now you’re tampering with the “picture theory.” 
You’re saying there need not be a one-for-one correspondence between true 
thoughts and the world — or rather between the parts of true thoughts and the 
parts of the world. The correspondence can be more indirect. It can be got at by 
“paraphrase,” for instance. But by weakening the “picture theory” in this way, 
you have to ask yourself whether you aren’t weakening your case for realism too. 
As it turns out, there are theological reasons too for not accepting the “picture 
theory” in the naive and extreme form in which I presented it earlier, and in which 
we find it in Fridugisus. I don’t want to go into these now, but I discuss them in 
“The Course in the Box,” Ver. 2.0, Vol. 1, Ch. 37 (from which I am taking a lot of 
what I am saying now). They involve the problem of evil. 
Let’s make a second pass over this second strand of argumentation, the “picture 
theory” argument. It turns out it’s actually a more serious argument than it might 
at first appear. 
Let’s push the argument further. You might say: Let’s not bother with the naive 
and extreme form of the picture theory. Let’s be a little more sophisticated about 
it. Let’s say that the surface-structure of our judgments masks a deeper and more 
fundamental structure, so that words like ‘nothing’ can be paraphrased away and 
can be strictly done without in a suitably pure language. (Recall the “ideal”-
language theories of some early-twentieth century philosophers, or for that matter 
Chomsky’s talk about “surface structure” and “deep structure.”) Then let’s say 
that the correspondence between thought and reality doesn’t occur at the level of 
the surface structure, but at the level of deep structure. Then you might go on to 
say that, while at that deeper level of fully expanded paraphrase, you may not 
need words like ‘nothing’ — and so we will not need to postulate nothings in 
reality to correspond to that word — nevertheless, we certainly will need some 
general terms at least, and so at least some universals in the world. In short, funny 
terms like ‘nothing’ can be paraphrased away. But we can’t do without any 
general terms whatever! 
Now that’s a fairly sophisticated line to take, but it is fancier than things got in the 
early Middle Ages. This kind of argument would be more at home in the 
fourteenth century. 
William of Ockham, for instance (early fourteenth century), will argue by means 
of such considerations of “deep structure” or paraphrase (these come out in his so 
called “connotation theory”), that you don’t need an entity corresponding to the 
word ‘nothing’. He went even further and said that you don’t really need to 
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postulate entities to correspond to terms in all the Aristotelian categories. You can 
say everything you want to say — although not so briefly — by using only 
substance terms and quality terms (and connecting words, of course). You don’t 
need real places, for instance, to answer to terms in the Aristotelian category of 
place. And so on. Motion for Ockham is not something over and above substances 
and their qualities. You don’t need motion terms in a suitably periphrastic 
language, and so you don’t need such entities in your ontology. 
Ockham uses the paraphrase argument in this way to cut down the list of 
categories in the world. Or at least that seems to be what he’s doing with such 
paraphrases. There is some doubt about exactly what his intentions were. But, 
whatever he was doing, when he comes to argue that even in the categories of 
substance and quality — where you do need general terms to say everything you 
want to say — you nevertheless don’t need real universal things in the world, he 
has to turn to a different kind of argument entirely. Here, in effect, he has to reject 
the “picture theory” even in its sophisticated, “deep structure” form. 
Peter Abelard, in the twelfth century, will in effect do the same thing. He does not 
have any program of reducing the number of categories in the world by 
paraphrasing them away, as Ockham seems to have had, so that the situation with 
Abelard won’t look a lot like the situation with Ockham later on. But still, 
Abelard — like Ockham — is going to reject the “picture theory” entirely, no 
matter how sophisticated a form it might take on. 
 
With that, then, let us now turn to the next main period: to Abelard and the whole 
cluster of people around him. 
First, a warning: We are now in the twelfth century, and by the twelfth century we 
begin to find a problem that will only get worse as we go along. Up to the twelfth 
century, you can count the people of philosophical significance in the Middle 
Ages on the fingers of one hand (Augustine, Boethius, Anselm — although only 
Boethius on the problem of universals). But now their number begins to grow 
enormously. There are lots of people to keep straight all of a sudden, and 
sometimes we don’t know very much about them, so it’s all the harder to do so. 
This phenomenon is part and parcel of a revival of education in the Latin West, 
after a period of serious decline following the collapse of pagan antiquity. During 
this period, various kinds of schools began to be organized around monasteries 
(actually, that had happened long before, but many such schools were re-
organized and beefed up during the eleventh and twelfth centuries), around 
cathedrals, and even around individual teachers. Out of all these educational 
institutions grew the universities of the thirteenth century, one of the two 
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enduring legacies of the Middle Ages to us today. (The other one is Parliament. 
You may or may not want to include the hierarchical form of the Church as a 
third “surviving” medieval legacy, depending on what you think happened during 
the Reformation.) (Here is a HANDOUT containing a kind of diagram showing the 
interrelations of a number of people during this period. DISTRIBUTE HANDOUT 
“RELATIONS OF INFLUENCE IN THE TWELFTH CENTURY.”) 
With that preliminary, I want now to turn to Roscelin. I’ve already said a little 
about Roscelin. He was the one St. Anselm criticized as being a tritheist. Roscelin 
was said to be a nominalist to such an extent that there was not even a shared 
divine nature common to the three persons of the Trinity. Each was a separate and 
distinct God. 
What little we know about Roscelin indicates that he lived from roughly 1050 to 
1120. He was therefore slightly younger than St. Anselm, who lived from 1033 to 
1109, and about thirty years older than Abelard, who lived from 1079 to 1142. 
There is some indication that Roscelin taught Abelard for a while, but this is 
uncertain. 
So Roscelin serves as a kind of transition figure between the generation of St. 
Anselm (and Odo of Tournai) and the time of Abelard. But that is not the main 
reason I want to bring him up now. The main reason is that Roscelin will help us 
to understand what to expect from Abelard’s own view. And, believe me, we’re 
going to need all the help we can get with that. 
For an interesting study of Roscelin, see Eike-Henner W. Kluge, “Roscelin and 
the Medieval Problem of Universals,” referred to in the handout on “Reserves” I 
distributed out at the beginning of this course. A copy is available in the 
“Articles” (Bibliography) subfolder of our “Resources” page on Oncourse. 
Peter King, in his dissertation, also discusses Roscelin and criticizes Kluge’s 
paper, I think on good grounds. Basically, King’s criticism is that Kluge’s paper 
tries to derive more theory than is warranted by the available sources. In other 
words, it exhibits a common professional failing in this business: an 
unwillingness to say I don’t know. But, having said that, the paper is still very 
useful. 
There is some more recent work on Roscelin which seems to indicate that we may 
have more sources than we thought. But the situation is still unclear. (See 
Constant Mews, “Nominalism and Theology before Abaelard: New Light on 
Roscelin of Compiègne,” available in the same subfolder on Oncourse) 
One of our main sources for Roscelin, apart from Anselm, is a certain John of 
Salisbury. John of Salisbury is a later figure in the twelfth century — he died 
sometime after 1170. He is not an especially important philosopher in his own 
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right, although he did have some philosophical views. But what he is mainly 
useful for is the information he provides us about the other important people of 
his day. And he provides us with a lot of information about that! John of 
Salisbury wrote an important work, with the intriguing title Metalogicon (which is 
not at all about “metalogic,” but is instead a kind of diatribe about the teaching 
methods of John’s day, and about the proper role of the various liberal arts). Well, 
in this work there is a passage in which he discusses the various current theories 
of universals. The passage is in Metalogicon, II, Ch. 17. There are some brief 
comments on the Daniel D. McGarry translation in the first part of Notes and 
Texts. (The translation itself is not in the public domain. Nevertheless, it is readily 
available in libraries, and in Arthur Hyman and James J. Walsh, ed., Philosophy 
in the Middle Ages: The Christian, Islamic, and Jewish Traditions, 2nd ed. (there 
is a more recent 3rd ed. that omits the passage), (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), pp. 
167–69. Page references below will be to this last source.). 
We will have occasion to refer to this passage several times. For the present, the 
important point to notice is that John of Salisbury contrasts Roscelin’s view on 
universals with Abelard’s. We can use his remarks therefore as a way of getting 
into Abelard. 
John tells us (handout, p. 167) that for Roscelin, universals were mere “word 
sounds,” as the translation reads. The Latin here is ‘voces’, which is the plural of 
‘vox’. 
That is, for Roscelin there are general terms, general in the sense that they are 
predicable of many things, but there are no general or universal realities 
corresponding to them — that is, general in the way a metaphysical universal is 
supposed to be general. Roscelin, in short, is a nominalist. 
The term ‘vox’ is important here. In his letter On the Incarnation of the Word (see 
the handout “Selections from Anselm’s Correspondence concerning Roscelin,” 
distributed earlier, line 36 on p. 5), Anselm says that for Roscelin (whom he does 
not mention by name, but merely identified as one of the “dialecticians of our 
time”) universals were mere “flatus vocis” (‘flatus’ is a fourth declension noun, 
so that the plural is also ‘flatus’. In that passage, I translated ‘flatus vocis’ as 
“verbal puffs.” It can also be translated “verbal farts,” which is probably more 
what Anselm had in mind. The medievals were hardly delicate about these things. 
A ‘vox’ then is simply any sound uttered by the vocal apparatus of an animal — 
and therefore excludes the stamping of feet and the breaking of trees, as a certain 
later author rather colorfully puts it — and that can be written down, that is, 
spelled, thus ruling out sneezes and coughs, and so on. (This last is what is 
sometimes meant by saying that a vox is an articulate sound. But this terminology 
was not firmly fixed in the Middle Ages.) 
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In short, ‘vox’ can pretty accurately be translated as “utterance.” Although that is 
sometimes a clumsy translation, it’s certainly a correct one as far as getting the 
right sense is concerned. 
Now the crucial point here is that a vox need not mean anything, it doesn’t have to 
be significant. Sometimes, later authors would give the example ‘bu ba blitrix’, 
which doesn’t mean any more in Latin than it does in English, but which is a 
perfectly good vox. 
John of Salisbury (who does mention Roscelin by name) contrasts Roscelin’s 
stand on universals with Abelard’s. If Roscelin says that universals are nothing 
but voces, Abelard instead says they are sermones — plural of sermo. The word is 
hard to translate very well (in the John of Salisbury translation, p. 167, it is 
translated “verbal concepts”), but basically for Abelard it means a significant or 
meaningful vox. In a sense, at least as I read him, Abelard is going to turn out to 
be a nominalist, as Roscelin was alleged to be. For both of them, there are going 
to be no universal things in the metaphysical sense of the word. There are only 
going to be universal terms, universal words that are universal only in the quite 
different sense that they are predicated of many things. 
But whereas for Roscelin, a universal might be (according to the description of 
his view in Anselm and John of Salisbury, anyway) just any old utterance, 
Abelard is going to insist on the significance of those utterances. In short, for 
Abelard, there are no metaphysical universals in the world, and yet our general 
terms are grounded in the world. Abelard, then, is going to try to face up to the 
epistemological difficulties of nominalism. 
If John of Salisbury is right in his sketch of Roscelin, then Roscelin just didn’t 
care whether a vox is significant or not. (Otherwise the contrast with Abelard 
loses its point.) What Roscelin leaves out of his account is how thought or 
language is significant, how it links up with the world. As far as Roscelin’s 
doctrine goes — or at least as far as John’s description of it goes — everything in 
the world is singular, and if that compromises our knowledge, so much the worse 
for knowledge. It is very doubtful that Roscelin himself ever said anything like 
that, but this is the description that other people, like John of Salisbury, gave of 
his view. It is this side of things that Abelard will try to fix up. 
 
With that, then, let us turn to Abelard, the second major figure in our study. 
First of all, I should call your attention once again to Peter King’s elaborate Ph.D. 
dissertation, “Peter Abailard and the Problem of Universals,” a copy of which is 
on reserve in the main library. King discusses passages and texts from a wide 
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range of Abelard’s writings, and he translates many of them in Volume 2 of the 
dissertation. 
For our purposes, however, we are going to concentrate on one passage only, part 
of his Glosses on Porphyry, contained in his big work called the Logica 
ingredientibus. The relevant passage is translated in Five Texts. And, as we are 
discussing it, you’ll want to follow along closely in the outline provided in the 
Notes and Texts (pp. 17–20) — it gets complicated. 
The Logica ingredientibus is so called because its first word is ‘ingredientibus’. 
The actual words ‘Logica ingredientibus’ can be translated “Logic for 
Beginners.” But that is not the way the title should be translated, although that is 
sometimes done. The work is a logic for beginners, as the opening lines make 
clear, but that is not what the title means. The title just means “The Logic with the 
First Word ‘Ingredientibus’.” 
Let me warn you about this work. It was edited and published in 1919 by 
Bernhard Geyer, along with a number of other logical texts by Abelard. But the 
edition is based on a single manuscript, which is all Geyer had to work with at the 
time. Since then, however, scholars have located further copies of this work, and 
it has become clear that the Logica ingredientibus is badly in need of being 
reedited. Peter King is involved in a project to do just that, and the finished 
edition eventually will appear in the Corpus Christianorum series. In the 
meantime, we have to rely on the Geyer edition and just do the best we can. 
The passage translated in Five Texts is from the “Glosses on Porphyry,” in the 
Logica ingredientibus, and in particular from the glosses on the famous passage 
from the Isagoge where Porphyry raises but declines to discuss the famous three 
questions we’ve seen before: 
(a) Whether genera and species subsist or are purely mental? 
(b) If they subsist, are they corporeal or incorporeal? 
(c) If they are incorporeal, do they exist in corporeal things, as 
a geometrical line does, or separated from corporeal things, 
as God and the angels do? (The examples are Abelard’s 
own interpolation. Porphyry doesn’t give any.) 
(See paras. (4)–(6) of the Abelard translation, on p. 26.) 
To these three classic questions, Abelard adds a fourth of his own. Notice first of 
all that this is a pretty nervy thing to do. It’s a little like adding an eleventh 
commandment of your own to the classic ten. In any event, Abelard’s fourth 
question is found in para. (10), p. 27: 
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(d) Would genera and species exist even if there were no 
individuals? (That’s not a quotation, but that’s what the 
passage comes to.) For instance, would the species rose 
exist if there were no roses? 
Note that this is a very good question. 
Recall how in Boethius’s Second Commentary on Porphyry, we had a basically 
nominalist theory supplemented by a theory of “abstraction” that was supposed to 
explain how our knowledge is nevertheless based on reality, and is not just an 
arbitrary fabrication on our part. 
Abelard’s own theory is going to belong to the same broad school of thought, 
although there will be big differences. 
Recall also how there were really two notions of a universal that we found in 
Boethius. The first and more important one for Boethius himself and for the 
Middle Ages generally was the notion we found in the Second Commentary on 
Porphyry, the metaphysical notion according to which a universal was something 
that is shared by or common to several things as a whole, simultaneously and in a 
peculiar metaphysically intimate way. 
But I also pointed out that in his Second Commentary on the De interpretatione, 
Boethius defined a universal, following Aristotle’s De interpretatione 7, as what 
is apt to be predicated of many. This logical or predicational notion of a universal 
we didn’t dwell on much in connection with Boethius. But now it becomes 
important. For it is in terms of this notion of a universal that Abelard sets up his 
statement of the problem of universals. (But don’t be misled. The Boethian 
metaphysical notion is not far away in Abelard’s discussion, as we shall see.) 
Universals are predicated of many, Aristotle says, while singulars are not. As I 
commented back when I mentioned this passage in connection with Boethius, the 
last part of that claim is strictly speaking ambiguous. It could mean that singulars 
are predicated of one thing only, as opposed to many things. Or it could mean that 
singulars are not the kinds of things that can be predicated at all — as, for 
example, in the Categories where Aristotle says that individuals are neither 
present in nor said of anything else. 
Well, Abelard breaks this possible ambiguity by citing Porphyry, who says that 
the individual or singular is what is predicated of one thing only. (Abelard, para. 
(16), p. 28. Compare Porphyry, paras. (8), (35).) 
So for Abelard the entire difference between universals and individuals is put in 
terms of predication: Universals are predicated of several things, whereas 
individuals are predicated only of one. 
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Now of course we have to ask: What kind of relation is this predication? What 
sorts of things do we say are predicated, whether predicated of many things or 
predicated of one only? 
Well, as we’ve talked about before, at one level predication is a matter of 
language. We say terms are predicated. We either say they are predicated of 
things, or of other terms. 
But there may be more to it than that. Is this predication relation in language 
based on and derived from a more basic metaphysical relation that we might also 
call a kind of “predication,” a relation between entities? If so, then the fact that in 
language we have terms that are predicated of many things — terms like ‘man’ or 
‘animal’ — would correspond to the fact that on the side of reality there is a 
single entity (man or animal, depending on which case we’re talking about), 
related to several individuals in a way that is mirrored by the facts of predication 
in language. And that entity would be a universal — not just a universal term or 
word but a universal piece of the ontology of the world. It might even be, 
depending on the details of your theory, a universal in the metaphysical sense we 
saw in Boethius’s Second Commentary on Porphyry — something  present as a 
whole and simultaneously to several things in a peculiar metaphysically intimate 
way. 
Of course, this is just the “picture theory” I talked about a little while ago, and 
said was one strand in the argument for realism. 
Well, this is the way Abelard sets up the problem of universals. Of course there 
are words that are predicated of many. That is just an undeniable and quite non-
controversial fact about language. What we want to know is: Are there in addition 
things that are predicated of many? Do the facts of general predication in 
language accurately mirror an ontological relation in the world? 
An affirmative answer is realism. A negative one is nominalism. 
Notice two things here: 
(a) This is not the way we set up the problem of universals in 
Boethius — even though the predicational notion of a 
universal can also be found in Boethius. In Boethius’s 
Second Commentary on Porphyry there was no discussion 
of predication at all; it was all put in terms of “sharing” or 
“having in common.” This means that we have two notions 
of “universals” here, and we have to keep them sorted out 
in our minds. We can’t just assume that realism in the one 
sense automatically entails realism in the other sense, or 
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conversely. That remains to be seen. (The fact remains, 
however, that for most authors the two senses did go 
together, whether they did so automatically or not.) 
(b) In terms of the predicational notion of a universal, it is easy 
to see what is “nominal” about “nominalism.” For 
nominalism, universals are only names — “nomina” — 
that is, pieces of language, not pieces of the world. 
Nevertheless, although it is easy to see the appropriateness 
of the terminology, we should not think the term 
‘nominalism’ first arose in this sense. As I’ve remarked 
before, the true history of that term is still very obscure. 
(For some very interesting remarks on this, you may want 
to look at two exceptionally interesting papers by Calvin 
Normore. One is “The Tradition of Mediaeval 
Nominalism.”4 The other is “Abelard and the School of the 
Nominales.”5 
Abelard goes on to cite some authoritative texts in Aristotle and Boethius for this 
kind of “predication” terminology (paras. (20)–(21), p. 29). That is, he wants to 
reassure us, he is not engaging in neologism here. 
Then he turns (after a transitional paragraph (22), p. 29) to a consideration of 
various realist theories current in Abelard’s own day. After refuting these views 
to his own satisfaction (pp. 29–37), he will set out his own theory (beginning on 
p. 37). 
Although Abelard doesn’t say so explicitly here, in fact his main target in these 
discussions is one of his own former teachers, a certain William of Champeaux 
(whose name you should get down). William was at one time Master of the 
cathedral school at Paris, and later of the monastic school of St. Victor just 
outside Paris. 
Now William held two different theories of universals at different points in his 
career. The reason he changed his mind is described by Abelard himself in his 
Story of My Adversities (see the earlier handout). Here is part of what he says on 
pp. 15–18, and it gives you a good idea of what Abelard must have been like to 
deal with: 
                     
4 Calvin Normore, “The tradition of Mediaeval Nominalism,” in John Wippel, ed., 
Studies in Medieval Philosophy, (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 
1987), pp. 201–217. 
5 C. G. Normore, “Abelard and the School of the Nominales,” Vivarium 30 (1992), pp. 
80–96. 
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My teacher William, archdeacon of Paris, had changed his 
state [that is, he had entered religious orders] and entered the Order 
of Regular Clerics6 for the purpose, it was said, of being 
considered more pious and thereby of gaining promotion to the 
rank of a major prelacy, as happened when he was made bishop of 
Châlons. 
At that time [that is, after he entered orders, not after he 
became bishop of Châlons] I returned to him to hear him lecturing 
on rhetoric. Among other essays at discussion I forced him by 
clear proofs from reasoning to change, yes, to abandon his old 
stand on universals. He subsequently so modified his position as 
to assert that [blah blah blah]  Once William had corrected, yes 
under compulsion had abandoned his position, his lectures bogged 
down into such carelessness that they could scarcely be called 
lectures on logic at all [I thought Abelard just said they were on 
rhetoric.] 
From then on my teaching gained such strength and 
prestige that those who formerly had somewhat vigorously 
championed the position of our master [that is, of William] and had 
most forcefully attacked mine now flocked to my school and even 
he [no one knows who this was] who had taken over the chair of 
our master in the cathedral school of Paris offered his place to me 
that along with the other students he might follow my lectures right 
where our common master had held sway. Within a few days after 
my taking over the chair of dialectics, envy began to eat the heart 
out of my master and anguish to seize him to a degree I can hardly 
express [although he seems to me to be expressing it rather 
forcefully] 
So Abelard was a pupil of William’s, and when William was presenting his 
theory of universals — that is, his first theory of universals — Abelard so 
hectored him, raising one objection after another, that William finally just had to 
give up his view. He then adopted a second, revised view, and Abelard apparently 
attacked him on that too. Finally, as Abelard says, William had to give up the 
question altogether, and his “lectures bogged down into carelessness.” 
In his Adversities, Abelard says enough about William’s own views (in the parts 
I’ve skipped over) to make it pretty plain that William is the target of the 
                     
6 I’m not sure what this refers to. 
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arguments in the Logica ingredientibus. (We have almost nothing from William 
himself on this topic.) 
So first we get an extended treatment of William’s first theory, and then of 
William’s second theory and several variations of it held by various other people. 
Both of these views we have seen before, in Boethius. Once again, I suspect that 
all theories of universals ever held can be found in some non-trivial sense in 
Boethius, at least in germ. 
We shall soon see that the situation is far more subtle than this, but to a first 
approximation we can say that Abelard’s attack on William’s first view is a 
metaphysical one. He thinks the theory is a metaphysically impossible one. And, 
as we would expect from what I’ve said so far about the historical line-ups on 
these things, William’s first theory was a realist one. 
Abelard’s attack on the second theory is different. In effect — again to a first 
approximation, since, again, we shall see that the situation is far more subtle than 
this — Abelard thinks the second theory is perfectly all right — although he 
doesn’t think it is the whole story and although he does have some quarrels with 
the way it is expressed. It’s just that, contrary to what its adherents maintain, there 
is nothing realist about the theory. So it is not what it purports to be. 
Let us then look first at William of Champeaux’s first theory (beginning on p. 29 
in para. (23)). (This runs through §§ (23)–(27).) 
It is generally conceded by many scholars — for instance, by Copleston, History 
of Philosophy, vol. 2 — that Abelard’s attacks on William of Champeaux’s first 
theory were devastating, that he thoroughly refuted William’s brand of realism. 
Well, historically he may have caused William to change his mind. But I am 
going to argue, on the contrary, that not a single one of the arguments Abelard 
gives here is conclusive against a realism like William of Champeaux’s, although 
they perhaps are telling criticisms against a certain confused version of that 
theory. (Perhaps the confused version was what William himself actually held, 
but the point stands: There were ways he could have defended himself.) 
But I wouldn’t want this point to be overstated. While William’s theory can be 
defended against the arguments Abelard gives, it is probably also true that 
Abelard’s objections can be presented in a stronger form than he actually gives 
them. So the question “Who wins?” is by no means settled. 
 131
 
William of Champeaux’s First Theory 
Consider the structure of an individual — say, of the individual man Socrates. 
Well, Socrates is a substance, and so has substantiality. He is a body (that is, a 
physical object), and so he has corporeality. He is an organism, and so has life. 
He is an animal, and so has animality. He is a man (a rational animal), and so has 
rationality (and therefore humanity — that is, rational animality). He is a Greek, 
the teacher of Plato, snub-nosed and so on. And so he has all those features too. 
Socrates is a kind of metaphysical layer-cake built up part by part in this way. We 
have here, therefore, a laminated view of individuals. 
Now consider Plato. He has many of the same features as Socrates has. In 
particular, he has the same features up to and including Greekness. But he has 
some different features too; they are what differentiate him from Socrates. 
Finally, let us consider “Brunellus” — that is, Browny the Ass, Abelard’s favorite 
example of an irrational animal. Browny has many of the same structural features 
Socrates and Plato have: substantiality, corporeality, life, animality. But he does 
not have rationality and humanity. Instead, he has irrationality and asininity. 
(HANDOUT THE FULL PICTURE OF BRUNELLUS.) 
Now — and this is the key point: If you start with Socrates and Plato, and take 
away all their features after humanity, what do you have left, one humanity or 
two? Is the humanity Socrates has his own, so that if you were to pull everything 
else off, so to speak, until you got down to the level of humanity, you would have 
two humanities left over — one for Socrates and one for Plato — or is there 
something one that is shared, some one humanity, so that when you pull off all the 
features that distinguish Socrates from Plato, you end up with one universal 
humanity? 
William of Champeaux’s first view answered: You have only one humanity, and 
it is common to and shared by them both. William’s first theory, then, is a form of 
realism in the metaphysical sense we discussed in connection with Boethius. (As 
near as I can tell from Abelard’s description of William’s first theory, William 
simply didn’t distinguish between the Boethian “metaphysical” notion of a 
universal and the Aristotelian “predicational” notion of a universal. Otherwise 
Abelard’s nice description of William’s realism in the Boethian “metaphysical” 
sense would be simply irrelevant to the problem of universals as Abelard has 
raised it — that is, is in the “predicational” sense.) 
(Note: This little “plucked chicken” thought experiment turns out to be a pretty 
good test for this kind of realism. It is because Plato’s doctrine (with the seal-ring 
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analogy) fails this test that I earlier called him a nominalist. And notice also that 
it’s not hard to see that the thought experiment is just another way of asking the 
question I asked at the beginning of this course in connection with the chalk-
trick.) 
Similarly, if you go somewhat deeper and pull off rationality, so that you break up 
the humanity you had, still you find something that is common to and shared by 
Socrates and Plato, on the one hand, and by Browny the Ass, on the other: 
namely, animality. And similarly if we go yet deeper. On all this see the handout 
on Boethius’s “Layer-Cake Ontology.” That theory is exactly the one we have 
here in William. 
But William apparently said more — and here we get some special terminology. 
In each case where you find something common like this, it acts, so to speak, like 
matter with respect to the later forms — what William called “advening forms” 
according to para. (27), p. 30. And so, according to Abelard, William calls this 
common matter-like layer the “material essence” (para. (23), p. 29), as opposed to 
the “advening forms,” which are attached to it. 
Note several things about this theory and its terminology: 
(1) The talk of “matter” here is probably meant as an analogy. William is 
saying (or Abelard is saying that William is saying) that the genus is like matter 
with respect to the species. How is it like matter? Insofar as it is indeterminate 
and indefinite, and is determined or narrowed down to a species by a determining 
difference. Aristotle talks this way sometimes in the Metaphysics: the genus is 
like matter and the difference is like form. See, for example, Metaphysics V 28 
1024b8–9; VII 12 1038a8; X 8 1057b38 & 1058a23. But of course the Metaphysics 
had not been translated yet and William of Champeaux could not have got this 
terminology from there. He could well have got it, however, from Porphyry, and 
from Boethius’s Commentary on Porphyry. They talk this way too. 
For example, Porphyry, Isagoge, para. (69): 
Also, genus is like matter, while difference is like form. 
Again, a little earlier (para. (51)): 
Just as things consist of matter and form, or have a structure 
analogous to matter and form — for instance, a statue is made up 
of matter (the bronze) and form (the shape) — so too the specific 
man in common consists of an analogue of matter, the genus, and 
of difference as a form. The whole, rational mortal animal, is man 
— just as for the statue. 
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As long as things stay at this metaphorical level, it is not clear whether the 
doctrine of matter — that is, literal, real matter, not some kind of analogy — has 
any role in this theory at all. 
Peter King, in Ch. 6 of his dissertation, has a very interesting discussion of this 
“Material Essence Realism,” as it has come to be called. (Ch. 6 as a whole is 
entitled “William of Champeaux and Material Essence Realism.”) 
King points out that, besides the passage in the Glosses on Porphyry (our paras. 
(23)–(27)), where Abelard describes this theory, there are also other sources too 
for our understanding of “Material Essence Realism.” There is: 
(a) Another passage from a later work of Abelard. 
(b) A passage from Pseudo-Joscelin of Soissons, who did not 
hold this theory, but describes it. (We will meet him shortly.) 
(c) A passage from Walter of Mortagne. (We’ll meet him too 
shortly.) 
King translates the relevant passages from all these people in volume 2 of his 
dissertation. 
He also points out the there may be a sense in which Material Essence Realism’s 
claim that the genus is matter is not just a metaphor — that is, it is not just that 
genus is indefinite and indeterminate as matter is. Genus may also be regarded as 
“matter” in the sense that is a material cause of the species — the raw material out 
of which the species is constructed. King discusses some of the implications of 
this possibility. (A good possible paper topic.) 
(2) On this kind of analysis, if you ask what the essence (the “material 
essence”) is of Socrates or Plato, or of Browny the Ass, the answer is: That 
depends. It depends on how deeply you want to push the analysis. At one level, 
humanity is the “essence” of both Socrates and Plato, the common essence that 
acts as a kind of matter for — underlies — further “advening” forms that 
differentiate Socrates from Plato. At a deeper level, however, animality is the 
“essence” of Socrates and Plato, and also of Browny the Ass. It acts as matter for 
the further forms that differentiate all three of them. 
As a result, the difference between substance or essence, on the one hand, and 
accident, on the other, is not really at home here. You have a kind of “sliding” 
notion of essence. What may be an “advening” accidental form at one level of 
analysis may be “essential” at another level. 
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Note: Abelard conspicuously does not use the term ‘accident’ in stating the view, 
although he does in attacking it. (Walter of Mortagne does use the term 
‘accident’.) The closest term Abelard uses is “advening form.” My point is that 
perhaps we shouldn’t be too Aristotelian when we read this “essence” talk. 
(3) The common essence is a universal in Boethius’s sense of the term. This is 
quite explicit in Abelard’s discussion. See para. (27), lines 3–5, where in 
describing William’s theory of universals, he refers back to Boethius’s famous 
description: 
…the universal is common, Boethius says, in such a way that the 
same whole is at the same time in diverse things, of which it 
constitutes the substance materially.” 
(Boethius of course doesn’t say “materially.” 
(4) We’ve seen this “layer-cake” theory before, of course, in a slightly 
different terminology. Look at the first part of text (2) from the Theological 
Tractates in the Notes and Texts (from Boethius’s De trinitate).This is the 
passage with the claim that “it is the variety of accidents that makes for difference 
in number,” and is the basis for the little diagram I handed out earlier on 
“Boethius’s ‘Layer-Cake’ Ontology.” (Note: Boethius does say ‘accidents’ in the 
Tractates, even if William says only ‘advening forms’.) Recall how the status of 
matter — that is, matter literally, not in the analogical sense — was unclear on 
that view. 
(5) William wasn’t the only one to hold this kind of theory in the twelfth 
century. It was also held at the so called School of Chartres by a certain 
Clarembald of Arras. (Pseudo-Joscelin and Walter of Mortagne didn’t hold it, 
although they did describe it.) 
The School of Chartres was a “school” or “group” of thinkers associated with the 
cathedral at Chartres. There is some question about whether there was ever really 
anything so formal as a full-fledged “school” there, but it is clear in any event that 
there were surely several people who tended to be associated with Chartres and 
with one another. For a little more on the School of Chartres, you may want see 
“The Course in the Box,” Ver. 2.0, Vol. 1, Chaps. 34 & 36. 
I’ve given you a text from Clarembald at the end of the section “Passages From 
the School of Chartres” in the Notes and Texts (pp. 70–71). In that passage — 
which, incidentally, is from his commentary on Boethius’s De trinitate — 
Clarembald denies that there is any singular humanity — that is, Socrates’s own 
humanity, for instance, as opposed to and as distinct from Plato’s humanity. Look 
at para. (13), for example (I took the paragraph numbers from the critical edition): 
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… nevertheless because certain famous doctors have spread it 
about that single men are men by singular humanities, even though 
it does not contribute much to the present tract [= Boethius’s De 
trinitate], we have considered it worth the trouble to show that it is 
one and the same humanity by which single men are men. 
Then he goes on to give a curious argument in favor of this view, which I will not 
delay over now (because I don’t really understand it). 
 
Well, this is William of Champeaux’s first theory of universals. Now let’s look at 
Abelard’s objections to it. (Please consult the outline in the Notes and Texts, pp. 
17–20.) 
First Objection (para. (29)) 
Contraries cannot be in the same thing at the same time. Indeed, that is more or 
less the definition of contrariety. For example, being white (all over) and being 
black (all over) are contraries. No one thing can be both white and black (all over) 
at the same time. But, the objection continues, on William’s view contraries 
would inhere in the same thing at the same time. For instance, both rationality and 
irrationality would inhere in animality at the same time. And rationality and 
irrationality are contraries. If they did not both inhere in animality at the same 
time, then you could not have the rational Socrates and the irrational Browny the 
Ass existing at the same time — because, on this theory, it is the same (one) 
animality in them both. In short, this first view of William’s, the objection says, 
violates the Law of Contraries, and so must be rejected. 
(As you may recall, I in effect raised this argument myself at the beginning of this 
course when I was arguing the case for nominalism. We’re now going to look at it 
in detail.) 
First Reply to Objection 1  (para. (30)) 
As it stands, there is a reply to this argument, and Abelard knows it. The obvious 
answer is that the Law of Contraries (“Two contraries cannot inhere in the same 
thing at the same time”) was never intended to rule out this kind of thing. Rather, 
it means only that two contraries cannot inhere in the same individual at the same 
time. And William’s first theory does doesn’t violate the Law of Contraries 
understood like that. Animality may have both rationality and irrationality at the 
same time, but no one individual animal does. 
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In effect, this reply proceeds by specifying that when the Law of Contraries says 
that two contraries cannot “inhere” in the same thing at the same time, this means 
only that they cannot both belong at the same time to anything higher on the 
metaphysical “layer-cake,” not that they cannot belong to something on a lower 
level. 
Refutation of the First Reply to Objection 1 (paras. (31)–(33)) 
Abelard anticipates this reply (para. (30)) and tries to counter it. He argues that, 
given William’s theory, it is not only the case that contraries inhere in the same 
universal thing at the same time. Abelard in effect grants, for the sake of the 
argument, that this would not after all violate the Law of Contraries properly 
understood. But things are worse than that. It turns out, Abelard thinks, that on 
William of Champeaux’s view contraries would inhere in the same individual at 
the same time. And that clearly does violate the Law. 
But why on earth does he think this would follow from William’s view? Well, 
here is his argument (paras. (31)–(33)). Let me just state it first, and then we’ll 
talk about the individual steps. 
(1) Socrates is identical with whatever is in Socrates other than 
the (advening) forms of Socrates. In other words, Socrates 
is identical with his material essence. (I said we’d talk 
about the argument later.) 
(2) So too, Browny the Ass is identical with its material 
essence — that is, the ass is whatever is in the ass other 
than the (advening) forms of the ass. (These first two steps 
are very strange.) 
(3) But whatever is in Socrates other than the forms of 
Socrates is the same as whatever is in the ass other than the 
forms of the ass. That is, the material essence of Browny is 
identical with the material essence of Socrates. 
  (4) Hence, Socrates is identical with Browny the Ass. 
  (5) And since rationality inheres in Socrates and irrationality in 
the ass, it follows from (4) that they both inhere in 
Socrates. Q. E. D. 
Plainly the argument is valid, but the premises need a little talking through, to say 
the least. Let us begin with (3), which is the easiest. Clearly, there is some level at 
which (3) is true — for example, the level of animality. It is both a material 
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essence of Socrates and a material essence of Browny, and is one and the same in 
each. So the force of this argument rests on the very strange premises (1) and (2). 
Why on earth would William ever want to say that Socrates is identical with his 
material essence animality, and that Browny the ass is likewise identical with his 
material essence, the same animality? The straightforward interpretation of 
William’s view would be that the individual is in every case to be identified with 
the sum total of all its forms, including, at any given level of analysis, the material 
essence together with all its advening forms. The individual is the product of this 
composite layering process, not some intermediate stage along the way. (And in 
fact it was the view that the individual is this sum total of all its forms that gave 
rise to my objection about how this kind of “individuation by accidents” in 
connections with Boethius ends up eliminating all accidental change.) 
But Abelard thinks he can block the interpretation that identifies the individual 
with the end result of the layering process. See para. (33) (“The fact that what we 
assumed above is true ... is plain because,” etc.). Here is his argument: The 
individual can be identified with either 
(a) The matter (understand: the material essence, at some stage 
of analysis). 
(b) The forms (understand: the advening forms, at some stage 
of analysis). Or 
(c) Both (a) and (b) together, the sum total of all the forms, 
both those counted in the material essence and those 
counted as “advening” forms. 
Alternative (c), of course, is the one William no doubt intended, and is probably 
the most plausible alternative in any case. But Abelard wants to rule out (c), and 
also (b), leaving only (a), which would give us premises (1) and (2) of the 
previous argument. Here is how he proceeds: 
Ad (b): If the individual is identified with its advening forms, then in that case 
accidents would be substance. That is, the individual substance — say, Socrates 
— would be identified with his accidents. 
This would of course follow only if William’s “advening forms” are to be taken 
as accidents. Now there is some evidence from another work of Abelard’s, his 
Dialectica, that William did in fact talk this way. The passage is translated in the 
Notes and Texts, on pp. 65–66. The key passage here is at the very end (lines 24–
26), where Abelard claims that William wanted to say that essential differences 
(differentiae) inhere accidentally (“as accidents”) in their genera. That is, 
rationality is just as accidental to animality, in this sense, as being snub-nosed or 
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being seated is to humanity. But the latter are paradigm instances of accidents. 
The evidence is hardly definitive, but if Abelard’s remark here is correct, then 
William perhaps did regard his “advening forms” as accidents. 
Now in order to refute (b) above, as Abelard wants to do, we must all agree that 
substances cannot be identified with accidents, as they would have to be on this 
alternative. Of course, if we are being Aristotelians, this follows simply from our 
standard terminological usage. Substance and accidents are in a sense opposites; 
they could scarcely be identified. It is not so clear that it follows, however, given 
William’s own rather non-Aristotelian use of the term ‘accident’ — to stand for 
the “advening forms” of a strongly realist theory. But in any case, whether it 
follows or not, we don’t have to worry about alternative (b). William certainly did 
not want to identify an individual with its advening forms. He would no doubt 
have been willing to grant Abelard that alternative (b) should be rejected. 
Ad (c): This is surely the alternative William would want to adopt. The individual 
is to be identified with the its material essence plus the sum total of all its 
(advening) forms. But Abelard argues, if this is so then .... Then what? Well, 
unfortunately, at this crucial point (p. 32, the end of para. (33), where I have 
inserted footnote #13), there are textual problems with the Latin edition of this 
work. 
As I remarked before, when Berhard Geyer did his critical edition of Abelard’s 
Logica ingredientibus, there was only one known surviving manuscript of the 
work (it’s in Milan) — and even that does not contain the whole thing. The new 
critical edition, based on subsequently discovered manuscripts, has not been 
completed yet, and I don’t know what the other manuscripts say at this point. But 
Geyer claims that at this point in the text the manuscript reads something that can 
be translated as: 
since then it would be necessary to allow that body is body. 
But of course body is body! That’s a tautology; it’s hardly a good basis for an 
objection to alternative (c) to say that a tautology follows from it. Because of this 
textual problem, Geyer conjectured that the text had to be emended at this point. 
He suggested an emendation that makes the passage read: 
since then it would be necessary to allow that body and non-body 
are body. 
Now, it may very well be the case that we can construct an argument against 
alternative (c) on the basis of this emended passage. I tried to do that in “The 
Course in the Box,” Ver. 2.0, Vol. I, Chap. 40, p. 9. But, while I did come up with 
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an argument, I had to admit that it was not a very good one. And it must be 
emphasized that there is no manuscript authority whatever for Geyer’s conjectural 
emendation, and so not for any argument reconstructed on the basis of it, either 
my own or anyone else’s. 
Well, Peter King, while he was writing his dissertation, took the trouble actually 
to check the manuscript again. What he found is that the manuscript does not say 
what Geyer says it does, and that in fact an emendation is perhaps not needed at 
all. The text as it stands in the manuscript is strained in any event. But it is 
possible, without changing it in any way, to make it say something like this: 
since then it would be necessary to allow that body and something 
that is already a body would be a body. 
That is the text King adopts, and translates in vol. 2 of his dissertation (§ 17 of his 
translation). There was an earlier translation too, by Richard McKeon. It’s 
reprinted in Hyman and Walsh and follows Geyer’s conjectural emendation at this 
point. So there is an important difference here between the McKeon translation 
and Peter King’s translation (apart from the fact that Peter’s is much better 
throughout): at this point in the text they are translating different Latin words. In 
my own translation in Five Texts, I have followed Peter Kings’s version of the 
Latin — since it, after all, is what Geyer’s manuscript actually has. 
On this whole question, see King’s dissertation, Chap. 6, especially pp. 155–57. 
So, following Peter’s version of the Latin, the manuscript says that if (alternative 
(c)) an individual is to be identified with the combination of its material essence 
plus its advening forms — the whole thing — then that won’t do, “since then it 
would be necessary to allow that body and something already a body are a body.” 
What on earth kind of argument does that give us? Well, King suggests — 
although this is all tentative — that Abelard is implicitly setting up a kind of 
infinite regress argument here, and that he is appealing to another feature of 
William of Champeaux’s theory in order to make the argument run. 
Again, if you want to follow this out, look at Chap. 6 of his dissertation. I don’t 
want to go into the details of this argument just here. We will come back it a little 
later. 
But for the present, note: If Abelard’s argument here is based not only on the 
identification of an individual with the combination of its material essence plus its 
advening forms, but also on some other feature of William’s doctrine that we 
haven’t fully discussed yet, then perhaps it is open to William to defend himself 
by simply changing that other feature of his doctrine. 
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In other words, perhaps Abelard’s argument is not really an argument against 
“Material Essence Realism” as such, but only against a particular version of it as 
held by William, and that perhaps “Material Essence Realism” could be saved by 
adjusting these other points. And that is in fact, I think, the real situation. 
In any event, let’s go on with the argument, and then come back to fill in this 
point later. 
Abelard thinks he has refuted alternatives (b) and (c), so that only alternative (a) 
remains: the individual is to be identified with its material essence, to the 
exclusion of the advening forms. This gives him what he needs to defend 
premises (1) and (2) of his refutation of the first reply to Objection 1. 
There is still a problem, however. Abelard should have recognized that the notion 
of “material essence” on William’s view was a sliding notion, relative to the 
depth of the analysis, as we have already discussed. There is no one form or group 
of forms that is the material essence; it depends on how deep you go. Does 
Abelard’s argument then force us to conclude that William’s individual is 
identical with all those forms that might, at some level of analysis, be called its 
“material essence”? That certainly seems hopeless. 
On the other hand, if not, then how are we to pick out one such form or group of 
forms and identify the individual with it? Abelard might well reply: Don’t ask 
me! It’s not my theory. 
Let me summarize the result of all this. I think the main problem here is that we 
have a terminology of matter, essence and accident that comes ultimately from 
Aristotle, and was known to the Middle Ages through Boethius’s translations of 
and commentaries on Aristotle and Porphyry, and through his own independent 
logical writings. With this terminology comes a set of terminological conventions: 
substances cannot be identified with accidents, and so on. On the other hand, the 
doctrine we are now dealing with just doesn’t fit that terminology and those 
conventions very well. Abelard’s objections so far apply only to a badly 
formulated version of “Material Essence Realism.” Such a realism can perhaps be 
defended against Abelard’s attacks by simply getting straight on the terminology, 
and getting straight on what is and what is not implied by the doctrine. 
Conclusion: The first reply to Objection 1 is a good reply, and Abelard’s 
refutation of it fails. Abelard has not succeeded in showing that contraries inhere 
in the same individual, and so has not succeeded in showing there is any violation 
of the Law of Contraries, properly understood. 
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Second Reply to the First Objection (para. (34)) 
Abelard considers a second reply to his first objection, and we can handle it 
quickly. The objection, once again, was the one about contraries’ inhering in the 
same thing at the same time. The first reply to it said that this wasn’t a problem so 
long as contraries didn’t inhere in the same individual. Abelard thought he had 
blocked that reply, although I don’t think he has. In any event, he now considers a 
second reply. In effect, this second reply accepts Abelard’s conclusion of the 
objection, that on William’s first view two contraries are in the same thing at the 
same time, but says this poses no problem. Animal — that is, the universal, 
animality — is indeed both rational and irrational, but in virtue of different forms. 
Animal is not irrational insofar as it has the form rationality, but insofar as it has 
the form irrationality. Neither is it rational insofar as it has the form irrationality, 
but insofar as it has the form rationality. (You may recall that at the beginning of 
this course I mentioned this kind of maneuver as a device some realists would try 
to use. Well here it is.) I don’t know who — if anyone — tried to argue this way 
in the Middle Ages. 
Refutation of the Second Reply to Objection 1 (paras. (35)–(36)) 
Abelard’s response to this is in effect: “So what?” It still remains true that 
contraries are in the same thing at the same time. And what’s so special about 
these “insofar as” considerations? There is nothing unique about contraries in this 
respect. Considerations like that apply to all forms. It is not in virtue of redness 
that the apple is round, but in virtue of roundness. Neither is it in virtue of 
roundness that it is red, but in virtue of redness. But none of that prevents its still 
being true that the same apple is both red and round. So too here: the same 
animality is still both rational and irrational. Nothing is gained by the appeal to 
these “insofar as” considerations, as though they somehow prevented this 
outcome. 
Abelard’s reply seems to me a conclusive refutation of a weak attempt to avoid 
his first objection. But the success of Abelard’s reply here does not allow us to 
conclude that his original objection stands. The first reply is still open, despite 
Abelard’s argument against it. Contrary forms are not in the same individual at 
the same time on William’s first theory, despite Abelard’s peculiar argument that 
they would be, and so the Law of Contraries, when properly formulated, is left 
intact. 
Abelard’s Second objection (para. (37)) 
Abelard now begins a whole new line of attack. In effect, he is starting over. 
There would be, he says, only ten essences for all things if William’s view were 
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correct — namely, the ten “generalissima” or ten Aristotelian categories. The 
argument is this: All substances are basically or in the end the same; they all share 
the common material essence substantiality. And that is indeed true on William’s 
view. So too, all qualities are basically or in the end the same: redness, greenness, 
tallness, and the rest, all share the common material essence quality. And so too 
for all the other Aristotelian categories. Note that the categories are the bottom 
layer of the ontological layer-cake. They are “generalissima” — most general 
genera. They are the most material of material essences. (The “layer-cake” in a 
sense goes the opposite direction from the Porphyrian tree, where the categories 
are at the “top,” at least as the tree is usually drawn.) 
Here then is the problem: Take two things — say, Socrates and Plato. They have a 
selection of features from each of the Aristotelian categories. They have features 
from the category of substance, others from quality, others from quantity, and so 
on. Now, on William’s theory, Socrates and Plato are supposed to differ from one 
another with respect to the peculiar combination of features each has. But — and 
here comes the punch — any feature the one has turns out, as we have just seen, 
to be basically or in the end the same as some feature the other has. The Latin 
here is ‘penitus’ — McKeon translates it as “at bottom” in this passage. And 
that’s a pretty good translation of it, if we ignore the spatial connotations of ‘at 
bottom’, which are not implied by the Latin. Peter King translates it in his 
dissertation as ‘exactly’, which seems to me to be not quite right here. 
In any event, the point is that, basically or in the end or at bottom Socrates and 
Plato do not differ at all — not in the category of substance, not in the category of 
quality, and so on. 
Hence, Abelard concludes, all distinctions among things will vanish. 
A Possible Reply William Might Have Made (Although There Is No Evidence 
Whatever That He Actually Did So) 
Everything up to the last step is fine. But that last step simply doesn’t follow. 
Why think there is no more to things than their bases, ends, bottoms? We might 
very well accept Abelard’s argument, up to and including the step where he says 
that Socrates and Plato, and in fact any individual, will be basically or in the end 
or at bottom the same as any other in all the categories. But why conclude from 
this that Socrates is not distinct from Plato? They differ by their “advening 
forms,” as we saw right from the beginning. There is a “too-fast” move in 
Abelard’s argument here. 
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Abelard’s Probable Reply to This Hypothetical Response 
There’s nothing “too fast” about it at all. I’m only arguing on your own grounds, 
Bill. 
And now look once again at the passage from Abelard’s Dialectica in the Notes 
and Texts (on pp. 65–66). We mentioned this text a little earlier, when I talked 
about how William of Champeaux’s “advening forms” are probably to be viewed 
according to William himself as what we would more familiarly call “accidents.” 
We’re now in a position to look more carefully at this passage. 
Note first of all that in line 20 Abelard says he is describing the view of someone 
he calls “master W.” As I say in n. 7 there, everyone just automatically assumes 
from what we know about Abelard’s life that this refers to William of 
Champeaux. There’s really no more evidence for this than what you see there in 
the text. But still, it’s probably right. 
Now here’s the point of this passage. Abelard might very well say: You are the 
one, Bill, who wants to hold not only the standard view that genera are divided by 
differences — for example, that substance is divided by “corporeal” and 
“incorporeal.” (Recall the Porphyrian tree.) You also want to hold the further 
semantic thesis that difference-words — for example, the words ‘corporeal’ and 
‘incorporeal’ as just mentioned — don’t just refer to the advening forms 
(corporeity, incorporeity), but to the combination of the advening form and the 
underlying genus or material essence. For example, ‘rational’ just means “rational 
animal.” It follows, of course, that difference-words would then do the job of 
species-words too. That is, ‘corporeal’ would not only refer to what is added to 
the genus substance to get the species corporeal substance, but also refers to the 
underlying material essence substance itself, so that ‘corporeal’ MEANS “corporeal 
substance” — which is the species. 
Why is that? Why do you want to maintain this, William? Well, you want to hold 
this peculiar view because, according to you (lines 24–26, p. 66) if this weren’t 
so, substance would be divided into accidents (that is, the genus or “subject” 
substance would be so divided). 
This would indeed follow, I suppose. If substance is divided into corporeal and 
incorporeal, and the latter refer only to the advening forms or accidents, then 
substance is indeed divided into accidents. Just why you think this is so bad, 
William, given your peculiar use of this terminology, I’m not prepared to say. But 
after all, it’s your theory, not mine. 
(Once again, here we see inferences drawn, not from the theory itself, but from an 
ill-fitting terminology in which the theory is expressed.) 
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Now let’s draw the consequence of all this. If what the passage from the 
Dialectica says about William of Champeaux is not an out and out fabrication, 
Abelard has him. Here’s why: 
When you try to define a species in the standard way, as a genus plus a difference, 
it turns out on William’s theory that the difference-word you use is also a species-
word. That is, it contains a reference to the genus plus something else. (That’s 
what a species is, after all.) That something else, of course, is the difference. But 
when you try to say just what this difference is, all you get is another reference 
back to the original genus plus something else. 
Perhaps an example will help. Consider the traditional definition of man as a 
rational animal. Here ‘rational’ is the difference-word and ‘animal’ is the genus-
word. But on William’s theory, as Abelard describes it in the passage from the 
Dialectica, the word ‘rational’ not only picks out the differences — that is, what 
is added to the genus to give you the species (in this case, rationality). It also 
refers to the product or result you get when you do add the difference to the genus 
in this way. That is, the difference-word ‘rational’ here play two semantic roles. 
In addition to singling out rationality in some way, the difference-word ‘rational’ 
also bears some kind of semantic relation to man (it is predicable of it). After all, 
it is men who are rational animals. The difference-word ‘rational’ is predicated 
not of rationality but of people. Rationality isn’t rational, men are — that is, 
rational animals are. Hence, the difference-word ‘rational’ really “means” rational 
animal. 
But if that is so, then when I define man as a rational animal, I am really saying 
that man is a rational animal animal, since ‘rational’ alone already has ‘animal’ 
built into it. And of course, ‘rational animal animal’ can be unpacked one step 
further, into ‘rational animal animal animal’, and so on. 
The species, then, is ultimately the genus plus something else, which something 
else is itself the genus plus something else, which something else is again ..., and 
so on in infinitum. Hence in the end, all you have is the genus, over and over 
again, plus a promissory note that is never really cashed out. And since any genus 
that is not a most general genus (= a category) is also a species of a higher genus 
on the layer-cake, any genus other than a category will run into these definitional 
problems. In short, the only forms there are that are not hopelessly involved in 
definitional infinite regresses are the ten Aristotelian categories. (And, recall, the 
categories have no real definitions at all.) Hence, if every individual has features 
from each of the ten categories, then it really does follow, as my argument 
claimed (Abelard is speaking again), that there is only one individual, and the 
distinctions among individuals vanish. 
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Once again, if this is not an outright distortion of William’s view, then Abelard 
has him. But notice that the objection is not really against William’s realism, but 
rather against his theory of the relation of genus and difference. William might 
easily revise that view to avoid Abelard’s objection without giving up his realism. 
He can say, for instance, that differences do not after all belong to the genus they 
differentiate. They are not the original genus plus something else. 
This kind of infinite-regress argument is also what Peter King suggests is behind 
the business about “body and what is already a body is a body” in the earlier 
argument we discussed from paragraph (33) of the Glosses on Porphyry. (I said I 
would come back to that.) For example, suppose we want to define organism 
= body + living. Now if the difference ‘living’ implicitly contains the genus 
‘body’, then to say that an organism is a “living body” would be to say that it is a 
“living body body” — and so on. We are off on our infinite regress. Hence body 
(that is, the genus) plus something that is already a body (the difference, “living”) 
would be a body, and in particular an organism. 
All this is rather strained, you may think, but it does fit the text of that earlier 
argument, and is not at all the kind of argument that would be foreign to Abelard 
and others of his day. What’s strained about it is just that, if this is what Abelard 
meant, he could have put it much more clearly. 
In connection with this argument, and with William’s doctrine as presented in the 
passage from the Dialectica, you may want to compare Metaphysics III.3, where 
Aristotle argues that being cannot be a genus (see the earlier handout), a sort of 
“supercategory,” since then its differentiae, in order to do their job, would have to 
be beings, and so fall into the genera they are supposed to differentiate. The 
presumption, of course, is that differences do not fall into their genera in this way. 
All this is very difficult stuff in Aristotle, and in any case the Metaphysics was not 
yet translated into Latin, so that it could have had no direct influence whatever on 
the controversy between Abelard and William of Champeaux. 
It seems to me that a more likely background for the dispute here is St. Anselm. 
Anselm wrote a work De grammatico, in which he discussed the semantics of 
what later medieval authors would call “connotative” terms (although that is not 
the word Anselm used for them). In that discussion, Anselm explicitly raised the 
kind of infinite regress considerations we have just seen, in order to argue that 
words like ‘rational’ do not contain a reference to their underlying genus. For 
Anselm, ‘rational’ does not mean rational animal. Whether or not Anselm had any 
direct influence on the dispute between William and Abelard, it seems to me that 
this kind of semantic issue is the real basis for Abelard’s argument. And, as far as 
I can see, William could well change his semantics without being thereby 
committed to giving up his realist metaphysics. So, once again, I think Abelard 
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has failed to come up with a really good argument against the kind of realism we 
are dealing with in William’s first theory, although he has scored points against 
other features of William’s doctrine. 
One last remark before I leave this second objection. The kind of definitional 
infinite regress Abelard has maneuvered William into has a technical name. It is 
called “nugation” (= nugatio) which means “speaking nonsense” or “babbling.” 
In Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations (which was only first appearing in 
translation in Abelard’s own day, and did not yet have any influence), one way to 
refute your opponent was to reduce him to “babbling” — the Latin translation 
says ‘nugatio’. This doesn’t mean that you are supposed to get your opponent so 
confused that he starts gurgling and frothing at the mouth (although you could 
probably “win” that way too). It means you can push him into one of these 
definitional infinite regresses. The flavor of the technical use of ‘nugatio’ can 
perhaps be better captured by translating it ‘stammering’ — for example, 
“rational animal animal animal animal ....” (We have the word “nugatory,” 
meaning “repetitious.”) 
(In Five Texts, I translate the word as “unnecessary repetition.” It doesn’t occur in 
the Abelard passage translated there. But see the Glossary, p. 233.) 
Abelard’s Third Objection (para. (38)) 
Abelard hurls another argument at his poor old teacher, and this one is easier to 
deal with. On your view, Abelard says, we ought to call an underlying material 
essence “many” — in the sense that a universal is said to be “many” (that is, 
“common to many”) — because of the many different kinds of forms inhering in 
it. And in a sense that’s right. What makes animal a universal, on this view, is the 
fact that not only does, say, rationality inhere in it, giving us rational animality or 
humanity, but also irrationality inheres in it, so that we also get irrational animal. 
Thus animality is “common to” or “shared by” both. 
But if that’s so, Abelard objects, then by the same token it seems we ought to call 
Socrates “many” — and so a universal — because he too has many different 
kinds of forms inhering in him — as he surely does on William’s theory. Thus 
your view, Abelard might conclude, ends up destroying all difference between 
universals and individuals. (Note that this will be a big theme in many of 
Abelard’s criticisms of earlier views: they blur — or even obliterate — the 
distinction between universals and individuals. And if course, if the charge is true, 
that would really be a serious objection.) 
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A Possible Reply William Might Have Made On His Own Behalf (But Once 
Again There Is Absolutely No Evidence That He Actually Did) 
William might have defended himself by arguing that the two cases are not the 
same at all. The forms inhering in Socrates constitute him — that is, they result in 
Socrates. But the forms inhering in animality do not constitute animality, do not 
result in animality. They are added onto something already there; they “advene.” 
The individual is the material essence plus the advening forms. Thus the relation 
of the advening forms to the material essence is quite different from their relation 
to the individual they constitute. It is the difference between the relation of one 
addend to another addend, on the one hand, and the relation of either addend to 
their sum, on the other. (Note: This is the distinction Porphyry makes between 
what he calls a “constitutive difference” and a “divisive difference” — see 
Porphyry’s Isagoge, para. (46), and n. 11 on p. 8 of the translation in Five Texts.) 
This dissimilarity is enough to warrant our calling the material essence a universal 
without our being thereby forced to call the individual a universal too. As far as I 
can see, such a reply would be perfectly correct, and Abelard’s case is purely 
sophistical. 
Abelard’s Fourth Objection (para. (39)) 
Here comes another one. This objection is directed against the notion of 
individuation by accidents. Abelard argues that this would make individuals 
dependent on their accidents, metaphysically “posterior” to them. But the 
opposite is true. Accidents are metaphysically “posterior” to and dependent on 
their individual substances. Accidents are ontologically parasitic.  
As far as I know, Abelard seems to have been the first to raise this kind of 
objection against the theory of individuation by accidents. We discussed such a 
problem as early as Boethius’s theory of individuation by accidents in the De 
trinitate. But Boethius himself did not seem to worry about it, or even to be aware 
of it. And, as far as I know, neither did anyone else until the time of Abelard. 
And, as I said when we originally discussed this kind of objection, I think this is a 
serious objection. But: 
William Might Reply (Although Again We Don’t Know That He Did) 
William might defend himself. Accidents may depend on their individuals for 
you, Abelard, and even for Aristotle and Boethius (in some passages). But on my 
view, accidents are ontologically prior to the individual. They constitute it, not the 
other way around. You have distorted my theory, Abelard. You have taken the 
notion of accident and interpreted it in an Aristotelian way that is not part of my 
theory. (Note that William himself may in fact have talked in the Aristotelian way 
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Abelard’s objection presupposes. But the point is: He didn’t have to, and if he did 
he shouldn’t have. Once again, the objection does not strike to the heart of this 
kind of realism, but only to an unfortunate terminology.) 
Nevertheless, this fourth objection suggests a good argument against this form of 
realism — an argument that, oddly, Abelard never made. And it is an argument 
we saw earlier in connection with Boethius. 
Aristotle’s distinction of essence and accident, and his identification of the 
individual substance with its essence, so that the accidents depend on the 
individual substance and do not constitute it, all this was motivated at least in part 
by a desire to account for accidental change — that is, for cases in which we say 
that an individual changes color, say, but stays the same individual it was to begin 
with. The “pin-cushion” would stay the same, so to speak; the pins would come 
and go. (Recall the “Warp and Woof” handout.) Now we saw when we were 
discussing the antecedents of William’s realist view in Boethius’s De trinitate 
that the real problem with the theory there is that it rules out accidental change, 
freezes the individual. The change of a single accident would result in a whole 
new individual. This objection can be met as Leibniz did later on, by adding 
explicit time-specifications to the accidents (for instance, “red at time t”). 
Nevertheless, that involves a rather major adjustment in the theory, and so the 
objection stands as a good objection to the theory as originally stated. 
But Abelard conspicuously — and strangely, in my estimation — did not raise 
this objection. 
Now let’s pause and summarize what we’ve seen so far. Some of Abelard’s 
objections to William’s first theory may hold against a confused or badly 
expressed form of realism that William perhaps actually held. But they do not 
refute this form of realism in general — that is, the strong realism suggested by 
the “individuation by accidents” passage from Boethius’s De trinitate. 
Nevertheless, there is another argument that does “refute” the theory (the 
argument about accidental change), or at least requires one to change it in major 
ways. But Abelard did not raise that argument. 
One wonders why William gave in to Abelard’s arguments as easily as he did. 
Nevertheless, he apparently did yield. As a result of Abelard’s criticisms — at 
least to hear Abelard himself tell is — William abandoned his strong realism for a 
second theory. And this is the second position Abelard discusses in the passage 
we are examining. We turn to it now. 
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William of Champeaux’s Second Theory (pp. 33–37, paras. (41)–(62) — 
including several variations held by various people) 
On William’s first theory, if you take Socrates and Plato and strip off all the 
advening forms until you get down to the level of humanity, you get only one 
humanity, not two. The humanity of Socrates and the humanity of Plato are one 
humanity. 
On the second theory (as stated in paras. (41)–(44)), this changes. You end up 
with two humanities, not one. The humanity of Socrates is not identical with the 
humanity of Plato. Each has his own. And if you ask what makes them distinct, 
the answer is “They just come that way.” There is nothing — no advening form 
— that narrows humanity in general down to yield Socrates, since there is no such 
thing as humanity in general on this theory. And there is nothing — no advening 
form — that you add to Socrates's humanity or to Plato’s humanity in order to 
make Socrates distinct from Plato. There are advening forms, perhaps (p. 31, para. 
(41), says there are). But whether there are or not, in any case they don’t play this 
role. They do not individuate or differentiate. Everything on this theory is 
individual to begin with, and already distinct from everything else at the outset. 
Now you might think this is an undesirable feature of Willam’s second theory. It 
leaves the distinctness of things a purely brute fact; there is no explanation 
whatever for their being distinct. But notice: even on William’s first theory, the 
ten Aristotelian categories are distinct from one another in this way (see p. 34, 
para. (43)). There is no one super-genus that is divided up by advening forms into 
the ten categories. The categories just are distinct all by themselves. They just 
come that way. 
In fact, it seems to me that almost any ontological theory — whether realist or 
nominalist — is going to have to say that some things are distinct from one 
another without there being anything else that distinguishes them. They are 
distinct because “they just come that way.” The basic and most fundamental 
elements of your ontology will have to be like this, or else they will not be really 
“basic.” 
There are only two ways to avoid this consequence, it seems to me: (1) Adopt a 
thoroughgoing Parmenidean monism, so that there is only one thing in your 
ontology from beginning to end, and the question of that one thing’s distinction 
from other things simply doesn’t arise. Or (2) you could, I suppose, adopt an 
ontology that has no basic and fundamental elements at all (no ontological 
“categories”), but rather accepts some kind of infinite analysis, an infinite regress 
in which everything in your ontology is built up on the basis of more fundamental 
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factors, without there being any ultimate starting point. Neither of these 
alternatives seems especially attractive, at least not to me. 
In short, even before we get into the details of William’s second theory, we can 
see that it is not automatically an objection to it to point out that it says things are 
distinct without there being anything else that distinguishes them. Most theories 
— and all “serious” theories — have to say that at some point or other. If we are 
going to argue against the theory, we are going to have to find some other point of 
attack than this. 
First, some terminology. On this new theory, we can no longer say that Socrates’s 
humanity and Plato’s humanity are “essentially the same” — i.e., with respect to 
their “material essence” — as Abelard describes the terminology of William’s 
earlier theory (at p. 29, para. (23): “they set up essentially the same substance in 
things diverse from one another through forms”). Rather, the second theory says, 
they “are the same not essentially but indifferently” (p. 34, para. (44): “they call 
things that are discrete ‘the same’, not essentially but indifferently”). 
The point of this terminological nuance is that here we are replacing a positive 
term by a negative one. The first view said positively, “They are the same,” where 
this is taken to mean that something is positively shared. The second view says 
negatively, “They are not different.” They do not differ “in man” or “in 
humanity,” or “in” anything else. (Note this locution. We’ll some back to it in just 
a moment.) 
Now, Abelard goes on, this lack of difference is to be spelled out in terms of 
similarity or likeness. The humanity of Socrates and the humanity of Plato are not 
identical, but they are alike (p. 34, para. (44)): 
The same things they call singular according to their discreteness 
they call universal according to their “indifference” and the 
agreement of likeness. 
In addition to the discussion in his Glosses on Porphyry (which we are now 
discussing), Abelard also sketches this second view very briefly in his 
Adversities, p. 17, where basically all he does is repeat the phrase “not essentially 
but indifferently.” 
 
Here are some things to note about this second theory: 
(1) While William’s first theory goes back to an interpretation of Boethius’s 
remarks in the De trinitate about individuation by accidents — near the beginning 
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of passage (2) from the Theological Tractates in the Notes and Texts — this 
second theory goes back to the nominalist view found, in various forms, in 
Boethius’s Second Commentary on Porphyry, the Contra Eutychen, and also 
other passages in the De trinitate (about “forms” vs. “images”). One way of 
cashing out this view, we’ve seen, was the well-worked “seal ring” analogy, 
where the ring was the divine idea. Abelard doesn’t develop the view in quite this 
way here, any more than Boethius did in his Commentary on Porphyry (there’s no 
mention of a “seal-ring” either place). Also, “matter” seemed to be a principle of 
individuation in the Contra Eutychen and in one passage from the De trinitate, 
although nothing is said about it in the Commentary on Porphyry, any more than 
there is here in Abelard. What William himself actually thought about these 
points is anyone’s guess. 
(2) The key term ‘indifferently’ (para. (44)) is a term we’ve seen before. It 
comes from Boethius’s De trinitate (p. 51, line 71 in the passage from the Notes 
and Texts, where I’ve flagged it in n. 7). There Boethius uses the term 
‘indifference’ (= “lack of difference” in the translation) for the basis of the unity 
of the Trinity. The three persons are not identical, but they are indifferent — that 
is, there is no difference between them, neither a specific difference in Porphyry’s 
sense nor an “individual difference” or principle of individuation (in the sense of 
“principle of differentiation,” as we described it earlier). The recurrence of the 
term ‘indifference’ is not coincidental. This is surely a conscious allusion back to 
Boethius. 
(3) Unlike William’s of Champeaux’s first theory, we do possess a text in 
which he apparently actually does maintain this second view. Most of William’s 
writings are totally lost. But we do have this little piece. It is translated by Muckle 
in Adversities, p. 17 n. 12. Here’s what it says: 
That we may exclude all ambiguity, you see that the two words 
one and same can be taken in two ways, according to indifference 
and according to identity of the same essence. [Those are just 
William’s second and first theory, respectively.] According to 
indifference, as we say Peter and Paul are the same in this that they 
are men, for so far as pertains to their humanity, just as the former 
is rational, so also is the latter; and just as he is mortal, so also is 
the other. But if we would acknowledge the truth, there is not the 
same humanity in both since they are two men. 
The passage is perhaps not entirely explicit, but there it is. (As far as I can see, 
there is no basis in this text for any suggestion of yet a third position, as Muckle 
says some people have thought.) 
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(4) William was not the only twelfth century author to hold a view like this, 
any more than he was the only one to hold a view like his first theory. We also 
find this second theory, or a reasonable facsimile of it, maintained by the famous 
Gilbert of Poitiers (also called Gilbert de la Porrée). Gilbert, like Clarembald of 
Arras, who — you’ll recall — maintained a view like William’s first theory, 
belonged to the School of Chartres. Bernard of Chartres seems to have been 
another one to hold a view like William’s second one. (See the handout I 
distributed earlier on “Relations of Influence in the Twelfth Century,” for a little 
chart showing you where Bernard — and the others — fit into the overall 
chronology of this period. See the HANDOUT “THE SCHOOL OF CHARTRES,” on the 
doctrine.) There are some texts from Gilbert in the Notes and Texts, pp. 69–70 (in 
the section “Passages from the School of Chartres”). They are pretty obscure, but 
you should be able to see the point of them. (The handout will perhaps help.) Also 
on Gilbert, see John of Salisbury’s remarks in Hyman and Walsh, p. 169 
(distributed in a handout earlier), and the fairly extensive discussion in Jorge 
Gracia’s book. 
Abelard’s Reply to William’s Second Theory 
Basically, Abelard thinks this second theory of William’s is perfectly all right, as 
far as the metaphysics goes. With certain adjustments, he will accept it himself 
(although he doesn’t think it is the whole story). On the other hand, he does not 
think it is a realism, as its proponents maintain. “Yet,” he says (p. 34, para. (44)), 
“they still retain a universal in things.”  That is, “they” think not only that words 
are “universals” in the sense of being predicable of many (everyone agreed on 
that), but also things could be predicable of many. Thus Abelard’s attack on this 
second view is not that it is metaphysically incoherent — although he does 
disagree with William’s way of expressing it. Rather, his main question for this 
theory is “What is the thing that is supposed to be universal on this theory?” 
Recall the definition of a universal at the beginning of the passage we are now 
considering from the Glosses on Porphyry, the definition from Aristotle. 
According to that definition, a universal is what is “predicated of many.” So, what 
thing on this second theory is predicated of many? Surely not Socrates’s 
humanity, since that is predicated only of Socrates. And not Plato’s humanity, 
since that is predicated only of Plato. And, on this theory, there simply is no 
common humanity to be predicated at all. 
Note: Although Abelard initially posed the problem of universals at the beginning 
of our section from his Glosses on Porphyry (p. 28, paragraph (16)) in terms of 
the Aristotelian predicational notion of a universal, a lot of what he says about 
William’s second theory will seem to blur the distinction between that notion and 
the more “Boethian” metaphysical notion in terms of being shared “as a whole, 
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simultaneously,” etc. In short, for a thing to be “predicated of many,” on this 
theory, seems in effect to be a matter of those things’ being “had by” or “inhering 
in” what they are predicated of. I can’t prove it, but I suspect this is probably a 
fair reading of William’s second theory; for the most part, although there were 
these two distinct notions of a universal, most people thought that in the end they 
amounted to the same thing. That is, what would count as a universal thing in the 
one sense was also universal in the other. (Universal terms of course would not 
count as Boethian universals.) Abelard’s own theory will break this equivalence, 
at least as I read him. But he’s not talking for now about his own theory; he’s 
talking about William’s. 
Abelard considers two variations of this theory, in addition to William’s own, 
variations that try to answer just this question, and so to save the realism of the 
theory. Just why people should be so concerned to insist that it is a realist theory 
is not very clear. Perhaps Anselm’s accusations against Roscelin had something 
to do with it. Or perhaps it was simply that people hadn’t really thought very 
explicitly about the questions Abelard was asking. In any case, let’s look at the 
first such variation: 
Joscelin of Soissons’ View (pp. 34–36, paras. (45)–(55)) 
(This is a good potential paper topic. There are texts available in 
English in King’s dissertation, and a moderate amount of 
philosophically-oriented secondary literature readily available, 
including the sample graduate paper I’ve put online from an earlier 
version of this course.) 
On this variation, the universal humanity is the collection (collectio) of all the 
individual humanities, the humanity of Socrates and the humanity of Plato and so 
on. All of them taken together constitute the species man, which is then 
predicated of them all. John of Salisbury (p. 169) is the one who tells us that this 
view was held by a certain Joscelin (= Goselinus), Bishop of Soissons, and by 
someone else. “There is another,” he says, “who with Joscelin ....” Peter King, in 
his dissertation, presents us with the Latin edition and an English translation of a 
text On Genera and Species that in fact maintains this “collectio”-theory. Victor 
Cousin, in 1836, published an edition of this text. King’s edition is better than 
Cousin’s, since we have subsequently found additional manuscripts on the basis 
of which to reconstruct it. 
Cousin attributed this text to Abelard himself, but that appears to be definitely 
wrong; Abelard’s theory is not like this at all. (Of course, when Cousin was 
writing Abelard’s works had never been printed and no one had much of an idea 
what he held.) On the other hand, Carl Prantl, the rather opinionated historian of 
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logic, in his Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande (1861), attributed the work to 
Joscelin on the basis of the fact that the doctrine in it conforms to what John of 
Salisbury says about Joscelin. Prantl’s attribution has been repeated many times, 
and seems to have been until recently the prevailing view about the authorship of 
this work. 
On the other hand, Peter King in his dissertation points out that the work seems to 
refer to Joscelin of Soissons in the third person, which suggests that it is not by 
him but by someone else. So Peter calls the author, appropriately, a “Pseudo-
Joscelin,” who may or may not be the “someone else” John of Salisbury referred 
to. In any event, the work maintains a version of the “collectio”-theory referred 
to by John of Salisbury, and you can look at it in King’s dissertation for details. 
(King also discusses Pseudo-Joscelin’s doctrine in some detail in Vol. 1 of his 
dissertation, Ch. 8. Note that, whoever he is, this Pseudo-Joscelin is the same 
“Pseudo-Joscelin” I mentioned a little while back in connection with “Material 
Essence Realism” — William’s first theory. I said, recall, that Peter King cites 
some other texts that give us evidence about how “Material Essence Realism” 
worked in the twelfth century. This is the same man, and in fact it’s the same text. 
So, while Pseudo-Joscelin gives us some evidence on how to interpret “Material 
Essence Realism,” his own theory is the “collectio”-theory.) 
Note that by ‘collection’, Joscelin almost certainly did not mean a “set” in the 
sense of modern set-theory. Set-theory is funny stuff, and really wasn’t invented 
until Cantor in the nineteenth century. If what Joscelin had in mind were sets in 
the modern sense, then we would have to start asking about the “null collection” 
and the “power collection,” and so on. And there is no trace of that kind of talk, or 
anything equivalent to it, in the Middle Ages — or of that kind of notion. 
What I suspect is much closer to what Joscelin had in mind is the modern notion 
of a “mereological whole.” The term ‘mereology’ comes from Greek ìÝñïò, 
meaning ‘part’, and mereology is in effect the theory of wholes and parts. It was 
developed to begin with by the Polish logician Leśniewski in the 1920’s and 
’30’s, and more recently by Nelson Goodman in his The Structure of Appearance 
and David Lewis in his Parts of Classes. But it’s not a purely modern 
development. A “mereological whole” is in effect what the Middle Ages called an 
“integral whole,” discussed to some extent in Boethius’s De divisione, which is 
available in a recent English translation. This is an important work I’m not as 
familiar with as I should be. 
The difference between a set and a mereological whole can be illustrated briefly 
like this: The state of Michigan is the mereological whole consisting of the Upper 
Peninsula and the Lower Peninsula as parts. That is, it is a certain land mass 
consisting of those parts. But the state of Michigan, the same land-mass, is also 
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the mereological whole consisting of all the counties in the state. That is, if you 
add up the Upper and the Lower Peninsulas, you get a certain geographical area. 
If you add up all the counties, you get the same geographical area. On the other 
hand, if you take the set of the Upper and Lower Peninsula and then take the set 
of all the counties in Michigan, you don’t end up with the same set; you end up 
with two distinct sets instead. The former has only two members, the latter many 
more than that (however many counties there are in Michigan). 
Well, I don’t want to go into the details of mereology here. I just want to warn 
you not to think of pre-nineteenth century talk about “collections” or “wholes” as 
though it were automatically about sets. It almost certainly is not. 
So when Joscelin speaks of the “collection” of all human beings as being the 
species man, he’s not talking about the set of all human beings. He’s probably 
thinking of something more like what we would call the human race. 
On the whole, Abelard has no trouble with this “collectio”-theory. Here are his 
objections (there are six of them): 
(1) (p. 35, para. (48)) A collection is predicated only by parts. The collection 
of all men is not wholly present to each man in such a way that the whole 
collection enters into the very structure of each individual. But Boethius says that 
a real universal is not predicated by parts, but only as a whole. Actually, if you go 
back and check Boethius, you will see that he doesn’t put in terms of predication 
at all. Abelard’s adjustment of Boethius here will be significant. Still, Abelard has 
a good point. Collections don’t seem to behave the way universals are supposed 
to do. (Note how this objection seems to collapse the distinction between the 
“predicational” sense and the “Boethian” sense of a universal.) 
(2) (p. 35, para. (49)) Furthermore, if you insist that there is a sense in which 
the whole collection is “predicated” of each of its parts (perhaps by taking 
predication as in effect just the converse of the relation of being a part of the 
collection), then whatever that sense is, it seems that Socrates may also be 
predicated in the same way of each of his parts, so that Socrates would be a 
universal too. In other words, if the relation between a universal and its 
individuals is just the whole-part relation, then how does it differ from, say, the 
relation between Socrates and his parts — his hand and his ear, for instance? If 
there is no relevant difference, then if the former relation makes humanity a 
universal, so too it ought to make Socrates a universal. (Compare p. 33, para. 
(38), Abelard’s third objection against William’s first theory.) 
This collectio-theory, then, radically alters the dividing line between universals 
and individuals. The only true individuals, on this view, would have no parts at 
all; they would be metaphysical atoms. Whether there are such things or not, they 
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are certainly not the things we normally call “individuals.” This view thus ends up 
betraying the common-sense starting point with which it began. 
The force of this objection seems to rest on taking the collection as what was 
called an “integral whole” (nowadays a “mereological” whole) — that is, a whole 
made up of parts in the way a house, say, is made up of the roof and the walls and 
the floor, etc. — so that the relation between the universal “collection” and one of 
its parts is just like the relation between Socrates and one of his physical parts. It 
is not clear whether this distorts the collectio-theory or not. We simply do not 
know. In any case, if this is not the relation between a universal and its 
individuals, then Joscelin owes us a further explanation of just what that relation 
is. 
(3) (p. 35, para. (50)) Man would not be a lowest species (infima species, 
species specialissima), as it is on the standard doctrine — that is, a species 
containing only individuals under it, no subordinate species. For there are various 
subcollections of men — by gender or nationality, for instance — and these 
subcollections would be universal (if universals are just collections), so that we 
would have subspecies after all. 
Joscelin could, I suppose, have replied that his doctrine is not a “standard” one, so 
that there is no reason to think he ought to be committed to the statement that man 
is a lowest species. Still, he would probably have felt the force of this objection. 
There is no reason to think Joscelin was trying to especially novel or innovative 
here. He would probably have regarded it as a defect of his theory if it really does 
imply that man is not an infima species. Everyone, realists and nominalists alike, 
accepted that. 
(4) (pp. 35–36, paras. (51)–(53)) The fourth objection is one I’m not really 
confident I understand very well, and there may in fact be some textual problems 
at this point. Note that in para. (51) on p. 35 I’ve had to supply some words of my 
own (in square brackets) in order to get anything that could be construed as an 
argument. Let’s look at what it says: “ Likewise,” he begins, “we would end up 
calling any collection whatever of bodies and spirits one universal ‘substance’.” 
What does that mean? Well, notice first that the phrase ‘bodies and spirits’ is just 
equivalent to saying ‘material and immaterial substances’. But why would “any 
collection” of such things count as “one universal ‘substance’“? 
Well, this might mean that if universals are just “collections,” then any old 
collection is going to give you a universal, and so any old collection made up of 
substances is going to give you a universal in the category substance. But I 
suspect instead that there are some words left out here, and that what Abelard 
means is that any old collection of material and immaterial substances that 
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includes all of them at a given time will count as the one universal category 
“substance.” (That’s why I put the word ‘substance’ in quotation marks in the 
translation, to try to signal that we’re not just talking about a universal in that 
category, but about that very category itself.) 
But whether that’s what he meant in this part of the paragraph or not doesn’t 
make a lot of difference, since the rest of the paragraph seems to be the more 
important part, and there he does seem to be thinking along these lines. “…since 
the whole collection of substances is one most general genus,” he says, “it would 
follow that when any one substance is taken away when the rest remain…” — 
and then I have to add some stuff of my own. 
What he means here can, I think, be put like this: Let’s suppose the collection of 
all substances at a given moment constitutes the category substance, as this theory 
seems to say—that is, the “most general genus” substance. All right, now suppose 
that one of those substances is destroyed (“taken away,” as he puts it) while the 
others remain. The collection of remaining substances is a different and smaller 
collection from the one we had before. And yet this collection is now the 
collection of all substances, by hypothesis, and so is now the category substance. 
The objection then seems to be that if the universal substance is just the collection 
of all substances at any given time, then it keeps changing its identity as old 
substances are destroyed and new ones are generated. 
What’s wrong with that? Well, Abelard doesn’t say. But it’s not hard to supply a 
reason. The universal category substance is supposed to be an important and 
essential component of my metaphysical make-up. So if that category is 
continually changing its identity over time, then my essence is continually 
changing over time too. 
So I am continually changing not only accidentally but even essentially without 
my doing anything at all, which seems wrong. 
Modern people might be tempted to reply that this objection can be easily met by 
simply taking the category substance as not just the collection of all presently 
existing substances, but the collection of all past, present and future (and perhaps 
even the merely possible) substances. That collection surely does not keep 
changing over time. But this is not a move that would be likely to occur to a 
medieval author, and would surely not have been very attractive even if it had. 
For it ends up making the category substance — this very important universal that 
is supposed to enter into my innermost metaphysical make-up — be such that 
most of it doesn’t even exist! 
In any event, Abelard doesn’t consider that possible reply. But he does suggest 
what appears to be an attempt to avoid this result in para. (52) on p. 35: “But 
 158
perhaps it will be said in reply that no collection included in a most general genus 
is itself a most general genus.” 
That’s not very clear, I’m afraid. It’s possible to interpret it in the way I just 
mentioned, as saying that the category substance is the collection of all past, 
present and future substances — although, as I say, I don’t think that’s very 
likely. 
In any case, whatever the reasoning here, the overall strategy of this reply is fairly 
plain. It proceeds by denying that any of the other “smaller” collections that result 
when a substance is destroyed will count as the category substance. (Presumably 
the “larger” collection that would result if a new substance is generated would 
also not count as the category. But that side of things simply isn’t mentioned at all 
here.) 
So, since these other collections don’t count as the category, for whatever reason, 
the category doesn’t keep changing its identity over time after all. 
We don’t really have to know the reasoning here, because Abelard has a 
counterreply to this strategy in any case. Look at pp. 35–36, para. (53). Suppose 
the reply in para. (52) is correct, he says. That is, no subcollection under the 
category substance can count as that category, no matter what substances come 
and go. Now suppose a single substance is destroyed. Well, he says, we will want 
to say that the category substance continues to exist anyway. He doesn’t say why, 
but it’s not hard to supply the reason. Categories are the most general genera, 
recall. But, as Porphyry says in the Isagoge (para. (64)), where he’s talking about 
the similarities between genus and difference, “when either the genus or the 
difference is destroyed, the things under it are destroyed too. For just as if there is 
no animal there is no horse or man, so too if rational does not exist there will be 
no animal possessed of reason.” In short, if the category substance ceased to exist 
when one substance were destroyed, no other substance could continue to exist 
either. To destroy one substance would be to destroy them all. 
OK. So we start off with all the substances there are, and then we destroy one of 
them. The category substance is somehow still there, as we’ve just seen, and so is 
the collection of all the remaining substances. Now if universals are just 
collections, then this collection of remaining substances is a universal of some 
kind or other. It’s not the category substance, by hypothesis. And certainly it’s not 
a universal in some other category, although Abelard doesn’t bother to make that 
obvious point explicitly. Therefore, the collection of remaining substances must 
be a species in the category substance. 
So far, so good. But, Abelard goes on, if the collection of remaining substances is 
a species in the category substance, then it “has to have a coequal species under 
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the same genus.” (To say two species are coequal is not to say they have the same 
number of individuals in them. It’s just to say they both occur at the same level of 
division and, so to speak, off of the same node of the Porphyrian tree.) 
Abelard’s point, then, is that a genus cannot be divided into a single species, 
because that wouldn’t really be a division. 
Now at first this sounds like the similar claim we’ve already seen Odo of Tournai 
make (Odo, pp. 61–62, line 30–32). Recall that Odo had said that while it is 
possible to have a species with only one individual in it (like the phoenix), you 
cannot have a genus with only one species in it. When we talked about Odo 
earlier, I said this didn’t seem to be right. What is there to prevent it from 
happening, for instance, that all animals are annihilated by some catastrophe or 
other — except for beetles? So even though “conceptually” you can’t have a 
genus that doesn’t have at least two species in it, nevertheless in actual fact one of 
those species might not be “actualized.” (Beetles turn out not to be a good 
example, since they come in several different species. But never mind.) 
Well, at first it sounds as if Abelard is making the same point. And perhaps he is, 
in which case either I just don’t understand his point or else Abelard is, at least 
here, as much of a lightweight as poor old Odo was. But I think the point is 
perhaps not really the same. In the present case, according to the story Abelard is 
telling, we start off with “the whole collection of substances,” as he puts it (para. 
(51)), and then destroy not a species, as Odo had it, but only one single substance 
— that is, an individual. So we cannot say, as we could in the case of the beetles, 
that the species coequal to the species that remains has been destroyed. It hasn’t. 
Only one individual has been destroyed, and an individual is not a species. (In 
fact, one of Abelard’s recurring criticisms in many of these arguments against 
these preliminary views is that they end up destroying, or at least blurring, the 
distinction between individuals and universals. This may be part of the point of 
Abelard’s second objection against William of Champeaux’s first theory [para. 
(37)]. But it’s certainly the point of his third objection [(38)]. And it will be his 
main objection to Walter of Mortagne’s theory, as we will see [Walter’s theory is 
stated in (47) and argued against in (56)–(58).) 
So we’re left with the conclusion that in addition to the collection of all remaining 
substances, which is a species of substance, there is also another, correlative 
species of substance still in existence—we haven’t destroyed a species, 
remember, but only an individual. (I’m not sure it really follows that we have a 
coequal species. But let’s just see what happens.) In that case, as Abelard quite 
properly asks, “But what coequal species can there be opposite to it?”—i.e., 
opposite to the species consisting of all the remaining substances. That coequal 
species would have to be some kind of collection of the remaining substances. 
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And there are only two possibilities. Either it is the whole collection of the 
remaining substances, in which case it isn’t really a new species, coequal to the 
collection of all remaining substances. It just is that species all over again. I take 
it this is what Abelard means when he says (p. 36 top) it would be 
“straightforwardly contained” in that species. By ‘straightforwardly contained’ he 
must here mean “exactly contained.” Otherwise, I don’t see how the argument 
will work. 
OK, that’s one alternative. The only other alternative is that the coequal species 
be some sub-collection of the collection of all remaining substances. As Abelard 
says (p. 36, para. (53)), it would “share some individuals with it.” But in that case, 
the two species aren’t coequal; the second is subordinated to, is a subspecies of, 
the first. 
Well, that’s the best I can do with this argument. If I’ve got it right, then Abelard 
may indeed have a case, although it would take a lot more work to see whether 
this is really a good line of argument or not. 
(5) Abelard has still two more objections against the “collectio”-theory. At p. 
36, para. (54), we get a fifth one. On the realist view, he says, individuals are 
composed of universals. (Recall the “layer-cake” picture.) Universals are the 
constituents of individuals, so that the individual is ontologically posterior. But 
Joscelin’s view makes universals (i.e., collections) out to be composed of 
individuals, so that the universal is ontologically posterior to the individual, as a 
whole is posterior to (= dependent on) its part. 
It seems to me that Joscelin could reply by saying that the ontological posteriority 
of individuals to universals is a feature of certain realist views, but not of his own. 
But I suspect Joscelin would have been unwilling to reverse the customary 
priorities in this way. As with objection (3), Joscelin would probably have found 
this result an embarrassment. His “collectio”-talk was presumably meant to be a 
defense of a longstanding, traditional theory, not a reversal of it. 
(6) The sixth and (mercifully) last argument is in para. (55). According to 
Boethius’s De divisione (= On Division — I’ve mentioned this book before, 
although I don’t know it well), the species is the same — that is, identically the 
same — as the genus. But on Joscelin’s theory they can’t be, since the collection 
of all men is not the same as the collection of all animals. 
This argument may puzzle you. How on earth can Boethius say in his De 
divisione that a species is identical with its genus? Well, he does say it (the 
reference is in para. (55)), and in fact he is being quite Aristotelian in saying it. 
(And now we’re going to get something we haven’t really seen so far.) 
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According to at least one way of reading Aristotle — the way Boethius is 
peddling in the De divisione — Socrates contains his own individual humanity, 
which is distinct from and similar to Plato’s own individual humanity . (That 
much, of course, is already familiar to us from the seal-ring picture.) Socrates also 
contains his own individual animality, and  — this is the important point — it is 
the same thing as his individual humanity. 
Put it another way, in terms of our “plucked chicken” experiment. Start with 
Socrates and Plato, and pull off their accidents and any other metaphysical debris 
until you get down to the level of humanity. How many humanities do you end up 
with? Two, on this theory. Now put it all back and start over. This time, pull off 
all the accidents and other stuff until you get down to the level of animality. How 
many animalities do you end up with? Two — and furthermore, you end up 
exactly where you did the first time around. 
Remember my “Warp and Woof” paper, where I talked about a basically 
Platonic-style metaphysics and a basically Aristotelian-style metaphysics. On a 
Platonic-style metaphysics (which is not what we have here), the facts of 
predication are a good guide to the metaphysical way things are. And so, since 
‘human’ and ‘animal’ are different predicates, and since they are not true of 
exactly the same things, they must correspond to distinct metaphysical 
components out there. And this is true no matter whether we are being realist or 
nominalist about universals, no matter whether we’re thinking in terms of 
metaphysical layer-cakes or seal-rings. 
Plainly, that is not the framework that is behind this sixth objection. On this 
framework, even though some things are animals that are not human beings, 
nevertheless within a human being, humanity and animality are the same thing. 
How does this work? Well, by having his own humanity Socrates has his own 
rational animality. That’s what humanity is, after all: rational animality. His 
humanity therefore is a kind of animality — no more, no less. In other words, on 
this picture we are not to think of humanity as somehow rationality PLUS 
animality (as something distinct from the rationality). 
The point is this: On this new picture, we don’t want to think of Socrates’s 
animality as something to which rationality is added as a separate ingredient. His 
animality not some neutral entity that’s neither rational nor irrational, such that its 
rationality would have to be added on as an extra. That would mean Socrates’s 
animality (as distinct from his rationality) would violate the Law of Excluded 
Middle by being neither rational nor not. (Remember, I sketched an argument for 
you along these lines at the very beginning of this course. There I cast it in the 
form of an argument against realism. But the same considerations can be used for 
other purposes too.) If you feel unsure of yourselves in this kind of metaphysics, 
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hold on a bit, because we’ll see it again in the next theory Abelard considers and 
rejects. 
But for the present, let’s finish up Abelard’s treatment of the “collectio”-theory, 
as in Pseudo-Joscelin of Soissons. This last objection by Abelard in effect 
observes that if universals are just collections, then since the collection of all 
human beings is not the same as the collection of all animals (the latter is much 
larger), there’s no way the “collection”-theory can do justice to the Aristotelian-
Boethian view (in Boethius’s De divisione) that the species is metaphysically 
identical with the genus. And, as far as it goes, this seems to me perfectly correct. 
Note that Abelard, by raising this objection, is in effect rejecting the opposing 
theory, the theory of “plurality of forms.” (This theory was discussed in the 
“Warp and Woof” paper.) According to that theory, Socrates’s humanity is one 
thing, and his animality is something else again. So too, his being alive, his 
corporeality and his substantiality. They are all distinct forms. This theory of the 
“plurality of forms” and the opposing theory, which Abelard (following Aristotle 
and Boethius) accepts, fought it out at length in the following century. Aquinas, 
for example, sided with Aristotle and Abelard. There were a number of factors at 
stake in this dispute, but we need not go into them now. For now it suffices to say 
merely that these two theories represent fundamentally different metaphysical 
approaches, as described in the “Warp and Woof” paper. 
Now it seems to me that Joscelin of Soissons could easily defend himself against 
this last objection. He could simply reject the Aristotelian identification of species 
with genus. There was certainly ample precedent for doing so — the whole other 
way of doing metaphysics. 
Let’s summarize then Abelard’s case against the “collectio”-theory. In my 
estimation, Abelard’s most successful objections are the first two, and to a lesser 
extent the third and fifth. (1, 2) The first two objections amount to saying that a 
“collection” is simply not the sort of thing that can play the role of a universal, or 
— if it is — then (objection 2) individuals (or at least individuals with parts to 
them) will turn out to be universals too, so that the theory wrecks the distinction 
between universals and individuals. (3, 5) The third and fifth objections could 
perhaps be answered if Joscelin were willing to break radically with traditional 
views and ways of talking. But it is more likely that he viewed himself as 
defending a certain traditional theory, not rejecting it. (4) The fourth objection 
may work, insofar as I understand it. But I’m not confident enough of it return a 
definite verdict. (6) The sixth objection seems to me an unfair attempt to judge 
Joscelin’s theory by standards he had no need to accept. 
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Walter of Mortagne’s Theory (stated in para. (47)) 
The last objection against Joscelin leads naturally to the second variation on 
William’s second view, which Abelard now turns to. 
Recall that the question Abelard is asking throughout his critique of William’s 
second theory and its variants is this: “What thing on this theory is universal, 
what thing is predicated of many?” On this new variant, Socrates the individual is 
simultaneously an individual, a species and a genus. He is an individual insofar as 
he is Socrates, a species insofar as he is a man, and a genus insofar as he is an 
animal. (And so on up the Porphyrian tree. In the end, we can say Socrates is a 
category insofar as he is a substance.) 
This theory is based on the kind of consideration we have just seen in the sixth 
objection to Joscelin’s view—the consideration that identified genus with species 
in Socrates. In that earlier discussion, we didn’t hear anything about identifying 
Socrates himself with that genus or species, which is what Walter of Mortagne’s 
theory does. But the underlying rationale is the same. What makes Socrates 
Socrates, what makes him a man and what makes him an animal are all the same 
thing. It is his own animality, which is not an irrational but a rational animality — 
that is, a humanity — and is not a Plato-style humanity — with brown eyes, say 
— but a Socrates-style humanity — with blue eyes. In Socrates, it is all the same 
thing. The different degrees of generality in our predication are just a result of our 
considering Socrates insofar as he is Socrates, insofar as he is a man, or insofar as 
he is an animal. That is, it all depends on how broad or narrow our focus is. But it 
is the same thing we are talking about in each case. 
John of Salisbury (p. 168) tells us that a view like this one was held by a certain 
Walter of Mortagne. (Like Pseudo-Joscelin of Soissons, we mentioned Walter 
earlier, in connection with other texts Peter King gives us that provide us with 
evidence for how “Material Essence Realism” was taken in the twelfth century.) 
Later on, John of Salisbury continues, Walter adopted a version of the Platonic 
Theory of Ideas, and held that the divine ideas were the true genera and species of 
things. Bernard of Chartres had already said the same thing about the divine 
ideas. See the handout on “The School of Chartres.” 
Note that Walter’s adoption of Platonism need not have involved any real change 
of mind on his part about the overall metaphysical picture. The nominalist, seal-
ring picture is quite compatible with the kind of Platonism John of Salisbury is 
talking about. The question is merely one of what we want to identify as the 
genera and species of things: the impressions in matter (Boethius’s “images”) or 
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the Divine Ideas that serve as their patterns and paradigms? The metaphysical 
picture can be the same on both alternatives. 
Peter King, in his dissertation, discusses Walter of Mortagne, and translates a text 
from Walter in Volume 2 of his dissertation. 
In any case, Abelard attacks this second variation too, in paras. (56)–(59). If you 
look at the text and take words like ‘Also’ and ‘Furthermore’ at the beginning of 
paras. (57)–(58) as signaling the beginnings of new arguments, then Abelard has 
four arguments against Walter’s theory. (And that’s the way I’ve outlined it in the 
Notes and Texts.) But in fact, it’s probably easier to treat them as really three 
arguments, or even two (paras. (56)–(58), and then para. (59)). 
Now before we even look at the arguments, you may well ask: If Walter of 
Mortagne’s theory is based on the same kinds of considerations as those Abelard 
himself appealed to in his sixth objection to Joscelin of Soissons — that is, if 
Walter’s theory is based on considerations with which Abelard agrees — then 
why on earth is Abelard arguing against it here? But be careful: He’s not arguing 
against the theory. He’s only arguing that it is not a realism, as it apparently 
claimed to be. Here are his arguments (I’ll condense them to two, as I just 
suggested): 
(1) (paras. (56)–(58)) The basic idea here is that on this theory, universals 
and individuals behave exactly the same way — which is not surprising, since on 
this theory the individual Socrates just is a universal species or genus if he is 
considered in a certain way. 
On this theory, Abelard says, humanity insofar as it is narrowed down to Socrates 
can no more be predicated of many than can Socrates himself, insofar as he is 
Socrates. (That much sounds like a valid point.) Conversely, Socrates, insofar as 
he is a man can be predicated of many just as much as humanity can, insofar as it 
is just humanity. (Well, maybe, depending on how the theory actually goes.) 
Hence, Abelard concludes, individuals and universals are predicable of exactly 
the same things in exactly the same senses. And that certainly doesn’t sound right. 
In fact, it means that this theory destroys the distinction between individuals and 
universals. If Socrates is an individual, a species and a genus, then an individual 
is a universal, and vice versa. (At least they are if this theory is a form of realism, 
as Walter apparently claimed.) Here again we see Abelard’s device of accusing 
other people’s theories of wrecking the distinction between individuals and 
universals. 
(2) (para. 59) Furthermore, Walter wants to say that, in some sense, Socrates 
and Plato agree (= convenire, literally “come together”) in humanity, or in man. 
That after all is why ‘man’ can be truly predicated of both. But what is this 
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humanity in which they agree? Which humanity is it? Not Socrates’s humanity, 
surely, because they don’t agree or come together in that — the one has it and the 
other one doesn’t. Neither can it be Plato’s humanity, for the same reason. And 
neither can it be anyone else’s humanity, for yet the same reason. And there is no 
general humanity in which they can agree or come together, according to this 
theory. Hence, there is no humanity at all in which Socrates and Plato can 
“agree.” 
It seems to me that these arguments are good ones. They show, not that Walter of 
Mortagne’s theory is wrong, but that it is not a realism. In effect, Abelard is not 
criticizing the theory so much as he is rejecting one of the claims made about it. 
On this theory, there is simply nothing in the ontology, no extra-linguistic thing, 
that is predicated of many. 
 
Refutation of William of Champeaux’s Own Theory (paras. (60)–(62)) 
After refuting these two variants of William of Champeaux’s second theory (or at 
least refuting the claim that they are realisms), Abelard turns to face William’s 
view itself. Presumably we’re now not considering various defenders of 
William’s second theory, or various followers of it, but rather the way William 
actually put it himself. (Of course, since we have so little of William’s actual 
writings, it’s pretty hard to be sure of this.) 
William wanted to say that Socrates and Plato agree in man, or agree in humanity. 
So did Walter of Mortagne, to judge by Abelard’s criticism in para. (59). But 
whereas Walter perhaps wanted to take these expressions positively, William 
takes them negatively; recall his term ‘indifferently’ in para. (44): “they call 
things that are discrete ‘the same,’ not essentially but indifferently.” Socrates and 
Plato then agree in man in the sense that they do not differ in man, or in humanity. 
The point is that we’re not basing this theory on a claim about what is out there, 
but on a claim about what isn’t out there; there isn’t anything to distinguish 
Socrates and Plato in this respect — that is, in being men. 
But, Abelard objects (para. (61)), neither do they differ in rock, and yet we don’t 
say they agree in rock, in such a way that the term ‘rock’ could be truly 
predicated of both of them. In effect, then, William has not given us any account 
of why we call both Socrates and Plato “men,” and yet we do not call them 
“rocks.” It’s true that nothing distinguishes them as being men, but then nothing 
distinguishes them as being rocks either. What we don’t yet have is an account of 
why despite their being nothing out there that does this, we nevertheless do call 
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them both “men” and don’t call them both “rocks.” And that point seems to me to 
be correct—at least as far as we’ve seen so far. 
A Possible Reply (para. (61), lines 3–5 — from “unless perhaps”) 
Abelard doesn’t really fill in the details of any reply. But he does say that perhaps 
you might want to add some premise (the Latin is ‘propositio’, which often, as 
here, does not mean “proposition” but “premise”) that allows the man case but not 
the rock case. That is, we want some premise to the effect that if persons A and B 
do not differ in man, then they agree in man in the sense that the term ‘man’ can 
be truly predicated of both of them. But we don’t want it to work where you 
substitute certain other terms — like ‘rock’ — for ‘man’. It doesn’t really make 
any difference how you would argue for this special premise, since Abelard 
doesn’t think it will help anyway. Here is why: 
Refutation of This Reply (para. (62)) 
Abelard counters that it is not even true that Socrates and Plato do not differ in 
man. Hence, it could hardly be appealed to explain anything. As I understand it, 
his analysis goes like this (and now things get a little formal): 
Since we are not talking about a universal man in the sense of William of 
Champeaux’s first theory, we must gloss the statement ‘Socrates and Plato do not 
differ in man’ as follows: Socrates and Plato do not differ in a man — that is, in 
any (individual) man at all. The lack of an indefinite article in Latin allows this 
step to be made without calling for any special comment. 
All right, but now what does this new sentence mean? Well, in general, how do 
we analyze a sentence of the form ‘A and B do not differ in a C’? 
Suppose we say that two things, A and B, do differ with respect to (“in”) a color 
— that is, with respect to some color. Then we can parse this as: Either A has 
some color that B doesn’t have, or B has some color that A doesn’t have. (Perhaps 
one is colorless.) So too, therefore, to say that A and B do not differ in a color is 
to say the denial of this: A has no color that B doesn’t have too, and likewise B 
has no color that A doesn’t have too. 
OK. Now similarly, to say that Socrates and Plato do not differ in a man, or in a 
humanity, is to say that Socrates has no humanity that Plato doesn’t have too and 
Plato has no humanity that Socrates doesn’t have too. But on William’s second 
theory, that is just plain false! Each of Socrates and Plato has his own humanity, 
which the other one does not have. Thus, far from saying that Socrates and Plato 
do not differ in a man, William should have said that they do. The claim that they 
do not encapsulates William’s first theory, not his second. 
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This is a good example of Abelard’s using his dialectical skill to dazzle his 
opponent. Later logicians would develop long treatises on how to treat the word 
‘differ’ in contexts like this and various other contexts. Their analyses look pretty 
much like the one I have just given, which is why I think it is not implausible to 
interpret Abelard himself as pushing an early version of this kind of analysis. 
Abelard here presupposes an already finely-honed analysis. 
Unfortunately, while it’s very impressive, I think it is probably unfair to William. 
William might well reply that Abelard’s fine logic doesn’t show that the view is 
wrong, but only that it was badly expressed. The basic point is unaffected: 
Socrates has his own humanity and Plato has his own humanity, and there is no 
difference between them — that is, no third entity that comes between them and is 
required to make them two humanities. They are two all by themselves; they just 
come that way. Their humanities don’t have to individuated or differentiated from 
one another by anything added on. They are already quite individual and distinct 
enough, thank you. There is a clear difference between this case and Abelard’s 
case of the rock. Neither Socrates nor Plato has a rockhood (a “lapidity”). 
Abelard can hardly object to such a theory, when properly stated. For, in the end, 
it disagrees in no respect with his own, except perhaps on some minor 
terminological points that don’t really matter. But Abelard is quite clear that his 
theory is not a realism, as apparently William thought his own was. 
This completes Abelard’s attack on William of Champeaux’s two theories and 
their variations. It is important to notice just what he has done. 
He seems to think he has refuted William’s first, strongly realist theory. Perhaps 
he has scored some points against William’s own formulation, but this type of 
realism can be touched up, at least in my judgment, in such a way that every 
single one of Abelard’s objections misses the mark. (He does not raise the one 
objection that would have been a real difficulty, and would have required a major 
change in the theory: that it makes accidental change impossible.) 
With respect to William’s second theory, Abelard has indeed scored some points 
against William’s way of expressing that theory. But his main success is 
elsewhere. He has pretty clearly refuted various attempts — (Pseudo-) Joscelin, 
Walter of Mortagne, and William himself — to explain how William’s second 
theory still amounts to a realism. There is apparently nothing on this theory, no 
non-linguistic entity, that is predicated of many. So if you are going to adopt a 
view like this one, you might as well just stop pretending you are a realist, 
confess that you are a nominalist, and just suffer all the shame and abuse William 
apparently thought went along with such an admission. 
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Abelard’s Own Theory 
This is precisely the conclusion Abelard himself draws (para. (63)):  
It remains to ascribe this kind of universality only to words. 
‘Words’ here = “voces,” which I said earlier might best be translated ‘utterances’. 
Only they are predicated of many. This passage marks a major point of 
articulation in the discussion. Abelard has now committed himself to nominalism 
(at least with respect to predication). We have yet to see how the details work out. 
From para. (64) to para. (75), Abelard gives us some preliminary explanations of 
the grammatical sense in which words (= voces) may be called particular 
(= individual) or universal. I’m just going to skip over those paragraphs for 
present purposes. Then, beginning in para. (76), he raises some questions that will 
serve to lead into the core of his own view. There are two questions, both having 
to do with the “signification,” in a broad sense, of those general or universal 
voces. 
Recall that, according to John of Salisbury, the difference between Roscelin’s 
theory and Abelard’s was that for Roscelin universals were just voces 
(utterances)—spellable (“articulated”) sounds produced by the vocal apparatus of 
an animal. They may or may not be significant. But for Abelard, universals were 
not just voces but also sermones—significant voces. So now we’re going to start 
talking about the notion of signification. 
(Now, an important warning. Be careful with the word ‘significatio’ in Latin. 
People often translated it as “meaning.” For example, Richard McKeon in his 
translation of this passage. We’ll have more to say about this term and how to 
translate it in just a moment. But to translate it ‘meaning’ is guaranteed to cause 
you trouble.) 
Here are the two questions Abelard raises: 
(1) First, there seems to be nothing for a universal word to 
name, no “subject thing,” as Abelard says (para. (77)). That 
is, universals are just voces = words, as we’ve just seen. 
But there seems to be nothing for a universal term to be 
truly predicable of. He has just argued that there are no 
universal entities in the realists’ sense to be named by 
universal words. We’ll see Abelard’s answer to this 
question shortly. 
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(2) But second, there doesn’t seem to be anything for universal 
words to signify either. 
Here we are back with this notion of “signification” again.  
Let me give you a little lesson in the terminology of medieval semantics. 
Aristotle, in De interpretatione 3 16b19–21, says that verbs “signify” something 
just as names do. The point here is that he introduces the word ‘signify’. Why do 
verbs signify something just as names do? Because someone who uses a verb, 
Aristotle says, “establishes an understanding” — in Boethius’s Latin translation 
the phrase is ‘constituere intellectum’, usually construed with the genitive. Hence 
in general, terms signify what they “establish an understanding of,” or in more 
colloquial terminology, they signify what they make us think of when we hear 
them, or see them (if they’re written).  
This passage came to be viewed as a kind of definition of signification in the 
Middle Ages. So “signification” for the medievals is fundamentally an 
epistemological/psychological notion.  
This Aristotelian background is what’s behind the phrase at the end of para. (77) 
on p. 40: universal names don’t seem “to establish a firm understanding of 
anything.” 
(Notice that it follows from this basic notion of signification, which all medievals 
used, that signification is a species of the causal relation, and is just as transitive 
as causality is. If A signifies B and B signifies C, then A signifies C. Some 
authors explicitly drew this conclusion. This, incidentally, is one reason why I 
regard it as wrong to translate ‘significatio’ as “meaning.” Meaning, whatever it 
is, is not transitive; signification is.) 
In effect, therefore, the second of Abelard’s questions is “What does a universal 
term make us think of when we hear it?” Certainly, it doesn’t make us think of a 
universal thing, since he has just argued at length against William of Champeaux 
and others that there are no such things. But it doesn’t seem to make us think of 
any individual thing either. When I hear the word ‘man’, I am not made to think 
of Socrates any more than I am made to think of Plato. And I cannot be made to 
think of all men, since I don’t know all men. There are lots of people on the other 
side of the world (in fact, there are lots of them on the other side of the street) 
whom I have never thought of in particular. Surely, when I hear the word ‘man’, I 
am not made to think of them — except in some very general sense that seems 
impossible to explain, since we have no general entities on this theory. 
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In short, there are two problems: (1) Universal names don’t seem to have 
anything to name or to be truly predicated of, and (2) they don’t seem to have 
anything to signify or make us think of either. 
Hence it looks as if universal terms cannot be sermones in Abelard’s sense — that 
is, significant words or significant voces — since there is nothing for them to 
signify or name. It looks, therefore, as if Abelard’s nominalism is committed to 
saying that universal terms are mere words without significance — mere flatus 
vocis, in Anselm’s phrase — with all the consequences that entails for our 
knowledge of the world. How is Abelard going to avoid this? How is he going to 
distinguish his theory from Roscelin’s? 
Well, he does. He sketches his answer at paras. (86)–(87), before getting down to 
details. “But this is not so,” he says (86), p. 41. 
Ad primum: First of all, what about naming? The objection here was that there is 
nothing for a universal term to name or be truly predicated of, because there is no 
universal thing for it to name. Abelard’s response is in effect: “So what? Why 
can’t the term name individual things?” In fact, that is what happens of course. 
The universal term ‘man’ is truly predicated of Socrates and Plato. 
It’s a little hard to see what is going on here, but it seems to run something like 
this. The problem arises only if (i) we think of naming or being truly predicated of 
as also a kind of signification (so that what a term makes you think of is what it is 
truly predicable of), and then (ii) recall that terms signifying more than one thing 
are equivocal. For example, ‘bank’ is equivocal, since it signifies both the 
financial institution and the side of a river. (See the remarks on equivocation at 
pp. 37–38, para. (65). READ IT.) So, the problem is this: How can a universal term 
be truly predicable of many things without signifying many things and so ending 
up being ambiguous — not univocal, after all? Compare the example of 
‘Socrates” in para. (65) on p. 38 (along with notes 22–23). 
Abelard’s reply in effect severs the notion of naming from the notion of 
signification in the sense of signification in which a term is equivocal if it 
signifies several things. Abelard is willing to allow that there is a sense in which 
naming is a kind of signification. Universal terms, he says, “in a way ... ‘signify’ 
diverse things by naming them” (p. 41, para. (86)). But that is not the kind of 
signification that is involved in equivocation. 
It is not entirely clear to me why Abelard is willing to allow naming, or as he calls 
it “nomination,” to be a kind of signification at all — even “in a way.” But, 
whatever the reason, it is clear that naming is not signification in the sense that 
seems to be presupposed by the objection. 
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I think, therefore, that Abelard has successfully handled the first objection. His 
answer proceeds by taking the notion of naming as in effect identical with the 
notion of being predicated of, and then by distinguishing this notion from 
signification in the sense in which multiple signification would entail 
equivocation. 
Ad secundum: But the second objection is harder. What are we made to think of 
when we hear the word ‘man’? In short, what is the link-up between our universal 
terms, our concepts, and the external world? How are we going to save Abelard’s 
nominalism from the epistemological skepticism it threatens to yield? This is the 
meat of Abelard’s theory. 
Well, here is where considerations about equivocation do apply. If a universal 
term is going to be univocal, it must establish in us a single understanding, a 
single concept. (‘Understanding’ in these contexts does not mean the faculty of 
understanding, but either the act of understanding or else the object of such an 
act.) 
That concept has to be a general concept. But what is it a concept of? Not of a 
general or universal thing, since there aren’t any, as Abelard has argued at length. 
Neither does the universal term make us think of individual things, for the reasons 
we’ve already seen, reasons the objection states and Abelard apparently accepts. 
And yet that general concept must somehow be grounded in those individual 
things, on pain of severing our thought from the world and reducing the theory to 
Roscelin’s. 
There must, therefore, 
Abelard says (paras. 
(87)–(88), p. 41), be 
some common cause or 
reason why the universal 
term is “imposed on” the 
several individuals it 
names (“imposition” is 
the assigning of names 
to things), and so names 
the several individuals it 
does, and which links 
the name to the general 
concept we have when 
we hear the term. This 
“common cause” is going to be the linkage between our concepts and the world 
that saves the objectivity of our knowledge. So it’s going to be pretty important. It 
common cause (?) 
imposed on, 
   names
concept 
‘man’ 
establishes an understanding
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is whatever it is that answers the question, “What is it that links the general 
concept generated by a universal term with the individual things the term is truly 
predicable of? 
Well, how does it work? We need to look at both sides of the question: (a) at this 
mysterious “common cause,” and also at (b) the “common concept” that it 
grounds (para. (88), p. 41). 
Ad (a): We have seen that Abelard criticized William of Champeaux’s second 
theory for saying that, while Socrates and Plato had two distinct essences, 
nevertheless they agreed — “indifferently,” to be sure, but “agreeing” nonetheless 
— in man or in humanity. Abelard thought this was just a verbal smoke screen. 
He says instead that Socrates and Plato agree, or are alike in being a man, or in 
that they are men, or in being man (para. (89), p. 41. READ). 
So what? What is the big difference here? Well, there is a big difference. A man 
is a thing — a res. And there is no thing in which Socrates and Plato agree, no 
thing they can share, as Abelard has already argued at length. 
Nevertheless, they must somehow agree, there must be some community between 
them, or else there would be no objective basis for our calling them both “men,” 
and we would be left with subjectivity and skepticism — and Roscelin’s doctrine. 
The common predication of the word ‘man’ of both of them must be tied to reality 
somehow. 
Well, Abelard bites the bullet. Since Socrates and Plato cannot “agree in” or share 
any common thing, and since they must nevertheless have some community, it 
follows that they must agree in or share some non-thing, something that is not a 
thing — not a res. 
They do not agree in man, he says (para. (89)), but they do agree in being a man 
(= hominem esse), otherwise translated as “to be a man.” Being a man, therefore, 
is not a thing. 
This doesn’t mean that being a man is “nothing,” that it isn’t really out there. It is 
really out there. It has to be, since there is an important epistemological job for it 
to do. But it is not a thing — not a res. 
Instead, it is what Abelard calls a “status” (fourth declension, so that the plural is 
‘stat¨s’ — spelled the same, but with a long ‘¨’). This word ‘status’ as a technical 
expression is not unique to Abelard in the twelfth century. Other people used the 
word too. For example, Walter of Mortagne used it. But we shouldn’t assume 
immediately that the word always means the same thing for all these people. And 
in fact, in many cases it may not be clear just what a given author means by it. In 
any case, let’s look at how Abelard is using it here. 
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Socrates and Plato, he says, agree in the status of man — that is, in being a man, 
or in to be a man. “We appeal,” he says, “to no essence here” (para. (91), p. 42) 
— that is, to no thing. 
Oh great, you may say. What on earth is going on? When it comes to the crunch, 
Abelard tries to fake his way out of the epistemological problem here by 
appealing to some contrived and utterly mysterious kind of “non-thing” he calls a 
status. That’s not a theory; that’s a sign of desperation! Isn’t Abelard in fact just 
throwing the whole thing away? Isn’t this mysterious status of man just the old 
realist universal man in disguise? Hasn’t Abelard distinguished his own doctrine 
from realism by nothing more than a verbal subterfuge? 
This is a particularly pressing question once we realize that Abelard needs the 
status for basically epistemological reasons, and epistemology has always 
provided the main arguments for realism. 
In order to see what is going on, we must remember the way Abelard defined a 
universal in the first place. A universal for Abelard, following the Aristotelian 
definition rather than the Boethian one, is what is predicated of many. And while 
Abelard seems perfectly willing to speak in some passages in his writings of 
things’ being predicated of things, he is not willing to allow things to be 
predicated of many things, since “it remains to ascribe this kind of universality 
only to words” (p. 37, para. (63)). 
The universal man of William of Champeaux’s first theory was a universal 
because it was supposed to be predicated of many. (It was also, of course, 
universal in the Boethian metaphysical sense, but that isn’t the main sense at issue 
in Abelard’s discussion.) The status, however, which is just as objective, just as 
much really out there in the ontology, is not a universal in Abelard’s sense 
because it cannot be predicated of many. Why not? 
What is the status of man? It is, Abelard says, being a man. Now ‘being’ is 
ambiguous in English. It can be either (a) an adjective (a participle, in particular), 
meaning that which is, or else it can be (b) a noun (a gerund, in particular) 
meaning what that which is does — namely, be. (Compare the difference between 
‘the living and the dead’ = ‘those who are alive and those who are dead,’ and 
‘Summertime, and the living is easy’ — that is, what those who are alive do is 
easy, namely living.) 
In Latin, participles and gerunds are quite distinct verb-forms. What we have in 
the present case, where we are talking about being a man, is the gerund, the 
verbal-noun. And in Latin, the nominative of the gerund is the infinitive. So to 
make this perfectly clear, we can say that the status of man is to be a man 
(= hominem esse). 
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Now the Latin sentence ‘Hoc est hominem esse’ (in English, ‘This is to-be-a-
man’) is certainly odd, and perhaps even ill-formed. 
(Note: There are some nasty complications here. In Latin as in English, there are 
some quite ordinary constructions where such gerund-constructions are in fact 
predicated. Consider ‘To be Socrates is to be a human being’, ‘To run is to be 
moved’, and so on. Some later authors will actually have a few things to say about 
these cases, but I don’t know what — if anything — Abelard has to say about 
them.) 
Now I am not very concerned whether you understand all the grammatical fine-
tuning here. But the general point is important. Although Abelard doesn’t exactly 
say so, I suspect this grammatical business is the reason why the status of man — 
to be a man or hominem esse — cannot be predicated of many. It cannot be 
predicated of many because it cannot be predicated at all. It is simply of the 
wrong form. It results in gibberish. 
Syntactically, this is just a matter of grammar. Metaphysically, it can be 
approached somewhat differently. 
The theory of the categories may be regarded as providing a list of the basic kinds 
of predicates. (‘Κατηγορία’ just means “predicate” in Greek, remember.) But the 
status of man does not fit into any of the ten recognized Aristotelian categories. 
Hence, it cannot be predicated, and so a fortiori cannot be predicated of many. 
To-be-a-man is not a substance, although any given man is. And to-be-a-man is 
certainly not an accident. So it doesn’t belong in any of the categories. 
It follows of course that the status not only cannot be predicated of many, it 
cannot be predicated of even one. Hence the status is not only not a universal, it is 
not an individual either. I suspect this is what Abelard means when he says that 
the status is not a thing. 
Way back at p. 28, para. (17), near the very beginning of our passage from 
Abelard, he quoted Aristotle’s De interpretatione, the beginning of Ch. 7, as 
saying that some things are universal and others are individual. And that’s exactly 
what Aristotle does say — he says things. Now, although Aristotle doesn’t 
exactly say so, it certainly looks as if this is intended to be an exhaustive division; 
all things are the one or the other, either universals or individuals. Abelard 
disagrees about universals, of course, but the point is that since the status cannot 
be either an individual or a universal, it follows on the authority of Aristotle that 
it cannot be a thing at all. 
Again, in another passage later in the Logica ingredientibus (this time from the 
Glosses on the Categories), Abelard says that the categories signify the ten 
primary genera of things. (See pp. 66–67 in the Notes and Texts, passages II and 
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III). Presumably then, since the status does not fit into a category, it is not a thing. 
But it is still out there. 
To some extent, this is sheer speculation based on scattered texts. In the end, 
Abelard simply is not very informative about these non-things. But something 
like this must be going on, or else I simply do not see how everything Abelard 
says can be reconciled. 
At this point, let us recall the two kinds of realism we have in circulation: 
(a) Predicational realism, the view that there are real, non-
linguistic entities predicable of many. This is based on 
Aristotle’s definition of a universal in De interpretatione 7. 
(b) Metaphysical realism, the view that there are real entities 
— whether you want to call them “things” or not is up to 
you — that are common as a whole, simultaneously, and in 
a metaphysically intimate manner, to several things. This is 
based on the definition given by Boethius in his Second 
Commentary on Porphyry. 
Now I have an interpretation of Abelard’s theory that seems on the whole to make 
sense of the texts. But I must confess the texts do not force this theory. It is just 
that I don’t know how else to interpret them. Furthermore, while my 
interpretation does seem to accommodate the texts — or at least those I’m 
familiar with — it doesn’t leave Abelard with a very attractive or adequate theory, 
for reasons we’ll see in a bit. 
For better or for worse, here is my tentative interpretation of Abelard. Abelard is a 
nominalist in the Aristotelian, predicational sense, but a realist in the Boethian, 
metaphysical sense. His doctrine of the status fits Boethius’s definition of a 
universal. He explicitly says all human beings “agree” in the status being a man. 
And he calls it the “common cause” of the imposition of the term ‘man’. This 
might just mean that it’s a “common cause” in the sense in which the sun is a 
“common cause” of all living organisms on earth. In that sense, being a “common 
cause” is just a matter of being a single cause of several effects, and there’s 
nothing metaphysically realist about it. The sun is outside the structure of the 
effects it causes, so that it violates the third condition of a Boethian universal (the 
“metaphysical intimacy” condition”).  
I say this might be what’s going on, but I don’t believe it. First of all, in the case 
of the sun we have several effects, and the sun is a “common” cause in the sense 
of being common to all those effects. But here we have only one effect, the 
imposition of the term ‘man’, the process whereby it is assigned its significative 
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role. So it would seem that the status can’t be a “common cause” in the sense of 
having many effects, but only in the sense that there is something common about 
it. And the only plausible way I can think of to make that out is the kind of 
metaphysical commonness Boethius has in mind: the status to-be-a-man is one 
metaphysical entity (we can’t call it a “thing,” remember) that “constitutes the 
substance” of all men in the required metaphysically intimate way. 
I confess this is all highly speculative and tentative. But if it is so, then Abelard is 
one of the few people in the Middle Ages for whom the difference between the 
Aristotelian “predicational” and the Boethian “metaphysical” definition of a 
universal actually makes a difference. It is only in the predicational sense that he 
is a nominalist: there is nothing except for terms in language that is predicated of 
many on Abelard’s doctrine. But there are shared or common metaphysical 
ingredients, in pretty much the sense Boethius talked about. 
It is the logical doctrine of predication, therefore, that is at the heart of Abelard’s 
nominalism. He is a nominalist only in the “predicational” sense. So when I said a 
little while ago that William of Champeaux’ second theory in effect agreed with 
Abelard’s own theory, although Abelard didn’t think it was the whole story, and 
that his main quarrel with it was the claim that it was still a realism, I meant 
realism only insofar as predication is concerned. There is nothing on William’s 
second theory that is predicated of many, even though he and his followers 
seemed to be unwilling to accept that consequence — at least to hear Abelard tell 
it. 
Now, there’s an additional question you might have at this point, and it would be 
a good question. Here it is: If Abelard does end up being a metaphysical realist 
but a predicational nominalist, then what happened to his arguments against 
William of Champeaux’s first theory? After all, wasn’t William’s first theory 
just a version of this kind of metaphysical realism? And Abelard mercilessly 
attacked that theory, as we have seen. It would be ironic indeed if his own view 
turned out to say pretty much the same thing. 
Well, what were Abelard’s objections against that theory? (1) The first objection, 
you will recall, was that on this theory contraries would be in the same thing at 
the same time, and this would violate the Law of Contraries, which says that 
contraries can’t do that. (2) The second objection was that there would be only ten 
essences for all things, and that since each thing has features from several 
categories at once, it would follow that there would be only ten things in all — or, 
even worse, only one thing with features from all ten categories! (3) The third 
objection was that William’s theory destroyed the difference between universals 
and individuals, since the reason we say humanity is a universal is because it has 
several forms inhering in it, and Socrates has several forms inhering in him in the 
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same way. (4) The fourth objection was that William’s theory reverses the priority 
of individual substances to their accidents. 
I’m afraid I don’t really know what to say here. There are two lines of response I 
can think of. (a) One is to recall that, in my own estimation, Abelard’s objections 
against William’s first theory may have scored some points against it, and in 
particular against certain other things William held that, when combined with the 
metaphysical picture behind this theory, led to absurd or otherwise unacceptable 
results, but that it didn’t really refute that metaphysical picture. All right, what do 
you expect? That is exactly the metaphysical picture Abelard himself has. So you 
could really shouldn’t expect his contrary arguments to be completely persuasive. 
You have to remember that Abelard’s arguments appear in the context of the 
preliminary arguments in what amounts to a quaestio, so that you can’t assume 
that he believes the arguments he is presenting. 
(b) The second line of response is perhaps not all that different. It is to say that 
Abelard doesn’t really think there is anything wrong with William’s first theory 
metaphysically speaking. His objections are that William goes wrong only when 
that theory is combined with other unfortunate claims he makes — in particular, 
claims about predication. The common factor in Socrates and Plato, then, really is 
common — that’s not the problem. But it’s not a thing, which means it has 
nothing do to with predication. This works best perhaps with the first line of 
objection, about the Law of Contraries. The whole notion of “contraries” is a 
logical notion, and logic is fundamentally about predication and about what can 
be predicated of what. It also works well with the second objection, insofar as 
‘category’ (recall) just means “predicate.” (And in fact, ‘praedicamentum’, 
related to ‘praedicatum’, is one standard word for ‘category’ in medieval Latin, 
even though Abelard in the second objection speaks in terms of “generalissima.”) 
In short, this second response amounts to saying that what I presented as the 
failures of Abelard’s arguments against William’s first theory, are not failures at 
all; they are by design. Abelard means to be attacking not the underlying realist 
picture behind William’s first theory, but only the other features of his doctrine 
that William was foolish enough to combine with that underlying picture. 
In the long run, I’m not sure what to say here. This is still a loose end in my 
understanding of Abelard. There is still a lot of work to be done before we finally 
have a firm grip on what Abelard is up to. 
 
This then is the end of our treatment of Abelard’s first question back at p. 41, 
para. (87)–(88), the question about the common cause of imposition. The reason 
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the term ‘man’ is “imposed” on Socrates and Plato, and all other men, is because 
they all have the common status: being a man, or to be a man. And this common 
status may plausibly, although conjecturally, be interpreted as a metaphysical 
universal in the Boethian sense, even though it is not a “thing” and is not 
predicated. 
Ad (b): Now what about the second side of our problem, the question of the 
“common concept”? What does a universal term, after all, signify or make us 
think of? What is the concept the concept of? 
At this point, you might well ask: What about the status? Wouldn’t that serve? 
Perhaps it would. If the status is “common to many” in the Boethian metaphysical 
sense, and so is a “Boethian” universal, it would seem to be tailor-made to be the 
one object conceived by the concept “man.” But, oddly, Abelard doesn’t take that 
route, for reasons we shall see a little later. On the contrary, for some reason he 
seems to think a term must signify a thing, not a “non-thing” like the status. 
To ask the question as precisely as possible: What is the thing of which a 
universal term “establishes an understanding” or concept? There must be only 
one, under pain of equivocation. (Terms that signify different things are 
equivocal, recall, even though univocal terms can very well nominate — “name” 
— different things.) 
Well, since what the term signifies can’t be any real “thing,” as Abelard has 
already argued, it is, he says (p. 43, para. (96)), “a kind of imaginary and made-up 
‘thing’“ — a res ficta, in Latin. That is to say, apparently, it is purely an 
intentional object, a thought object, a thought thing. It is in no sense real — not 
even in the sense in which the status is real even though it is not a “thing.” The 
thought object is a “thing,” only it is a fake thing — a metaphysically impossible 
thing, if Abelard’s arguments against William of Champeaux’s realism are 
correct. 
So to the question “What does the universal term make us think of, since there 
can’t be any universal thing,” Abelard’s answer is: “No problem. It makes us 
think of a universal thing, even though there can’t be any universal thing. 
Later people, at the end of the thirteenth century and afterwards, will distinguish 
real being (= esse reale), which all of us enjoy, from intentional being (= esse 
intentionale), which thought objects must be content with. (‘Intentional’ here is 
taken in the sense that thought intends or aims at, “tends towards,” its object, 
whether the object is real or not. ‘Intentional’ does not here mean “on purpose.”) 
This is the germ of the doctrine of intentionality that will play such a big role in 
modern phenomenology. Brentano claimed he got this notion from the 
Scholastics. Well, he didn’t get it from Abelard; he got it from later people. But 
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we can already see the germ of it in Abelard. Another term for it in the later 
Middle Ages is “objective being” (esse objectivum) — in the sense of the being 
an “object of thought” has. (You may recall that Descartes uses the term 
‘objective reality’ in his Third Meditation in exactly this sense.) 
Digression 
There seems to be some obscurity in Abelard concerning this res ficta. Is it some 
kind of mental representation, or is it some kind of impossible objective entity in 
the world? 
On the one hand, he seems to think this res ficta is a product of the activity of the 
mind, like dream images, and that it is this product we are made to think of when 
we hear a general or universal term. (See p. 43, para. (96), “The imaginary cities 
seen in a dream.”) 
On the other hand, later in the Logica ingredientibus, in his Glosses on the De 
interpretatione (see p. 67 in the Notes and Texts, item IV), he seems to say that 
such images or figments are not what we think of when we hear a general term, 
and so not its significate, but are rather the mental products that are the means by 
which we think of what they are images of. We do not think of the images, we 
think of things through the images. 
In short, on the former interpretation, the res ficta is identified with a mental 
image, while on the latter the res ficta is identified with the object of thought, the 
intentional impossible object that the image is an image of. 
The terminology, at least, and perhaps the content of the doctrine as well, are 
fluid here. Perhaps the best way to view it is this: The universal term establishes 
in us (that is, causes in us) an understanding, a concept, regarded as a kind of 
mental picture. That concept or picture is of a metaphysically impossible general 
object. Since terms signify that of which they establish an understanding in us, 
not that understanding or concept itself, it is the impossible intentional object that 
is signified by the universal term, not the concept or image of that object. Thus: 
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Just which of these — the impossible intentional object or the understanding or 
concept of that object — is to be called the res ficta, I am not clear. But it seems 
to me most plausible that the res ficta is to be identified with the intentional 
object, not the concept or image, and it is that res ficta that is signified by the 
term. But if I am wrong about this, and the res ficta is to be identified with the 
concept or image, it is easy to make the terminological adjustment. In that case, 
the term will signify the intentional object of the res ficta or image. 
End of Digression 
This theory is an account of all terms, not just of universal ones. Proper names as 
well as universal terms produce or establish in us a concept or image of an 
intentional object thing, which object the term signifies. In the case of a proper 
name, of course, the intentional object is an individual and so may also be a really 
existing thing. For universal terms, however, this cannot happen. 
At p. 43, para. (100), Abelard suggests an exception to this. A proper name — 
say, ‘Socrates’ — need not produce in us a concept or image of Socrates, he says, 
provided that Socrates is present in person and I perceive him. In that case we do 
not need the image in order to be made to think of Socrates; the reality suffices. 
But where Socrates is absent, I do need his image in order to think of him. Where 
the term is a universal term, however, there can never be a universal thing really 
present to my perception, since there are no universal things out there at all. 
Hence for universal terms we always need an image or concept in order to think 
of what they signify. 
(There’s perhaps a problem here. If t signifies x, then t “establishes an 
understanding” of x, as we’ve seen. But what is this understanding that’s 
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established, if there is no concept or image, but only the object itself — as with 
proper names when the object itself is present to us?) 
Before we get too far afield, let me point out something. At p. 43, para. (97), 
Abelard considers a view that denies that concepts or images are products of the 
mind’s activity at all, but instead identifies the concept or image with the very act 
of thinking itself. Abelard doesn’t really argue very fully against this theory, but 
he says he disagrees with it (para. (98)). It is an interesting theory, because after 
toying with a “fictum theory” very much like Abelard’s, William of Ockham in 
the fourteenth century will opt for the act-theory Abelard here rejects, the theory 
that concepts are identical with the mental acts themselves, not with the products 
of those acts. 
So far, then, we have a fictum-theory for Abelard, a theory that applies equally to 
general concepts and to particular or individual ones. What is the difference 
between these two kinds of concepts? The distinction is drawn beginning at p. 44, 
para. (102). 
Particular or individual concepts are mental pictures or images that represent one 
thing to the exclusion of others — for instance, the image of Socrates. General 
concepts are mental pictures or images that represent several things at once. They 
are in that sense “confused” concepts. This does not mean that there is anything 
wrong with them, or that they are stupid. It means that they con-fuse or “fuse 
together” a number of things. The concept “man,” for instance, is equally a 
picture of every man. It is not any more a picture of Plato than it is of Socrates, or 
vice versa. But it is more a picture of those men than it is of anything that is not a 
man. 
Well, this is troublesome, since we want know just how this is supposed to work. 
At pp. 44–45, para. (108), Abelard gives us a troubling analogy. He says we can 
paint a picture of a particular lion — “limping, maimed, or wounded by Hercules’ 
spear,” as he rather oddly puts it. But we can also, he goes on, paint a picture of 
no lion in particular, but of a lion in general. This of course suggests Abelard is 
leaving himself wide open to all the objections Berkeley would later raise against 
the notion of abstract general ideas — objections based precisely on the 
identification of concepts or ideas with mental images. (We cannot imagine a 
triangle in the abstract, the objection goes; any triangle we actually picture to 
ourselves will have to be either equilateral, isosceles or scalene.) 
Whether Abelard can answer such objections or not, the analogy with painting 
still seems to be a bad analogy. Nevertheless, let’s not push the point. We can 
then summarize Abelard this way: 
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(1) In the presence of an individual to the senses, a proper 
name — for instance, ‘Socrates’ — brings to mind Socrates 
himself, and also signifies Socrates. No image or mental 
picture is needed. 
(2) In the absence of individuals to the senses, a proper name 
— for instance, ‘Socrates’ — brings to mind the image or 
picture of Socrates, but signifies the individual Socrates 
himself. It does this whether Socrates exists or not. 
(3) A universal term — for instance, ‘man’ — brings to mind a 
general picture or concept of no one man in particular, but 
of a man in general, and signifies the metaphysically 
impossible man in general that I think of through that 
concept or image. 
Thus, terms as a whole signify a realist world, a world with universal things in it 
— only that realist world is a world of intentional objects, not exclusively of 
realities. Realism is the correct theory for the world we picture, the world we 
think of, as realists have argued all along. (Recall, realism’s strongest arguments 
are based on epistemology.) It is, unfortunately, not the correct theory for the 
world that exists. 
Realism, if it thinks universals are real, extra-linguistic things, makes the mistake 
of regarding the world that is signified as the real world. Abelard thinks it is not. 
His distinction between naming and signifying properly speaking makes this 
outcome possible. 
Boethius, in his Commentary on Porphyry, adopted a version of moderate 
realism, as we saw. He said we can separate in the mind things that cannot be 
separated in reality. We can form abstract, general concepts although there is no 
such thing as a general or universal thing. Abelard is in effect just accepting this 
theory, but spelling it out in more detail. Unfortunately, he complicates matters by 
identifying concepts with mental images. 
You may well think this whole outcome is a rather ironic one for a doctrine that is 
trying to preserve the objectivity of our knowledge. After all, the upshot of the 
whole thing is that the world we think about, and so the only world we could even 
have a chance of knowing, is not the world that exists, but rather a metaphysically 
impossible world populated with universals. What kind of objectivity does a 
doctrine like that preserve? 
This brings us back to a question we put off a while ago: Why cannot the status 
serve as the significate of a universal term? Why cannot the term ‘man’ make us 
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think of the status of man? It seems to be just the kind of significate we want. It is 
common to many, even though it is not predicable of many. And it would clearly 
ground the objectivity of our knowledge if it were the significate of the universal 
term — that is, if we were to think of it when we heard the term ‘man’. In that 
case, the universal term could make us think of something real, even if not strictly 
a thing, and not of some impossible universal thing predicable of many. The 
world that is signified, the world we think of or conceive, would then be just the 
real world after all, and knowledge would be saved. 
The reason Abelard does not adopt this attractive approach is that he thinks we 
cannot form a mental image of a status. 
Before I give you my reasons for saying this, I should mention one important 
scholar who disagrees with me. It is Martin M. Tweedale, in his Abailard on 
Universals (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1976)—on reserve in the main library. 
On p. 208 of that book, Tweedale takes Abelard to hold that universal terms do 
signify the status. I find no text to support this claim, and indeed I think the whole 
business about painting pictures of general lions goes against this interpretation. 
But there is one passage in particular (p. 45, para. (112)) where I think Abelard 
definitely — although perhaps obliquely — rejects it. At p. 45, para. (110), 
Abelard asks whether a universal term signifies the form to which the 
understanding is directed. And in the context, he is talking about the intentional 
object, not the mental image. And he goes on to say yes, this view is “confirmed 
both by authority and by reason.” 
Note that he’s talking about the intentional object. What we want to know now is 
whether or not this is the same as the status. 
Note also the pairing of authority and reason in this paragraph: that the universal 
term signifies the intentional object, he says, is “confirmed both by authority and 
by reason.” This pairing will become a regular theme in later authors. Be aware of 
it, because it goes a long way toward disabusing us of the common but facile view 
that medieval philosophers had an overly slavish respect for authority. They did 
appeal to authorities, no doubt about it; they did it all the time. But they almost 
always paired that appeal with a matching appeal to philosophical reason, as here. 
The “authority” he cites in this case is one Priscian. Priscian was an important 
Latin grammarian from around 500 AD. In a rather obscure passage quoted by 
Abelard in para. (111), Priscian seems to suggest, Abelard says, that the Divine 
Ideas — that is, God’s concepts — are concepts of the stat¨s of things. 
It’s easy to make a case for this, since the metaphysical structure of creatures is 
supposed to be patterned after the divine ideas. This suggests that the ideas are 
ideas of the stat¨s, which do enter into the metaphysical structure of things, rather 
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than of metaphysically impossible universals, which do not. Otherwise, it’s hard 
to see how the Ideas could be patterns at all. 
Just how we get from this to the conclusion Abelard draws, that the universal 
thought object is what universal terms signify, is not very clear. But in any case, 
Abelard seems to accept that conclusion: it is confirmed, he says, “by reason.” 
What he doesn’t accept — and here I think Tweedale misinterprets the passage — 
is the suggestion that this signified intentional object is the status. 
That’s fine for God, Abelard says, but not for us (p. 45, para. (112)). The objects 
of his universal ideas are the stat¨s of things; but not the objects of ours — 
because we cannot form an image or concept of the status. We have no way to 
picture accurately what it is to be a man. That is because, Abelard says, the status 
cannot be sensed; it is not a sensible quality. We have no perceptual access to it, 
and therefore do not know how to picture it — we “men,” he says, “who know 
only through the senses” (p. 43, para. (113)). Note this claim well. It is quite an 
unusual claim for its time, when the prevailing tradition was the Platonic/
Augustinian tradition of “illumination,” a tradition that tended to downplay the 
importance of the senses in acquiring knowledge. Abelard here sounds 
surprisingly Aristotelian, given that he didn’t have any more of the Aristotelian 
texts available to him than did the earlier medievals. I have no idea where he is 
getting this claim. 
At any event, the only features we know about things — say, about human beings 
— are their sensible qualities, so that the picture we make up for ourselves when 
we hear the term ‘man’ must be constructed out of those ingredients. (Note that 
quality is one of the standard Aristotelian categories, so that sensible qualities are 
things.) 
God’s knowledge, however, is not confined to what can be sensed, so that God 
can picture the stat¨s of things. The connection between thought and reality is 
much closer for God’s thought than it can ever be for our own. 
Very well, but what does all this mean for the connection between our thought 
and reality in the final analysis? How is it supposed to work? 
Well, the status provides an objective non-arbitrary grounding for the imposition 
of terms. The term ‘man’ is “imposed” to name all men because they are men, 
because they agree in being men. They share a common status. It as, recall, the 
“common cause” of the imposition of terms. 
The term cannot signify that status, however — at least not to us — because we 
cannot picture it. But we do the best we can, and form a kind of monstrous image 
of no one man in particular, but of an impossible man in general. This image is 
serviceable; it might, for instance, guide us in knowing what to count as a “man,” 
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since it is after all equally a representation of every man and of nothing quite so 
much as a man. It can serve that function. But it is too indefinite and 
indeterminate to be an exact image of any possible reality. And there is where the 
old realists made their mistake. 
Before we turn to an evaluation of this theory, let us look briefly at the end of 
Abelard’s discussion. From para. (125) to para. (142), pp. 47–51, there is a further 
discussion of abstraction, taken from Boethius’s Commentary on Porphyry. Then 
Abelard turns to answer the four questions he raised at the beginning of the 
passage. (Recall how Abelard added a fourth question to Porphyry’s traditional 
threee.) This discussion occupies the rest of the passage, from para. (143) to the 
end. 
(1) With respect to Porphyry’s first question, whether genera 
and species subsist, Abelard glosses this as: Do the words 
— general and specific words — signify something real, or 
are they purely mental, that is, do they not signify 
something real? Abelard’s answer: Both. They signify in a 
loose sense, by nomination — that is, they name or are 
truly predicable of — real things. But those real things are 
individual things, not universal ones. On the other hand, in 
the other sense of ‘signify’, the strict sense (what the terms 
make us think of), they signify nothing real, but only a 
fictive intentional object. That fiction nevertheless is not 
exactly empty, for the reason explained in his discussion of 
abstraction. 
(2) As for Porphyry’s second question, are genera and species 
corporeal or incorporeal, Abelard glosses this as: Do they 
(the general and specific words) signify corporeal things or 
incorporeal  things. And again Abelard’s answer is: Both. 
And once again, he trades on the two senses of 
signification. Loosely and by nomination, they do signify 
corporeal things; in the strict since they do not, but only 
signify fictions. (Note: He seems to be implicitly confining 
himself to general terms for material things here.) 
(3) With respect to Porphyry’s third question, are genera and 
species in sensible things or separated from them, Abelard 
glosses this as: Do genera and species words signify things 
in sensible things or do they not? And once again, as you 
no doubt have come to expect by now, his answer is: Both. 
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By nomination, they signify or name things in sensibles. 
(Presumably, once again, this is supposed to hold only for 
terms involving material objects. Abelard doesn’t seem to 
be thinking of any other kind here.) For instance, 
‘humanity’ signifies (names) the humanities in Socrates 
and Plato. But more strictly, such terms signify the 
common intentional objects, those impossible things that 
are not really in a sensible object (or anywhere else) but are 
only fictions. 
(4) Finally, what about Abelard’s own, fourth question: Can 
universals continue to exist without any singulars? Again, 
he parses this: Can universal terms continue to signify as 
they do even if there are no singulars that fall under the 
universal, no individuals for such terms to be predicated 
of? Again, his answer is, once more: Both. They obviously 
cannot signify then by nomination, but just as obviously 
they can continue to signify in the strict sense; they can 
signify the common intentional object. 
The distinction between nomination and signification in the strict sense is 
therefore the main vehicle for Abelard’s answering the four questions that frame 
his discussion. But don’t be fooled. As we’ve seen, there’s a lot more than that 
going on in this passage. 
 
Now, let us pause to evaluate this theory. It is subtle and deep, no doubt, but I 
think it just won’t work — at least not insofar as I understand it. What, after all, 
leads us to form exactly the image we do when we hear the word ‘man’ — an 
image of an impossible man in general, but an image that is nevertheless equally 
if not exactly a representation of just exactly those individuals who share in the 
status of man? 
What a coincidence! Isn’t it odd that the fit should be so exact? It seems that this 
must be an extraordinary coincidence unless we are led to do this by somehow 
getting in touch with the status. The status must guide us. But how can that be? 
On Abelard’s own account, we cannot sense the status and so cannot form any 
concept or picture of it. 
It looks as though we can have no inkling at all of the status of things. And if that 
is so, then while the status may very well be out there, it can be of no 
epistemological use to us whatever — and the whole project breaks down. 
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It is extremely instructive, I think, to reflect on why the project breaks down. It is 
because, on Abelard’s own account of human knowledge, he provides no way in 
which we can be led by the status in forming the images or concepts we do. There 
is no way to do this for him because we cannot sense the status, and so have no 
way to get in touch with it. 
But doesn’t this confirm — or at least illustrate — a point I made earlier (right 
before we began talking about Abelard), that the epistemological difficulties of 
nominalism only arise if one assumes a kind of empiricist epistemology. Not 
necessarily an empiricism that relies on sensation, as it does with Abelard, but an 
empiricism at least in the sense that our knowledge of x must ultimately be 
derived from x itself, not from something else. 
If Abelard had not had such an epistemological theory — and as I said earlier, 
such a theory was a bit odd in Abelard’s day — and if he had adopted instead 
something like the traditional Augustinian theory of illumination, which might 
very well put us in touch with the stat¨s of things, since after all God’s 
knowledge is of the stat¨s of things, and presumably he could impart that 
knowledge to us in illumination — then it seems to me his theory would have 
worked out better. Or alternatively, Abelard could have allowed us to have an 
empirical knowledge of the stat¨s of things, just as God has. 
Either way would do: We could form correct universal concepts of individual 
external objects by coming into empirical (not necessarily sensory) contact with 
their common stat¨s. Or else we might adopt a theory of illumination, or some 
other theory, to allow us to have a non-empirical knowledge of the status of 
things, on the basis of which we can form correct concepts of individual external 
objects. 
But by insisting on the epistemological theory he did — a theory that requires us 
to get our knowledge of objects empirically and then forbids us from having any 
empirical knowledge of the stat¨s of things — Abelard appears to condemn his 
own doctrine to failure. 
 
Now let’s come up for some air. We’ve looked at two main figures so far, along 
with several other people. We’ve looked at: Boethius and Abelard. They are 
roughly 600 years apart, and in a sense stand at opposite poles on the problem of 
universals. 
The majority of texts in Boethius seem to point in the direction of a so called 
“moderate realism,” a theory that is nominalist with respect to the existence of 
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universals (there aren’t any), but then tries to save knowledge by an appeal to a 
theory of abstraction. The attempt fails, I have argued. The basic metaphor behind 
the Boethian view appears to be the “seal-ring” picture that goes back to Plato’s 
Timaeus. 
There are other passages in Boethius that might be read in a more realist way, and 
at least one passage in his Second Commentary on the De interpretatione that 
pretty clearly has to be read that way. (See pp. 43–44 of the Notes and Texts.) But 
on the whole, the seal-ring picture, with its distinction between “forms” and 
“images,” and with both matter and accidents playing important roles in the 
construction of individuals — that is the predominant Boethian theory. 
Abelard, on the other hand — at least in the passage we have read — is a more 
complicated story. If we judge Abelard from the point of view of the 
metaphysical notion of a universal that we got from Boethius’s Second 
Commentary on Porphyry, he is an out and out realist. Universals are what he 
calls the stat¨s of things. They are present as a whole, simultaneously, and in a 
metaphysically “intimate,” constitutive way, to several things. 
On the other hand, curiously, Abelard’s realism does not save his epistemology. 
His insistence, on the one hand, that human beings get all their knowledge from 
the senses, combined on the other hand with the view that we do not have any 
sensory contact with the stat¨s of things, prevents those stat¨s from playing any 
epistemological role, and therefore prevents Abelard from reaping the 
epistemological benefits of his realism. 
On the other hand, if we judge Abelard by his own definition of a universal as 
what is “predicated of many” — a definition that goes back to Aristotle and can 
be found in Boethius as well — Abelard turns out to be a nominalist. There are no 
universal entities predicated of many; only words are. 
 
We are now about ready to plunge into the later Middle Ages, with all its 
refinements and complications that come with the recovery of the texts of 
Aristotle, and the translation of the great Islamic philosophers, especially 
Avicenna (on this point — others were more important on other philosophical 
questions). 
As we shall see, one of the themes that will keep coming up again and again in 
our future discussions is the notion of unity and identity. We have already seen 
this to some extent in Boethius, who began his argument against universals with 
the observation that being and unity were convertible, and then argued that since 
universals were supposed to be shared by a plurality of things at once, that 
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plurality of things would somehow infect the universal itself and make it a 
plurality too — with the result that, since it could not be one, it could not be at all. 
We followed Boethius’s discussion a long way, but we never found a fully 
satisfactory explanation of this move—the “contagion” theory of plurality, that 
the plurality of things to which a universal is supposed to be common somehow 
infects the universal itself and makes it plural too. We did make some progress a 
while back when we talked about Plato’s Parmenides, with its claim that if the 
Forms were shared in the way Socrates was suggesting in that dialogue, they 
would be “separated from themselves,” which at least sounds like a violation of 
some kind of logical principle of identity 
Let’s look at the question again now. Only this time, let us not look at it from the 
point of view of the texts of Boethius, or the texts of anyone else in particular. 
Let’s just look at the problem in the abstract for a moment. 
What I am about to give you is a discussion that is intended to serve two functions 
at once: (a) it will help to fill in the missing step in Boethius’s argument, and (b) 
it will serve to sharpen our sensibilities to questions of unity and identity that will 
be coming up in what follows. 
The argument I am about to give you has been called “Spade’s salt shaker 
argument,” since I first came up with it at a dinner-table conversation with some 
students the first time I taught this course, and I used salt and pepper shakers to 
illustrate my point. 
Step (1): Let us begin by considering once again the notion of an aggregate whole 
or aggregate unity. This is the same as the notion of a “mereological whole” I 
discussed earlier, in connection with Joseclin of Soissons’ “collection”-theory of 
universals. I am here calling them “aggregates” only because I think the phrase 
“aggregate unity” sounds a little more like English than “mereological unity” 
does. But nothing rests on the terminology. 
If you are familiar with Nelson Goodman you will perhaps recognize that what I 
am talking about is in effect included in what Goodman is talking about in his so 
called “Calculus of Individuals” — as, for example, in his The Structure of 
Appearance. Goodman uses the term ‘individual’ in a much broader sense than I 
am going to want to do, so once again I prefer to call these things “aggregates” or 
“aggregate wholes” or “aggregate unities” rather than “individuals,” as Goodman 
does. The term ‘aggregate’ is meant to be relatively theory-neutral here, at least to 
begin with. 
For example, consider this pile of stuff on the table. There is a perfectly good 
sense — although a sense that we might not be able to articulate very fully at first 
— in which it is one object, one thing; it is one pile. 
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Or, consider a somewhat odder example. Consider the one object consisting of 
my wrist-watch, your grandmother and the planet Mars. That too is a perfectly 
good object, a perfectly good “individual” in Goodman’s sense of the word — it’s 
what I want to call an “aggregate.” 
Basically, the notion of an “aggregate” I am trying to focus on here is the notion 
of a pile or heap, with the added possibility that the things in the pile or heap 
don’t have to be close together or in contact with one another. 
That last clause is what allows us to have so called “scattered individuals,” such 
as the “Goodman-style” individual consisting of my wrist-watch, your 
grandmother and the planet Mars. It’s a possibility Goodman emphasizes 
strongly, but you may want to play it down — or perhaps even reject it. Nothing I 
am about to say rests on whether or not the components of an “aggregate” can be 
widely separated in space, or for that matter in time. 
This notion of an “aggregate,” or a “Goodman-style individual” in the broad 
sense, is not some new or recent notion that would be only an anachronism in our 
discussion of the Middle Ages. We’ve already seen something very much like it 
in Joscelin of Soissons. And it is not unreasonable to find it, or something 
recognizably akin to it, in Aristotle: See, for instance, Metaphysics V.6, and 
Metaphysics X.1. In both passages, Aristotle is describing various kinds of 
“unity.” His notion of what I want to call an “aggregate unity” seems to require 
physical contact or “continuity” among all the parts, but I said that doesn’t matter 
for our purposes. 
I remind you also of a point I emphasized when I was talking about Joscelin of 
Soissons: mereological wholes, or what I am now calling “aggregates,” are not 
sets. 
Now I am not really concerned with the details of mereology, or “aggregate 
theory,” or Goodman’s “Calculus of Individuals.” All I want you to understand 
for now is that there is this notion of a kind of compound, aggregated object, and 
that we are not talking about sets. 
All right, that’s Step (1), to introduce this notion of an aggregate object. 
Step (2) is now to contrast this with the notion of what I want to call an 
individual. NOT merely an individual in Goodman’s sense — because I said he 
used that term very broadly. (In fact, “individuals” in Goodman’s sense include 
what we have just been calling an aggregate.) Rather, what I now want to call an 
individual is an “individual” in a different and somehow “stronger” sense of the 
word. 
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I am not now in a position to analyze exactly what the difference is between the 
notion of an aggregate and the notion of an “individual,” in the sense in which I 
now want to use the term. But I can say enough, even now, to show you that there 
is a distinction to be drawn here. 
For example, consider yourself — as a biological and psychological unity. Think 
of your various parts — your physical parts, first of all: your foot and your head, 
and so on. Then also your various metaphysical ingredients: your qualities and 
features and characteristics, your size and shape, and weight, and color, and so on. 
Also the mental side of you (whatever your theory of the mind is): your thoughts 
and memories, and so on. 
Isn’t there an obvious sense — which of course does not necessarily mean a sense 
that we analyze adequately just now — an obvious sense in which all those parts 
and features and characteristics and ingredients go together in you? Aren’t they 
all somehow unified in the one object that is you? 
I think we would all say yes. And, even without yet being in a position to say just 
what that sense is, we can see that it is plainly somehow different from the sense 
in which the pile on the table is unified. You are not just a “pile of parts.”  
Or, if you don’t like that example, consider a more theoretical argument. Unless 
you’re prepared to countenance an infinite regress and say there is nothing that is 
not an aggregate of more basic ingredients (it’s aggregates “all the way down”), 
you must allow for something that is one — can be counted — but is not an 
aggregate of more basic parts. 
So we have then two notions: 
(a) the notion of an aggregate whole, with its relatively 
weak and loose kind of unity. (Any old things can be 
regarded as making up an “aggregate.”)  
(b) the notion of an individual — not necessarily a 
“Goodman individual” but a “real” full-blooded individual, 
with its relatively stronger and stricter — or in any case, 
different — kind of unity. (Not just any old things can be 
regarded as making up a robust “individual” in this sense.) 
Note that it’s not really important for now how you rank these different kinds of 
unity. I’ve called sense (b) the “stronger” and “stricter,” the more “robust” sense. 
But it doesn’t matter for now. 
Now, Step (3): Let’s notice an important characteristic of aggregates. 
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Consider three bricks: A, B, and C. And let’s put them one on top of the other, so 
that we don’t have to worry about their being widely separated in space, as 
Goodman allows (but does not of course require). 
 
Now consider the object consisting of bricks A and B, and the distinct object 
consisting of bricks B and C. Both of these are perfectly good aggregates; there’s 
nothing wrong with them at all. 
But notice: Brick B is in both aggregates, in both AB and BC. And for that matter, 
it is also in the larger aggregate ABC. 
This is an important feature of aggregates: things can be constituents of several 
aggregates at once. That is, distinct aggregates can have some of their constituents 
in common; they can “share” them, so to speak. There is nothing funny or 
especially problematic about that. 
Finally — and here’s the punch — Step (4): Suppose you are a realist, so that you 
believe in universals that are common to or shared by several things at once. 
Then, a question for you: What is the difference between the way in which your 
universals are common to or shared by several individuals at once and the way in 
which brick B is common to or shared by the aggregates AB, BC, and ABC? 
There must be a difference, or else the two cases in effect collapse into one, and 
there will be no relevant difference between individuals and mere aggregates. 
Individuals would turn out to be mere aggregates of individuals. (Note: Not 
Joscelin’s theory, where universals are aggregates of individuals, but just the 
opposite.) 
But we all agreed that there is such a difference, back in Step (2). Individuals, we 
said, were somehow unified in a stronger, or at any rate different sense than mere 
aggregates are. 
We were not then in a position to analyze exactly what the difference between 
those two senses was. But initially we agreed that there is such a difference that 
we hoped would continue to be there after analyzing and clarifying these notions. 
A
B
C
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If, as a result of our analysis and theory, there is no longer any distinction 
between individuals and mere aggregates, then we have lost something we 
initially wanted to keep. 
On the other hand, you realists, if there is a difference between the way in which 
universals are common to their several individuals and the way in which brick B 
is common to the aggregates AB, BC, and ABC, then you tell me what it is. 
Don’t resort to a metaphor, now! Tell me what it is! Don’t tell me that the relation 
between universals and individuals is a primitive notion that cannot be further 
explained, but is in any case different from what we have in the case of 
aggregates. That’s not a theory; it’s an admission that you have nothing 
enlightening to say on the point, combined with a request that we nevertheless 
overlook that failing and believe you anyway. 
By contrast, the nominalist, who does not have any universals to account for, can 
quite straightforwardly state the difference between individuals and aggregates 
that we said back in Step (2) was a distinction we wanted to preserve. Individuals 
are such that their constituents cannot at the same time be constituents of other 
individuals, whereas aggregates are such that their constituents can at the same 
time be constituents of other aggregates. Full stop, end of paragraph. 
Or, to put it formally: 
Let sentences of the form CP(α,x) be read “α is a constitutive part 
of x.” 
Then where x and y are individuals, we have 
CP(α,x) & CP(α,y) ↔ x = y. 
But where x and y are aggregates, that does not generally hold. 
And there we have a quite clear distinction the nominalist can draw. 
Some things to note here: 
(1) The task here is not to distinguish individuals from 
universals — recall Abelard’s frequent objection that his 
opponents’ theories blurred this distinction. Rather here the 
task is to to distinguish individuals from aggregates. 
(2) Why can’t the realist explain the difference between 
individuals and aggregates the same way the nominalist 
can? Because in addition to all the entities the nominalist 
has in his ontology, the realist also has universals, which 
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are metaphysical constituents of many individuals, thereby 
violating the way the nominalist characterizes individuals. 
(3) Does this mean the realist is in effect committed to the 
infinite regress I mentioned a moment ago (“aggregates all 
the way down”), that the realist really can’t have “robust” 
individuals in the ontology without just postulating them by 
fiat and being utterly unable to say what counts as an 
individual? 
The reply to that is: it depends. The realist might very well have entities that fit 
the nominalist’s characterization of an individual. That is, the realist too can have 
entities that do not share metaphysical constituents with anything else. But they 
will be the most general universals — either the ten categories, or the universal 
being (which might be a universal, after all, even if it can’t be a genus), but not 
what the nominalist was treating as individuals. 
In short, you won’t be an individual any more, although being (or perhaps the 
category “substance”) will be. You, on the other hand, will be simply an 
aggregate of universals. 
Nominalists therefore can very well have individuals as well as aggregates of 
individuals. Realists, on the other hand, can very well have universals as well as 
aggregates of universals. The problem is to have all three, individuals, aggregates 
and universals, and to be able to say what the differences are among all three. 
What we have as a result of all these considerations might be regarded as a 
metaphysical argument in favor of nominalism and against realism. But by now 
we ought to realize that issues are not so clear-cut as that. What we really have, it 
seems to me, is an illustration — and in fact the clearest and strongest illustration 
I know of — of the metaphysical difficulties of realism. Realism tends to — 
threatens to — destroy our notion of an individual, to dissolve individuals and 
turn them into mere aggregates — aggregates of universals. 
That may be a consequence you are willing to live with, a price you are willing to 
pay. But it is not something we were willing to accept to begin with. To begin 
with, we said there was a distinction there that we would like to preserve. I’m not 
just a “pile” of metaphysical parts. The realist may therefore have to pay a real 
price that the nominalist does not have to pay. 
The only alternative is for the realist to come up with some explanation of the 
distinction, an explanation that does not, as soon as you press the point, 
degenerate into hand-waving and metaphor. 
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If you think about it, there is nothing whatever that is new about the set-up I’ve 
just given you. As early as Boethius, we saw that realism runs into difficulties 
over the question of unity, even though Boethius himself never succeeded in 
spelling those difficulties out very fully. How can a universal be shared by many 
individuals at once in a way that keeps them individuals? 
As early as Plato’s Parmenides, we saw the question of how universals were 
related to their individuals, and the question was left hanging. (Recall that unlike 
the Forms in the “seal-ring” passage in the Timaeus, the Forms in the Parmenides 
appear to be thought of as really universal — that is, they do enter into the 
structure of individuals, in a way in which they do not on the “seal-ring” 
metaphor.) 
And even today, the question for realists is: How do you explain instantiation, 
exemplification, participation, or whatever you call the relation between 
universals and their particulars? 
The considerations I have just given you amount to setting up the problem in as 
sharp a way as I know how. 
What we have seen then is a question that focuses on matters involving unity, the 
notion of an individual, and so on. These notions will be crucial in what follows 
— that is, in the later Middle Ages. Let us turn to that now. 
 
The Later Middle Ages 
With this we are going to have to abandon a strictly chronological approach, and 
begin to skip around a bit. We will be approaching things now more from a 
topical point of view. And while we are treating a certain topic, certain people 
will be discussed. When we turn to another topic, some of those same people may 
be discussed again, but others will now enter into the picture. And so on. 
We begin with Thomas Aquinas on the principle of individuation. Then we will 
turn the clock back to Avicenna to discuss the notion of so called “common 
natures.” 
Reading Assignment: Aquinas, On Being and Essence. There will 
be a lot in this that will be irrelevant to our present concerns, but 
read it all anyway. It’s not very long. 
Aquinas lived from 1224 or 1225 to 1274. (He was probably not quite 50 years 
old when he died.) He was an Italian by birth, and by vocation a member of the 
Dominican order of Friars. The Dominicans were just getting started at that time, 
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and so Aquinas, getting in so to speak at the ground level, soon acquired the 
status of the more or less “official” philosopher and theologian of the order. 
Although he traveled around a fair amount, most of his academic writing was 
done at the University of Paris. 
On Being and Essence (= De ente et essentia) was one of Aquinas’s earliest 
treatises, written sometime before March of 1256 — that is, when was 31 or 32 
years of age. One of the main influences on Aquinas in this work was the great 
Islamic philosopher Avicenna, who lived 980–1037, and whom we will be 
meeting again later at much greater length. 
To begin with, let us go back to our by now famous “seal-ring” theory, as for 
instance we found it in Boethius, with the distinction in his De trinitate between 
forms and images. And recall also the so called binarium famosissimum, the 
“most famous pair” — that pair of twin doctrines that always seemed to be found 
together in the Middle Ages: (a) the doctrine of universal hylomorphism and (b) 
the doctrine of plurality of forms. I discussed this pair of doctrines in the Warp 
and Woof handout. If you’re not familiar with it, please go back and get familiar 
with it. 
The pair of doctrines in the binarium is nicely represented in the “seal-ring” 
picture, as I discussed in that handout. (The binarium is perhaps not entailed by 
the “seal-ring” picture, but they are certainly quite comfortable with one another.) 
 
Now let’s look at history for a moment. After the time of Abelard and his 
immediate successors in the mid-12th century, the problem of universals basically 
“died out” for a while. That is, people didn’t discuss it — or, if they did, it was 
only in a perfunctory way, without any really original and new contributions. The 
fact is, people seemed to be interested in other things in the late-12th and the first 
part of the 13th centuries. 
This was the time of the “translations.” All of a sudden, and for reasons that might 
make an interesting study, people started translating lots and lots of works into 
Latin. These included translations directly from the Greek, and also from Arabic 
(and to a lesser extent from Hebrew). Much of this work was done in Moorish 
(that is, Islamic) Spain, where the Latin and Arabic worlds met. These 
translations, through Spain and elsewhere, included works of medicine, 
mathematics, exotica from the East brought back as a result of the Crusades, and 
so on. And they included also a lot of philosophical works, including basically all 
the remaining works of Aristotle, as well as new translations of the Categories 
and De interpretatione, which they already had from Boethius. It also included 
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the works of the great Muslim philosophers, including (but by no means limited 
to) Avicenna, whom we have already mentioned, and Averroes. Averroes was one 
of the all-time great commentators on Aristotle. He lived in Spain from 1126–
1198 (and so was a quite recent figure as far as Thomas Aquinas was concerned). 
His commentaries were so good that the Latin came to call him simply “the 
Commentator.” So when you see “as the Commentator says,” they are talking 
about Averroes. (There is one exception: The Nicomachean Ethics, for whom the 
“Commentator” was one Eustratius of Nicaea.) 
Perhaps it was because people were too busy trying to assimilate all this new 
material to try to say anything new and original on their own. But, for whatever 
reason, the problem of universals — and all the correlative problems that go with 
it — were in “eclipse” from roughly 1150 to roughly 1225. (These are very rough 
dates.) And of course, when people did begin to think about these issues again, 
the old traditional doctrines, including the “seal-ring” doctrine, were still live and 
available options — although they were often now reformulated in more rigorous, 
precise and technical ways. 
In particular, the “seal-ring” picture, perhaps in a refined and more sophisticated 
form, came to be viewed as a good-old, familiar, conservative, and therefore 
“safe” theory. It was one that people felt comfortable with. It was not the only 
theory to be viewed this way, but it was one of them. And a lot of people held it in 
Aquinas’s day — particularly among the Franciscan order. 
And Aquinas rejected it. Or at least he rejected it in its most common and familiar 
interpretations. 
Along with the “seal-ring” picture, Aquinas also rejected the twin doctrines of the 
binarium famosissimum that the picture represented so well. 
For present purposes, I’m not so concerned with the doctrine of plurality of forms 
in the sense discussed in the Warp and Woof handout. I want to concentrate 
instead on the other half of the binarium, the doctrine of universal hylomorphism. 
The theory of universal hylomorphism makes two claims that I want to 
distinguish for present purposes. Both are illustrated clearly by the “seal-ring” 
picture. They are: 
(1) Everything except God is a composite of matter and form. 
(MENTION THE NOTION OF “SPIRITUAL MATTER.”) Or in the 
terminology of Boethius’s De trinitate, everything except 
God is an image of a Form or divine idea in matter. (Let’s 
not worry for now about whether this means that matter 
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itself is a composite of matter and form. Matter is going to 
be funny on any theory.) 
Claim (1) is pretty much definitive. That is, it is the claim that constitutes the 
theory of universal hylomorphism. In other words, on this theory all creatures are 
material. 
(2) Again, provided only that you don’t worry too much about 
what to say about matter: Only God is entirely simple. 
Everything else is composed of distinct ingredients, which 
for the hylomorphists are matter and form. 
Claim (2) doesn’t exactly follow from (1), since there might be other kinds of 
“composition” besides a composition of matter and form, and God might turn out 
to be composite in those other ways. But the hylomorphists typically held (2) as 
well as (1), and implicitly held that composition is always a case of matter and 
form, a determinable factor and a determining factor. Recall the “seal-ring” 
picture once again. The wax is indeterminate, and by itself has no particular shape 
at all. The ring determines the wax to take on the particular shape it does. 
Recall also how we found William of Champeaux, in his first theory (the 
“material essence/advening forms” realist theory, not his later “seal ring” 
nominalism), talking about how higher genera were “material” with respect to the 
differences that divided them, which differences played the role of “forms.” And 
recall how, even in Porphyry and Boethius, we saw that the genus is — if perhaps 
only metaphorically — like matter with respect to the differences, which played 
the role of “forms.” 
Now Aquinas rejects universal hylomorphism, and so denies (1). But he accepts 
(2); only God is absolutely simple. He accepts this for other reasons, which we’ll 
look at in a bit. Since he accepts (2), it follows that all creatures are composites. 
Thus, since he also rejects (1), it follows that for Aquinas there must be some 
other kind of composition besides the composition of matter and form. 
Note: When we say that God is absolutely simple for Aquinas (and for everyone 
else), we do not mean to rule out the doctrine of the Trinity, according to which 
there are three really distinct persons who are all identical with the one absolutely 
simple God. How you sort all that out is a theological question that is certainly 
relevant to this course, but I don’t want to try to get into it. 
Aquinas’s reason for rejecting (1) is given in On Being and Essence, Chap. 4, § 2, 
pp. 52–53. I’ll just refer you to it here; if you want to go into it in more detail, you 
should look at this handout, from “The Course in the Box,” Vol. I, Chap. 56 
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(particular near the beginning). Otherwise, the passage will probably be 
unintelligible to you. (DISTRIBUTE HANDOUT “SOME MAIN THEMES IN AQUINAS.”) 
For Aquinas, we said, there must be some other kind of composition besides the 
composition of matter and form. That is one kind of composition, all right. But 
there is a more basic one. Aquinas says that, for everything except God, there is a 
composition of the things’ essence with its existence. 
‘Existence’ here translates the Latin infinitive ‘esse’ — literally, ‘to be’. So 
Aquinas is talking literally about the composition of a thing’s essence with its to 
be. This sounds less odd in Latin than it does in English, because in Latin the 
infinitive functions also as the nominative of the gerund, as I mentioned with I 
was talking about Abelard’s theory of status. (We sometimes do this in English 
too, as in ‘To run is to move’.) For this reason, the word is sometimes translated 
into English as ‘being’. This is OK, but I prefer not to translate it this way, 
because it is easily confused with ‘being’ in the participial rather than the 
gerundial sense. The two are not distinguished in English. What we want for now 
is “being” not in the sense of a being, but rather in the sense of what a being does: 
the act of being. To avoid this potential confusion, I refer to translate ‘esse’ as 
“existence.” 
The composition of essence and existence or essence and the act of being is 
absolutely crucial to Aquinas’s whole philosophy and theology. How it works is a 
long story. But here is a first rough map of the territory: 
For Aquinas, the things that exist can be divided into three classifications: 
(a) Material creatures. These have an essence, and that essence 
is a composition of prime matter and substantial form, in 
the sense distinguished in the Warp and Woof handout. But 
in addition, there is a second composition in them, a 
composition between the essence as a whole, including 
both the matter and the form, and the esse or the thing’s act 
of existing. 
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(b) Spiritual creatures. These include the angels (what the 
medievals called the “intelligences,” which term never 
means human cognitive powers in medieval usage), and 
human souls. They too have an essence and an act of 
existence, an esse. So there is that composition present in 
them. But, unlike material creatures, the essence of spiritual 
creatures does not involve a composition of prime matter 
and substantial form. The essence is purely a substantial 
form — and that’s all. There is no matter involved. That is 
why we have a spiritual creature, after all, and not a 
material one. 
 
 (c) God. God, we said, is absolutely simple. Not only do we 
not have a composition of matter and form in God, we do 
not even have the composition of essence + esse. Yet God 
certainly exists (let us take this for granted here — Aquinas 
of course has some arguments for this); there is an act of 
existing involved. Hence, we must conclude that this is all 
that is involved. God is nothing but a pure act of existing, a 
pure esse, “ipsum esse subsistens” = ”subsistent being 
itself.” 
 
If you want, of course, you can say that God has no essence on this picture. 
Alternatively, you might say that he does have an essence and that it is identical 
with his esse, his existence. In part, this is purely a terminological point, provided 
you are clear that God does not have an essence in any way distinct from his 
existence. 
Now of course all this raises a whole host of pressing questions, and if this were a 
course on Aquinas exclusively, I would go into as many of them as possible. In 
this course, however, I will only be able to look at a few of them. 
 
 
Esse 
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First, just what kind of distinction are we talking about between a thing’s essence 
and its existence (except in the case of God, of course). 
Well, this was a question that many people in Aquinas’s own day found hard to 
answer, and some of them simply rejected Aquinas’s version of the distinction. 
On this, you may want to look at John Wippel’s book on Godfrey of Fontaines 
(see the handout on “Reserves”). He discusses many of these people. Don’t be 
misled by the fact that you may never have heard of Godfrey; the book is very 
illuminating about lots of people. 
Modern commentators too have found it hard to say clearly exactly what is going 
on here with this “distinction.” 
On the one hand, the distinction has to be a real distinction, in the sense that it 
can’t just be a sort of artificial distinction the mind cooks up on its own without 
any corresponding ontological division out there in the object. If it weren’t a 
“real” distinction in this sense, then the composition of existence and essence 
would not be a real composition, but only a kind of manner of speaking. And if 
the composition were only a manner of speaking in this way, then there would 
seem to be no real basis in the end for distinguishing God from creatures on this 
theory (or least God from spiritual creatures). And that, of course, is in effect a 
reductio. The distinction must be “real,” and not merely a fabrication of the mind. 
But when it comes to just exactly what kind of real distinction this is, the 
literature is filled mainly with confusion. Much of the problem arises, I think, 
from interpreting Aquinas here in the light of later medieval theories of 
distinction that we will find, for example, in John Duns Scotus and William of 
Ockham. For the later people, the criterion of a real distinction always involved 
some kind of separability. Not separability in space, necessarily, but separability 
in the sense that if two things are really distinct, then at least one of them can 
exist even if the other one doesn’t. 
This was a fairly standard criterion of “real distinction” after Aquinas, and to 
some extent before, but plainly it cannot be what is involved here. Essence and 
existence are not separable in creatures in this way. If a thing’s essence could 
exist without the thing’s existence, then why on earth would you need the thing’s 
existence in the first place? And conversely, you can’t have the existence of the 
thing all by itself, without having the thing itself, including its essence. Plainly 
this is not what Aquinas has in mind. 
Some scholars, therefore, have pointed out that in people like Scotus there is not 
only the notion of a real distinction in the fairly strong sense I just described (in 
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terms of separability), but also another kind of distinction that is real in the sense 
of not being a mere fabrication of the mind — it corresponds to some ontological 
distinction out there in reality — and yet is not a “real” distinction in the sense 
that involves anything as strong as separability. This was what Scotus called the 
formal distinction, and it is very important. We will look at it later. 
Aquinas himself sometimes speaks of a distinction that some scholars have 
regarded as a kind of prototype of Scotus’s “formal distinction.” This is what 
Aquinas calls a distinction of reason with a foundation in reality. That is a very 
slick notion, and we may look at it too later. But in any case, most scholars are 
pretty much agreed, I think, that Aquinas’s distinction between existence and 
essence is not to be interpreted as this last kind of distinction. 
So the secondary literature is a mess on this topic. 
I have my own suggestion to make here. And, while I am by no means a specialist 
on Aquinas, nevertheless I think it’s right. 
The main thing is not to look at the problem in terms of the later history of the 
theory of distinctions, but rather to think of it in terms of the notion of efficient 
causality. 
You recall that Aristotle distinguished four kinds of causality: The material and 
formal causes were simply the matter and form of a thing. The final cause was the 
goal or purpose for which it was produced. But the efficient cause, as it came to 
be called, was the cause that produced the thing. 
Now Aquinas explicitly tells us (Summa theologiae, I, q. 3, a. 7) that: 
Every composite thing has an efficient cause, for realities of 
themselves diverse cannot unite to constitute one single thing save 
by some cause binding them together. (Gilby translation.) 
There are other passages like this; it is not an unusual passage in any sense. 
The idea then is that things that are really distinct don’t just happen to be found 
together. Something has to put them together. This is an important and 
substantive philosophical claim. It’s not by any means automatic. It deserves a lot 
of thought. Indeed, I suspect that, although it isn’t talked about very much, it’s 
perhaps as deeply engrained in the Philosophical Tradition as the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason is. 
In fact, I think this is pretty much the whole notion of “efficient cause” for 
Aquinas. The efficient cause is the “putting together” cause, the “com-posing” 
cause — the “ef-ficient” = “making out of” cause. 
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Some corollaries: 
(1) This is why, incidentally, God has to be absolutely simple. If he 
weren’t, then he couldn’t be the uncaused cause at the head of the 
causal chain. He would be composite, and so dependent on a prior 
efficient cause. 
(2) It is also why everything other than God — that is, every creature 
— is composite. If it weren’t, it would not need an efficient cause. 
It wouldn’t need an efficient cause — that is, a cause to com-pose 
it, because it would not be com-posed; it would not be com-posite. 
It would not need an efficient cause, and in fact could not have 
one; there would be nothing for an efficient cause to do. Things 
other than God, therefore, would not have to be created; they could 
exist without being created, which of course is not what we want. 
Part of the doctrine of creation is that everything besides God is 
created by God. 
Thus, God is absolutely simple, and everything else is in some way composite. It 
follows from the doctrine of creation plus the notion of what efficient causality is. 
(This fulfills my earlier promise to explain to you why Aquinas accepted the 
claim that only God is absolutely simple, even though he rejected the 
hylomorphists’ reasons for saying so.) 
So we have this link-up between the notion of efficient causality and the notion of 
composition. We can use this link-up in two ways: 
(1) We can take the notion of a “composite” as relatively clear, and use it then as 
a kind of “primitive” notion to explicate the notion of efficient causality. That is a 
very attractive thing to do, because in a sense efficient causality has always been 
the most mysterious of the four kinds of causality. Just what does an efficient 
cause do? To say that the efficient cause is the “putting together” cause seems to 
be a real step forward in our understanding of this mysterious notion. 
(2) But I propose to take advantage of this link-up here to go just the other 
direction. In the present instance, the murkier and more obscure notion seems to 
be the notion of composition: what is this “real composition” of “really distinct” 
existence and essence for Aquinas? That’s our problem right now. 
And we can now answer that problem in terms of efficient causality. In other 
words, I suggest that for present purposes we take the notion of efficient causality 
as our starting point — explaining it as best we can in some other way — and use 
it to explicate the notion of real distinction and the real composition of essence 
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and existence in all creatures. To say they are “really distinct,” then, is just to say 
it takes an efficient cause to make the essence exist. 
Here is an example. It is perhaps a little labored, but I hope it will make the point. 
The example is of the form “just as ...., so too .....” And please note that the two 
parts are formulated in exactly parallel ways. (That’s the whole point of the 
example.) Here we go: 
Take, for example, buttered bread. Now it required an efficient 
cause to butter the bread. That is, to make the bread be buttered. 
This means, since efficient causes are just “putting together” 
causes, that something must have put the butter on the bread, and 
that therefore the butter and the bread are distinct and got put 
together. To say they are really distinct and that there is a real 
composition here is just to say that it really took an efficient cause 
to butter the bread. (Of course, in this example, the butter and the 
bread are also really distinct in the stronger sense that they can 
exist separately in the way I described earlier. But that doesn’t 
affect the point.) 
So too — and this is the point — here is a created individual. That 
individual is an existing essence (compare “buttered bread”). Now 
the individual, we said, was created, which is to say it required an 
efficient cause to make the essence exist (compare “to make the 
bread be buttered”). This means, since efficient causes are just 
“putting together” causes, that something must have combined the 
essence and the existence of this individual, and that they are 
therefore distinct. To say that they are really distinct and that there 
is a real composition of essence and existence here is just to say 
that it really took an efficient cause to make that essence exist, 
to bring it about that the individual was really created. 
And, if I am right, that is all it means for Aquinas. 
Notice the way I just put this: I said the individual was just an existing essence. 
Now you may wonder about that. After all, essence is supposed to be what is 
given by a real definition, as we learned as long ago as Porphyry. And real 
definitions were always given in terms of genus + difference, which yielded 
species. So essence, it appears, stops at the level of species. It stops at the level of 
the species in the sense that Socrates and Plato must in some sense have the same 
essence. (Just what sense that is remains to be seen.) But if that is the case, then 
when that essence exists, how can we say that the existing essence is this 
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individual, Socrates (say), any more than that individual, Plato? In short, how can 
I say that an individual is just an existing essence? 
Nevertheless, I do say it. And so, in effect, does Aquinas. Essence stops at the 
level of the species, but an existing essence is an individual. This suggests that 
existence is going to have a very important role to play in Aquinas’s theory of 
individuation. And it does. 
 
But before we get into that, let’s say a little more about Aquinas’s claim that 
existence and essence are really distinct, and about how we are to think about this 
funny ontological factor called existence. 
Aquinas was by no means the first to draw a distinction between existence and 
essence. Avicenna, for instance, in the eleventh century, had already appealed to 
such a distinction in his ontology. And, in the early thirteenth century, one 
William of Auvergne — a very interesting author whom we won’t be able to say 
very much about (he later became Archbishop of Paris) — picked up on 
Avicenna’s distinction and made it an important part of his own philosophy. For 
both Avicenna and William, however, the existence of a thing was viewed as a 
kind of accident that its essence may or may not take on. For these authors, this 
was simply another way of saying that creatures are contingent things and do not 
have to exist. 
Aquinas doesn’t approach the matter this way. Avicenna and William, by calling 
the existence of a thing an accident, betray the fact that they are thinking in terms 
of forms. The existence of a thing is clearly not its matter (especially not in the 
case of an immaterial thing), and if there is a real distinction between essence and 
existence, then the existence of a thing cannot be its substantial form either. (The 
kind of distinction these people had in mind is not the distinction between whole 
and part, but rather the distinction between two components of a joint product.) 
As long as we are thinking only in terms of matter and form, it appears then that 
the only thing left for existence to be is an accidental form. 
But Aquinas says no. For him, accidents are ontologically dependent and 
derivative; they are ontological parasites that get all their reality from the 
substance of which they are the accidents. But the existence of a thing is what 
gives it reality, not the other way around. So existence cannot be an accident of a 
thing. It follows, therefore, that existence is not a form at all. 
And with that move, Aquinas has introduced a whole new ingredient into the 
philosophical scheme of things, in addition to matter and the various kinds of 
forms in the traditional ontologies (substantial forms and accidental forms). 
Existence is something entirely different. 
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Let’s look briefly at one of the consequences of this move: 
If you think back to the Aristotelian theory of knowledge that I mentioned briefly 
when we were talking about Boethius (see also the handout on “The Greek 
Background”) — the theory according to which the knower takes on the form of 
the known through a process that involves, first of all, sensation and then a kind 
of abstraction that results in a concept — you will see that, on such a theory, form 
is what we grasp in concepts. Form is what gets “impressed” on the intellect, with 
the result that we are “informed,” and acquire “information.” Hence, if the 
existence or esse of a thing is not a form, we can have no concept of it. We have 
no concept at all of a thing’s existence. 
But that certainly sounds odd. If we have no concept of it, then what have we 
been talking about? Well, we have to explain carefully what we mean: 
We have no concept of a thing’s esse that is a concept acquired by acquaintance. 
That is, we have no simple concept of existence, got by abstracting it from things 
we have observed, after the fashion of Aristotle’s theory of abstraction. If we did, 
then the esse of a thing would have to be a form after all. 
But to say we have no simple concept of a thing’s esse, acquired by acquaintance, 
is not to say we cannot construct a complex concept that describes existence 
accurately. After all, prime matter is not a form either, and yet we can still talk 
about it intelligibly, and even conceive it after a fashion, as “that which underlies 
forms in changeable substances, and makes them changeable,” or something like 
that. So too, we can construct a complex concept that describes existence as 
“what makes a being a being,” or something like that. (‘Being’ there is taken 
participially in both occurrences.) This is what Boethius was talking about as 
“composition.” 
In short, we can form a kind of mental job description of a thing’s esse, just as we 
can of matter, even though in neither case do we have any direct cognitive 
acquaintance with what fills that job description. 
The fact remains, then, that we have no real understanding of esse, in the 
Aristotelian sense of “understanding,” no “intellection,” acquired by experience. 
We never really get at a thing’s esse by way of concepts. Rather, it is in judging 
that we get at a thing’s esse. And indeed, without going too far in the direction of 
a “picture theory of language” of the naive kind we saw in Fridugisus, we can 
nevertheless say that the copula of a subject/predicate judgment, just as it joins 
the parts of the judgment together, so too it reflects or mirrors the composition in 
the thing itself. 
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This is a complicated parallel that some commentators have tried to make much 
of, although Aquinas himself doesn’t seem ever to develop the point very 
thoroughly — or at least not in any text I am familiar with. 
 
With these preliminaries, let us now turn to Aquinas’s theory of individuation. 
We’ve already seen that there is reason to think the notion of esse will play a role 
here. Let’s look more carefully. 
Recall the distinctions we drew when we were discussing the problem of 
individuation in Boethius’s Theological Tractates. At that time, I said we can 
distinguish at least three different questions under the general heading ‘problem 
of individuation’: 
(a) What is it that makes something an individual, rather than a genus 
or species? This is what we earlier called the “principle of 
individuality.” 
(b) What is it that makes an individual the individual it is? We earlier 
called this the “principle of identification.” 
(c) What is it that distinguishes this individual from that one? This we 
called the “principle of differentiation.” 
Be warned: These are my terms, not Aquinas’s or any other medieval author’s 
that I know of. 
 
Ready? Here we go: 
In Aquinas’s doctrine, a thing’s esse is its principle of 
identification. That is, it answers question (b): What is it that 
makes an individual the individual it is? 
What makes Socrates to be Socrates is just his own act of existing, which is 
unique and private to him. What makes Plato to be Plato is likewise just his own 
act of existing, which is just as unique and private to him. (There are questions 
and problems here, but just be patient. This is only a “first pass” over a very 
complex and nuanced doctrine.) 
So when it comes to counting individuals, and you want to know “How many 
individuals do we have here?,” the answer is that you have as many individuals as 
you have acts of existing. In a given material individual, for example, the matter 
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does not have its own act of existing, substantial form another, and perhaps the 
accidental forms yet other acts of existing. No, there is one act of existing that 
actualizes the whole thing, and therefore we have one individual. 
(This, incidentally, is Aquinas’s answer to the question I raised some time back, 
when I discussed Goodman’s “calculus of individuals” and the problems realists 
have distinguishing the unity of a real individual from the unity a mere heap or 
aggregate has. Aquinas’s answer is that a real individual has one esse, while a 
heap will have several — one for each individual in the heap. So Aquinas has a 
ready answer to that challenge. Of course, we still have to see to what extent, if 
any, he is a realist.) 
Let me give you a particularly striking consequence of the thesis that esse is the 
principle of identification, a consequence that will drive the point home 
forcefully: 
Consider Socrates the man. He is a substance, and in particular, he is a rational, 
sensate, organic, corporeal substance (according to the Porphyrian tree), so that 
his essence involves the presence of matter. Now consider Socrates’s soul. It too 
is a substance, since it is capable of existing in its own right, and in fact does so 
exist after Socrates dies; souls are immortal for Aquinas. (Incidentally, Aquinas 
saved some of his very best work — and Aquinas at his best is pretty impressive 
— for his arguments for the immortality of the soul. But I am not going to go into 
them now. 
When the soul continues to exist in this way after death, it of course does not have 
matter and is not in matter. (That is, it does not have any matter of its own, as a 
kind of internal component, and it is not attached to matter any longer either, to 
yield some third thing as a kind of product. Socrates’s soul is entirely separated 
from matter; he is dead, after all.) 
Thus, while the essence of Socrates the man requires matter, we just said, the 
essence of his soul does not. They are different essences. 
Nevertheless, Aquinas says — and here comes the punch — even though there 
are different essences involved, the soul that continues on after the death of 
Socrates is the same individual as Socrates the man was when he was alive. It is 
the same individual because it is the same act of existing. If it were not the same 
act of existing, and so not the same individual, there would be no personal 
immortality. The soul that survived death would not be the same person who died, 
so that it would make little sense to reward or punish it. So too, it would make no 
sense to pray to the saints, since the souls hovering around up there would not be 
the same people who lived such holy lives down here in this vale of tears. The 
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soul that survives is thus the same individual, but not the same substance, as 
existed down here in this life. 
Once again, there are lots of doubts and questions about this. But, once again, I’m 
just going to skip over them here. 
So esse or existence is the principle of identification. Socrates’s existence makes 
him Socrates, and Plato’s existence makes him Plato. And, as I said, the number 
of individuals you have is ultimately a question of how many acts of existing you 
have. 
 
But, you may well ask, how do you distinguish acts of existing? What is it that 
makes Socrates’s act of existing distinct from Plato’s act of existing, so that they 
are two? Well, for Aquinas, this amounts to asking: How do you distinguish 
Socrates from Plato? And this brings us to the principle of differentiation, the 
answer to question (c) above. 
Now, before we go any further, let’s make sure we know exactly what problem 
question (c) raises, so that we’ll know exactly what kind of principle of 
differentiation we are looking for. 
We are not here concerned with the general question what makes one thing 
distinct from another. We are concerned only with the more particular question 
what makes one individual distinct from another. 
The term ‘individual’ in this context doesn’t just mean any old thing that might be 
counted as “one” entry in some kind of list or other. (After all, we can talk about 
“one pile of things.”) It means an “individual” in the sense of the Porphyrian tree 
— that is, an “individual” as contrasted with a genus or a species. Thus, to talk 
about “an individual species” or “an individual genus” is just sloppy terminology; 
what we should say instead is “one species” or “one genus.” 
Remember also that the structure of the Porphyrian tree is supposed to apply 
equally well to all ten Aristotelian categories, so that we can talk about 
“individual” accidents as well as “individual” substances. For example, Socrates’s 
whiteness as distinct from Plato’s whiteness, even if their skin-colors are of 
exactly the same shade and hue. 
(If you ask: “Does this talk of ‘individual accidents’ mean that the Porphyrian tree 
is incompatible with the “Boethian Layer-Cake Ontology” we discussed in 
connection with the De trinitate?,” the answer is: It looks that way. On the 
Boethian Layer-Cake Ontology, accidents were universals, and individuals were 
built up only as the intersections of several such universals, including universal 
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accidents. The Porphyrian tree is by no means an ontologically neutral picture. 
And, although everyone accepted it, it turns out to be harder to fit into some 
theories than into others.) 
Now individual accidents are going to turn out to be differentiated from one 
another, for Aquinas, by the individual substances to which they belong. That is, 
the differentiation of accidents is parasitic on the differentiation of substances. So 
our basic question is going to be about the principle of differentiation for 
individual substances. 
Now my reason for stressing this is that we are not concerned here with the 
question what makes one substantial form, for instance, distinct from another, or 
what makes a quantity distinct from a quality. We are not concerned with what 
makes the ten categories distinct from one another. And we are not concerned 
with what makes esse distinct from essence. We saw earlier that for Aquinas the 
distinction between esse and essence amounted to saying merely that creatures 
were causally dependent on an efficient cause. We’re not concerned with any of 
that right now. 
For Aquinas, there simply is no principle of differentiation in those cases, and 
there doesn’t have to be. There is nothing that distinguishes all those things from 
one another. They are just distinct all by themselves. They just “come that way.” 
As I argued earlier, any ontological theory that allows for plurality in the world is 
going to have to grant at some point that certain things are just distinct all by 
themselves, and require no “principle of differentiation” to keep them distinct. If 
this were not so, then every time you introduced a new entity to distinguish one 
thing from another, you would be forced to introduce yet further entities to 
distinguish your new one from all the others. This will result either in an infinite 
regress that never gives us the promised explanation for the distinctions among 
things, but rather keeps putting off that explanation to the next step. (That may be 
a result you are willing to accept, I suppose.) Or else your theory will end up 
trying to hide its embarrassment in a cloud of metaphor, of the sort that we’re all 
too familiar with from reading — well, reading bad philosophy! 
Perhaps there is some subtle philosophical theory that gets around all this. But I 
do not think so, and even if there is, it is certainly not a theory that was 
maintained by anyone we are studying in this course. So I will not argue the point 
any further. 
We are concerned — to return to the point — only with the principle of 
differentiation for individual substances. 
At this point, you might well ask: Well, why not just say that they don’t have or 
need any principle of differentiation either, that they too just come that way? 
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Some authors in fact said just that. For instance, William of Ockham, who was a 
fairly strict nominalist. 
But Aquinas doesn’t do that. He thinks we do have a principle of differentiation 
for individual substances — and based on that, a kind of corollary principle of 
differentiation for individual accidents too, I suppose. But the latter point will 
pretty much take care of itself automatically once we differentiate individual 
substances. 
So, when we get right down to it, what we are asking about in the end is the 
principle of differentiation for individual substances only. 
After all that, here we go: 
For Aquinas, the principle of differentiation in this sense is form. And it works 
like this: 
Individual A is distinct from individual B if and only if the one has 
some form the other one doesn’t have. 
Write that down, and write it down exactly the way I put it: “the one has some 
form the other one doesn’t have.” Don’t say: “they have different forms,” or 
something like that. That is not the same thing. If A and B had to have different 
forms in order to be distinct, then God — who has no forms at all, but is a pure 
act of existing, “ipsum esse subsistens” — would not be distinct from created 
individuals. And that, of course, would be pantheism in a fairly strict sense of the 
term. In order to accommodate the case of God, therefore, we say not that A and 
B have different forms, but that one has some form the other one doesn’t have. 
All creatures have essences that consist perhaps of prime matter in part, but in any 
case of a substantial form at least. So any creature will have a form that God 
doesn’t have, and therefore be distinct from God. 
With that technicality out of the way, let us consider now how individual created 
substances are differentiated from one another. And here we must divide the 
question into subcases: 
(1) If created individual substances A and B are not in the same 
species, then their substantial forms will differentiate them. Since 
they are not in the same species, they will have different kinds of 
essences, and therefore different kinds of substantial forms, and 
nothing more need be said. We don’t need to ask how the 
substantial forms are different; they are structurally different from 
the very outset — they just “come that way.” 
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Note that this holds no matter what kind of creaturely substances A and B are, 
provided only that they are in different species. If they are both material 
substances, then — since matter is just matter, and does not distinguish the one 
from the other — it can only be their substantial forms that put them in different 
species. Likewise, if A and B are both immaterial substances, then there is no 
matter to enter into the picture at all, and once again it can only be their 
substantial forms that put them into different species. Again, if the one is a 
material substance and the other an immaterial substance, the material substance 
will have a substantial form that can be joined to matter, while the immaterial one 
will have a substantial form that cannot. These will obviously have to be distinct 
forms. There is perhaps a complication in the case of human souls, since they can 
be combined with matter when the human being is alive, and yet exist apart from 
matter after death. But, since human beings are the only things that have this 
special kind of substantial form, the point continues to hold. If A, say, is a human 
being and B belongs to a different species, then either B will be a material 
substance the substantial form of which cannot exist apart from matter, or else it 
will be an immaterial substance the substantial form of which cannot exist in 
matter. In either case, this will have to be a distinct substantial form from A’s, 
which can do both. Q. E. D. 
Thus, in the case where A and B belong to distinct species, it is the fact that their 
substantial forms are two different kinds of substantial forms that allows you to 
have two acts of existence and therefore two individuals. 
(2) But if the created individual substances A and B are in the same 
species, then things are different. In that case, of course, A and B 
have the same essence, and so the same substantial form. (Note: 
What kind of realism does this commit Aquinas to? We’ll talk 
about that later.) On the general principle then that forms are what 
differentiate individuals, we must conclude that it is the accidental 
forms that differentiate individuals within the same species, since 
their substantial form is the same. 
We have to be very careful now. 
First of all, notice: Once again, we see the theory of differentiation by accidents 
that we saw as early as Porphyry and Boethius’s De trinitate “Layer Cake” 
theory, and saw again in William of Champeaux’ first theory. 
But note also the following differences: 
(a) In Boethius’s “Layer Cake” theory, although he was not fully 
explicit about it, it appeared to be the case that accidents not only 
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differentiated individuals from one another; they also were what 
made an individual the individual it is. In other words, for 
Boethius, it appeared that the unique combination of accidents an 
individual has not only serves as its principle of differentiation, but 
also as its principle of identification, in the sense in which we 
distinguished those two notions a while ago. 
There was a problem about this, as we saw: It made substances dependent on 
accidents rather than the other way around, as it is supposed to be. This was an 
objection we ourselves raised against Boethius, and Abelard raised it again 
against William of Champeaux. 
But Aquinas avoids this problem. For him, accidents differentiate, but they do not 
identify. The principle of identification for Aquinas is esse, not accidents. 
Accidents do not have that dual role for Aquinas. In short, while any creature is 
presumably going to have accidents, and while if any two creatures are in the 
same species their accidents will differentiate them from one another, 
nevertheless their accidents are not what makes those creatures the individuals 
they are; their esse’s do that. 
For example: As long as there are at least two human beings in existence, they are 
going to have to be distinguished from one another by some accidents or other. 
Since their essence is the same, it is only their accidents that allow you to have 
two acts of existing here, and so two individuals. But if all other human beings 
are destroyed, and there is only one human being remaining, that human being is 
going to be the individual it is no matter what accidents it has. Its identification, 
its identity, does not depend on accidents, although its differentiation from other 
individuals in the same species does. 
(b) There is another difference between Aquinas’s theory and 
Boethius’s. In Boethius’s De trinitate perhaps — although not in 
the passages we looked at from his Second Commentary on the De 
interpretatione and the shorter passage from his Second 
Commentary on Porphyry in the Notes and Texts — the theory 
seemed to be that all accidents were involved in the differentiation 
of individuals, with the result that accidental change turned out to 
be impossible. All change was substantial change. At the time, we 
ourselves raised that as an objection to Boethius. 
Aquinas, of course, is going to have none of that. As a good Aristotelian, he is 
going to be especially conscious of differences between accidental and substantial 
change (recall the Warp and Woof handout), and want to preserve that distinction. 
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So, for him, not all the accidents of a thing are relevant to differentiating it from 
other things in the same species. 
The story is complicated, but in the end Aquinas thinks the only accidents that are 
involved are accidents that require matter. We will look at the role of matter in a 
moment. But, for the present, note that this gives us an important “theorem”: 
Wherever there is a plurality of individuals in the same species, 
they are all material. 
As an immediate corollary of that “theorem” and the fact that Aquinas rejected 
the doctrine of universal hylomorphism — and in particular the theory that angels 
have a kind of “matter” too, a kind of “spiritual matter” — we get: 
Angels come only one to a species. 
Each angel exhausts a species, so that two angels are not only numerically distinct 
but distinct in kind. The archangels Gabriel and Michael, for instance, are as 
unlike one another as a lizard is from a dog. This was a characteristic Thomist 
thesis, one that came to be especially associated with him. 
For immaterial substances, therefore, the distinction between species and 
individuals in effect collapses. You can say either that each angelic species has 
only one individual in it (“angels come only one to a species”), or that each angel 
is itself a species. There may be some small considerations that make the one 
locution preferable to the other for certain purposes, but at this level it’s basically 
all the same. 
 
So, to summarize: 
(1) What is the principle of differentiation? There are two cases: 
(a) The principle of interspecific differentiation is substantial 
form. 
(b) The principle of intraspecific differentiation is a 
combination of accidents, and in particular, accidents that 
require matter. (For that reason, you might alternatively 
want to say the principle of intraspecific differentiation is 
matter. But that is not an especially good way to put it, 
since all the individuals in such a species will have matter. 
We’ll talk about matter in a moment.) 
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(2) What is the principle of identification? Answer: esse. 
(3) What is the principle of individuality — that is, what makes something an 
individual? Well, to some extent that depends on how you interpret the 
question. You might say it is the having of an esse, since that is true of all 
individuals, and of nothing else. Or you might say it is matter, in the sense 
that it is only in the case of material things that we have individuals as 
distinct from species. You can decide for yourselves which of these you 
want to award the title “the principle of individuality.” As long as you are 
clear what is involved, the label doesn’t matter. 
 
 
Now let’s talk about matter. 
Why do you suppose Aquinas thought that whenever you have several individuals 
in the same species, they must be material individuals? 
Well, I’m not sure I know the answer to that completely. But let’s go back and 
consider Boethius’s De trinitate, a passage we looked at once before, where 
Boethius talks about the role of place in differentiation (Notes and Texts, pp. 51–
52, lines 83–88): 
For three men are distinguished not by genus or species, but by 
their accidents. If by the mind we separate all their accidents from 
them, nevertheless place is diverse for each of them, and we can in 
no way suppose that it is one. For two bodies will not occupy one 
place, which is an accident. And therefore they are several in 
number, because they are made several by their accidents. 
In short, for bodies at any rate (that is, material substances), diversity of place 
seems to be a necessary and sufficient condition for differentiating substances. 
Aquinas seems to be thinking along roughly these lines too. 
What makes Socrates distinct from Plato? It can’t be their substantial forms, 
because they have the same substantial form. On the other hand, IN ONE 
SENSE we have to say it isn’t accidental forms either. That is, we don’t want to 
think we are distinguishing here between one combination of the essence with a 
certain group of accidents and another combination of the same essence with a 
certain other group of accidents. 
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Now you may say: “Wait a minute! I thought that’s just what we were saying. 
Socrates and Plato differ in virtue of their accidents.” Well, that’s true: Accidents 
do the differentiating, but they have no part in the story of what it is we are 
differentiating here. 
That would be to revert to the Boethian picture, and to give accidents not only a 
role in differentiating but also a role in identifying. That is, accidents may very 
well be part of the story of how Socrates gets to be differentiated from Plato, but 
they are no part of WHAT we are differentiating. Accidents are not for Aquinas 
what makes Socrates Socrates and what makes Plato Plato, even though they are 
what enables Socrates to be distinct from Plato, so that we can have both of them 
at the same time. 
So what we are distinguishing here is not the essence plus certain accidents from 
the essence plus certain other accidents. What we are distinguishing is one 
occurrence of the essence (forget about the  accidents) from another occurrence of 
the essence (forget about the accidents). Accidents are required in order for that to 
happen, but they are not part of what we are distinguishing.  
In short, the essence, the very same essence, must be somehow repeatable. 
How can that happen? Well, Aquinas seems to be thinking that this can only 
happen if the essence is repeated in distinct places. I don’t know of any very clear 
argument he gives for that  conclusion, but that seems to be the idea. 
It follows, therefore, that the only species that can have more than one individual 
in them are those that involve place — location. Now, in the Aristotelian 
tradition, things that occupy a place are bodies — that is, material objects. 
Therefore, the only species that can have more than one individual in them are 
species of material things. 
This is why Aquinas sometimes talks as though the principle of intraspecific 
differentiation were matter. (We will see such a passage in a moment.) 
Matter is required, as we have seen. It is a condition sine qua non. But, although 
you have to have it, it doesn’t really do anything to differentiate one individual 
from another within the same species. It’s the accidents that presuppose matter 
that do all the work. 
Indeed, if you think about it, it’s easy to see that matter by itself couldn’t 
differentiate one individual from another within a species. All the individuals in 
that species will have matter — so that won’t serve to differentiate them. 
And if you say, “Oh, it’s not just the having of matter by itself that differentiates 
one individual from another, it’s having this matter as opposed to having that 
matter” — now you aren’t talking about plain old matter any more. Now you’re 
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talking about matter that has already been divided up into this glob and that glob 
— that is, matter that has been spread out in space, and that occupies dimensions, 
which of course are accidents in the category of quantity. 
This is what Aquinas is talking about when he talks about designated matter or 
signate matter.  It’s complicated business, and I have a handout on it (DISTRIBUTE 
“AQUINAS ON DESIGNATED (SIGNATE) MATTER.”) It’s ASSIGNED. 
But now I want to move on to a new topic — and a new set of people. 
 
Common Natures 
In effect, this is just the problem of universals in Arab dress. As we shall see, the 
Arabs — and in particular Avicenna — provide a nice introduction to the problem 
of universals in the form it took in the later Middle Ages. 
Reading Assignment:  
On this topic, the best single secondary source available is: 
Joseph Owens, “Common Nature: A Point of Comparison between Thomistic and 
Scotistic Metaphysics,” Mediaeval Studies 19 (1957), pp. 1–14. A PDF copy may 
be found in the “Articles (Bibliography)” subfolder of our “Resources” page on 
Oncourse. 
Notes and Texts, “Five Passages from Avicenna on Common Nature” (pp. 73–74), 
which goes along with Owens’s paper. (This is just an English translation of 
passages Owens leaves in Latin in his own paper.) 
As the title of Owens’s paper suggests, he is writing mainly about Aquinas and 
Duns Scotus. But, as it turns out, both Aquinas and Duns Scotus have their point 
of origin in Avicenna. So we’ll begin there. 
 
Avicenna (980–1037) 
Let’s look first at Avicenna’s Logica (to use the title it was known by in Latin), 
where he is worried about the notion of predication. And let’s recall the way 
Abelard had set up the problem of universals. For him it was a question of “What 
is predicated of many?” If you say “things,” then you are a realist; if you say 
“only words,” then you are a nominalist. 
When the question is framed in this way, Avicenna is going to turn out to be a 
realist. But he will be a realist with a difference. It is going to be much more 
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subtle than the rather straightforward realism of William of Champeaux’s first 
theory, for example. Something new is happening with Avicenna. 
Look first at “Five Passages” in the Notes and Texts, passage (1), p. 73. There 
Avicenna says that animal is in itself a certain something, but in itself it is neither 
singular nor universal. (‘Singular’ here is just the same as ‘individual’. You say 
“singular” when you are speaking in an especially logical tone of voice rather 
than a metaphysical tone. That is, it is a piece of vocabulary that comes more 
from the medieval logical tradition than from the metaphysical tradition.) 
Now think about the consequences of what I just said: that for Avicenna, animal 
in itself is neither singular nor universal. Insofar as ‘singular’ and ‘universal’ are 
meant to be opposites here, this begins to sound like perhaps a violation of the 
Law of Excluded Middle. 
In fact, if you will recall back to my very first lecture in this course, I used a claim 
very much like this to construct an argument against realism. At that time I said 
that one objection against realism is that it violates the Law of Non-Contradiction 
insofar as it holds that animality — the very same animality — is both rational 
insofar as it is the animality of Socrates and non-rational insofar as it is the 
animality of Browny the Ass. Abelard, of course, raised exactly the same 
objection against William of Champeaux’s first theory of universals. 
I also said, you will recall, that you might try to avoid this objection by claiming 
that it’s not animality itself that is properly said to be rational or non-rational; it’s 
animals — that is, individual animals, Socrates and Plato and Browny. “The 
contradictory properties,” I said, “do not belong to one and the same animal 
nature, but rather to several and distinct individual animals, so that there is no 
violation of the Law of Non-Contradiction at all.” 
But, I replied, that won’t work. “Such a dodge may save you from violating the 
Law of Non-Contradiction. But, insofar as you have just committed yourself to 
saying that the one animal nature is neither rational nor non-rational, you now 
violate the Law of Excluded Middle.” 
At the time, I commented that this argument might strike you as fishy. Well, here 
it is again. Isn’t Avicenna in effect doing the same thing? Animal by itself, he 
says, is neither universal nor singular. Only he doesn’t view this as an objection. 
It’s his own view. 
How does it work? Well, let’s look first at his arguments, and then try to figure 
out how his claim can be maintained. 
Here is the argument in passage (1). Let’s just look at it first, and consider 
objections to it in a moment. 
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(a) Animal is not of itself universal. For if it were of itself 
universal, then it could never be predicated of singulars. 
Anything that is an animal would a fortiori be universal, 
insofar as animal is of itself universal. There could be no 
singular or individual animals. 
(b) On the other hand, animal is not of itself singular either. 
For if it were of itself singular, then it could not be 
predicated of many individuals. There would be only one 
animal. 
This is a puzzling argument — both parts of it — but the basic strategy is clear. 
The strategy is to argue that the facts of predication — the fact that animal is 
predicated of singulars, and that it is predicated of several of them — require that, 
all by itself, animal be neither singular nor universal. 
Passage (2) in the Notes and Texts then goes on to say that being singular or being 
universal are things that just happen to animal in itself — that is, they are 
accidents of animal in itself. (Latin accidit = ”happen.”) 
If we look at passage (3), we can perhaps get some clarification. This is a passage 
not from Avicenna’s Logica, but from a distinct work, his Metaphysics. And here 
he is talking not about animal but about horsehood (= equinitas = equinity). But 
the basic idea here seems to be the same as in the Logica, and I don’t think there 
is anything to be made out of the fact that he uses a concrete noun (‘animal’) in 
the one case and an abstract noun (‘horsehood’) in the other. So, for the sake of 
uniformity, let’s just put everything in terms of animal. 
The idea then in passage (3) seems to be this: 
Animal by itself has a certain definition. 
Qualification: We don’t want to take ‘definition’ in too strict a 
sense here. For the picture we are going to get is one we are also 
going to want to apply on up the Porphyrian tree, even at the level 
of substance — which is a category, and so does not have a strict 
definition in terms of genus + difference, because there is no 
higher genus. 
Instead, when Avicenna here talks about “definition,” I think we 
should read something like “intelligible content.” We can, after all, 
form a perfectly good concept of substance by the Aristotelian 
process of abstraction (which is the context we ought to be 
thinking of here). In that sense, we can “understand” substance, 
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there is a perfectly good “intelligible content” there, even though 
we cannot define substance in the strict terms of genus + 
difference. 
With that caveat, then, let’s go on. 
Animal by itself, we said, has a certain definition or intelligible content. Now, 
what is true of animal by itself appears from passage (1) to be just exactly what is 
included in its definition or intelligible content — and presumably also whatever 
else is entailed by what is so included. (We want some kind of logical closure 
here.) That is what it means to say that such and such is true of animal in itself. 
No more and no less. 
Generalizing, then, we can say that A in itself is B if and only if B 
is contained in or entailed by the definition or intelligible content 
of A. (Here ‘A’ and ‘B’ are to replaced by general terms — we’re 
talking about the problem of universals, after all.) 
In short, the idea is that A in itself is B if and only if the claim ‘A is B’ is an 
analytic truth. The notion of analyticity is a notoriously difficult one, but its clear 
enough for us to get a handle on what’s going on here. 
OK, well what is the definition or intelligible content of animal? Here we do have 
available a definition in the strict sense of the word, namely: sensate, animate, 
corporeal substance. And that’s all. There is nothing said here about this sensate, 
animate, corporeal substance. And there is nothing said here about sensate, 
animate, corporeal substance that is predicated of many. In short, neither 
singularity nor universality is brought into the picture at all, one way or the other. 
Animal by itself is just indeterminate with respect to all that. 
Now go back and think about Avicenna’s two-part argument in passage (1), the 
one that appeals to the “facts of predication.” In effect, what he is saying is that it 
is animal in the sense just described that is what is predicated. By itself, it 
includes neither singularity nor universality. Only such an indeterminate kind of 
thing, Avicenna argues, is capable of being predicated in all the required ways. 
It is this indeterminate kind of thing that came to be called a common nature. (The 
actual term ‘common nature’ is apparently not in Avicenna, although he is 
certainly the source and fountainhead of this kind of talk.) 
 
That’s passages (1)–(3). Now let’s pause to evaluate this, to head off two 
objections, and thereby perhaps to clarify what is going on here. 
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The first part of Avicenna’s argument, you might say, is fine — that is, the part 
about universality. If animal all by itself were universal, then according to the 
way we have just learned to interpret that locution, this would mean that 
universality would be somehow built into the very definition or notion of animal. 
Part of what it is to be an animal, then, would be to be universal. Hence, anything 
that animal could be predicated of, universality could be predicated of it too, so 
that animal could never be predicated of individuals. This follows from a general 
principle that Aristotle formulated way back in the Categories 3 1b10–11: 
When one thing is predicated of another, all that which is 
predicable of the predicate will be predicable also of the subject. 
In short, if animal were by itself universal, then ‘universal’ would have to be built 
into the very definition or notion of animal, and so could be truly predicated of 
animal, and therefore also truly predicable of anything of which animal was truly 
predicable, with the result that there could be no individual animals. And that’s 
why animal by itself is NOT universal. 
That much is fine. But (OBJECTION (1)) the other half of Avicenna’s argument, 
you may say, is just a fallacy. If animal by itself is singular or individual, it does 
not by any means follow that animal cannot be predicated of many individuals, as 
Avicenna says it does follow. All that really follows it that every one of the many 
individuals of which animal can be predicated will be a singular. And that’s 
hardly a problem — that’s true! 
In other words, if individuality or singularity is built into the definition or notion 
of animal then, on an analogy with the first half of the argument, all that follows 
is that anything of which animal can be truly predicated is an individual or 
singular. And that is hardly a problem; that’s exactly what we want! It just means 
that the only real animals are individual animals. 
So, while the first half of Avicenna’s argument may go through, his attempted 
reductio in the second half just fails. 
This is the first objection. It sounds persuasive at first, but in fact the situation is 
not so clear. 
The objection assumes that when Avicenna is talking about whether animal in 
itself is singular or individual, he means merely a singular, an individual. But the 
objection fails, and Avicenna’s argument works, if he means something stronger 
than that: being this individual — say, Socrates. 
This distinction, of course, corresponds to a distinction I have drawn several times 
already, between various senses of the phrase ‘principle of individuation’ — 
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among others, what makes something an individual, as opposed to what makes it 
the individual it is. 
If Avicenna is talking about being this individual — say, Socrates — then clearly 
his argument works. If being this individual, Socrates, is built into the very notion 
of animal, then animal cannot be truly predicated of anything but Socrates. 
And in fact I think this probably is what Avicenna had in mind, so that in that 
sense the second half of his argument works as well as the first half. 
But, you might still object, there is another sense of individuality or singularity, 
namely being AN individual, being A singular, and that in that sense there doesn’t 
appear to be any reason at all for saying that singularity or individuality is not 
built into the very notion of animal. After all, all animals are individual animals. 
But I think the objection still fails. That is, it turns out that, even if we keep clear 
about all the relevant distinctions, Avicenna still has an argument that neither 
being this individual — say, Socrates — nor even being AN individual can be 
built into the notion of animal. It’s not an argument Avicenna actually gives, but 
it’s certainly one that’s available to him. 
In other words, it’s nice to be clear about these distinctions. But the result is not 
that Avicenna’s position is weaker than he thought it was. It’s rather that his 
position is stronger than we may have thought it was. But we’ll have to wait a 
little to see how this goes. 
Before we get to that, let’s look at a second line of objection. This will lead us 
into the heart of Avicenna’s theory. 
Objection (2): Earlier, I said Avicenna is arguing that the facts of predication 
require that animal all by itself, with neither universality nor singularity built into 
it, is what is “predicated of many,” and that in fact only this kind of neutral 
common nature can be predicated of many. 
But how can that be? If it’s predicated of many, isn’t it a universal in the sense 
we’re talking about now, even though we just said it’s not? I thought Aristotle 
had defined the universal in the sense we’re now talking about as “what is 
predicated of many” (see De interpretatione, 7). 
So how about it, Avicenna? You have an argument that the common nature in 
itself is not universal, and so is not predicated of many. And yet you say it the 
common nature in that sense that is predicated of many. Which is it? Is the 
common nature universal or not? Make up your mind! 
Reply to Objection (2): Sure it’s universal — no doubt about it. But it is not 
universal by itself. In other words, its being predicable of many is not something 
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built into the definition of the nature, and it doesn’t follow from what is built into 
the definition either. But that doesn’t mean that animal, for instance, is not 
predicable of many; it just means that it is not in itself predicable of many. 
In order to understand this, we are going to have to look more closely. 
For Avicenna, common natures can be found in two kinds of cases: 
(a) In singular things — that is, in particulars. This singular 
animal is indeed “this sensate, animate, corporeal 
substance.” Singularity or individuality does belong to the 
common nature insofar as it exists in singular things. 
(b) In the soul — that is, in concepts. This, of course, is just 
the Aristotelian theory according to which the nature of the 
external object is taken on by the mind of the knower. And 
in concepts, the common nature is abstracted from all 
singularity, all individuating and differentiating conditions. 
As a concept, therefore, the common nature is indeed 
universal. 
Now the common nature by itself is neither singular nor universal. By itself it is 
just sensate, animate, corporeal substance, and whatever all that implies — but no 
more. The common nature animal, however, is singular — only not just in itself. 
That is something added on. It is singular in individual animals. Although animal 
all by itself does not include singularity, this animal does. 
Likewise, the common nature animal is universal — only not just in itself. That is 
something added on. It is universal in concepts. Although animal all by itself does 
not include or entail universality, the concept “animal” does. 
The common nature, therefore, is both singular and universal. And for that reason 
it cannot be in itself either one of these. If it were in itself one of these, that fact 
would prevent its ever being the other. So much for Objection (2). 
Important: Once again, the notion of the common nature’s in 
itself being such and such is basically the notion of something like 
analytic entailment. The phrase ‘in itself’ is thus doing duty for 
something like the expression ‘analytically’. 
Reply to Objection (1): We are now in a position to see what was wrong with the 
first objection, against the second half of Avicenna’s argument. The objection, 
you will recall, was in effect the observation that while animal in itself could not 
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be this singular or individual, there didn’t seems to be anything wrong with its 
being in itself an individual or singular. 
We now see what the problem with that is. If animal in itself were even an 
individual, then everything animal is predicated of would have to be an 
individual, with the result that animal could not exist in the mind in the form of an 
Aristotelian universal concept. The concept in the mind is not an individual. (It 
may be an individual concept, yes. But it’s not an individual animal, which is 
what we are talking about here.) 
In short, the real reason for the failure of that first objection is the fact that 
Avicenna accepts the Aristotelian theory that the knower takes on the form of the 
known. 
 
Now let’s move on. 
Look at passage (4) from Avicenna (p. 74 in Notes and Texts), and text (3a) on 
the handout Notes on Common Natures. (Text (3a) is a passage I for some reason 
neglected to include in the Notes and Texts. Note: I don’t seem to have this 
handout any longer!) 
According to these passages, the question of unity or multiplicity simply cannot 
be sensibly asked about the common nature taken by itself. Recall, on the view of 
William of Champeaux’s first theory and the view of Clarembald of Arras, the 
humanity of Socrates and the humanity of Plato are one humanity. On Boethius’s 
view in the Commentary on Porphyry, William of Champeaux’s second theory 
and Gilbert of Poitiers’ view, they are two humanities. 
In the present passages, Avicenna is saying that, if you ask about the humanity 
that is in Socrates — insofar as it is humanity, and not insofar as it is in Socrates 
— there is nothing to make it any different from Plato’s. There is nothing singular 
about it. But neither is there anything in the notion of humanity that says it is one 
in Socrates and Plato. There is nothing universal about it either, taken in itself. 
Hence the common nature in itself has no unity. This is not to say that it lacks 
unity, in the sense that it is a multiplicity or plurality. It doesn’t have multiplicity 
or plurality either. The question of unity or multiplicity simply doesn’t arise at 
that level. It arises when we talk about the common nature as existing either in 
singulars or in concepts. But then we are not talking about the common nature in 
itself any more. 
Nevertheless, look at passage (5) of the Avicenna texts in the Notes and Texts, p. 
74. Although common natures have no unity (or for that matter plurality) all by 
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themselves, they do have, he says, a kind of being even all by themselves. 
Although they exist only in individuals or in the mind, nevertheless they have 
some kind of being of their own. This is not the being of existence. That they do 
not have all by themselves. They only really exist insofar as they are in 
individuals, or alternatively, in the mind. 
Rather this being that belongs to the common nature all by itself is a kind of lesser 
being — what came to be called esse essentiae or the being of an essence. (This 
terminology is not Avicenna’s, but was used by later Scholastics who got the 
basic idea ultimately from Avicenna.) The idea is that the common nature is an 
entity in its own right. And while by itself animal is neither singular nor universal, 
it certainly is all by itself a different entity from the common nature stone, for 
instance. Each common nature has an integrity of its own, as a kind of 
metaphysical block — and that is what we call its lesser being. It has some 
“ontological status,” as it used to be fashionable to say; it is not absolutely 
nothing all by itself, even though it doesn’t exist all by itself, either in singulars or 
in the mind. 
So we have a curious state of affairs when we put all these passages together. 
Common natures have a kind of lesser being, but they have no unity at all. (This 
is not to say, of course, that they are multiple or plural.) All this, of course, is with 
respect to the common nature taken in itself. 
Now what do you suppose happened when you took this doctrine and injected it 
into Latin philosophy, which was by now thoroughly Augustinian, and very 
conscious of the Augustinian equation of being with unity that I talked about 
when we were discussing Boethius? (This was pretty much accepted even by 
those Latin philosophers who were not otherwise especially Augustinian in their 
outlook — like Abelard. It was a kind of metaphysical axiom.) 
Avicenna himself is not quite so clear about this equation of being and unity. In 
some places he seems to accept it, probably because it is to be found in Aristotle. 
But in the passages we are looking at now, he plainly does not accept it; here we 
have common natures that all by themselves have a kind of being but no unity 
whatever. 
Apparently the equation of being with unity was not an especially important 
matter for Avicenna, since he equivocates on it. But it was an important matter for 
the Latins. 
They could not tolerate Avicenna’s doctrine here just as it stood: a lesser being 
but no unity at all. For them, being and unity went hand in hand. Hence, they 
could go one of two ways: 
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(a) They could take seriously Avicenna’s denial of unity to 
common natures in themselves, and conclude that common natures 
have no being in themselves either, not even a lesser being, 
contrary to what Avicenna said. 
(b) Or they could take seriously Avicenna’s claim that 
common natures have a lesser being all by themselves, and 
conclude that therefore they have a lesser unity all by themselves 
too, despite Avicenna’s denial that they do. On this alternative, 
you would distinguish kinds or grades of unity to go with kinds or 
grades of being. 
According to Owens in his paper “Common Nature,” Aquinas took the first road, 
Duns Scotus the second. 
Hence: 
 Convertibility Degrees of 
Being 
Degrees of 
Unity 
Avicenna X OK X 
Aquinas OK X X 
Scotus OK OK OK 
 
 
Aquinas 
Let’s look at Aquinas first. I am first going to present the interpretation of 
Aquinas that Owens gives, because it represents what has come to be a more or 
less standard — or at any rate common — interpretation (although probably less 
common now than it was when I was in graduate school). I think there are serious 
difficulties with this interpretation as a philosophical theory, and although it may 
be perfectly correct that Aquinas held it, I do not think he did. In fact, I think the 
more likely interpretation of Aquinas ends up making him look a lot more like 
Scotus — so that both Aquinas and Scotus took alternative (b) above, and it turns 
out to be Ockham who took alternative (a). But I will tell you about all that later. 
For the moment, let’s just set out the “Owens interpretation.” 
For Aquinas, on Owens’s interpretation (I won’t bother adding that clause 
hereafter), the only kind of being a thing has is its act of existing, its esse or what 
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later would be called its esse existentiae. Aquinas has no room for Avicenna’s 
lesser being. 
In part, this is because of his theory of predication, Owens thinks. Aquinas does 
not think that true judgments in general correspond part by part with the world, in 
the simple minded way Fridugisus apparently did. But he does think this is so in 
some cases — for example, in the judgment ‘Socrates is a man’. Just as the 
predicate ‘man’ is there bound to the subject ‘Socrates’ by the copula ‘is’, so too 
the judgment so formed is true because in reality the common nature man is 
bound into the individual Socrates by an esse, an act of existence. If the common 
nature already had its own esse by itself, Aquinas thinks (according to Owens), 
then this would prevent that kind of composition. It would get in the way. 
Let’s look a bit more closely at Aquinas on common natures. This discussion can 
be turned into a partial commentary on the notion of form in the very obscure 
Chapters 2 and 3 of On Being and Essence — still following Owens’s 
interpretation. 
For the fuller account, see my paper “Degrees of Being, Degrees of Goodness: 
Aquinas on Levels of Reality.” 
Aquinas in Chap. 2, § 12, pp. 43–44 of On Being and Essence (see also p. 31, n. 
7) distinguishes what he calls the form of the part from the form of the whole. The 
form of the part is the same as the substantial form of a thing, without matter. 
(The omission of matter is what makes it partial; it is only part of the essence.) In 
man, for instance, the form of the part is the rational soul, which is the form of the 
body. 
The form of the whole, on the other hand, is the whole essence, including both the 
substantial form and prime matter. In the case of a man, the form of the whole is 
man or humanity. It is a bit perverse, perhaps, to call this a “form,” since it 
includes matter, but that is what Aquinas calls it. (See p. 2 of the handout 
“Common Natures.”) 
In an immaterial substance, of course, the distinction between the form of the part 
and the form of the whole vanishes. The substantial form just is the essence in 
that case. There is no matter involved. 
Henceforth, we are concerned only with the form of the whole, the entire essence, 
Avicenna’s common nature. I mentioned the form of the part only to set it aside. 
Now recall the distinction between abstraction with precision and abstraction 
without precision from our discussion of Boethius. 
The term ‘body’, we said, could be taken without precision, and in that 
sense we can say that Socrates is a body — a very special kind of body, to 
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be sure: an organic, rational, snub-nosed one, etc. But a body for all that. 
The term ‘body’ taken without precision doesn’t imply any of that extra 
stuff, but it doesn’t rule it out either; it’s just neutral about all that. 
Or we can take the term ‘body’ with precision. And this time we do rule 
out all that extra stuff. In thi sense, we can’t say Socrates is a body, but 
rather that Socrates has a body — plus all that other stuff (rationality, snub 
nose, etc.) added on separately, as extra. 
When Boethius was talking about “abstraction” (or “division,” as he sometimes 
called it), he was talking about abstraction without precision. 
Aquinas makes pretty much the same distinction. We can talk abut the essence of 
something taken with precision. (See (1) on the handout.) Typically (although not 
always, as we just saw with ‘body’, which example comes from Aquinas himself), 
Aquinas uses the abstract form of the noun to express this notion: ‘humanity’ 
rather than ‘human’, ‘animality’ rather than ‘animal’. This is what Aquinas calls 
the essence CONSIDERED AS A PART. (Note: This means we have the “form of the 
whole considered as a part.” Be careful with the terminology.)  
When we are talking this way, we are talking about what is contained in the 
definition of that essence (and what is entailed by that), but nothing more. 
Anything more has to be mentioned separately, as an add-on. Thus, Socrates is 
not a humanity; Socrates has a humanity, plus a snub nose, and bunch of other 
things. Therefore, humanity is a part of Socrates. 
Aquinas acknowledges that the essence can also be taken without precision, what 
he calls the essence (the “form of the whole”) “CONSIDERERD AS A WHOLE.” ((2) 
on the handout.) Here we use the concrete form the noun: ‘man” rather than 
‘humanity’, ‘animal’ rather than ‘animality’. In this case, the other ingredients of 
Socrates (or whatever we’re talking about) are not implied, but they’re not ruled 
out either. 
So far, this all looks fairly familiar. But Aquinas isn’t done yet. He goes on to say 
that the essence considered as a WHOLE in this way can be further considered 
absolutely or else insofar as it has being (esse) — either being in this or that 
individual, or else being in the mind as a concept. (Aquinas too accepts the 
Aristotelian theory that the mind take on the form or essence of the known.) 
Considered absolutely ((2a) on the handout), the essence without precision is 
sometimes (when it occurs in subject position) expressed by phrases like “animal 
as such” or “man qua man.” Whether we use a locution like that or not in any 
given case, we mean to include whatever is implied by the notion of the essence, 
to exclude (rule out) whatever is incompatible with that notion, and to be 
completely neutral about all the rest. 
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Considered insofar as it has being in this or that individual or in the mind as a 
concept, we mean to include all the rest — whatever is built into the individual, or 
whatever is built into the concept in the mind. (See (2bi) and (2bii) on the 
handout.) (It’s a little hard to see how the two forms of (2b) continue to be 
“abstracted” at all, with or without precision, but that’s what Aquinas says.) 
For Aquinas, (1) — the essence or “form of the whole” considered as a part — 
has no being. The term ‘humanity’, for instance, is simply a non-denoting term. It 
prescinds from — that is, excludes — everything that is not included in the notion 
of “man.” But that of course means it prescinds from or excludes esse, which is 
“included” only in the notion or essence of God. (Avicenna would of course say it 
prescinds only from the esse that is accidental to it, not from its own lesser being, 
but — on Owens’s interpretation — Aquinas is not buying any of that.) Since 
esse is positively excluded, of course humanity cannot exist. 
Humanity, then, does not exist for Aquinas. What does exist is the composite of 
humanity plus an esse. But that composite is not an existing humanity; it’s an 
existing individual — for instance, the composite Socrates. 
(This commits us to the perhaps odd view that an existing whole has non-existing 
ingredients or “parts” — and indeed, non-existing essential parts. For Aquinas, at 
least for Owens, you cannot weasel out of the oddity of this by allowing that 
while this “part” — the nature — doesn’t really exist, nevertheless it’s still out 
there, with at least some minimal kind of lesser reality. Many people will find this 
consequence too much to take. But it’s not a philosophically incoherent view, just 
unusual — and ought to be thought about very carefully.) 
Furthermore, given some funny business with Aquinas’s theory of predication, I 
think it follows that for him, (1) in the handout — that is, the form of the whole 
considered as a part — is not what is predicated, contrary to what I take to be 
Avicenna’s view. In order to be predicated at all on Aquinas’s theory, the 
common nature must be taken in a way that doesn’t positively exclude esse. 
Hence, we need some form of (2) on the handout. In order to be predicated of 
many, it must not include this or that esse, either in individuals or in the mind. 
That would preclude its being predicated of anything else. Hence, for Aquinas, 
only (2a) remains. Only that is what is predicated of many. 
Putting it another way, (1) cannot be predicated of many because it excludes too 
much. (2b), in either of its alternatives, cannot be predicated of many because it 
includes too much. (2a), however is “just right,” and it is that that is predicated of 
many. 
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Now, so far we have the common nature or essence considered in these various 
ways, and in some cases expressed by special terminology to reflect these various 
ways of conceiving it. What we want to know now is what these various ways of 
conceiving or considering the common nature have to do with ontology, with 
what is really in the world. In other words, what does all this “conceiving” and 
“considering” talk have to do with the metaphysics of the situation? 
In each case — (1), (2a), and (2b) in both alternatives — our way of considering 
the common nature is a correct representation of what is going on, in the sense 
that we are not including anything that isn’t there. (Our consideration is not “false 
and empty,” to use Boethius’s phrase.) But under what circumstances is our way 
of conceiving the common nature an exact representation of what is going on? 
When have we accommodated everything? In short, according to which of the 
above divisions and subdivisions does a common nature exist in exactly the way 
we consider it? 
Obviously, the answer is: only (2b-i) and (2b-ii). The common nature taken as in 
(1) does not exist, as we have already seen, since it excludes esse outright. 
Similarly, the common nature taken as in (2a) does not exist just like that, since 
— just like that — it takes no account of esse at all. Taken absolutely, it is too 
indeterminate to exist just as it is conceived. 
Let’s put this another way. For Aquinas, there is a being (in the participial sense 
— something that exists) that answers to the term ‘the man Socrates’, and another 
being that answers to the term ‘the concept man’. But there is no being that 
answers to the term ‘humanity’ (or even to the term ‘the humanity of Socrates’), 
although there are beings of which humanity is a constituent part. And there is no 
being answering to the term ‘man’ taken absolutely, or as we sometimes put it, to 
‘man qua man’. 
Therefore, what is predicated of many — (2a) — has no being in reality. There is 
none of this “lesser being” stuff that Avicenna talks about. Neither does what is 
predicated of many have any unity of its own. Aquinas agrees with Avicenna 
here. 
Let’s go back to the “plucked chicken” experiment we have performed several 
times before. Pull the accidents off Socrates and Plato, until you get down to the 
common nature. How many do you have left? William of Champeaux’s first 
theory and Clarembald of Arras say: One. Boethius’s theory in the Commentary 
on Porphyry, William of Champeaux’s second theory and Gilbert of Poitiers all 
say: Two. Avicenna says that you indeed have a common nature left, and it has its 
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own proper being, but the question how many you have is simply inapplicable 
when you frame the question this way. 
What is Aquinas’s answer? ZERO! 
Although you can talk about doing this kind of thing, what you end up with 
verbally or conceptually is just the common nature taken either according to (1) 
or according to (2a). And nothing answers to those. 
On this interpretation of Aquinas’s theory of common natures, there are two 
mistakes to avoid: 
(i) Common natures do not exist. 
That’s wrong. They do exist, for Aquinas. They exist in individuals and they exist 
in the mind. But they do not exist in abstraction with precision or in abstraction 
without precision and absolutely — that is, according to (1) or (2a). They derive 
no being at all from themselves. 
(ii) Since sameness and difference do not pertain to the nature 
taken in abstraction without precision and absolutely — 
that is, to (2a) — or for that matter taken with precision — 
that is, (1) — therefore the common nature man in Socrates 
and the common nature man in Plato are not diverse and 
are not the same. They are neither the one nor the other, but 
rather some kind of indeterminate third something in 
between. 
That is wrong too. They are diverse. The nature in Socrates is all tied up with 
Socrates’s matter, with Socrates’s differentiating accidents and with his esse. The 
one in Plato is all tied up with Plato’s. They are quite diverse. They are just not 
diverse (or, for that matter, the same) considered just insofar as it is the nature — 
that is, considered in abstraction without precision and absolutely. It is diverse in 
diverse things — which is to say, not taken absolutely or with precision. 
 
Evaluation of Owens’s Interpretation 
Well, that is Owens’s interpretation of Aquinas — or rather my way of putting 
that interpretation. It is a very influential interpretation, any many people have 
accepted it — both as the correct interpretation and as the correct theory in its 
own right. And, it must be said, there is some pretty strong textual support for this 
interpretation. 
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Nevertheless, I think there are some insuperable objections to it. This is not to say 
that Aquinas didn’t really hold the theory (although I don’t think he did). But if he 
did hold it, he shouldn’t have held it. 
What is the problem? Well, I think there are two problems. They are distinct, but 
closely related. 
(a) First, how on earth is theory ever going to account for the 
community — the “commonness” — of the common 
nature? For Aquinas, if the interpretation sketched above is 
correct, the nature taken in abstraction without precision 
and absolutely — that is, (2a) above — is (because of 
Owens’s account of Aquinas’s theory of predication) what 
is predicated of, and so is somehow metaphysically in, 
Socrates and Plato, and for that matter also in the mind. On 
the other hand, on this same interpretation, there is nothing 
answering to the nature so taken, as we have just seen. 
Nothing at all! So it looks as if Aquinas is heading straight 
for nominalism. There is nothing out there that is really 
common, and nothing out there that is really predicated of 
many either. (That is or course not yet an objection. It’s 
just to observe that this interpretation commits Aquinas to 
nominalism. But it will be the basis for an objection, as we 
shall see.) 
(b) There is an altogether similar problem with the Aristotelian 
theory of knowledge, which Aquinas by and large accepts. 
(He accept enough of it to give us this problem.) If the 
nature in the mind is not somehow the same as that in the 
thing, then how do I ground the objectivity of knowledge? I 
thought the whole point of this Aristotelian approach to 
knowledge was to say they are the same, and that no 
inference was needed from the one to the other. 
On Owens’s interpretation, Aquinas turns out to be unable to make up his mind. 
Sometimes he sounds like a nominalist, sometimes like a realist. If you stress the 
claim that knowledge and common predication are grounded in the common 
nature, then he looks like a realist. But if you stress the fact that the common 
nature, taken in the only sense in which it can do these things, doesn’t exist, then 
he certainly sounds like a nominalist. 
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You see, on this interpretation, although Aquinas doesn’t want to grant any reality 
at all to the common nature in the relevant sense, he nevertheless wants it to do 
work for him. He refuses to give it any metaphysical rights, but yet he demands 
that it take on epistemological and predicational duties. It is supposed to ground 
the objectivity of knowledge; it is supposed to be the justification for the fact that 
we predicate the same term ‘man’ non-arbitrarily of Socrates and Plato. These are 
not trivial tasks. And yet we are supposed to entrust them to a complete non-
entity? 
 
The Principle of Philosophical Fair Play 
Let me introduce you here to a kind of basic philosophical principle that Aquinas 
appears to be violating. I call it the Principle of Philosophical Fair Play. 
The basic idea here is that if, in your philosophical thinking, you appeal to 
something to do a certain theoretical task for you, then it is only “fair” to grant 
that something some kind of “ontological status” (as they used to say) in your 
theory. After all, if it is not even there, it can hardly do any serious work, solve 
any philosophical problems for you. 
So the basic idea is: No pay, no work. 
I described this as a “a kind of basic philosophical principle.” That doesn’t mean 
it’s certainly true, but it is at least initially compelling if you approach things in 
a certain way. And it’s the kind of thing philosophers have to take a stand on — 
whether to accept it or to reject it. 
For instance, consider thoughts. Thoughts perhaps appear to be distinguished 
from one another by what they are about, by their objects. (I do not mean to be 
committing myself to this view; I am just using it to illustrate a point.) 
Now thinking about a golden mountain is different from thinking about a round 
square or thinking about the present king of France. Hence those thoughts, 
presumably, are distinguished by their objects. And yet those objects — golden 
mountains, round squares, present kings of France — do not exist. 
In such cases, many philosophers — for instance, Alexius Meinong  and Hector-
Neri Castañeda — have felt the Principle of Philosophical Fair Play to be so 
compelling that they had to grant a certain kind of ontological reality to golden 
mountains and round squares and present kings of France. These things do not 
exist, of course, but they must have some kind of reality — or else they could not 
do their job of distinguishing those thoughts from one another. 
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So, if we follow this line of reasoning, we begin to make distinctions among kinds 
of reality. Some things have full-blown existence. Others have a lesser reality — 
call it Meinongian “subsistence” or whatever. But everything you are ever going 
to appeal to in your philosophy ends up being awarded some degree of reality or 
other. For if it’s not out there in some sense, it can hardly do any work for you. 
No pay, no work. That’s the Principle of Philosophical Fair Play. 
On the other hand, other philosophers have not found this so called “Principle” to 
be all that compelling. They have been willing to deny it, and to say that thoughts, 
for example, are distinguished by their objects — even though those objects 
might have no reality at all. 
Edmund Husserl held this, at least in his early period (for example, in his Logical 
Investigations), and Reinhardt Grossmann holds it still today, unless I 
misunderstand him. 
Now you may or may not find the idea of appealing in this way to complete non-
entities to do philosophical work for you to be an abhorrent idea — very strange 
indeed. But of course your feelings of abhorrence don’t count as legitimate 
philosophical arguments. So the Principle of Philosophical Fair Play seems to me 
to be an open question. 
Nevertheless, what is not an open question, what is certain is that there are certain 
cases where we have to make a choice: either to deny the Principle, or to start 
distinguishing degrees and levels of reality. 
Thinking about non-existent objects is one such situation. And Aquinas has now 
found himself in another such situation: What are we going to do about the 
common nature taken absolutely — about man as such, man qua man? 
Aquinas appeals to this notion in his account of predication and in his theory of 
knowledge. Hence he is either going to have to grant it some degree of reality, or 
else he is going to have to deny the Principle of Philosophical Fair Play. 
Which does he do? Well, as Owens interprets him, Aquinas denies the Principle. 
He refuses to allow degrees of reality. For Aquinas, being is being — and that’s 
all there is to it. It doesn’t come in levels or degrees. The common nature taken 
absolutely has no being of its own. The only being it has is the esse or existence 
of the individuals in which it is found, or else the esse or existence of a concept in 
the mind. 
There is certainly textual support for Owens’s interpretation. To pick just one 
passage, consider On Being and Essence, Chap. 3, § 4, p. 47: 
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So it is clear that the nature of man, considered absolutely, 
abstracts from every being (= esse), but in such a way that it 
prescinds from no one of them. (Emphasis added.) 
And there are other texts that can be likewise read as supposing Owens’s 
interpretation, although this is probably the most explicit of them. 
Nevertheless, if that is Aquinas’s view, he has got himself into a hopeless fix. 
Although he here seems to be explicitly saying what Owens says he says, it 
nevertheless appears that other features of his doctrine commit him to a kind of 
being for the nature taken absolutely. That is, the particular kinds of jobs Aquinas 
is asking the common nature taken absolutely to do for him are jobs that, on his 
own grounds, cannot be done without granting them some kind of being of their 
own. 
What are these jobs? They are unifying jobs. Think of the problems I raised a 
moment ago. The common nature in Socrates and the common nature in Plato 
must somehow be the same nature, or else there is no real basis sayhing the same 
nature is predicated of both. What is it, then, that is the same in both Socrates and 
Plato? On the grounds we have seen already, it can only be the nature taken as a 
whole and absolutely — that is, in sense (2a). On the other hand, to say it is the 
same is just to say it is one. (Aquinas explicitly accepts the identification of 
sameness with unity in many texts.) And to say it is one is just to say that it does 
have being after all, on the basis of the Augustinian identification of being with 
unity, AROUND WHICH OWENS BUILT HIS ENTIRE PAPER! 
In other words, to say that the same one common nature in sense (2a) is what is 
predicated of many, and then to say that this same one common nature has no 
being at all, is to deny the Augustinian equation of being and unity, not to uphold 
it in the face of Avicenna’s theory, as Owens makes it out to be. And since I think 
there is incontrovertible evidence that Aquinas adhered to the Augustinian 
equation, I also think there is good evidence that either Owens’s interpretation of 
Aquinas’s theory is wrong, or else Aquinas himself has a hopelessly inconsistent 
theory. 
The same thing can be said with respect to the second problem I raised earlier. If 
there is no sense whatever in which we can say that the common nature that exists 
mentally in cognition and the common nature that exists externally in Socrates 
and Plato is the same one common nature, then the entire Aristotelian account of 
knowledge collapses, and with it the Aristotelian guarantee of the objectivity of 
our knowledge. That account depended crucially on our being able to say there is 
no inference needed to be sure that our concepts match reality, since our concepts 
are formally identical with (= the same as = one with) the realities out there. But 
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if we say they are the same, then we are committed, on the basis of the 
Augustinian equation, to saying they have some degree of being too, contrary to 
Owens’s interpretation of the theory. 
Notice that it does no good to say that, yes, the common nature does have being; 
it has one (mental) being in the mind, and another being in Socrates, and yet a 
third being in Plato. Now we have three beings, and so three unities. And none of 
them is what we want. Each of them is confined to its own little realm, to the 
mind, or to Socrates or to Plato, and none of them is common. Hence none of 
them is available to take on the duties Aquinas requires. The only way to do that 
is to give the nature in sense (2a) a unity of its own, and therefore (by 
convertibility) a being of its own too. If Aquinas were really denying all unity and 
all being to natures considered absolutely, he would have to abandon the 
Aristotelian theory of knowledge and have to say there is nothing (besides words) 
that is predicated of many. But Aquinas doesn’t do that, although William of 
Ockham, in the early fourteenth century, will. 
And that is why I think Owens’s interpretation, while it may or may not be a good 
interpretation of Aquinas, is certainly a bad theory. 
 
 
John Duns Scotus 
Let’s now see what John Duns Scotus has to say about all this. 
Scotus lived from around 1265 to 1308. He therefore died when he was roughly 
43. In my judgment, Scotus was one of the best philosophers who ever lived. 
Note: We do not have a text from Scotus in our Readings on the 
topic of common natures. The text that is in the Readings is 
devoted more to the notion of individuation. 
For Avicenna, recall, common natures in themselves have no unity whatever. But 
they do have a lesser degree of being. For Aquinas, on Owens’s interpretation, 
they have no unity or being either one, not even in a “lesser” degree; as we’ve just 
seen, I’m not so sure about this interpretation of Aquinas. For Scotus, they have 
both a lesser being and also a lesser unity. 
Avicenna had already distinguished kinds or degrees of being, but not of unity. 
The latter is Scotus’s contribution. And it is an important contribution indeed. 
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For Scotus, natures are always (1) individuated when they exist in real things out 
there in reality. We can also (2) conceive a nature universally, in the mind. So far, 
this sounds just like Aquinas. But (3) between these two conditions, there is for 
Scotus the nature just in itself. And it is in his doctrine here that Scotus differs 
from Aquinas, at least according to the Owens interpretation of Aquinas. (On my 
own view, the two are somewhat closer to one another than Owens has them.) 
Scotus seldom uses the term ‘common natures’. He simply speaks of ‘natures’. 
Sometimes he also calls them ‘formalities’, or just ‘realities’. But he never calls 
them “things” (res). For Scotus, a res is always an individual. This means that 
‘thing’ is a reserved term in Scotus’s philosophical vocabulary, so one has to be 
careful not to speak loosely when talking about Scotus’s views. 
Natures are indifferent in themselves to esse or existence, just as they are for 
Avicenna and Aquinas. They are a kind of “neutral essence.” Yet they have their 
own being, a kind of esse quidditativum, a “quidditative being” (quiddity 
= whatness = that which is the answer to the question “What is it?” = the 
essence), or “essential being.” This too is just as in Avicenna, although it is 
contrary to Owens’s interpretation of Aquinas. 
In addition to having their own kind of being, for Scotus natures just in 
themselves have a kind of unity of their own too, contrary both to Avicenna and 
to Owens’s interpretation of Aquinas. The nature stone has a kind of unity of its 
own, and the nature man also has a unity of its own. And the two are in some 
sense distinct from one another. We can say all this, Scotus thinks, without ever 
considering the question of existence. But we could not do this if they did not 
have some unity and being of their own. 
(DISTRIBUTE HANDOUT “DUNS SCOTUS: KINDS OF UNITY AND DISTINCTION.”) 
Now look at the top of the handout “Duns Scotus on Kinds of Unity and 
Distinction.” For Scotus, there are three “levels” (so to speak) at which natures or 
essences may be considered: (a) the level of the individual (res), (b) the level of 
the concept, and (c) the level of the nature or formality just in itself, which can 
actually be found only in individuals or concepts. For each of these levels, there is 
a kind of unity (= sameness, identity) and correspondingly a kind of diversity or 
distinction. This is a rather sticky but very important part of Scotus’s doctrine. It 
is sticky because it is not altogether clear exactly how to define these various 
notions. And Scotus seems to have changed his mind on some of them over the 
course of his career. 
On all this, see Marilyn McCord Adams, “Ockham on Identity and Distinction,” 
Franciscan Studies 36 (1976), 5–74, and also her William Ockham, vol. 1, Ch. 2, 
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on “physical” reserve in the Wells Library. Both of these sources talk about 
Scotus as well as Ockham. But I have lots of questions about Adams’s analysis. 
Roughly, here’s how it goes: 
(1) At the level of the individual or thing (= res), the unity 
involved is called numerical unity. Socrates is numerically 
one. This is the kind of unity an individual thing has. Thus, 
Socrates is “numerically one,” and Cicero and Tully are 
“numerically the same” or “numerically one” or 
“numerically identical.” 
The distinction that goes with this level of reality is called 
the real distinction. It is found whenever you have 
numerically more than one thing. Sometimes the 
expression ‘numerical distinction’ is found instead of ‘real 
distinction’, but the latter is the more usual term. 
Scotus nowhere that I know of gives us a very clear account of just what he 
means by numerical unity or real distinction. But William of Ockham, in the 
intellectual generation immediately after Scotus, in effect takes the 
Indiscernibility of Identicals as the main criterion of numerical unity, and 
correspondingly the failure of indiscernibility as the main criterion of the real 
distinction. In other words, 
Two individuals (NB) A and B are numerically identical if and 
only if everything that is true to say of A is also true to say of B 
and vice versa, and they are really distinct otherwise. 
And, although one should be cautious, it is probably safe to view Scotus as having 
basically the same thing in mind. 
But there is more to the story. The notion of real distinction is often tied up 
throughout this period with the notion of separability, at least if we are talking 
about creatures. ‘Separability’ here means it is possible to have one without the 
other. It doesn’t necessarily have anything to do with spatial separation. 
I have to add the clause about “creatures” because at this time everyone agreed, as 
a result of a certain formulation of one of the ecumenical councils, that the three 
persons of the Trinity are all really distinct from one another. Yet since God is 
supposed to be necessarily a Trinity of persons, there is no question of having one 
person without the other here. 
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Thus, provided A and B are not both persons of the Trinity, we can say (where, as 
before, A and B are individuals): 
A is really distinct from B if and only if it is possible for A to exist 
without B, OR ELSE possible for B to exist without A (or perhaps 
both). 
Furthermore, if A and B are creatures, and are not causally related (and I don’t 
just mean efficient causality) to the extent that one depends causally on the other, 
then we can say something stronger: 
A is really distinct from B if and only if it is possible for either to 
exist without the other. (That is, it goes both ways.) 
The word ‘possible’ here refers not to natural possibility — like the so called 
“laws of nature” — but to the broadest kind of logical possibility. This notion of 
logical possibility is to be cashed out for Scotus in terms of God’s power. To say 
God is omnipotent is just to say he can do anything that is logically possible. Or, 
to turn it around, the notion of logical possibility is grounded metaphysically in 
God’s power. (This, incidentally, is a very rich metaphysical claim, that 
possibility is general is metaphysically grounded in the powers of things, and that 
logical possibility in particular, the broadest kind of possibility, is metaphysically 
grounded in the powers of God.) 
Thus, Socrates and Plato are really distinct, since it is possible for either one to 
exist without the other. Likewise, God and creatures are really distinct, since 
while (because creatures causally depend on God) it is not possible to have 
creatures without God, it is possible to have God without creatures. 
Likewise, an individual substance is really distinct from at least its separable 
accidents. Not only can you have the substance without the accidents. You can 
also have the accidents without the substance, Scotus thinks — at least by the 
power of God. This would be a miracle, in the sense that it goes beyond the 
normal laws of nature; but it would not be a logical impossibility. In fact, many 
people thought this is exactly what happens in the case of the Eucharist: the 
accidents of bread and wine are preserved, even though their underlying 
substance has been annihilated. (The accidents certainly don’t inhere in the body 
and blood of Christ. The body of Christ is not round and flat.) 
Although these claims about separability seem to be true on Scotus’s theory, I 
suspect his actual notion of numerical identity and real distinction is based on the 
Indiscernibility of Identicals, as we discussed a moment ago. 
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(2) At the level of concepts, the unity that is appropriate is the 
kind of unity the concept of man, for instance, has as one 
concept. Scotus has no special term for this kind of unity, 
and as far as I can tell, he never really talks about it very 
much. 
The corresponding kind of distinction is called the 
distinction of reason. This is a very low-grade distinction, 
and is not on the whole especially important in Scotus’s 
philosophy. 
The criterion for a distinction of reason is this: 
A and B are distinct by a distinction of reason if and only if the 
concept of A and the concept of B are two concepts for the same 
item. 
Notice that I use the neutral phrase “the same item,” and not “the same thing 
(= res). This is because, for Scotus, the notion of a distinction of reason applies 
also at the level of natures. Thus, at the level of individuals, Aristotle and the 
teacher of Alexander the Great are distinct by a mere distinction of reason, since 
although the concept of Aristotle and the concept of the teacher of Alexander the 
Great are two distinct concepts, nevertheless the actual person who is Aristotle 
and the actual person who is the teacher of Alexander the Great are numerically 
the same person. (Note: This means that a distinction of reason is perfectly 
compatible with numerical identity.) But the distinction of reason applies also at 
the level natures. For example, man and rational animal are distinct by a mere 
distinction of reason, since although the nature man and the nature rational animal 
are one and the same nature, nevertheless those two terms express two distinct 
concepts. (The concept “rational animal” is a complex concept with at least two 
ingredients, whereas the concept “man” is presumably not.) 
Scotus has very little to say about the notions of identity and distinction at this 
level, so I am not altogether clear about either the criterion I have given or the 
examples. As far as I can tell, this whole level is not very important for Scotus’s 
theory. 
Now comes the hard part: 
(3) Between levels (1) and (2), there is the level of the nature 
or formality. Here is where Scotus makes his biggest 
contribution. The unity that goes at this level is called a real 
less than numerical unity or real minor unity. (‘Minor’ is 
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just Latin for “less.”) This unity is real — that is, it is not 
just a product of our minds, not just something we make 
up. It is grounded in reality, on the side of reality, ex parte 
rei. And yet it is less than numerical — that is, it does not 
amount to singularity. If the kind of unity the nature man 
has all by itself were numerical unity, then the nature by 
itself would be an individual. And, as Avicenna has already 
shown us, that isn’t so. 
The distinction appropriate to this level is the celebrated 
formal distinction. 
Adams suggests a criterion for the formal distinction (“Ockham on Identity and 
Distinction,” p. 35; William Ockham, Vol. 1, pp. 24–25). Basically, it goes like 
this (I am paraphrasing drastically, but I don’t think I’m distorting): 
A and B are formally distinct if and only if (1) they are either 
numerically the same thing, or else are metaphysical ingredients of 
(constituents of, accidents of, etc.) what is numerically the same 
thing, and (2) neither one is analytically contained in the other. 
I think there are lots of problems with this cobbled-together definition, so don’t 
take this as the final criterion. But let’s not stop over them now. Instead, let’s 
back up and look at what this and other such definitions are trying to capture. 
Basically, the formal distinction is a distinction that applies not at the order of 
individuals — that is, not in the order of actually existing things. In other words, 
the formal distinction is not the real distinction, in the technical sense in we have 
just talked about the real distinction. It is, of course, “real” in the looser sense that 
it is “on the side of reality” — it is not something we just make up, a distinction 
merely in our point of view. For this reason, the formal distinction is not the same 
as the mere distinction of reason either. Rather, it is a distinction that has some 
real metaphysical basis, but belongs to the order of essence or nature all by itself. 
Since essences are what is conceived, the formal distinction between one essence 
and another can be put in conceptual terms — or, as I have paraphrased it a 
moment ago, in terms of analyticity. (Can you conceive of A without conceiving 
of B or vice versa?) At the same time, since essences or natures have their own 
kind of quidditative being for Scotus, the formal distinction is on the side of 
reality. It has a basis in the real world, and is not just a matter of concepts. 
Let me emphasize once again that this distinction among essences or natures is 
not called a real distinction, even though it does have a real basis. The term ‘real 
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distinction’ is reserved for something else, as we have seen. On the other hand, 
the less than numerical unity that belongs at this level of essences or natures is 
called a “real unity.” This is because the opposite of the real distinction is not 
called “real” unity, but rather “numerical” unity. So the term ‘real unity’ is not 
already spoken for, and is free to be used here. 
(Once again, consult the table at the top of the handout “Duns Scotus: Kinds of 
Unity and Distinction.”) 
Part of the difficulty in defining the formal distinction in Scotus (and for that 
matter in defining the real distinction) is in coming up with a good, reliable list of 
what and what is not supposed to be formally (or really) distinct from what else. 
Scotus discusses this in several places, but the upshot is not as clear as one would 
like it. 
In this messy situation, perhaps the best thing to do is to back up and ask what the 
formal distinction is supposed to do. Why does Scotus want any such distinction 
to begin with? 
Let us start from the other end, with the notion of real less than numerical unity. 
The idea there seems to be this: 
Consider two individuals, Socrates and Browny the Ass. They have many things 
in common — common natures. For example, both are animals. On the other 
hand, there are other things they do not share. Socrates, for example, is a rational 
animal, whereas Browny is an irrational animal. In other words, animality is 
rational (or combined with rationality, if you prefer) in Socrates, and is not in 
Browny the Ass. 
Now there is a sense in which the animality in Socrates and the animality in 
Browny the Ass are one and the same animality. The nature is a common nature, 
after all, and so is present wholly and entirely in both of them. It follows, 
therefore, that this one and the same animality is both rational (or combined with 
rationality, if you prefer) and not rational (not so combined). And that is a 
contradiction. 
As we have seen already with Abelard, it does no good to say here that animality 
is rational insofar as it is in Socrates and not rational insofar as it is Browny. All 
that is true enough, but it does no good if we think we are going to avoid the 
contradiction that way. It would only avoid the contradiction if we took these 
“insofar as” considerations to mean that the animality in Socrates and the 
animality in Browny are not the same animality after all, whereas (as we have just 
seen) we want to find some way of saying that are the same animality. 
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Here, therefore, we have an entity that is in some sense one and the same and yet 
we can say contradictory things about it. 
Now go back and recall our definitions of numerical unity or identity and the real 
distinction. There we said that the criterion of numerical unity is the 
Indiscernibility of Identicals. But here we have a case where we have one entity, 
the animality that is in some sense the same in Socrates and in Browny the Ass, 
and yet it violates the Indiscernibility of Identicals, since it is both rational and 
not rational. 
Hence, we conclude, the unity that this one animality has is not numerical unity, 
but rather another kind of unity. It is real — it is not just a fiction we make up — 
but it is less than numerical, since it fails the test of numerical unity. 
Well, what is the criterion for this real less than numerical unity? (I’ve already 
given you the criterion for the corresponding distinction: the formal distinction.) 
On the criterion of numerical unity, Scotus says different things in different 
places (see Adams, William Ockham, Vol. 1, pp. 24–25). But it always seems to 
have something to do with the notion of analyticity. Thus, if A and B are common 
natures, then A is identical with B by a real less than numerical unity (this is 
sometimes called formal identity) just in case the one is analytically contained in 
the other, or (in other texts of Scotus) just in case the two are analytically 
equivalent — for example, man and rational animal. This, of course, is the 
delicate part that takes the most careful working out. 
Scotus also adds the proviso that A and B have to be found together in the case of 
numerically one individual. But this addition seems to be to be unnecessary, since 
if the one is analytically contained in the other, then in whatever individual the 
containing nature is found, the contained one will be found too. Thus the 
additional proviso appears to be satisfied automatically. (There may be a problem 
if you want to worry about natures that do not exist in any individual, but let’s 
just ignore that for now.) 
Now once we have this notion of real less than numerical unity, we need a notion 
of the corresponding kind of distinction or diversity, which we call the formal 
distinction. As I said, I’ve already given you this. Scotus in effect seems to say 
simply that if A and B are natures, then they are formally distinct just in case the 
kind of analytic containment fails that would be required for them to be one with 
the kind of real less than numerical unity we just described. Of course, all the 
ambiguity in the notion of analytic containment involved in formal unity is just 
inherited now by the notion of formal distinction. 
Once again, Scotus adds the requirement that A and B are found together in the 
case of numerically one individual. This time the proviso is not idle, of course, 
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and although I do not see any compelling reason to add it, there is no special 
reason not to either. It just means that, for whatever reason, Scotus wants to 
reserve the term ‘formal distinction’ for natures that are in fact sometimes found 
together. Thus with this proviso, humanity and asininity would not count as 
formally distinct. On the other hand, the two are plainly distinct in a way that is 
not a mere distinction of reason, since there is a real metaphysical basis for the 
distinction. And the distinction between them is not the real distinction either, 
since the criterion of a real distinction is just the failure of indiscernibility for the 
kinds of entities we say are identical only when they satisfy indiscernibility. But, 
as we saw a moment ago, we talk about one and the same identical nature even 
where indiscernibility is violated. (In short, real distinction applies at the level of 
individuals, not of natures.) So perhaps in a broader sense of the term — one that 
does not require that the natures be found together in numerically one individual 
— humanity and asininity would count as formally distinct after all. Either that or 
else we’re going to have to allow yet another kind of distinction to account for 
such cases.. 
Let us give some examples: 
(1) Socrates’s humanity and his weight are formally distinct. 
Neither one is analytically contained in the other. (On the 
other hand, Socrates and his weight are really distinct, 
since — at least by the power of God — either one might 
exist without the other.) 
(2) Socrates’s humanity and his animality may count as 
formally distinct, depending on how we interpret the kind 
of analytic containment involved in real minor unity. (If 
real minor unity requires that A and B each be analytically 
contained in the other, then of course humanity and 
animality fail that requirement, so that they count as 
formally distinct. But if we require only one-way analytic 
containment for formal unity, then they will be identical by 
a real minor unity.) 
(3) God’s will and his intellect are formally distinct. So too are 
his divine goodness and divine wisdom. For all the 
ambiguity in Scotus’s theory of formal identity and 
distinction, he is quite clear on these claims. 
Indeed, there is a lot of evidence that the notion of the formal distinction first 
arose not as a result of the kinds of general metaphysical speculations we have 
just been engaging in, but rather as the result of quite particular theological 
 245
considerations like this. In short, it is likely that the whole notion of the formal 
distinction was originally a theological theory that only later came to be applied 
to purely philosophical matters. 
In fact, it was because of theological considerations that Scotus came to revise his 
notion of the formal distinction. On this, see Adams, “Ockham on Identity and 
Distinction,” pp. 37–43; Adams, William Ockham, Vol. 1, pp. 26–29; and Hester 
Gelber’s Ph.D. dissertation, Logic and the Trinity — on reserve in the Wells 
Library. (See the handout on “Reserves.”) 
Apparently, people criticized Scotus’s notion of the formal distinction, as we have 
just described it, on the grounds that if God’s will and his intellect are formally 
distinct, and if that notion is developed in the way we have just described, then 
this implies a plurality of metaphysical principles in God — and so compromises 
the divine simplicity. 
Scotus felt the pressure of this objection, and in his later writings, revised his 
notion of the formal distinction in a way that he claimed avoided this result. I 
must confess, I do not see how the revised theory works, how it avoids the 
problem, or even what they theory is. Adams and Gelber discuss this revised 
theory in the places just cited. But I do not understand what the theory amounts 
to, and so I will say no more about it. 
There is one other application of the formal distinction I want to mention. In at 
least some passages, Scotus says that the divine nature (= divinity) is formally 
distinct from the divine persons in the Trinity. The importance of this for my 
purposes is that a divine person is in no sense a nature. It is something that has a 
nature. Thus there is precedent for saying that a formal distinction does not 
require that both terms of the relation be natures. Perhaps, as here, only one of 
them is. 
And, once we are willing to allow that, there seems no reason why we cannot also 
say that the distinction between Socrates and his humanity is a formal distinction 
too, so that there is a formal distinction between the individual and its nature. 
William of Ockham, later on, certainly interprets Scotus as holding this, and he is 
generally pretty accurate in his statements of Scotus’s views. But I am not clear 
about what Scotus himself says on this point. 
All of this, of course, is subject to the extreme confusion and tentativeness of this 
whole cluster of doctrines in Scotus’s writings. 
 
Note that for Aquinas, according to the Owens interpretation, this entire middle 
realm of natures, with their own special kind of being and unity, is rejected 
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wholesale. There is no real minor unity, and there is no formal distinction. 
Consider, for example, the following text from Aquinas’s Summa contra gentiles, 
I, Chap. 26 (emphasis added): 
What is common to many is not anything over and above the many 
except by the reason alone. 
That is, the distinction between the common nature and the individuals that have 
it — between humanity and Socrates, for instance — is only a “distinction of 
reason” for Aquinas. For Scotus, the same distinction may be a formal distinction, 
as we just said, depending on how we interpret the formal distinction, but 
whatever it is, it is not for him a mere distinction of reason. 
For Aquinas, we have two distinct words or concepts, ‘man’ and ‘Socrates’. But 
ex parte rei, there is nothing to answer to the term ‘man’ except just individual 
men, Socrates and all the rest. The distinction between Socrates and his nature is 
merely one of reason. They are numerically the same. 
Note that this text is strong evidence in favor of Owens’s interpretation of 
Aquinas. Nevertheless, the theoretical difficulties I raised against that 
interpretation still stand. If what is “common” to Socrates and Plato is nothing 
over and above the individuals themselves, then in what sense is it “common”? In 
my own view, there is equally strong textual pressure to interpret Aquinas as 
granting some kind of reality and unity to natures in themselves: every passage in 
which he affirms the Augustinian equation of being and unity is such evidence. 
But, however you stand on that, it is quite clear that Aquinas does not yet have the 
vocabulary to allow different grades of identity and distinction on the side of 
reality. That comes with Scotus. 
 
Now let’s talk about some other (but related) things in Scotus. 
In Scotus, we must carefully distinguish two notions: community and 
universality. Community is what the nature has in external individuals. 
Universality is what the concept has in the mind. Note that the nature in itself has 
neither one, for the reason we saw Avicenna give earlier. (If it did, then anything 
that nature was predicated of would also have to be common or universal, which 
is false.) 
What is the difference between community and universality? Scotus says that for 
Aristotle, the universal is one in many, and predicable of many. As a matter of 
fact, there isn’t any passage where Aristotle says both of these things at once, but 
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in any event this slogan became a kind of commonplace. Notice how it 
conveniently combines the metaphysical notion of universality with the 
predicational one. 
The ability to be in many things is what Scotus calls community, and amounts to 
metaphysical universality as we saw it defined in Boethius’s Second Commentary 
on Porphyry. The ability to be predicated of many is what Scotus calls 
universality, and amounts to predicational universality as we saw it defined in 
Aristotle’s De interpretatione 7, and used by Abelard. 
The “formality” or nature has community in external objects. It can be in many 
things at once; it is not “repugnant” to it (as they say) to be so. (This is so even if, 
as a matter of contingent fact, there is only one such thing — for example, if all 
human beings but one should be annihilated.) But the “formality” or nature out 
there in external objects is not yet able to be predicated of many things. In order 
to be able to be predicated of many, the nature has to be thought — and this is 
what constitutes it as a universal. 
I take it the idea here is that the notion of “predication” is the notion of 
“predicating.” It is not something that happens in the logical or semantic abstract. 
Predication is an act that human beings perform, and they do it with their minds. 
So nothing can be predicated without being thought of our conceived. This seems 
to be the implicit reasoning here. 
In any case, for Scotus it is the concept that is predicated of many, and so it is the 
concept that is universal. 
Now let’s think about that last claim. Recall that Avicenna had an argument that 
the universal could not be what is predicated — or rather that what is predicated 
could not of itself be universal. But a general concept is of itself universal — that 
is, it is of itself what is predicable of many without bringing anything else into the 
picture. How does Scotus get around this argument? 
The argument, remember, was that if what is predicated were of itself universal, 
then whatever it was predicated of would have to be universal too. So it could 
never be predicated of singulars. The argument was just the converse of the 
argument about singularity. 
When I predicate man of several people — say, of Socrates and Plato — what I 
predicate is just what is contained in the definition. I predicate “rational, sensate, 
organic, corporeal substance” of them. I do not predicate “this rational, sensate, 
organic, corporeal substance” of them, since I could say that of only one thing. 
(We discussed that reasoning earlier.) Neither do I predicate “universal rational, 
sensate, organic, corporeal substance” of them, since I cannot say that of any 
individual. 
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That was Avicenna. Note the assumption here: that singularity and universality 
accrue to the nature like accidents in the “quidditative” or intelligible order — 
that is, the order of natures. In other words, the assumption is that when you add 
those accidents (or whatever they are), you change or add to the intelligible 
content of what you started with. You get a new and richer (less indefinite) 
concept. That is why they get in the way of predication. (You are not predicating 
what you thought you were.) 
This is not so for Scotus. Singularity and universality for him are not further 
determinations of the nature, so that they too would belong at the level of natures. 
Rather, they are what he calls “modes.” This notion of a “mode” came to be a 
characteristic of the Scotist school. 
A “mode” for Scotus is whatever can be added to a nature without changing its 
intelligible content. For instance, an example that was sometimes given: the 
intensity of white light is a mode of that light. 
Question for homework: What — if anything — does this notion of “mode” have 
to with the notion of “mode” in Descartes and Spinoza later on? 
Note, incidentally, that the introduction of modes allows a new kind of 
distinction: the modal distinction. This too came to be a characteristic of the 
Scotist tradition. The light and its intensity are only modally distinct. It is not a 
real distinction, between two things or res, since the mode is not a thing or res in 
its own right. It is not a formal distinction, between two “formalities” or natures, 
or between a nature and an individual res (for example, humanity and Socrates), 
since formalities or natures determine. They belong to the formal, intelligible, 
quidditative order. And it is not a mere distinction of reason either, since the 
distinction appears to be on the side of reality. 
Another question: Is there is special kind of unity to go with the modal 
distinction? Presumably there would have to be, but I know of nowhere Scotus 
discusses it. 
Existence, for example, Scotus regards as a mode of a nature. (This, incidentally, 
sounds a lot like Kant.) Hence Scotus rejects Aquinas’s real distinction between 
essence and esse. Of course, this may be only a terminological point. The so 
called “real distinction” between essence and esse meant something quite 
different in Aquinas than the “real distinction” does for Scotus. It is not clear that 
they are really disagreeing here. 
Singularity and universality are also modes of the nature for Scotus. They do not 
change the nature’s intelligible content; they do not determine the nature any 
further in the quidditative or intelligible order. They don’t give you a new 
concept. Hence they do not get in the way of predication as Avicenna had argued 
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they would. So the way is left open for Scotus to think of predication as 
something a mind does, so that what is predicated of many for Scotus is of itself 
universal. 
This part of Scotus is sticky business, and I’m not sure I fully understand 
everything that’s going on here. 
 
Now what are Scotus’s grounds for positing real common natures like this? For 
Avicenna it was to account for the facts of predication, as we have seen. Scotus, 
as near as I can tell, has (with his theory of “modes”) a somewhat different theory 
of predication, and it’s not clear to me that the same factors are motivating him. 
So what are his reasons. Well, basically, he gives two “metaphysical” reasons and 
three epistemological reasons. 
Note: Throughout this course, I have been maintaining that the basic pressures  
behind realism were epistemological, not metaphysical or ontological ones. So it 
is extremely interesting to see Scotus giving metaphysical reasons for his special 
brand of realism. They must be examined very closely, to see if they really do the 
trick. 
Here are his metaphysical reasons: 
(1) Real common natures are needed to account for real 
relations, and in particular to account for real relations of 
sameness or identity. 
In the Middle Ages generally, people talked about relations of sameness or 
identity corresponding to three of the Aristotelian categories. (You could have 
such relations in any of the ten Aristotelian categories, of course, but there was a 
special terminology reserved for only three of them.) 
(i) The category of substance, where the relation is called 
identity or sameness narrowly speaking. (In Latin, the 
terms ‘sameness’ and ‘identity’ are the same word, 
‘identitas’ — from ‘idem’ = ”same.”) 
A terminological point here: Earlier, when we were talking about the theory of 
identity and distinction in Scotus, we said that common natures have a kind of 
identity or sameness all by themselves; we called it real less than numerical unity. 
That’s fine, and it’s OK to use the terms ‘identity’ or ‘sameness’ in that way. But 
here we have a more restricted and specialized usage. Here we are talking about a 
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relation between two or more individual things (= res). And in this specialized 
sense, to say that two individual things are the same or identical is to say that they 
belong to the same genus or species. 
For example, Socrates and Plato are specifically the same or specifically identical, 
since both are men. Socrates, Plato and Browny the Ass are generically the same 
or generically identical, since all three are animals. 
Thus, within the category of substance, we can speak of generic or specific 
sameness or identity. 
You might also, if you wish, speak of a relation of numerical sameness or 
numerical identity in the category of substance. In that sense, Cicero and Tully, 
for example, would be numerically the same or identical. 
But in fact people did not very often talk this way in the Middle Ages. Numerical 
identity — that is, being the same individual thing — was not generally treated as 
a relation in the Middle Ages. Generally, they tended to regard relations as always 
involving at least two distinct terms. There was no reflexivity in the medieval 
theory of relations; they tended to regard all relations as irreflexive. Thus, they 
would not say that Socrates is identical with himself, but rather that Socrates is 
numerically one. That is, they treated numerical identity as a one-place “property” 
(in our loose, present-day sense of the term ‘property’) rather than as a relation. 
So much for relations of identity or sameness in the category of substance. The 
two other categories where such relations were discussed were: 
(ii) The category of quality, where it is called similarity. 
(iii) The category of quantity, where it is called equality. 
It is best to get used to these terminological fine points, to be sensitive to them 
and observe them. Medieval authors did not say “equal” where they meant 
“identical,” or vice versa. And they did not say “similar” when they meant 
“equal,” or vice versa. Thus, if Socrates and Plato both weigh 175 pounds, they 
are equal in weight (a quantity), not similar or alike in weight. 
In any case, in order to account for all these real relations of sameness, Scotus 
thinks there must be something in each case on the part of reality that joins the 
relata. This something cannot be numerically one all by itself, or else it could not 
be in both relata at once to join them. Therefore, it must have a real unity, but a 
unity that is less than numerical. It must be real, because real relations of 
similarity, equality and identity are not just the products of our minds. 
In a real relation of this kind, you have three factors involved, according to 
Scotus: 
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(a) Two things (= res) that are related, the so called “relata.” 
Each of these is numerically one, and the two are really 
distinct from each another. 
(b) A foundation for the relation — that is, something that is 
shared, a common nature, a formality. This has a real less 
than numerical unity of its own. 
(c) The relation itself, relating the two relata and founded on 
the common nature. For instance: similarity, equality, 
generic or specific identity. 
Thus: 
 
For Scotus, the relation itself is a third thing, a third res. It is really distinct from 
each of the two relata x and y.7 The foundation, however, is only formally distinct 
from the relata. 
(2) The second metaphysical reason Scotus gives for positing 
real common natures is this: They are needed to explain causality. 
Between cause and effect there is — at least in some cases — a nature shared. For 
example, fire causally produces fire. This kind of causality is what people called 
“univocal” causality. They recognized, of course, that this is not what happens in 
all cases. For example, the sun is a cause of life down here on earth, but it is not 
itself alive. But this does not affect Scotus’s point. He only requires that some 
cases of causality are univocal. 
For Scotus, this fact about causality would be so even if there were no intellects 
or minds. Fire causes fire whether anyone thinks about it or not. Thus, the unity of 
the nature that is shared in univocal causality must be not just a product of the 
                     
7It is really distinct because it is separable. If x exists but y is destroyed, then x’s relation 
to y is destroyed. And likewise if y continues to exist but x is destroyed. If the relation is taken as 
depending causally on the relata, then the converse independence relation need not hold. (That is, 
for a real distinction we do not need for it to be possible to have the relation exist without x, or for 
the relation to exist without y.) 
 Relation  
Foundation in x = Foundation in y 
x  y 
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mind, not just a mental fabrication. It must be real. But it cannot be numerical 
unity, since nothing causes itself. Therefore, it must be a real but less than 
numerical unity. 
These then are Scotus’s metaphysical reasons for positing common natures with 
their own real less than numerical unity. It is perhaps worth your trouble to decide 
what you think of them. 
 
Here are Scotus’s three epistemological reasons for positing real common natures: 
(3) We need them to provide a proper object for the intellect 
and for the senses. 
For the intellect — that is fairly clear. The idea is that the object of the intellect is 
what is common. We frame our knowledge in terms of the common or general. 
We pigeonhole things. And, unless the mind is to be regarded as producing its 
own objects, these common natures must be real — that is, mind-independent. 
Knowing is supposed to be a discovery, not a making. (In short, Scotus rejects 
idealism.) 
The case for the senses is more interesting. There was a famous “Aristotelian” 
slogan that people often cited in the later Middle Ages. The slogan can’t actually 
be found in Aristotle himself in just this form, but it certainly expresses an 
Aristotelian point of view. The slogan is: 
Sensation is of particulars, but understanding of universals. 
(Sensus est particularium, intellectus autem universalium.) 
Aquinas, for example, accepts this slogan, and lots of other people did too. This, 
incidentally, makes the distinction between sensation and understanding very nice 
and neat in Aquinas; they have different kinds of objects. 
Scotus, however, disagrees with both sides of this slogan. On the side of the 
intellect, the disagreement is mainly verbal. The proper object of the intellect for 
Scotus is not the universal, he thinks, but rather the common nature. (Recall the 
distinction between community and universality in Scotus.) Scotus is willing to 
accommodate the traditional terminology of the slogan by calling the universal 
concept a “complete” universal or universal “in act,” whereas the common nature 
all by itself is only an “incomplete” or “potential” universal. In any case, it is only 
the common nature, not the fully universal concept, that is the object of the 
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intellect for Scotus. As I said, the disagreement here is mainly verbal. What 
Scotus calls common is what others wanted to call universal. 
But more important, Scotus disagrees with the part of the slogan about sensation 
too. For Scotus, intellect and sense have exactly the same kind of proper object. 
(What then is the difference between intellection and sensation for Scotus? That is 
a good question, and it is not at all so neat and tidy as it was in Aquinas.) 
The argument for this interesting view is as follows. I hear sound, for example, of 
a certain pitch and quality. I see a color of a certain shade, and so on. The object 
of hearing is not this individual occurrence of the sound, and the object of vision 
is not this individual occurrence of the color. 
Suppose the entire field of vision were filled by a certain shade of red. Then 
suppose it disappears and things get completely dark, and then the same shade of 
red returns and again fills the entire field of vision. What do we say? Do we say 
“There it is again,” or do we say “There’s another one just like the one before?” 
We don’t know which to say, which just shows that sensation, when left to its so 
called “proper sensibles,” does not reach as far as individuals. 
The object of a sensory faculty, therefore, is going to have a real unity, to be sure, 
but not a numerical unity. Therefore, it will be a real less than numerical unity. 
Sight distinguishes white from green, but not this occurrence of white from that 
one. 
We do in a way sense individuals, to be sure, but we can discriminate individuals 
in perception only if we take into account the so called “common sensibles” — 
features that, unlike the “proper sensibles,” can be perceived by more than one 
sense faculty (for example, place and position, which can be both seen and felt). If 
we do not take those into account (as we cannot in the example where the shade 
of red fills the entire field of vision), then we cannot discriminate occurrences. 
Suppose God created two physical objects with exactly the same dimensions, 
color, and so on. The sense of sight could not distinguish them on the basis of 
proper sensibles, but only on the basis of position, which is a common sensible. If 
position is not at stake, then sight cannot discriminate between them at all. 
Thus, the proper objects of sensation are common natures, and only those — not 
individuals. 
(4) Common natures are needed to explain predication. 
This does not of course mean the common nature just by itself is what is 
predicated; we’ve seen the arguments against that. Rather the universal concept is 
what is predicated. Instead, the common nature is needed to ground the 
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objectivity of predication. If the universal were totally a work of the mind, rather 
than a work of the mind done to something real, then predication would be a 
fiction. Once again, knowing is discovering, not making. 
(5) Common natures are needed to provide proper subjects for 
the sciences. 
According to the authority of Aristotle, for instance in the Posterior Analytics, 
science deals with the “universal.” Scotus interprets this as referring to the 
incomplete universal — the common nature. The basic idea here is that science is 
not about this individual or that one, but rather deals with types and classes. When 
a biologist raises a culture in a little dish, he’s not the slightest bit interest in those 
little microbes as individuals. He’s only interested in them insofar as they are 
typical representatives of their type — what Scotus would call their nature. If 
these natures, these (incomplete) “universals,” were not real, then science would 
be a pure product of the mind, a kind of mental invention. Once again, the same 
point: Knowledge is supposed to be a discovery, not a making. 
Scotus argues that if the objects of a science were not real, but totally the work of 
the mind, then every science would deal with concepts. (They are what are the 
products of the mind.) Now the science that deals with concepts — that is, with 
what is predicated — is logic. Hence, Scotus thinks, if there were no real common 
natures, all the sciences would be reduced to logic. Whatever you may think of 
this consideration, Scotus was not the only one to appeal to an argument like this. 
 
Now I want to weave together a few miscellaneous but important themes: 
In Scotus’s opinion, there is no need for any special outside help to ground our 
knowledge, as there was for instance on the old Augustinian theory of 
“illumination,” according to which in order to have real, full-fledged knowledge 
the mind needs some kind of outside help from God; it is simply incapable 
achieving real knowledge on its own. The classical Augustinian reason for saying 
there is such a need was that the individual object is changeable and mutable, and 
so too is the intellect. (It is a creature, after all, and only God is supposed to be 
absolutely immutable.) Neither the object nor the intellect itself was “firm” 
enough to ground certain and fixed knowledge. This is basically a Platonic 
approach to knowledge. 
For Scotus, all this is simply not so. Material individuals are changing, to be sure, 
but they have immutable common natures in them. And so there is something in 
the individual, after all, that is sufficient to ground knowledge. 
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In effect, this was just Aristotle’s answer to Plato, as I discussed in the Warp and 
Woof handout. Just as Aristotle doesn’t need Plato’s theory of reminiscence to 
account for our knowledge, so too Scotus doesn’t need the Augustinian theory of 
illumination. His theory of common natures is what makes this work. 
Aquinas was another one to make this move explicitly. He can do it because he 
too wants to find a fixed and immutable nature in things. But Aquinas’s and 
Scotus’s views on how the common nature in the individual works in knowledge 
will be quite different. 
The difference concerns the role of the so called agent intellect, that part of the 
mind that has the job of abstracting universal concepts from individuals and of 
recording them (“stamping” them — like the old “seal-ring” metaphor) on another 
part of the mind, the receptive or passive part. (On this complicated but very rich 
doctrine, see the handout “Aristotelian Epistemology and Its Arabic 
Developments.”) 
As we said, Aquinas accepts the Aristotelian dictum: “Sensation is of particulars, 
but understanding of universals.” Now recall that for Aquinas, at least on 
Owens’s interpretation, there is no distinction on the side of reality between the 
individual and its nature. There is no real distinction, and there is no formal 
distinction, since Aquinas simply has no such notion as a formal distinction in any 
case. Hence there is only a distinction of reason. (Whether we accept Owens’s 
interpretation or not, Aquinas does actually say this much. Recall our quotation 
from the Summa contra gentiles, I, Chap. 26: “What is common to many is not 
anything over and above the many except by the reason alone.”) 
Therefore, when sensation gets through doing its job of recording the 
“impression” of an individual object, the nature preserved in the sense image or 
sense impression is still individual. It is not yet common. 
What the agent intellect has to do then is to work on the sense image, to separate 
the common nature from the individuating conditions. Just how it does this is not 
very clear, since the common nature (at least on Owens’s interpretation) has no 
being of its own. 
In fact, I think Aquinas’s notion of the role of the agent intellect has all the same 
difficulties we saw when we were talking about the notion of abstraction in 
Boethius. Aquinas’s descriptions are more a kind of program of what has to be 
done than a real explanation of how it gets done. The agent intellect in Aquinas is 
a real black box. Think of it as somehow “warming up” the sense image, so that it 
mysteriously releases these vaporous natures. (The difficulties I find with 
Aquinas’s account of abstraction are just another form of the difficulties we have 
already discussed with his theory of common natures.) 
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Then, only after all that is done, is the nature ready to be recorded and actually 
known by the mind. The agent intellect does this chore too. 
So for Aquinas, the agent intellect has two jobs to do. First, it must somehow get 
the common nature out of the particularized sense image, and then it must, 
second, record the result in the “receptive” part of the mind. 
For Scotus, the agent intellect has much less to do. In the individual thing (= res), 
the individual and its nature are distinct. There is a distinction for Scotus on the 
side of reality. It is more than just a distinction of reason. It is not a full-fledged 
real distinction in the technical sense of that term, but it is a formal distinction. 
Hence the nature present in the individual already has a community — that is, it 
already has the ability to be in many. 
That is why Scotus can say the sensible image is of the common nature and not of 
the individual, without needing to postulate any kind of agent sense after an 
analogy with the agent intellect. Nothing has to be done to the nature to get it 
ready to be a proper object of sensation. (That’s true for Aquinas too, but for a 
completely different reason — for Aquinas, the object of sensation is the 
individual.) 
Likewise, for Scotus nothing has to be done to the nature to get it ready for the 
intellect. There is no “warming up” needed here. Scotus’s agent intellect doesn’t 
have that task to perform. All it has to do is to read off the common nature from 
the sense image, and then impress it on the receptive part of the mind. 
For Scotus, the agent intellect is first a selecting device, and then a kind of 
printing press. That first task is quite different from what goes on for Aquinas. 
The agent intellect for Aquinas has to do more than just select. The common 
nature is not already there in the sensible species or image, just waiting to be read 
off. There is nothing to select. That is the whole point about the metaphysics of 
common natures — again, at least on Owens’s interpretation. 
The agent intellect has less to do for Scotus than it does for Aquinas. For Scotus, 
the agent intellect really acts, but it doesn’t act on the sense image. It acts only on 
the receptive side of the mind. 
Remember how I said Aquinas sounded like a realist if you pushed him one way, 
and like a nominalist if you pushed him another way? Here we see how Aquinas 
splits the difference. The difference between Scotus’s and Aquinas’s 
(epistemological) realism is in the role of the agent intellect. It has more to do for 
Aquinas than it does for Scotus, and to that extent Aquinas is less realistic, I 
suppose. 
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A good Rule of Thumb: The more realist you are, the less work you will think the 
agent intellect has to do. 
Now William of Ockham — and we might as well begin talking about him now to 
some extent — will be a nominalist. He doesn’t think we even have an agent 
intellect. And this is not because its task would be so easy it is not needed. Rather, 
it is because the job of abstracting on Ockham’s theory would be so difficult as to 
be impossible. For Ockham, we simply cannot form concepts by abstraction in the 
traditional way. He is a nominalist of the strict observance. 
Aquinas distinguishes himself from Ockham’s view insofar as for Aquinas, the 
agent intellect still has a possible task to perform. It is not asked to do the 
impossible. (At least, he thinks it isn’t impossible; you, like Ockham, might 
disagree.) 
Remember the two sides to the old problem of universals, the metaphysical side 
and the epistemological side. We can give a metaphysical and an epistemological 
formulation of both realism and nominalism, as they developed in the late-
thirteenth and early-fourteenth centuries. (See the handout “Duns Scotus: Kinds 
of Unity and Distinction.”) 
In the metaphysical formulation, realism holds that the common nature (taken 
absolutely, as Aquinas would put it) has a being of its own; nominalism says it 
does not. 
In the epistemological formulation, realism holds that the common nature (taken 
absolutely, as Aquinas would put it) is the ground of our knowledge, its basis in 
the world; nominalism says it is not. 
In these terms, we can say (see the handout once again) that: 
Aquinas is a metaphysical nominalist but an epistemological 
realist. 
Scotus is a realist on both the metaphysical and the 
epistemological formulations. 
Ockham is a nominalist on both the metaphysical and the 
epistemological formulations. 
If you concentrate on the metaphysics (and buy Owens’s interpretation), Aquinas 
sounds almost indistinguishable from Ockham. If you concentrate on the 
epistemology, he sounds like a realist, and so a bit like Scotus. Only if you take 
both sides into consideration do you see what is going on in the large. Of course, 
there are still huge problems with Aquinas’s theory, as I have indicated earlier. 
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Here these problems show up in his theory of the agent intellect. Its performance 
is very mysterious in Aquinas. 
 
Here are some further questions to keep in mind when thinking about Scotus: 
(1) How is sensation distinguished from understanding? They 
both have the same object for Scotus, the common nature. What 
then is the difference between these two mental faculties? Why do 
we need them both? Or do we? 
(2) How do we get knowledge of the individual? This is sticky 
in both Scotus and Aquinas. Aquinas has trouble saying how we 
can understand or intellectually know anything about the 
individual, since “sensation if of particulars, but understanding of 
universals.” For the same reason, of course, he has no trouble 
saying how we sense the individual. Scotus has trouble on both 
sides. Ockham will press Scotus on this point. We obviously do 
know things — both at the level of sensation and at the level of 
understanding — about individuals. 
This problem of knowledge of individuals gives rise to a theory of what is called 
intuitive cognition in both Scotus and Ockham, and in lots of other fourteenth-
century people too. We won’t discuss it here. If you are interested, there are two 
chapters on it in my The Cambridge Companion to Ockham (on physical reserve 
in the Wells Library). 
(3) Why is the agent intellect needed at all for Scotus? If the 
common nature is present in the individual and already capable of 
impressing itself on the sense without the aid of any agent sense, 
then why can it not impress itself on the mind too, without the aid 
of any agent intellect? (A possible answer: The common natures 
are presented all together, all mixed up, in the sense image. 
Something is needed to select the one to be impressed on the mind. 
But still, does that mean the second job of the agent intellect — its 
impressing job — is idle? 
Scotus on Individuation 
Two of Scotus’s big contributions to philosophy were the notion of real minor 
unity and, for all its obscurity, the formal distinction. Another was his theory of 
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individuation, with its famous account of “haecceity” or “thisness.” That is what 
we are going to talk about here. 
Reading Assignment: The text from Scotus in Five Texts, together 
with the notes on that text in the Notes and Texts. 
For Scotus, natures by themselves have community, a real minor unity, as we 
have already seen. So there is no need to inquire about a cause or principle of 
community. Natures “just come that way.” On the other hand, natures are not by 
themselves universal, and they are not by themselves individual either. Something 
has to be done to them to make them universal or individual. Hence it is 
appropriate to ask about the “principle of universalization” (and that is going to 
be the mind or intellect), and about the “principle of individuation.” We still have 
to look at the latter. 
What is it, then, that you have to add to the common nature to yield an individual? 
What is it that contracts the common nature to this individual? (This “contraction” 
talk is characteristic. Get used to it.) 
Recall the several senses of the term ‘principle of individuation’ that we have 
distinguished several times already. 
(1) What makes something an individual? (This we agreed to 
call the “principle of individuality”.) 
(2) What makes an individual the individual it is? (This we 
agreed to call the “principle of identification” or the “principle of 
identity.”) 
(3) What distinguishes one individual from another — either in 
different species or in the same species? (The “principle of 
differentiation.”) 
For Aquinas, as you will remember, these questions have different answers. The 
answer to (1) depends on how you interpret the question: 
If you mean “What makes something an individual as opposed to a 
heap, the answer is: the one act of esse that ties the whole thing 
together. 
If you mean “What makes something an individual as opposed to a 
species or genus, the answer is matter, since it is only in the case of 
material species that there is any distinction between the species 
and the individual. 
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The answer to (2) for Aquinas is esse. 
The answer to (3) is form in general, substantial form if we are talking about 
interspecific differentiation, or matter-entailing accidental forms if we are talking 
about intraspecific differentiation. 
In the Boethian tradition of individuation by accidents — as we saw it suggested 
in Boethius’s De trinitate, and then explicitly held in William of Champeaux’s 
first theory and in Clarembald of Arras — the answer to both (2) and (3) is the 
same: accidents. (The answer to (1) is not altogether clear in this tradition, and 
may differ from author to author. Perhaps accidents play this role too.) 
As for Scotus, when he is talking about contracting the species or common nature 
to the individual, I think he is primarily concerned with question (2), that is, the 
principle of identification. But that is not completely clear to me. He may also be 
talking about the other questions too. 
So for the present let’s just adopt the blanket-term ‘individuation’, and hope we 
can come to sort out exactly what questions Scotus is trying to answer with this 
doctrine. 
Scotus treats the topic of individuation in a number of places, but perhaps most 
importantly in a series of questions in his Oxford Commentary on the Sentences of 
Peter Lombard, the so called Ordinatio. The text is contained in the Five Texts. 
Peter Lombard was an important twelfth-century author who compiled a work 
called the Sentences, which means “sentences” in a quasi-judicial sense: 
“decisions,” “verdicts.” It does not mean just “statements.” The Sentences of 
Peter Lombard was one of the first systematic and theoretical discussions of 
theology; it made use of both the authoritative texts of Scripture and the Church 
Fathers, and also of good hard argumentation. Since it was one of the first works 
of this type (and since it is pretty good too), it achieved the status of a kind of 
“standard textbook” in the medieval university system. Part of a student’s training 
in the typical faculty of theology at a medieval university was to present a course 
of lectures commenting on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. Scotus did this in fact 
several times, at Oxford, Paris and Cambridge. The Ordinatio is his Oxford 
commentary. The term ‘Ordinatio’ means that Scotus had the opportunity (and 
took the opportunity) to go over the text of his lectures carefully, revising and 
altering them, and in general getting them in polished form for “publication” 
(which meant copying out longhand — this was still well before the invention of 
the printing press around 1455). So it is an especially “authoritative” source for 
Scotus’s doctrine on this and other points. 
Lombard’s Sentences was divided into four books, and each book was subdivided 
into a number of distinctions. In standard commentaries, the issues raised in these 
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distinctions were discussed in a series of one or more questions. These were 
generally written in the quaestio form we have already seen in a rudimentary state 
in Boethius’ discussion of universals in his Second Commentary on Porphyry. By 
the time of Scotus, this quaestio form had become very highly developed. 
The passage we are concerned with is in Scotus’s Ordinatio, Book II, distinction 
3, questions 1–6. There Scotus considers a series of five views purporting to 
identify the “principle of individuation.” Scotus argues against all of them, and 
then gives his own answer in Question 6. 
 
In q. 1, Scotus asks: Is a material substance (and that is all he is talking about 
throughout this list of questions) one or singular all by itself — ex se? That is, 
does it just come that way? Is it de se hoc (=  “by itself (a) this?”)? (The question 
put in this way might of course refer to any one of our three notions of 
individuation.) 
Some people had said yes to this question, and others would continue to do so 
later on. For example, Richard of Middleton, Godfrey of Fontaines, and good old 
William of Ockham. (On some of the names and doctrines throughout this 
discussion, see John Wippel’s book on Godfrey of Fontaines, as listed in the 
handout on “Reserves” distributed at the beginning of this course.) 
Scotus argues against this theory. We have already seen some of his reasons, in 
the context of the two metaphysical and the three epistemological reasons for 
positing common natures, discussed earlier. (Not all of these reasons, however, 
are brought out in this question.) 
But if the substance is not de se hoc, then of course we must look for an 
additional principle of individuation. Scotus tries various alternatives. Here then 
is a kind of road-map of the discussion: 
q. 1 — Is a material essence individual ex se? (Middleton, 
Godfrey, Ockham) 
q. 2 — by a negation? (Henry of Ghent) 
q. 3 — by existence? (Giles of Rome) 
q. 4 — by quantity? (Aquinas, roughly, although he might be a 
little surprised to find himself described in these terms.) 
q. 5 — by matter? (Aristotle, Aquinas) 
q. 6 — Scotus’s own view 
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(Notice, incidentally, that there is nothing whatever in this discussion about 
individuation by all the accidents, as we found this doctrine suggested in 
Boethius’s De trinitate — although q. 4 is about one kind of accident.) 
Question 2 considers the view that individuation is somehow accomplished by a 
negation. This peculiar-sounding theory was in fact maintained by Henry of 
Ghent, a close predecessor of Scotus’s and an influential philosopher in his own 
right. Many of Scotus’s arguments are directed against Henry of Ghent, whom 
Scotus regards as a very serious opponent. 
Henry of Ghent had the misfortune of not belonging to one of the 
new religious orders that had just got started in the 13th century 
(such as the Dominicans and the Franciscans). He was a priest, 
certainly, but belonged to what is called the “secular” clergy rather 
than the “regular” clergy — those who were subject to the “rules” 
of a certain religious order. As a result, Henry didn’t come to have 
the partisan defenders some of the members of the “regular” clergy 
came to have, and consequently he is largely unknown to the 
present day. But that is by no means his fault. He was an important 
and influential man in his own day. 
According to Henry’s theory, the common nature is not contracted to the 
individual by adding any new positive ingredient. So there is no positive principle 
of individuation. The positive features of Socrates, the ones that actually make 
him up and so are not accidental — the pin-cushion, as opposed to the pins (see 
the Warp and Woof handout — are exactly the same as those of Plato. 
Henry’s point is based on the very notion of an individual. An “individual,” as the 
etymology of the term (‘in + dividuum’) would suggest, is undivided. This means 
two things for Henry: 
(a) The individual is not identical with any other being. 
(Otherwise it would be, in a sense, divided from itself.) 
(b) The individual is also internally un-divided. It is not a heap, 
but more a unity than that. 
(Notice how these two points correspond to senses (3) and (1) of the term 
‘principle of individuation’, as we distinguished them earlier.) 
Observe that both (a) and (b) are put negatively. And since (a) and (b) 
encapsulate just what it is to be an individual, this means that individuality can be 
described in purely negative terms. This twofold negation is the principle of 
individuation for Henry. No positive principle is required. 
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Scotus replies to this view as follows. This is indeed what we mean by an 
“individual,” Scotus agrees. But what is it that makes it impossible for an 
individual to be internally divided in this way? What prevents it from being 
identified with any other being? Henry has tried to find the principle of 
individuation by simply describing its effects. In effect, he has given only a job 
description for the principle of individuation, but not told us what fills that job 
description. That is not enough. 
In other words, this two-fold negation Henry appeals to comes too late to serve as 
a principle of individuation. What Henry is describing is the effects or result of 
individuation, not its cause. 
Furthermore, Scotus argues, this twofold negation appears to be just the same in 
the case of Socrates as it is in the case of Plato. Both are unities and not heaps, 
and neither is identical with anything distinct from itself. So it looks as if the 
twofold negation Henry describes is itself common, and so stands itself in need of 
individuating. (In effect, this criticism is based on sense (2) of the notion of 
“individuation” distinguished earlier — the “principle of identification.”) 
We are still a long way from solving our problem. It appears we must look for 
some positive principle of individuation. 
Thus we go to Question 3, where we consider one suggestion for such a positive 
principle of individuation — namely, existence. 
Despite what you might think at first, Scotus is not thinking of Aquinas here, for 
whom existence is a principle of “individuation” in some senses but not in others. 
Instead, he is thinking of a certain Giles of Rome, a “follower” of Aquinas, who 
nevertheless revised Aquinas’s views in certain respects. (For what it is worth, 
Giles later on became the more or less “official” philosopher of the Order of the 
Hermits of St. Augustine.) 
Giles’s theory seems to be this: 
Existence is the ultimate and final actuality of a being, what makes the whole 
thing real in the end. And actuality or act (as opposed to potentiality) always 
determines and distinguishes. That is, for Giles act and potency are always related 
as the determinate to the (relatively) indeterminate. (Note that he is certainly 
thinking here of “individuation” in sense (1) distinguished earlier, but also 
perhaps in senses (2) and (3).) 
What Giles has in mind here is the Porphyrian Tree. There, substance is potential 
with respect to being either corporeal or incorporeal. The differentiae actualize 
that potency; they determine and distinguish. And so on down the tree, making 
each step more and more “actual.” 
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The last step on the tree in the individual — Socrates, for example. (Recall, from 
our discussion of the Porphyrian Tree at the beginning of this course, that there 
was some ambiguity about whether to put individuals on the tree or not. But this 
need not stop us here, and apparently didn’t stop Giles.) Now it is the individual 
that actually exists. So it looks as though actual existence is the individual 
difference — like the “specific difference” — that determines individuals within 
the species. Existence is the last actuality. For him, the last step on the Tree gives 
you individuals.  
Scotus’s reply to this theory is twofold: 
(1) First, existence pertains to a nature only after it has already been fully 
determined or contracted to an individual. In other words, existence comes 
too late to be a principle of individuation. When I am given “substance,” I 
can ask “Is it corporeal or incorporeal?” So too, when I am given 
“Socrates,” the individual nature, I can still ask “Does he exist or not?” 
Existence, remember, is for Scotus a mode, and so does not affect the 
content of what exists. Existence, for Scotus, is not on the Porphyrian Tree 
at all. It has nothing to do with intelligible content, which is what the tree 
is all about. Thus, it cannot serve as in individual difference or principle of 
individuation. 
Aquinas would accept the basis behind this objection. Esse for Aquinas is an act, 
but it is not of the same order as the differentiae on the tree. Esse is totally off the 
tree; it is not a form. 
(2) A second criticism Scotus raises to this view is one Aquinas would not 
accept. It runs like this. Existence, like the nature itself, is not individual 
all by itself; it is not de se hoc (=  by itself this). Hence it cannot serve as a 
principle of individuation. Existence needs to be contracted to the 
individual just as much as the nature does. In fact, existence is more 
common than any species or genus is. It is the most common thing of all, 
and hence needs to be contracted most of all. (This seems addressed to 
sense (1) of the term ‘individuation’.) 
Aquinas would not accept this argument. Esse for him is not something common; 
it does not need to be contracted. Each act of esse is totally “isolated” from every 
other one. They are not shared, and they themselves do not share anything. Since 
Aquinas does not accept the Scotist theory of modes, therefore, if esse were 
common, it would be just like any other common nature. There is no other way of 
being common for Aquinas. But the whole point of Aquinas’s doctrine of esse is 
to contrast it with natures. It stands over against natures, to such an extent that 
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there is a real distinction between them (with, of course, all due caution exercised 
about the term ‘real distinction’ in connection with Aquinas). 
In Question 4, Scotus considers the suggestion that quantity is the principle of 
individuation. The position here is like this. Take a common nature — say, fire. 
Now this fire differs from that fire only insofar as the form of fire is received into 
different parts of matter. But one part of matter differs from another part of matter 
only by quantity — that is, by size and shape, dimensions and location. Hence it 
is only quantity that divides part from part, and therefore the principle of 
individuation in the end reduces to quantity. This of course is the theory of 
designated or signate matter associated with Aquinas, and in different variations 
with Avicenna and Averroes. Aquinas, however, might not have recognized his 
own doctrine when it is presented like this. 
Again, Scotus raises a twofold objection: 
(1) First, quantity is an accident of an individual substance. But substances 
are naturally prior to their accidents, not the other way around. Therefore, 
quantity cannot individuate. (Recall that Abelard has a criticism like this 
against William of Champeaux’s first theory.) We need a principle of 
individuation that is not accidental, but belongs to the substance itself. In 
terms of the pin-cushion analogy I developed in the Warp and Woof 
handout, we need a principle of individuation that is down there in the 
cushion, and is not one of the pins. Quantity comes on the scene too late. 
(2) Second, quantity is not de se hoc any more than the nature is. It is 
common too, and so it also needs a principle of individuation. (Remember 
the problems with Averroes’ doctrine of “indeterminate dimensions.” The 
same problems are operative here.) 
Just as for Questions 2 and 3, the objections here are that quantity (a) comes too 
late to do the job of individuating, and (b) is not de se hoc anyway, and so itself 
stands in need of individuation. 
As a last resort, Scotus considers in Question 5 the view that matter is the 
principle of individuation. This view is associated with Aquinas, as we saw when 
we were discussing his theory, but his view is much more complicated and 
involves much more than just matter. Aristotle, however, appeals to matter as a 
principle of individuation in many places. I gave you the references earlier. 
Scotus’s objection to this view runs like this: Matter is part of the nature of a 
material substance, together with the form. Hence it is just as common as the 
nature itself is, and stands in need of a principle of individuation too. 
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Here is where the notion of designated or signate matter comes in. Aristotle may 
or may not have had anything like this; probably not. In any case, Aquinas does. 
Part of the motivation behind signate matter is to answer just this problem, to 
individuate matter, so to speak. But there are monstrous problems with the theory 
of signate matter, as we discussed earlier. Scotus’s objection seems a good one. 
Note, incidentally, that Scotus cannot (and does not) argue here 
that matter comes too late to individuate, that the nature is already 
individualized before matter comes on the scene. That just isn’t so. 
 
Finally, after exhausting the opposition, Scotus turns to explain his own theory on 
the topic, in Question 6. 
For Scotus, the individual difference is a special kind of entity, not to be 
identified with any of the items considered so far. Let us ask what conditions it 
must fulfill. 
(1) On the Porphyrian tree, each of the inferior or lower steps 
contains something not contained in the superior or higher 
steps. Each lower step adds a positive determination. Since 
the individual is the last step on the tree, and since the 
individual difference is how one makes that last step, 
therefore the individual difference must be a positive entity, 
and not just the mere absence or negation of something. We 
already know this much from Scotus’s criticism of Henry 
of Ghent’s theory, in Q. 2. 
(2) Furthermore, the individual difference must somehow 
combine with the specific nature to form a substantial 
unity, not just an accidental unity. We already know this 
from Scotus’s criticism of the quantity-theory, in Q. 4. 
(3) The individual difference must be the last difference on the 
Porphyrian tree. (See Q. 3, Giles of Rome’s theory.) Here’s 
why: At each lower division on the tree, all the higher 
stages still apply; the higher stages can all be predicated of 
the lower ones. For example, an animal is also an organism 
and a substance. But this stops at the level of the 
individual. Thus, if you divide up the species man into 
Socrates and Plato, each of them is a man, an animal, an 
organism, and so on. But if you divide Socrates up, you get 
 267
parts of Socrates, which are not themselves Socrates. (The 
question whether the whole is predicable of the part is, to a 
first approximation, just the difference between what 
people called a universal whole made up of subjective 
parts, and an integral whole made up of integral parts.) 
(4) The individual difference cannot be intellectually 
conceived in the sense of forming a concept of it in the 
standard Aristotelian way. If it were conceivable, then 
because the object of the intellect is the general or 
common, the individual difference would be common 
itself, and so would itself need a further principle of 
individuation. No, the individual difference must be de se 
hoc. (Recall Scotus’s claim that singularity was mode of a 
nature, so that adding it does not alter the intelligible 
content of the nature.)  
Points (3) and (4) are what make the individual difference special. It is in these 
respects unlike the other differences on the tree. 
The idea behind (4) is that generality or community must stop at the level of the 
lowest species. 
Now since common natures are the proper objects of the understanding, and even 
of sensation, the individual difference is not going to be very easy to get at or to 
understand. The individual difference is a very mysterious entity for Scotus. The 
mind is not really at home among individuals on Scotus’s doctrine. It is most at 
home with common natures. Even the senses have only a very indirect awareness 
of individuals. For Scotus, the most mysterious thing around us is individuality. 
(In this respect, it is interesting to compare Scotus’s notion of the individual 
difference with Aquinas’s notion of esse. Each is very mysterious and hard to 
conceptualize. Each has a crucial role to play in the theory of individuation. We 
shall say a little more about this shortly.) 
 
In the literature on Scotus, you often see the term ‘haecceity’ (= “thisness”). This 
is perhaps not Scotus’s own term for the individual difference. (The manuscripts 
of Scotus do not agree with the early printed editions here — which are quite old 
and badly in need of revision.) Perhaps the term was coined by the early followers 
of Scotus and soon found its way into the manuscripts. In any case, it is a pretty 
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good term to describe what is going on. How do you get from animal to man? 
Add rationality. How do you get from man to this man? Simple: Add thisness. 
If you look at what Scotus has done from one point of view, it is easy to say that 
his notion of the individual difference is hopelessly ad hoc, and so has “all the 
advantages of theft over honest toil,” as Bertrand Russell once said. 
After all, what is the individual difference exactly? By his own admission, he 
cannot say. All he has is a job description for it (the one we’ve just seen in 
requirements (1) to (4)). He has no idea at all what it is that does that job. 
As a result, you might say that Scotus has got himself into serious trouble. He has 
contrived a metaphysics of common natures that need a principle of individuation. 
But then he systematically denies that it can be any of the familiar things in his 
metaphysics. It is not matter, not a form, or at least not an intelligible form (since 
then it would be common). It is not an accident, not esse. 
Now that’s a problem, you might well object. But instead of facing it, and 
admitting that nothing in his metaphysics can possibly do this necessary job, 
Scotus manufactures on the spot some totally new and previously unheard of 
entity the sole purpose of which is to get him out of this problem. 
Is this not a paradigm case of an ad hoc move? 
But don’t be so sure. Maybe it is and may it isn’t. (In fact, I think it is a very 
fruitful philosophical exercise to reflect deeply on the notion of the ad hoc.) 
After all, what should Scotus have done? Granted, it would have been nice if he 
could have said more about what this individual difference is, but that doesn’t 
mean what he did say is illegitimate or suspicious. It is not as though Scotus 
found himself by chance in the position of needing to appeal to this mysterious 
entity. He has arguments: We need a principle of individuation. Natures are 
common by themselves, not individual — for the two metaphysical and three 
epistemological reasons we discussed earlier. 
But, as have seen, the principle of individuation cannot be any of the other things 
we have considered in this series of question, for the reasons given. 
In short, if all the arguments work, then Scotus has a proof that there is a principle 
of individuation of the kind he says, even though he can’t say any more about it. 
In the face of that proof, just what was he supposed to do? Just freeze up and 
panic? 
The moral of this story is: Always be slow to accuse a philosophical move or a 
theory of being ad hoc. There is almost always a reason (whether you think it is a 
good one or not) why the author felt compelled to make the move he did. 
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Haecceity for Scotus is not a thing (= res). It doesn’t combine with the nature as 
two things combine to form a third thing — as matter and form, for instance, 
combine to form a composite material object. 
(For Scotus, matter and form are really distinct. God can make either exist 
without the other. This is part of the Augustinian tradition: matter even by itself 
has a certain minimal degree of actuality. This is quite unlike Aquinas’s theory, 
for instance.) 
Socrates’s nature (humanity) and his haecceity are not two things, but two 
“realities,” not two res but two realitates. There is (perhaps) a formal distinction 
between them. 
Note: Haecceity or the individual difference really introduces a 
new and fourth level into Scotus’s ontology, in addition to 
individual things, common natures and concepts. Haecceity is not a 
thing, it certainly isn’t a common nature, and it isn’t a concept. Is it 
then a mode? I’m not sure. On the one hand, perhaps it is. Recall 
that earlier we said that both universality and individuality (that is, 
thisness, haecceity?) were modes of a nature. On the other hand, 
perhaps not. Recall that just a little while ago, we saw Scotus give 
an argument against the notion that esse is a principle of 
individuation, on the grounds that it is a mode. 
Remember how both community and individuality belong to the nature outside 
the mind, for Scotus. Community, we said, is the possibility of being in many. 
That is, it is not repugnant or inconsistent with the nature to be in many. Even if 
there were only one human being, humanity would still be common in this sense. 
As for individuality, the nature has it too outside the mind, not ex se of course, but 
rather only in virtue of something else, in virtue of the individual difference, the 
haecceity. 
Haecceity or thisness at first looks a bit like the notion of a bare particular that 
was discussed in certain philosophical literature in the middle of the twentieth 
century. But, at least as far as most of that literature is concerned, the two are not 
the same at all. Haecceity does not underlie anything; it does not exemplify 
anything; it is not a subject of predication. Socrates’s haecceity is not Socrates 
himself. Keep these differences in mind when you read various recent 
philosophers who announce that they are going to do such and such in a “Scotist” 
way, or that such and such in their theory is the equivalent of Scotus’s haecceity. 
Those I’ve seen are for the most part not equivalent at all. 
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If we look back over Scotus and Aquinas, and look ahead a little to Ockham, it is 
worth saying that one of the big differences among these people is over the 
question where you want your great mystery. For Aquinas, it is esse, which is 
very strange for him. (We have no concept of it, recall.) For Scotus, it is haecceity 
or individuality. For Ockham, as we shall soon see, it is universality or 
commonness. 
Scotus’s haecceity in some ways plays a role in his philosophy comparable to that 
of esse for Aquinas. It is worth thinking about this a long time. Both at the very 
heart of their respective philosophies. In both cases, it is the positive principle of 
individuation (in at least sense (b) of that term — a principle of identification, 
what makes Socrates Socrates), there is no proper concept to be had of it, it is not 
a common nature, not a universal. Each individual has its own. And it is not a 
thing, but a kind of “principle.” It is not a thing because it cannot exist separately, 
and what it combines with cannot exist separately from it. 
Let me finish this discussion of Scotus with a few miscellaneous remarks. 
(1) First, Scotus’s view of God. God is special in Scotus’s ontology. For him, 
the divine nature is the only nature that is de se hoc. God just comes already 
individual. He needs no principle of individuation to narrow divinity down to the 
one God. Everything in God is de se hoc. There is a formal distinction, to be sure, 
between God and his will, his intellect, and so on, but all those formally distinct 
features are nevertheless quite individualized, and are all de se hoc. 
But perhaps even more important in view of what is just coming up, for Scotus 
there is nothing really common between God and creatures. This was of course 
more or less “standard” medieval doctrine. It was a “commonplace.” 
The idea was this: If there were some metaphysical feature common to God and 
creatures, then God would have to be composite. He would have the metaphysical 
feature he share with creatures, but he would also need some additional ingredient 
to distinguish him from creatures. But God cannot be composite, because 
composites need efficient causes. We first saw this notion with Aquinas, but it is a 
view that is by no means confined to him. 
In Scotistic terms, therefore, God must be de se hoc. If there were something 
common to God and creatures, then this something would have to contracted to 
God, so that he would not be simple any longer. For Scotus, therefore, and for 
Aquinas and others too, there is quite a sharp and radical metaphysical gap 
between God and creatures. There is nothing in common there. 
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Nevertheless, for Scotus at least, we can form a universal concept common to 
God and creatures — for instance, the concepts “being,” “good,” and so on. We 
can do this because creatures are like God in various degrees, even though they 
share no nature of any kind with God. 
Aquinas disagreed. Not only is there no metaphysical nature common to God and 
creatures, there is no concept that can be applied univocally to God and creatures 
either. Aquinas then goes on to offer instead his famous theory of analogy, which 
is notoriously difficult. The basis for Aquinas’s refusal to allow a univocal 
concept to apply equally to God and creatures seems to be the assumption that if 
there were any such univocal concept in common, then there would have to be a 
common nature to ground it. This nature would then require some kind of 
principle of individuation, so that God would end up being composite, with all the 
problems we have just seen. 
Oddly, this means that in a sense it is Aquinas who is the more “realist” here. It is 
Scotus who, in this one special case, refuses to allow that a common univocal 
concept implies a common nature, which view has always been one of the main 
pressures in favor of realism. Ockham will hit Scotus hard on this point. 
(2) Second, remember the basic principle that goes back to Parmenides, the 
identification of being with intelligibility. What is most fully real is also most 
fully intelligible. Now in the Aristotelian tradition in which Scotus finds himself, 
the individual is what is most fully real, what most fully is. Hence the individual 
is in itself intelligible. There is nothing in the individual that is opaque to 
intelligence in principle, including its haecceity or thisness. God and the angels, 
for instance, know the individual through and through. We do not, unfortunately. 
For us, individuals and their individuality constitute the most mysterious things 
around us. In our present life, we have a direct and immediate knowledge only of 
common natures — both in intellection and in sensation. Sensation nevertheless 
can get some small grasp on the individual by means of the common sensibles. So 
too the intellect can get a minimal grasp on the individual by turning to the sense 
impression or image, the so called “phantasm.” 
Aquinas has a similar doctrine, the so called conversio ad phantasmata as an 
account of our intellectual knowledge of individuals. How does it work in Scotus? 
Remember that the job of the agent intellect for Scotus was to read off one by one 
the common natures that were all simultaneously present, but mixed up, in the 
sense-image. The sense-image presents all at once a number of common natures. 
These will include the proper objects of the various senses — colors, sounds, and 
so on — and also the common sensibles — place, shape, orientation, size, and so 
on. Note that all these are accidents, and they are all common. We do not come 
into direct cognitive contact with common natures in the category of substance. 
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Neither do we come into direct cognitive contact with thisness. Nevertheless, we 
can form a complex concept of the individual by describing it in terms of these 
accidental features, including position and the common sensibles, which are 
included in the sense-image. 
If we think of concepts as forming the vocabulary of a mental language (as 
Ockham and others would do), then there are no proper names in a Scotist mental 
language, only descriptions. 
Knowledge of the individual can only come about in this very discursive and 
laborious way. Essences (in the category of substance) and haecceity are opaque 
to us. Recall the Boethian tradition of individuation by accidents. Scotus is in 
effect saying that, while metaphysically that doctrine is just backwards — putting 
the prior after the posterior — nevertheless epistemologically it is correct. That is 
exactly the way we come to know the individual, even if it is not the way the 
individual comes to be constituted. 
Ockham 
We turn now to Ockham. 
First of all, please note his name. It is spelled ‘Ockham’ — not ‘Occam’, as you 
sometimes see it. The latter is the French spelling, and has achieved some 
currency in the English secondary literature because many of the most prominent 
historians of medieval philosophy in the early part of the twentieth century were 
Frenchmen. But in fact, it is a place-name. Ockham was born in the town of 
Ockham, in Surrey, and it is spelled ‘Ockham’. Just to put him in chronological 
perspective, you should know that he was born sometime around 1385 and died in 
1347, probably of plague. (Sometimes you see the year 1349, but it is now pretty 
well established that that’s wrong.) Scotus, you will remember, died in 1308. 
Reading Assignment: Please read everything that’s left in Five 
Texts, and in the Notes and Texts — that is, all the Ockham 
material. Note: I am not stupid. This adds up to many pages of 
very dense stuff, and I know perfectly well you are not going to 
read it all carefully. But it’s assigned anyway, so just do your best. 
Sometime before 1350, an anonymous author wrote a very interesting work with 
the title De principiis theologiae (= On the Principles of Theology). 
At one time the work was thought to be possibly by Ockham, but it is now pretty 
generally agreed that it isn’t his. Nevertheless, the doctrine in the little treatise is 
genuinely “Ockhamist.” And this makes the work all the more interesting, 
because it purports to systematize all of Ockham’s philosophy and theology 
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around two main principles, from which the author then “deduces” various 
“theorems” of Ockhamism in a systematic fashion. 
Neither of the two main principles is unique to Ockham, although both are 
certainly guiding ideas in Ockham’s thought, to which he returns again and again. 
Here they are: 
(1) God can do whatever is not absolutely impossible. There is 
nothing new about this claim, of course. Everyone held this 
in effect, and had for centuries. But in Ockham and his 
contemporaries, there is a new emphasis on the power of 
God. God is not bound by natural necessity, the laws of 
nature. In short, God is boss, not Aristotelian physics. For 
the background on this development, see The Course in the 
Box, Ver. 2.0, on the so called “Condemnation of 1277,” 
and for some interesting applications, see the chapter on 
“Intuitive Cognition.” 
(2) The so called “Ockham’s Razor”: Don’t multiply entities 
beyond necessity. In other words, get by with as much 
theoretical economy as you can. Note that Ockham 
nowhere enunciates this principle in the form in which it is 
usually given (and in which I just gave it). And even if he 
had, there would have been nothing novel about it. You can 
find similar statements in Scotus, after all. Almost 
everyone agreed on the principle; the disputes are always 
over just how many kinds of entities are really “necessary.” 
Principle (1), divine omnipotence, is primarily a theological principle. It follows 
from the doctrine of creation. Here’s how: 
The doctrine of creation holds the following two claims at least: 
(a) God produced everything other than himself. He did not, 
like the Platonic Demiurge, simply shape some pre-existing 
materials. No, he produced the materials too. Absolutely 
everything other than God himself is a product of God’s 
creative activity. 
(b) God didn’t have to do this. He didn’t have to create at all, 
and given that he did create, he didn’t have to create things 
the way he did. Again, God is not like the Platonic 
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Demiurge, who has to do what he does out of the necessity 
of his nature. 
From (a) it follows that there are no external constraints on God’s creative 
powers, since before he creates there is no external anything. And from (b), it 
follows (although there may be some steps to fill in) that there are no internal 
constraints either. Hence, combining these two claims, it follows that there are no 
constraints at all on God’s creative powers, which is just to say he is omnipotent. 
In this sense, then, the doctrine of divine omnipotence is a theological claim. And 
Ockham explicitly recognizes it as such. He says he finds it in the Creed: “I 
believe in God the Father Almighty....” (And of course he did find it there.) 
Principle (2) is the main thing that is always associated with Ockham’s 
nominalism. Ockham rejects Scotus’s theory of common natures. He doesn’t 
think they are needed to explain the facts. Thus, for Ockham, the only things that 
exist are individual substances and their individual qualities (that is, for example, 
the whiteness of this particular piece of chalk). There is nothing metaphysically 
common for Ockham. 
 
Digression: There are two separate issues here. Ockham not only thinks he can do 
without universals. He also thinks he can do without all the Aristotelian 
categories except for substance and quality. All the rest can be reduced, he thinks, 
to those two. The secondarily literature often very carelessly lumps these two 
issues together under the heading “nominalism,” as though they were the same 
thing. But in fact they are entirely separate issues. It is quite possible to think 
there are no universals, and yet that you need to allow entities in all the traditional 
Aristotelian categories (or in a different combination of them than Ockham 
allows). And it is equally possible to think you can reduce the number of 
Aristotelian categories as Ockham does, and still to think you will need to allow 
universal entities in some or all of these categories. All these possibilities are 
actually realized in various medieval authors. 
Sometimes people wonder why Ockham picked substance and quality as the only 
two non-eliminable categories. Why those two? Well, substance is pretty basic, 
but why include quality? Why not eliminate it too? 
For example, Ockham thinks there are no real entities in the Aristotelian category 
of relation. (Technically, that’s not quite true. He is willing to allow a few highly 
specialized kinds of relations because he thinks they’re required by certain 
theological considerations — for instance, in the case of the Trinity. But there 
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aren’t any relations in the purely creaturely world.) Ockham is perfectly willing, 
of course, to say that substance A is really related to substance B in various ways. 
He doesn’t deny that. What he does deny is that this fact requires us to posit novel 
entities in the category of relation. He thinks he can account for A’s being related 
to B without appealing to anything like that. 
Why then doesn’t Ockham do the same thing with quality? Why doesn’t he say, 
for instance, that the apple just is red, and that this does not require us to postulate 
a distinct redness in the category of quality? 
I don’t know for certain, but I have a deep suspicion that the answer is in the 
doctrine of the Eucharist. Ockham, like everyone else at this period, held that at 
the moment of consecration during the Mass, the substance of the bread and wine 
of the Eucharist is no longer there, but is replaced by the body and blood of 
Christ. On the other hand, the accidents of the bread and wine are obviously still 
there — we can sense them: the whiteness of the bread, its taste, etc. Of course, 
we can’t say that these accidents inhere in the body and blood of Christ. The body 
of Christ, for example, isn’t white and flat and small like the bread. 
So what do we do with the accidents of the bread and wine after the consecration? 
The standard doctrine was that they just hover there, accidents without an 
underlying substance. This sort of thing would never happen in the normal course 
of events, to be sure, where accidents always require a substrate. But, according 
to the doctrine, it does — and therefore can — happen in the Eucharist. And this 
means, of course, that we must allow in our ontology some accidents in addition 
to substances. 
Although I know of no text to support this conjecture, I suspect this is one of the 
main reasons Ockham did not go all the way and eliminate entities in all the 
Aristotelian categories of accident. 
 
Back to Ockham’s rejection of universals. Because Ockham denies Scotus’s 
common natures, there is for Ockham no such thing as real minor unity, no such 
thing as the formal distinction. The only kind of real unity is numerical unity. The 
only kind of distinction on the part of reality is the real distinction between 
separable entities (separable at least by the power of God). There are no Scotist 
formalities, only things (= res). So far, except perhaps for the criterion of the “real 
distinction,” this sounds just like Thomas Aquinas on the Owens interpretation. 
Ockham’s world is therefore made up of a number of isolated units, sharing 
nothing at all in common. Again, this sounds like Owens’s version of Aquinas. 
Ockham thinks this is Aristotle’s doctrine, and is moreover supported by 
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experience. We encounter only individuals, after all, in our experience. (So much 
for Scotus’s view that we never encounter individuals, even at the level of 
sensation, but only common natures.) 
Ockham thought he was perhaps the first one to understand all the implications of 
this. In any case, he thought his predecessors had betrayed this basic idea by 
giving lip-service to it, but then granting that nevertheless in some sense there is 
universality or community in the world anyway. 
In effect, what Ockham has done is to take Scotus’s view of the relation between 
God and creatures and make it paradigmatic of the relations among all things. In 
other words, Ockham is arguing in effect, if you can have a concept that equally 
applies to God and creatures, even though there is nothing really common or 
shared by them, as Scotus thinks you can, then why can’t you do the same thing 
in the case of creature and creature? Remember, Scotus had some arguments 
about the need for real common natures to ground the objectivity of our concepts. 
(Recall his epistemological arguments for common natures.) If those arguments 
are any good to begin with, then they should apply just as much to concepts 
common to God and creatures as they do to concepts common only to creatures. 
There is nothing in those arguments that restricted them to only certain concepts 
and not to others; they are quite general. Conversely, therefore, if those arguments 
do not apply to concepts common to God and creatures, then there must be 
something wrong with the arguments. But then why should we think they apply 
anywhere? 
Of course, Ockham is not going to pin his metaphysics on the adequacy or 
inadequacy of Scotus’s view of God’s relations to creatures. He needs 
independent arguments, and has to show that Scotus’s arguments do not hold. 
There is another way too in which Ockham will take Scotus’s talk about God as 
paradigmatic. Scotus says the divine nature is de se hoc, but is the only nature like 
that. Ockham is going to say the same thing holds of every nature whatsoever. 
Every nature is by itself a this. It is already individual, and does not need to be 
individuated. This is just the theory Scotus discussed in his Question 1. (Others 
had held it before Ockham — for instance, Richard of Middleton and Godfrey of 
Fontaines — so Scotus wasn’t prophesying about what Ockham would say later 
on.) 
Thus, for Ockham, there is no need to look for a principle of individuation, as 
Scotus and others had done. All that is just so much wasted effort. What we need 
to explain is not the individual, but the universal concept. How do we get that, if 
everything is as individual as Ockham says it is? In short, Ockham has the 
epistemological problems we learned to expect from nominalism as far back as 
the very first lecture in this course. 
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In his Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, Book I, distinction 2, 
questions 4–8, Ockham gives us a long “treatise” on the universal. I have 
translated the whole thing for you in Five Texts. 
For some reason, although the passage we looked at from Scotus and this passage 
from Ockham are absolutely crucial texts in the later medieval history of the 
problem of universals — and despite the fact that scholars have known this 
centuries — the translation in Five Texts are the first time they have ever been 
translated into English in full. 
There are some other relevant texts of Ockham on universals in the Notes and 
Texts. I’ll mention them as needed while we’re going along. 
In connection with the long Ockham passage in Five Texts, it is probably good to 
look back to the table of contents at the beginning of that volume. This will 
provide you with a little outline of Ockham’s discussion in his Commentary on 
the Sentences, so you will be able to keep track of what is going on. As the 
discussion unfolds, Ockham considers progressively less and less realistic views, 
until he concludes that the universal is only in the mind, that it is only a concept. 
 
Now let’s go through Ockham’s discussion. 
In question 4, Ockham considers the view that a universal is a real thing (a res), 
outside the mind and in individuals, really distinct from them, and not 
“multiplied” according to the multiplication of individuals. 
The last clause — about “not being multiplied” — just means you have only one 
in several individuals. If you perform the “plucked chicken” experiment we have 
done so many times before, this theory says you have only one humanity in 
Socrates and Plato after you get done pulling off all their distinguishing features. 
This is perhaps the same as the realist theory we saw earlier in William of 
Champeaux’ first theory, and in Clarembald of Arras. I say perhaps because at 
that time there was not yet a developed vocabulary and doctrine about the “real” 
distinction, so it is hard to know what they would say about it. 
Nevertheless, I think the author Ockham has primarily in mind here is almost 
certainly not any of those people, but rather his contemporary Walter Burley (also 
spelled ‘Burleigh’). I have translated an important text of Burley’s, his On 
Universals, in the Notes and Texts. 
When the critical editors of Ockham’s writings published the Latin edition of this 
passage in 1970, there was not much known about Walter Burley’s views. It was 
known that he had a reputation as a realist of some stripe or other, and that he and 
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Ockham engaged in a kind of controversy over certain semantical principles. But 
that was about all. 
Since then, however, more has come to be known about Burley’s views. And I 
think it is now pretty certain that Burley is the one Ockham has in mind here. The 
thing that makes me think this is the fact that on the theory Ockham is describing, 
universals are said to be present in but nevertheless really distinct from their 
individuals. And this was a characteristic feature of Burley’s doctrine. 
Burley’s main reason for saying this (see his On Universals, §§ (57)–(61) in the 
Notes and Texts, p. 87) is that opposite things can be truly said about universals 
and their individuals. Hence, by the principle of non-contradiction, they can 
hardly be really the same. (Note: This is exactly the same criterion of real 
distinction we said Ockham had. See formula I on the handout “More on Kinds of 
Unity and Distinction.”) It’s just the Indiscernibility of Identicals. 
For example: 
(a) Universals are in many; individuals aren’t. 
(b) Universals can be defined (at least some of them can — 
not, for instance, the most general genera); individuals 
cannot. 
And so on. 
Ockham says that the reasons given for this view are these (and all of them are in 
fact found explicitly in Burley’s text, which lends credence to my identification of 
Ockham’s opponent with Burley): 
(a) To explain definition. I define the universal man, not the 
individual Socrates. (As we discussed at the beginning of 
this course, individuals cannot be defined in the 
Aristotelian tradition.) That is why the people who hold 
this view say there is a real distinction between the 
individual and the universal (otherwise, when I define the 
one I would have defined the other), and why the universal 
is not multiplied according to the multiplication of 
individuals (why should it be, since they are really 
distinct?). (See Burley, On Universals, § (36) and 
elsewhere.) 
(b) To explain essential predication. When I predicate ‘man’ of 
Socrates, man must be really in Socrates, not separated 
from him. That is why the people who hold this view say 
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the universal is in individuals. (See, for example, Burley, 
§§ (30)–(31).) 
(c) To ground the objectivity of the sciences. (Recall Scotus’s 
epistemological arguments earlier, and see Burley, § (45).) 
 
Ockham’s reply to this view is that is totally false and absurd. (It is fun to watch 
how these epithets get less and less strong as Ockham considers less and less 
realist views.) If the universal is really distinct from the individual, then, Ockham 
says: 
(1) It would follow that God could create the universal without 
the individual and vice versa. But if you can have the 
individual without its universal, then what good does it do 
to posit the universal nature to begin with? (Don’t multiply 
entities beyond necessity.) 
Note: Ockham explicitly says that if the universal and the individual were really 
distinct, then each one could exist without the other. It goes both ways. 
For Scotus, on the other hand, the theory of the real distinction was different. (See 
formula II.2 on the handout “More on Kinds of Unity and Distinction.”) For him, 
it is only if the two really distinct things are not related in such a way that the one 
is causally dependent on the other that we have this two-way separability. 
Otherwise, only one half of it holds: the causally prior and independent one can 
exist without the causally posterior and dependent one, but of course not the other 
way around. 
Ockham drops that proviso. For him — with only one exception — whenever two 
things are really distinct, each one can exist without the other. The exception is of 
course if at least one of the two is God. (If both of them are God — for example, 
if we are talking about the real distinction between two persons of the Trinity — 
then of course neither one can exist without the other.) 
Whether this difference represents a genuine difference of theory about the real 
distinction, I am not sure. It may represent instead only the fact that Ockham has a 
different theory of causal dependence, which he certainly does. 
For help with all this, consult Marilyn Adams, “Ockham on Identity and 
Distinction” (in the “Articles (Bibliography)” subfolder on Oncourse — the paper 
talks about Scotus as well as Ockham), and her book William Ockham, on 
physical reserve at the Wells Library. Also her paper, “Was Ockham A Humean 
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About Efficient Causality,” Franciscan Studies 39 (1979), pp. 5–48 (which I 
don’t have online). 
(2) Furthermore, Ockham says, this strongly realist view would 
not account for essential predication, which was one of the 
main considerations that motivated it in the first place. 
If the universal man is really distinct from Socrates, then it is present in him only 
as a part, and parts are never predicated of their wholes. Socrates is not his hand, 
and in general wholes are not their parts — they have their parts. 
If you object that this is true of integral wholes but not of universal wholes, 
Ockham will deny that it makes any difference. A universal whole (for example, 
animal) is predicated of its subjective part (for example, man), but for no type of 
whole is the part predicated of the whole. 
(It seems to me that the whole force of this objection rests on Ockham’s claim 
that if the universal is really distinct from its individual, then it must be present 
only as a part. What reason is there to believe that? It’s not an implausible claim, 
but one would like to see this filled out more. I suspect Ockham has some quite 
general considerations from which this follows, but I am not sure what they are.) 
In any case, Ockham thinks that, on the contrary, what is predicated is not any 
real universal at all, but simply a common term. 
For Ockham, there is a sharp distinction between ontology and language. For him, 
there is none of this real predication stuff that we saw discussed (and rejected, at 
least for universals) by Abelard, and saw accepted by both Avicenna and Scotus. 
For Ockham, what is predicated is simply a term, a piece of language. 
A term is individual just like anything else, metaphysically speaking. But it is 
“common” or “universal” in the sense that it stands for many things, or as 
Ockham says, “supposits” for many things. 
(‘Supposition’ is a technical term from medieval logic. It doesn’t 
mean “assumption,” although that usage was current too. For 
present purposes, just read the term as “standing for” or “referring 
to.” The origin of the term is very obscure. But it appears to have 
come out of speculations on the Trinity. The term ‘suppositum’ is a 
technical term in Trinitarian theology — and in the theology of the 
Incarnation, for that matter. It means that in which other things 
“inhere” — as for instance accidents inhere in a substance — but 
does not itself inhere in anything else. One of the main branches of 
“supposition” is called “personal supposition,” which certainly 
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suggests the kinds of issues that arise in discussions of the Trinity 
and the Incarnation. If you’re interested in a capsule summary of 
what you need to know about supposition-theory, see my chapter 
on “The Semantics of Terms” in The Cambridge History of Later 
Medieval Philosophy — on physical reserve in the Wells Library.) 
The term ‘man’ in the sentence ‘Socrates is a man’ stands for or supposits for men 
— for all of them. So too in the sentence ‘Plato is a man’. Those sentences are 
true if and only if the predicate term ‘man’ stands for or supposits for what the 
subject stands for or supposits for (and perhaps more besides). Predication can be 
explained without appealing at any point to real universals. (Notice how all this 
sounds a little like Abelard — although of course the details turn out to be quite 
different.) 
As for the first consideration that motivated this first theory of universals (the 
consideration about definition), Ockham has a theory of definition, developed in 
his Summa logicae and elsewhere, according to which terms are defined, not 
things. And of course the universal or common term IS “really distinct” from the 
individual or singular term. But that is no argument for Burleian realism. 
With respect to the third and final consideration in favor of this theory (the 
consideration about science), Ockham holds that it is indeed true, as Aristotle had 
said, that science deals with universals. But the only universals there are for 
Ockham are universal terms, and primarily terms in mental language or thought 
— which is to say, primarily concepts. (Ockham regarded thinking as a kind of 
language of its own. If semantics is the theory of the relation between language 
and what that language is “about,” then we can say that the semantics of mental 
language is a branch of epistemology.) 
For Ockham, the object of a science is simply sentences with general terms in 
them. That’s how he accommodates Aristotle’s dictum that science deals with the 
universal. 
This of course doesn’t mean that we can never, in our knowledge, get beyond the 
level of language to things. For Ockham, there are two senses of the term ‘know’ 
(= scire in Latin, from which comes scientia = ”science”): 
(a) As we just said, the sense in which to know is to know a 
sentence, or a term in that sentence. In this sense, the object 
of a science is universal. 
(b) We can also be said to know what that sentence is about, 
what the subject-term in it stands or supposits for. What we 
know in this sense is invariably the individual, 
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metaphysically speaking, since there is nothing else for 
Ockham. This is not the object of science in the sense 
Aristotle is talking about. 
Traditionally, there were three kinds of sciences people distinguished: (a) the so 
called “real” sciences: physics, metaphysics and mathematics; (b) the so called 
“rational” science: logic; and (c) “grammatical” science: grammar. For each of 
these kinds of science, Ockham distinguishes a kind of “supposition.” 
(i) Going with “grammatical” science, there is what is called 
“material” supposition, in which terms stand for words they 
do not signify. For example, in ‘Man has three letters’, the 
subject term ‘man’ is in material supposition — at least in 
the sense in which the sentence is true. (But don’t make the 
mistake of thinking that Ockham’s “material supposition” 
is just what we do with quotation marks. It is more 
complex than that.) 
(ii) Going with the “rational” science of logic, there is what is 
called “simple” supposition. There terms stand for concepts 
they do not signify. These concepts are the genera and 
species that logic talks about. For instance, in the sentence 
‘Man is a species’ (in the sense in which it is true), the 
subject term ‘man’ stands for the concept “man,” which is a 
species — that is, a species-concept. It definitely does not 
stand for any real universal man. 
(iii) Going with the “real” sciences, there is what is called 
“personal” supposition (which has nothing especially to do 
with persons — although it perhaps originated in theorizing 
about the persons of the Trinity). There terms stand for the 
things they signify. For example, in the sentence ‘Man is an 
animal’, the subject term ‘man’ is in personal supposition, 
and stands for individual human beings. They are the ones 
who are animals. The spoken or written word is not an 
animal, and neither is the concept. 
What I have just given you is just a tiny taste of the very elaborate and subtle 
doctrine of supposition. But notice, no universal entities are needed to do any of 
this. This is in effect Ockham’s answer to Scotus’s epistemological arguments for 
common natures. They are just not needed for predication or science — or for 
definition, for that matter. 
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There is another Scotist argument, however, that has not yet been answered. It is 
the epistemological argument that common natures are needed to serve as the 
objects of intellect and sensation. Remember the dictum, “Sensation is of 
particulars, but understanding of universals.” Scotus had disagreed with this, and 
said that intellect and sense have the same object — namely, the common nature. 
Ockham too denies the dictum. He too thinks sensation and intellection have the 
same object, but he goes the opposite way from Scotus. For Ockham, that object 
is the individual. On Ockham’s ontology, there is simply nothing else for it to be. 
I can know an individual term that stands or supposits for many things, and can in 
that sense be said to know a universal, since by means of the term I can be said to 
know the many things it stands for. But there is no appeal to a common nature 
involved in any of this. 
 
So much for question 4. 
In question 5, Ockham considers a somewhat less realistic view of universals. 
This is approximately the view of Gilbert of Poitiers and Boethius in his 
Commentary on Porphyry. It is also approximately William of Champeaux’s 
second theory. 
I am not sure who Ockham is thinking of in this question, but he is perhaps 
thinking of a certain William of Alnwick (pronounced “Annick”). Scotus 
describes such a view, and attributes it to Alnwick. 
According to this theory, the universal is a res outside the mind, really distinct 
from individuals, but nevertheless in them, and is multiplied according to the 
number of individuals. It is the last clause that distinguishes this theory from the 
one just considered in question 4. 
On this theory, the universal is multiplied in the same way the impression of the 
signet-ring is “multiplied” according to the number of times you stamp it on 
different spots of wax. 
Ockham’s verdict on this view is that it is simply false (which, I suppose, is not so 
bad as being totally false and absurd, as the first view was, to its shame). On this 
theory, Ockham says, there is an individuating difference that contracts the nature 
and multiplies it. The nature is really distinct from the difference, and therefore 
God can create the humanities of Socrates and Plato, say, without the 
individuating differences. (Once again, note Ockham’s criterion of the real 
distinction here.) But if that actually happened, and God did create the humanities 
of Socrates and Plato without their individuating differences, those humanities 
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would still be two humanities — or so at least Ockham says. But, if they would 
still be two in the absence of any individuating differences, they would perforce 
be two all by themselves. 
Why is Ockham so sure that the humanities of Socrates and Plato would continue 
to be two even in the absence of their individuating differences? Well, the point is 
just that if they were not two but one, then we are back to the first view, and we 
have already discussed that in question 4. 
Hence, Ockham concludes, the individual difference is superfluous on this theory. 
The only function it is supposed to perform can be done just as well without it. 
This is a curious argument, and I am not sure how to evaluate it. Surely William 
of Champeaux and Gilbert of Poitiers never spoke of any individuating difference 
in these terms, and they certainly didn’t say such an individuating difference was 
really distinct from the nature it differentiates, at least not in the sense of the term 
‘real distinction’ Ockham has in mind. I don’t know about William of Alnwick’s 
view here. 
In question 5 especially, and perhaps also in question 4, Ockham is perhaps 
taking unfair advantage of the notion of real distinction. Surely the authors of 
these views never meant to imply that the individual could exist separately from 
its universal ingredients. When they said the universal is really distinct from the 
individual (or from the individuating difference — if in fact anyone ever really 
said that), all they probably meant was some kind of distinction grounded in 
reality. Such a distinction could perhaps be less than what came to be defined 
later as a real distinction in the technical sense. Perhaps something like Scotus’s 
formal distinction would be closer to what they really had in mind. 
 
Well, this brings us naturally to Scotus’s own theory, which Ockham discusses in 
question 6. He gives a pretty accurate account of what Scotus’s view is. (In 
generally, Ockham was scrupulous about presenting Scotus’s views correctly. He 
regarded Scotus as a worthy adversary, and wouldn’t stand for any quick and easy 
“victory” based on a mere caricature.) 
We have already seen what Scotus himself had to say about all of this. Here is the 
way Ockham puts it: According to this theory, the universal (Scotus would call it 
only an “incomplete” or “potential” universal, the common nature) is outside the 
mind, in individuals, but distinct from those individuals by a distinction based in 
reality — only that distinction is not a full-fledged real distinction but instead 
only a formal distinction. 
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Ockham thinks this theory is unreasonable (which is not so bad as being totally 
false and absurd, or even as being simply false). He simply rejects it. For 
Ockham, only concepts are common — and, derivatively, we can say that spoken 
or written terms are common too, insofar as they are “subordinated” to common 
concepts, which is to say: insofar as they express those concepts through the 
conventions of language. 
Ockham simply refuses to accept the idea that there is any distinction at all on the 
side of reality, real or formal, between the individual and its nature. He doesn’t 
think any such distinction is needed, or in fact that any such distinction even 
makes sense. 
In effect, Ockham is pressing some logical points against Scotus. Recall how 
Scotus’s real less than numerical unity was a kind of “unity” that allowed us to 
say opposite things at once about the common nature. Ockham is emphasizing the 
logical difficulty of making sense out of this. 
What then about Scotus’s own actual arguments? What does Ockham have to say 
to them? 
Well, the epistemological arguments have in effect already been answered. We 
talked about them when we were discussing Ockham’s question 4, dealing with a 
stronger form of realism than Scotus had, to be sure, although the same kinds of 
considerations apply here as well. 
But what about Scotus’s metaphysical arguments for common natures? There 
were two of them, recall. First, that they were needed to account for real relation 
of sameness, similarity and quality, and second, that they were needed to account 
for real univocal causality. Since the basis for the second argument is the idea that 
the effect must be similar to the cause, the second argument is really just a special 
case of the first one. So Ockham has to show us how we can have real relations of 
similarity, equality, and so on, without appealing to Scotist common natures. 
Ockham’s answer is: Let’s just look at what happens here. We observe men, let us 
say, to be much alike. Because of their being similar, we can form a specific 
concept of “man.” Ockham even uses the term ‘abstraction’ to describe this 
formation process, but it is certainly not abstraction in the usual sense. It doesn’t 
mean there is anything shared by those similar men. 
Things are really similar. Ockham never denies that. But they are not really 
similar in virtue of some third entity, a similarity. They are just similar all by 
themselves. If there is no common nature needed to ground the fact that creatures 
resemble God in varying degrees (as Scotus had already granted), then none is 
needed to ground the fact that one creature resembles another. 
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Furthermore, Ockham gives some arguments against Scotus’s theory of relations 
in general. First, he gives a kind of “regress”-argument that I don’t understand 
very well. Second, he argues that if, as Scotus says, the relation is a third thing 
really distinct from the relata (as Scotus had said), then God could create it 
separately. In that case, of course, we would have a similarity without there being 
anything similar. And Ockham thinks that’s just silly. 
Here again we see the difference between Ockham’s notions of the real 
distinction and Scotus’s. This result would simply not follow on Scotus’s theory 
of the real distinction. 
For Ockham, relations are just relational terms. Things really are related to one 
another, but they are not related to one another in virtue of some entity we call a 
relation. They are just related to one another all by themselves. 
 
In question 7, Ockham considers an even less realistic theory of universals — but 
still too realistic for his own tastes. According to this view, universals are outside 
the mind and in individuals. (Notice, incidentally, that Ockham never considers 
the theory that universals are outside the mind but separated from individuals — 
like Platonic Ideas. They clearly aren’t universals in the sense people were 
discussing. Recall Boethius’s definition of a universal and our discussion of how, 
on this notion of a universal, Plato was a nominalist.) In addition, according to 
this theory, universals are not distinct from their individuals by any distinction on 
the side of reality, either a real distinction or a formal distinction. The distinction 
between the universal and the individual is only a distinction of reason. 
(Recall Aquinas’s own statement, Summa contra gentiles, I, Chap. 
26: “What is common to many is not anything over and above the 
many except by the reason alone.”) 
Ockham considers three variants of this theory. The first one has not been 
identified, so let’s just skip over it. The second one, however, is Aquinas’s theory 
— or at least the way certain Thomists put Aquinas’s view. According to that 
theory, the same common nature is singular according to the actual esse it has in 
things, but it is universal according to the esse it has in the mind. 
Ockham’s response to this is that nothing can be made universal just by thinking 
about it, just by being considered. For Ockham, understanding something is not a 
case of doing something to it. It is not acting on the thing. That seems obvious (or 
at least it seemed obvious before Kant came along at the end of the eighteenth 
century, with a whole different point of view on all this). But Aquinas’s view 
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seems to be committed to the opposite. For Aquinas, the intellect, for instance, 
acts on the nature and separates out the individuating conditions. 
Why is Aquinas committed to this implausible view? Well, he wants to say that in 
the two sentences ‘Man is an individual’ and ‘Man is a universal’, we are talking 
about the same thing, the same nature. In the first sentence, we are talking about 
the nature as it is in real, external objects. There, it is individual. But in the 
second sentence we are talking about the same nature as it is in the mind. There, it 
is universal. The Aristotelian theory of knowledge, according to which the 
knower is the known, requires that we be talking about the same thing in these 
two sentences. 
Ockham does not have any of these theoretical commitments. For him, the two 
sentences simply involve two different kinds of supposition. In the first case, the 
term ‘man’ has personal supposition, and in the second case it has simple 
supposition. The terms stand for quite distinct things. As Ockham sees it, Aquinas 
is just guilty of equivocation. 
What this means is that Ockham is giving up the old Aristotelian principle that the 
knower is the known. And with it, of course, he is giving up one of the best 
guarantees of the objectivity of our knowledge. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
nominalism is tied up with skepticism. (Not that Ockham embraced skepticism. 
But it is easy to see pressures in that direction in his doctrine — pressures he in 
fact resisted.) 
The third variant theory Ockham discusses in question 7 is the theory of Henry of 
Harclay, originally a follower of Scotus, who later turned critical of Scotus. This 
theory is very close to Ockham’s own — but it is still not quite there. 
Henry’s theory in fact sounds a lot like the view of Walter of Mortagne, which 
Abelard had argued against. On that theory, remember, Socrates insofar as he is 
Socrates is an individual, and insofar as he is a man he is a species, and so on. But 
it’s identically the same thing — namely, Socrates — we’re talking about in each 
case. 
On Henry’s theory, the universal is outside the mind, in things, not distinct from 
them by anything greater than a mere distinction of reason, and not in such a way 
that thinking about it makes it universal. 
For Henry, outside the mind everything is individual de se hoc. Ockham would 
applaud this. There is no individual difference; none is needed. Ockham would 
cheer this. But, Henry says, each individual can affect the mind in two ways: 
(a) It can make me know it distinctly — that is, it can cause a 
clear concept of itself. 
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(b) It can also make me know it “confusedly” — that is, it can 
cause a more vague concept in me, one that represents not 
only that individual, but also any other individual similar to 
it in certain relevant respects. 
Henry appeals to no common nature in any of this. Nevertheless, it is still too 
realistic for Ockham. 
But what, you may well ask, is realistic about this? It looks like a pretty austere 
nominalism. Well, Ockham says, Henry is still trying to find some ground for the 
universal concept in things. What it all comes down to is this: 
For Henry, like everyone else we have been considering so far, it is possible to 
derive a universal concept from a single experience of a thing. For fairly strong 
realist views this is quite easy; the mind just reads off a universal that is already 
present in its experience, even a single experience of a single instance. This is the 
way it is for the realism of William of Champeaux’s first theory, and the theory of 
Clarembald of Arras. This is also pretty much the way it is for Scotus. For 
Aquinas,  on the Owens interpretation, it’s a bit harder. The agent intellect has 
more work to do for Aquinas. It cannot simply read off the universal from the 
single experience. But still, it can get the universal concept from a single 
experience, if it just goes to enough effort. How it can do this is of course a great 
mystery. 
For Ockham, however, no universal concept can ever be derived from a single 
experience. It takes at least two experiences, which are then compared with one 
another, before we can get a universal concept. (In this respect, Ockham’s view 
sounds like, say, Locke’s.) And that is what is wrong with Henry of Harclay’s 
theory. As long as the same object can all by itself affect the mind in two ways, in 
one way producing a singular concept that is a concept only of that object, and in 
another way producing a general or universal concept of that thing and of other 
things similar to it — as long as the same object can do that all by itself, that is 
still too much for Ockham. 
(Incidentally, this provides us with an instructive rule of thumb that is very useful 
for measuring an author’s realism or nominalism: “Can we or can we not form a 
general or universal concept on the basis of a single experience?”) 
 
In question 8, Ockham draws his conclusions from all this. Universals are not 
outside the mind at all. Universals are in the mind. They are concepts. And he 
doesn’t then compromise this, as Scotus did, by saying that of course there is a 
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kind of “incomplete” universal or common nature out there in the world. No — 
community too can only be found in the mind. 
(Ockham is willing to say that spoken and written terms, which are not in the 
mind, are also universal or common. But their universality or community is 
derivative from that of concepts, and is by no means the kind of thing realists are 
thinking of. So it is not oversimplifying things too much to say that for Ockham 
universality and community can be found only in the mind.) 
Universals, then, are concepts. But what sorts of things are concepts? Well, 
Ockham considers four theories of concepts in question 8. 
(1) The first theory makes the concept a conventional sign. 
That is, what it is a concept of is a matter of arbitrary 
agreement or convention. This view has been attributed to 
Roscelin by some scholars, but heaven only knows what 
Roscelin really thought, or who Ockham was thinking of. 
In any case, Ockham rejects this theory. For him, the concept is a natural sign. 
That is to say, what it is a concept of is not a matter of convention or arbitrariness. 
It is fixed by nature. In fact, Ockham thinks concepts are likenesses of the things 
they are concepts of. He has a kind of “picture”-theory. Such “picture”-theories 
are notoriously difficult to work out in detail, but at any event it is clear that for 
Ockham it is not just a matter of taste or convention what concepts are concepts 
of. 
Setting that view aside, then, there are three other theories that Ockham ways are 
“probable.” (This just means that you can give a probatio =  ”proof” = pretty 
good argument. It is not “probability” in the statistical sense.) 
In this passage from the Commentary on the Sentences (translated in Five Texts), 
Ockham just leaves it at that. He does not seem to make up his mind and decide 
among the three theories, although he leans toward what is called the “fictum”-
theory. The three views he considers are these: 
(a) The “fictum”-theory, that the concept is a thought object, 
and has only an esse objectivum (= ”objective being” — 
objective not in our sense, but in the sense of being an 
object of thought, an intentional object.) On this theory the 
concept is not identical with the act of understanding, but is 
instead the object of that act. The theory is very much like 
Abelard’s fictum-theory earlier. On this view, the concept 
is very much like a “picture.” 
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Ockham later on rejected the fictum-theory. He did so primarily because of 
arguments raised against the theory by one Walter Chatton, a contemporary of 
Ockham. (There’s a passage from Chatton in the Notes and Texts.) 
Chatton and Ockham almost certainly knew one another, and probably taught 
together as colleagues. 
Ockham took Chatton’s arguments very seriously, and in fact changed his mind 
because of them. As far as I can figure out, Walter Chatton has the curious 
distinction of being the only person who ever got William of Ockham to change 
his mind — about anything! 
We can see some traces of this in Ockham’s Ordinatio. (Recall the meaning of 
this term — his own revised and corrected version of his Commentary on the 
Sentences. We have Ockham’s Ordinatio only for Book I of his Commentary. But 
that is OK, since that is the part that contains the discussion we are now 
considering.) 
What appears to have happened is that Ockham wrote a version of a Commentary 
on the Sentences, in which he maintained the fictum-theory fairly definitely. 
Chatton saw this version and criticized the view. Then, when Ockham later went 
back to his Commentary to go over it and prepare it for final “publication,” he 
added some material to take account of Chatton’s objections and tone down his 
own commitment to the fictum-theory. 
These later passages are identified in the critical Latin edition, and I have flagged 
them in my translation in Five Texts by enclosing them in pointed brackets. 
I have also given you a passage from Chatton, in which he criticizes the fictum-
theory as Ockham had held it. It is contained in the Notes and Texts, and comes 
from Chatton’s Reportatio. (Unlike an Ordinatio, a Reportatio was not gone over 
by the “master’s” own hand. Instead, it amounts to student’s lecture notes, with 
all the horrible possibilities that opens up.) 
Reduced to their most basic form, Chatton’s arguments went (in part) roughly like 
this: 
A fictum, a merely intentional object, would not be real in the sense that it would 
not fall into any of the ten Aristotelian categories. How then could it be like the 
objects it is supposed to represent? Concepts are supposed to be natural likenesses 
of their objects. But how could something that is not even in an Aristotelian 
category be like something that is? 
Furthermore, this theory leaves itself open to all the skeptical difficulties of a 
representational theory of cognition (think of Descartes!). For these reasons, then, 
Ockham later gave up the fictum-theory. 
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According to the two other “probable” theories, the concept or universal has an 
esse subjectivum — a “subjective being.” (Something funny happened to the 
terms ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ in the history of philosophy. They got 
completely turned around. Ockham’s subjective being means what we would 
mean by objective being — the being of a real subject or substance, or if not a 
substance, then at least a real subject of predication. I suspect this reversal of 
meanings was due to Kant, but I can’t prove it.) 
On these two theories, the concept is a real quality existing in the soul, and 
therefore does fall into the Aristotelian categories. Concepts are accidents of the 
mind, and really inhere in the mind just as color really inheres in a body. 
Note: It would seem that at least the first objection that led 
Ockham to reject the fictum-theory would also apply here. How 
can a quality in the mind be really similar to the substance 
Socrates? They are not even in the same category! So there is just 
as much a problem of getting concepts to be in general natural 
likenesses of their objects on this theory as there is on the fictum-
theory. I don’t know why Ockham apparently didn’t anticipate this 
point. 
There are two varieties of this theory, the first with two subcases: 
(b) The concept is distinct from the act of understanding but is 
still a real quality inhering in the mind. On this view, the 
concept can be either: 
(i) Prior to the act of understanding. In that case 
it would be what is called the intelligible 
species. This was the usual term for what the 
agent intellect somehow got out of the 
sense-image and then impressed on the 
receptive faculty of the mind. (Of course 
that process is totally different in Ockham 
than it is for the other people we have 
looked at.) Or else it could be 
(ii) Posterior to the act of understanding. This is 
called the mental word (= verbum mentale, 
or verbum mentis — the term applies to 
theories besides Ockham’s as well). This is 
the term for the result of the agent intellect’s 
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impressing the intelligible species on the 
receptive faculty of the mind. (The “act of 
understanding” in all this presumably refers 
to the act of the agent intellect in impressing 
the intelligible species on the mind’s 
receptive faculty.) 
(c) The concept just is the act itself. This is the so called 
intellectio-theory. Abelard referred to it, and rejected it 
without any real argument. I called your attention to that 
fact at the time, and commented that it would come up 
again. Here it is. 
In the relatively early Commentary on the Sentences (which is the passage we 
have been working through now), Ockham seems to favor the fictum-theory, even 
in his revised, Ordinatio version, although he does not unequivocally come down 
for any one of them. But in his later Commentary on the De interpretatione, he 
seems to favor the intellectio-theory. (See the passage from that commentary 
contained in the Notes and Texts.) It does not lend itself to the difficulties of the 
representational theory of cognition, as the fictum-theory does. And there is no 
need on the intellectio-theory for an intelligible species, as there is on both forms 
of theory (b), so that on grounds of theoretical economy, it is perhaps preferable. 
In any case, in his late work, the Quodlibets, Ockham definitely comes down in 
favor of the intellectio-theory to the exclusion of the others. (Again, see the 
passage from the Quodlibets translated in the Notes and Texts.) 
Note: The term ‘quodlibet’ basically means just “whatever you 
please.” It was the term given to disputed questions that were 
actually conducted in open forum at various ceremonial times of 
the year according to medieval academic customs. At these times, 
a “master” would post an announcement that he was going to 
conduct a quodlibet, which meant in effect that he would debate all 
who came along on any topic they picked! The results of these 
disputations, which were actually held, were then revised and 
edited for publication, and that is the form in which we have them 
today. 
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Now you may well be asking yourself: How does Ockham suppose the mind is 
able to form these universal concepts? After all, he’s made it pretty hard for 
himself, since he won’t even allow Henry of Harclay’s minimal degree of realism. 
Well, here it is. Ready? Ockham says (Ordinatio, dist. 2, q. 7, the objection in § 
(24), p. 194, and the reply in § (129), p. 212): 
Nature does work mysteriously in the case of 
universals. 
Natura occulte operatur in universalibus. 
In other words, “I don’t know.” It is a very mysterious process, but the mind 
obviously has the power to do it, since we do have such concepts. 
This is a striking illustration of my claim at the beginning of this course that 
nominalists have difficulties over epistemology. Ockham in effect is here just 
recognizing those difficulties, and giving up. 
Earlier, I said that one way to view the main differences between Aquinas, Scotus 
and Ockham is in terms of the question “Where do you want your great mystery?” 
For Aquinas, it was the esse of a thing; for Scotus it was individuality. For 
Ockham, it is universals — which for him means universal concepts. It is possible 
to regard Ockham’s admission that “Nature does operate mysteriously in the case 
of universals” as just a sign of desperation, an indication of a major weakness in 
his philosophy. But it is equally possible to regard it as a heroic admission on 
Ockham’s part that he does indeed have problems, and he doesn’t know what 
more to say about them. Aquinas and Scotus had their gray, mysterious areas too; 
they were just in different places. And I don’t know of any passage where either 
Aquinas or Scotus admits his difficulties quite so frankly as Ockham does. 
